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1 Introduction: Internationalizing intrastate conflict 
“The results brought out by the inquiry no longer permit the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment to maintain the attitude of patient tolerance which it has observed for years toward 
those agitations which center at Belgrade and are spread thence into the territories of the 
Monarchy. Instead, these results impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the obli-
gation to put an end to those intrigues, which constitute a standing menace to the peace of 
the Monarchy.” 1 
Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia, July 1914 
“We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every 
region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. 
From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be re-
garded by the United States as a hostile regime.” 2   
George W. Bush, September 2001 
 
1.1 Why states interfere – an empirical puzzle 
Many have argued that external and especially military intervention is a major factor for the pro-
longation of intrastate wars. As observed in the prominent cases of the Second Congo War (1998-
2003) or the Chadian Civil War (1965-1979), also the provision of assistance to groups violently 
challenging the domestic status quo reduces the conflict parties’ willingness to settle the conflict, 
impedes societal reconciliation processes and further exacerbates tensions.3  
The ultimatums heralding in World War I (1914-18) and the war in Afghanistan (2001-present) 
both refer to governments tolerating or even actively supporting political violence or terrorist ac-
tivity against other countries, a policy that is in general described as state sponsorship of terrorism. 
There can never be full certainty as to what extent this factor initiated these wars or other crises. 
Nevertheless, it played a major role in justifying and legitimizing the internationalization of local 
conflicts and the resort to interstate violence. 
As external backing is seen as a key factor preventing conflict resolution and infringes ceteris pari-
bus the principle of state sovereignty, those who intervene in intrastate conflicts risk ending up in 
the international pillory. Likewise, if assistance does not reflect popular sentiments of solidarity 
with the insurgents in the supporting state, interference can also backfire domestically.  
                                                       
1 Leopold Berchtold, "The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, 22 July 1914," in Modern European History, 1871-2000: A 
Documentary Reader, ed. David Welch (London: Routledge, 1999). 
2 George W. Bush. "Address to the joint session of the 107th Congress."  Selected Speeches of President George W. 
Bush. 2001-2008 (2001): 65-73. Published electronically September 20. http://1.usa.gov/1hLhlVD. Accessed 
January 31, 2014. 
3 Patrick M. Regan, "Third-party Interventions and the duration of intrastate conflicts," Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, 
no. 1 (2002); David E. Cunningham, "Blocking Resolution: How external states can prolong civil wars," Journal of 
Peace Research 47, no. 2 (2010). 
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In this context, whether an intervening state receives praises as a liberating force–or curses as re-
sponsible for turmoil and chaos–lies in the eye of the beholder. While Libyan rebels enthusiasti-
cally waved Qatar’s flag as an act of expressing gratitude for Doha’s support of their successful 
uprising in 2011, demonstrators in several towns burned flags and even a doll representing Sheikh 
Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani only two years later expressing outrage over what they understood 
as Qatar’s blatant interference in Libya’s internal affairs.4  
This indeterminacy has been particularly prominent in the case of state sponsorship of terrorism. 
The term ‘terrorism’ is widely accepted to describe the illegal and illegitimate use of violence. It is 
also frequently used–independently of regime type or cultural affiliation–in order to denounce 
competitors to a legitimate status quo. Subsequently, no government or social entity would asso-
ciate itself with either terrorism or its support.5 Yet, as an indisputable and specific definition of 
what constitutes an illegitimate act of violence, does not exist so far, differentiating between 
‘struggle,’ ‘resistance,’ ‘repression,’ ‘asymmetric warfare,’ and ‘terrorism’ as well their state and 
non-state perpetrators is intrinsically tied to the dominant international and domestic discourse.  
Reasonable allegations of counterproductive intervention in intrastate conflict marked the apex of 
Syria’s tarnished international reputation before the outbreak of the civil war in 2011 shifted the 
focus towards domestic politics. Only months before European statespersons denounced Presi-
dent Bashar al-Asad as a ‘butcher’ and a ‘wretched tyrant’ in the course of the Syrian govern-
ment’s massive crackdown on internal dissent, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to 
the president as a “reformer.”6 Until then, criticism centered mainly on Syria’s rejectionist stand 
against Israel and subsequent doubts concerning the peaceful aims of its alliance with Iran, as-
sumed non-compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and an 
overall opposition to the assertive U.S. Middle East policy after 2001. With regard to the issue at 
hand, Syria experienced a massive international backlash in 2005 over its interference in Leba-
non’s domestic affairs. In addition, Syria’s assistance to many non-state actors classified as being 
terrorist organizations, such as the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad, or the Kurdistan Work-
ers’ Party (PKK), contributed to a ‘pariah’ reputation, reflected in Syria’s continuous designation 
                                                       
4 Cecily Hilleary. "Examining Qatar's Arab Spring Largesse."  Voice of America (2013). Published electronically April 
29. http://bit.ly/18f9Y1P. Accessed January 31, 2014. 
5 Grant Wardlaw, "Terror as an instrument of foreign policy," in Inside terrorist organizations, ed. David Rapoport 
(London: Frank Cass, 1988), 237. In 2013, for instance, Syria’s President Bashar al-Asad publicly denounced the 
Turkish government’ siding with the opposition as supporting terrorism. "President al-Assad stresses necessity of 
differentiating between Turkish people's stances in support of Syria's stability and stances of Erdogan's government 
which insists on supporting terrorism."  SANA (2013). Published electronically March 7. http://bit.ly/1fB7PDG. 
Accessed January 31, 2014. 
6  "Assad 'the butcher' must go, says France's Fabius."  France 24 (2012). Published electronically August 16. 
http://f24.my/IZx0nl. Accessed January 21, 2014; "Cameron calls Assad ‘a wretched tyrant’ as he calls for tougher 
sanctions on Syria."  Daily Mail (2012). Published electronically January 19. http://dailym.ai/1dhmukT. Accessed 
January 31, 2014; Hillary Clinton. "Interview With Bob Schieffer of CBS's Face the Nation."  (2011). Published 
electronically March 27. http://1.usa.gov/IPmMGF. Accessed January 31, 2014. 
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as a state sponsor of terrorism on the part of the U.S. government since 1979 as well as its inclu-
sion into the infamous ‘axis of evil’ in 2002.7 
 
Figure 1: Third-Party Intervention in contemporary conflict research 
 
As illustrated by Figure 1, this study brings together three major contemporary issues of interna-
tional relations: intrastate conflict, third party intervention, and interstate relations. By examining 
state sponsorship of terrorism as a type of third-party intervention by means of forming alliances 
with non-state conflict parties, it links international and domestic incentives for specific foreign 
policies with formal and informal limitations political leaders have to take into consideration 
when adjusting to security challenges. First, it argues in a neoclassical realist tradition that state 
sponsorship emerges under specific conditions of mutually reinforcing external and internal secu-
rity dilemmas and constitutes thereby a third way between balancing an international rival 
through alliance formation on the one hand and armament on the other. Second, the study as-
sumes that both extent and shape of sponsorship policy trace back to specific interplay patterns 
between external and internal security challenges. Examining Syria’s support policies between 
1964 and 2006, the analysis explores the formation and development of sponsorship relations in 
order to gain a deeper understanding of a process, which has not yet been systematically traced. 
1.2 State of research 
In the context of international law and the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Ter-
rorism by the League of Nations, early debates on state support of terrorism focused on the ques-
tion of bilateral and multilateral extradition treaties and expanded their scope to the question of 
refugees after World War II.8 Given an increasing number of aircraft hijackings in the 1960s, the 
UN member states signed numerous conventions outlawing attacks on civil aviation, expanded 
                                                       
7  U.S. Department of State. "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001."  (2002). Published electronically May 21. 
http://1.usa.gov/1aT3UDI. Accessed January 31, 2014; "US expands 'axis of evil'."  BBC News (2002). Published 
electronically May 6. http://bbc.in/MoXy3n. Accessed January 21, 2014.  
8 Ben Saul, "The Legal Response of the League of Nations to Terrorism," Journal of International Criminal Justice 4, no. 1 
(2006). 
Third-Party 
Intervention 
(TPI) 
How do states 
interfere in 
intrastate 
conflicts? 
Intrastate 
Conflict 
How does TPI 
affect intrastate 
conflicts?  
Interstate 
Conflict 
Which role does 
TPI play in 
interstate conflict? 
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in the following decades by treaties on hostage taking, proliferation of weapons, bombings, and 
financing of terrorism.9 As a unilateral measure of sanctioning a breach of these conventions, the 
1979 Export Administration Act (EAA) provided the president of the United States with the rights 
to control exports inter alia for reasons of national security. Subsequently, the Department of 
State established a list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, designating governments actively assisting ter-
rorists and exposing them to unilateral political and economic sanctions.10  
Reflecting the increase in political debates in the early 1980s, sponsoring terrorism as a means of 
covert warfare became a constant, though not particularly emphasized, part of many academic 
books dealing with the overall phenomenon of international terrorism.11 
Under the sway of the Cold War, it is not surprising that Western academics and journalists 
mainly examined the issue in the context of superpower rivalry. In particular, they focused on 
governmental support to radical-leftist and anti-Western groups and suggested a military ap-
proach as the appropriate political response.12 Tending to overestimate and -emphasize the level 
of threat posed by state sponsorship of terrorism, such works sparked criticism by other scholars 
of political violence. These emphasized, by contrast, not only the need for solid scientific defini-
tions, but also a thorough assessment of the sponsor’s strategic motivations and political risks that 
come along with supporting terrorist groups.13 Particularly, two points of criticism raised by 
Grant Wardlaw in 1988 influenced the recent research agenda at least indirectly and the study at 
hand directly: First, he demanded to “distinguish between providing support, training and fi-
nance to terrorist groups and setting up and directing them for specific policy purposes”14 on the 
analytical level. Thereby, he called not only for a more differentiated assessment of sponsorship 
types but also for their reconnection to the backer’s motivation–internationally and domestically. 
Second, Wardlaw rejected the idea of terrorist groups as mere tools or puppets. In contrast, he 
stated that “even those terrorist groups closely associated with particular states may operate ac-
                                                       
9For an overview of UN Treaties against terrorism, see United Nations,  http://bit.ly/1lCtscP. Accessed January 31, 
2014. 
10 Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy  (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001). 158; Christopher J. 
Donovan, "The Export Administration Act of 1979: Refining United States Export Control Machinery," Boston 
College International and Comparative Law Review 4, no. 1 (1981). 
11 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Pillar, 
Terrorism; Magnus Ranstorp, ed. Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the art, gaps and future direction (New York: 
Routledge, 2007); Andrew Silke, "An Introduction to Terrorism Research," in Research on Terrorism. Trends, 
achievements and failures, ed. Andrew Silke (London: Frank Cass, 2004); Alex P. Schmid, ed. The Routledge handbook of 
terrorism research (London: Routledge, 2011). 
12 Yonah Alexander and Ray S. Cline, Terrorism as state sponsored covert warfare  (Fairfax: Hero Books, 1986); Michael 
Stohl and George A. Lopez, eds., The state as terrorist: the dynamics of governmental violence and repression (Westport, 
Conn: Greenwood Press, 1984); Neil C. Livingstone and Terrell E. Arnold, eds., Fighting Back. Winning the war 
against Terrorism (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986); Harry H. Jr Almond, "The Use of Organized Groups by 
States as Vehicles to Promote their Foreign Policy," in Terrorism, Political Violence and World Order, ed. Henry 
Hyunwook Han (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984). 
13 Wardlaw, "Terror as an instrument of foreign policy."; Walter Laqueur, "Reflections on terrorism," Foreign Affairs 65, 
no. 1 (1986). 
14 Wardlaw, "Terror as an instrument of foreign policy," 251. 
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cording to their own agenda part of the time, and sometimes this will not be in the direct interest 
of their sponsor state.”15  
State sponsorship of terrorism lost its global political appeal after 1990 and became an issue most-
ly in area studies dealing with transnational operating insurgencies and proxy warfare.16 However, 
amid the rise of Hamas and Hizballah, the phenomenon gained new attention as a key source of 
group survival and vigor.17 This resulted in an increased body of literature in the realm of political 
science, international relations, and security studies, particularly regarding Iran and Syria, which 
have been identified as the main backers of terrorism in the Levant.18 Nevertheless, publications 
remained often limited to either journalistic assessments, loose descriptions as part of foreign pol-
icy studies, or narratives of the groups’ international sources of support.  
In general, studies on state sponsorship of terrorism suffer from a lack of reliable data and the in-
dicated struggle for a common definition of terrorism in both academia and politics.19 Moreover, 
political and academic debates diverge, broadly speaking, into three strands schools of thought: 
 
1. The largest group of analysts has turned to the concept of external insurgency support and in-
volvement in intrastate conflict, particularly in the so-called Third World. Recent studies on, 
for instance, the interrelation between external rebel support and civil wars or the likelihood 
of interstate conflict to escalate came along with intensified research on the involvement of 
third parties, particularly states.20 The understanding of state-sponsored terrorism as a type of 
                                                       
15 Ibid. 
16  See, for instance, Sean K. Anderson, "Iranian State-Sponsored Terrorism," Conflict Quarterly 11, no. 4 (1991); Süha 
Bölükbasi, "Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad, and the regionalization of Turkey’s Kurdish secessionism," Journal of South 
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 14, no. 4 (1991); Marius Deeb, Syria's Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process  
(New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Magnus Ranstorp, "Hizbollah's Command Leadership: Its Structure, 
Decision-Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions," Terrorism and Political Violence 6, no. 3 
(1993); Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements  (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001); Victoria 
Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan, and the Unending War  (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003); Alexander Evans, 
"The Kashmir Insurgency: As Bad as it Gets," Small Wars and Insurgencies 11, no. 1 (2000). 
17 Christopher Paul, "How Do Terrorists Generate and Maintain Support?," in Social Science for Counterterrorism. Putting 
the Pieces Together, ed. Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 120; Byman et al., 
Trends in Outside Support. 
18 See Eyal Zisser, Commanding Syria: Bashar al-Asad and the first years in power  (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007); Shahram 
Chubin, Iran and its neighbours: the impact of the gulf war  (London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 1987); 
John Calabrese, Revolutionary Horizons. Regional Foreign Policy in Post-Khomeini Iran  (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1994); Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "The foreign policy of Syria," in The foreign policies of Middle East states, ed. 
Raymond A. Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "The foreign policy of Iran," ibid. For the second group, see Zaki Chehab, Inside Hamas: 
the untold story of the militant Islamic movement  (New York, NY: Nations Books, 2007). Chapter 7; Amal Saad-
Ghorayeb, Hizbu'llah. Politics & Religion  (London: Pluto Press, 2002). Chapter 4; Matthew Levitt, "Hezbollah 
Finances: Funding the Party of God," in Terrorism Financing and State Responses. A Comparative Perspective, ed. Jeanne 
K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Muhammad Muslih, The Foreign 
Policy of Hamas  (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999). 
19 For instance, regarding an explicit encouragement to conduct terrorist acts in contrast to other means of political vio-
lence 
20 Regan, "Third-party Interventions."; Idean Salehyan, "Transnational Rebels - Neighboring States as Sanctuary for 
Rebel Groups," World Politics 59, no. 2 (2007); Navin A. Bapat, "The Internationalization of Terrorist Campaigns," 
Conflict Management and Peace Science 24, no. 4 (2007); Idean Salehyan, "No shelter here: rebel sanctuaries and 
international conflict," The Journal of Politics 70, no. 1 (2008); Belgin San Akca, "Supporting Non-State Armed 
Groups: A Resort to Illegality?," Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 4 (2009). 
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covert warfare is featured prominently in nearly all of these studies, while a significant num-
ber also addresses issues of cooperation and bargaining between the group and its sponsor.21  
2. Since 1994, a second school of thought debates state sponsorship of terrorism in context of 
the so-called rogue states. These works often cite sponsorship in tandem with policies of inter-
nal repression and human rights violations, the development and proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) and missile delivery systems, and jeopardizing Western interests in 
key regions.22 
3. A third group of scholars, which emphasizes the domestic characteristics of state sponsors 
and gained importance in the mid-1990s, focused on both failed states involuntarily providing 
a safe haven for terrorists and others being indifferent towards terrorist activity within their 
territory for domestic reasons.23 
 
On September 9, 2001, the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon caused a shift in 
the literature on terrorism towards al-Qaeda and other transnational networks operating mainly 
independent of statist support. Hence, active state support gradually relegated from the main-
stream agenda of terrorism research. According to a study conducted in 2006 by Lum et al., only 
2.6 percent out of 4,458 peer-reviewed articles on terrorism were dealing with state-sponsored ter-
rorism; accounting for six times less articles than those dealing with WMD.24 
Such a strong bias in favor of counterterrorism measures such as policing and tracing both in 
scholarship and research funding came to the detriment of social science research on terrorism.25 
According to Paul Wilkinson, for instance, this imbalance explains why questions concerning the 
specific connections between terrorist movements and sponsoring states have remained mostly 
unaddressed.26 Taking on this gap in academic terrorism research and against the background of 
the outlined relevance of sponsorship in the context of intrastate conflict, this study will examine 
the specific relations, ties, and interactions between sponsoring states and sponsored terrorist 
groups. 
                                                       
21 Ranstorp, "Hizbollah's Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision-Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy 
and Institutions."; Kathryn Haahr-Escolano, "Iran’s Changing Relationship with Hezbollah," Terrorism Monitor II, no. 
19 (2004); Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps, "Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-
Sponsored Terrorism," International Studies Perspectives 11, no. 1 (2010). 
22 Petra Minnerop, "Rogue States - State Sponsors of Terrorism?," German Law Journal 3, no. 9 (2002); Anthony Lake, 
"Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 3 (1994): 46; Robert S. Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign 
Policy: Containment after the Cold War  (Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000); Ulrich Schneckener. "Iraq 
and Terrorism. How are "Rogue States" and Terrorists Connected?",  SWP Comments 3, (2003). 
http://bit.ly/1bkjndB. Accessed January 31, 2014. 
23 Daniel Byman, Deadly connections: states that sponsor terrorism  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
Chapter 8; Robert I. Rotberg, "The Challenge of Weak, Failing, and Collapsed States," in Lashing the Dogs of War. 
Conflict Management in a divided World, ed. Chester A. Crocker, et al. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 2008). 
24 Cynthia Lum et al., "The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies," Campbell Systematic Review 2(2006): 8; Alex 
P. Schmid, "The Literature of Terrorism," in The Routledge handbook of terrorism research, ed. Alex P. Schmid (London: 
Routledge, 2011), 461; Alex P. Schmid and Bradley McAllister, "Theories of Terrorism," ibid., Routledge handbooks. 
25 Paul Wilkinson, "Research into Terrorism Studies: Achievements and Failures," in Mapping Terrorism Research: State 
of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction, ed. Magnus Ranstorp (New York: Routledge, 2007), 319. 
26 Wilkinson cites, for instance, the work of Daniel Byman and Magnus Ranstorp ibid., 320. 
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1.3 Theoretical overview 
In order to establish predictions for state sponsorship of terrorism, respective studies have fre-
quently resorted to instruments of foreign policy analysis (FPA).27 Moreover, analysts utilize real-
ist approaches, while focusing on national interest and cost-benefit calculations under conditions 
of interstate rivalry.28 Others, such as Daniel Byman, comprise alternative or complementary 
triggers of support, including ideology and domestic politics.29 However, as most studies refer on-
ly implicitly to the theoretical framework of their assumptions and analyses, they have contribut-
ed little towards a reflection of their explanatory prowess. In order to trace the process between 
motivations and the relation between those who sponsor and those who are sponsored, this study 
systematically integrates systemic and unit-level approaches in an explorative and supplementary 
manner.  
 
For decades, state-centered structural realist thinking has dominated the study of international 
politics and alliance formation.30 So far, however, state sponsorship of terrorism constituted a 
blind spot for structural/neorealist studies, despite two striking parallels: First, policy is under-
stood as a means to challenge an unfavorable imbalance of power and second, policy failure, e.g. 
an unwanted conflict escalation, as its potential outcome. With regard to the latter point, struc-
tural realism claims that deviations from the path laid out by the system are punished. If sponsor-
ship indeed represents such a deviation, the U.S. bombing raid on Libya after the 1986 ‘La Belle’ 
attack or cruise missile strikes targeting Sudan and Afghanistan after the U.S. embassy bombings 
in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998, constitute cases of punishment. This suggests, that the 
mere suspicion of state-sponsored terrorism has significant potential to escalate interstate con-
flicts.31  
In this case, what seems to be a cheap strategy to manipulate the international and domestic 
power evaluations of others can also come at a high price–including immaterial (pariah status) 
and material (embargos, military interventions) sanctions. Arguing that foreign policy is primari-
ly a response to systemic incentives with the aim to maximize the state’s security, while the antic-
                                                       
27 Ronald D. Crelinsten, "Counterterrorism as global governance: A research inventory," in Mapping Terrorism Research. 
State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction, ed. Magnus Ranstorp (New York: Routledge, 2007), 221f. 
28 Stephen M. Saideman, "Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support for Ethnic Groups," 
Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 1 (2002); Zeev Maoz and Belgin San-Akca, "Rivalry and State Support of Non-State 
Armed Groups (NAGs), 1946–2001," International Studies Quarterly 56(2012). 
29 Byman, Deadly Connections; Schmid and McAllister, "Theories of Terrorism," 209-211. 
30 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance politics  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances  
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International politics before and 
after Hiroshima  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics  (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
31 Wardlaw, "Terror as an instrument of foreign policy." 
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ipation of costs is influential for its specific implementation, this study is employing a neoclassical 
realist approach in order to link security calculations to sponsorship of terrorism.32  
Neoclassical realism (NCR) operates in various fields of International Relations (IR) and FPA, 
blending elements from both classical realism in the spirit of Hans Morgenthau and neorealism as 
established by Kenneth Waltz.33 Its application to a study on state sponsorship of terrorism is of 
great interest for mainly three reasons. First, NCR explicitly takes up the Waltzian claim that 
states can do “any fool thing”34 and addresses the question why states decide to pursue foreign 
policies that are initially seen as irrational, e.g. teaming up with non-state and outlawed actors in-
stead of forming interstate alliances, which are perceived as being less aggressive.35 Second, NCR 
started out as a “theory of mistakes”36 and was at the outset reduced to explaining why states fail 
to successfully adjust to systemic constraints. As it has managed to overcome this stigma and is 
frequently used to augment the overall explanatory strength of realist approaches in FPA, it is 
expected to constitute an explicative tool and at least the onset of an eligible model of state spon-
sorship of terrorism.37 Finally, as competing explanations from the realm of realism and Innen-
politik approaches have constituted a crucial point of departure for NCR, it is expected to serve as 
a framework for a moderate variety of explanations regarding the occurrence and nature of state 
sponsorship of terrorism.38  
                                                       
32 Theory of International Politics: 126. 
33 Gideon Rose first coined the term neoclassical in order to describe a fourth school of foreign policy theory, besides In-
nenpolitik or liberal approaches emphasizing the impact of unit-level factors on foreign policy on the one hand and the 
offensive and defensive variations of realism highlighting the supremacy of systemic factors on the other hand. 
Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): 146. See also 
Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International 
Organization 51, no. 4 (1997); ———, "Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment," in Progress 
in international relations theory : appraising the field, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 2003); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics  (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2001); Jack L. Snyder, Myths of empire: domestic politics and international ambition, Cornell studies in security affairs 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991). The explicit emphasis of NCR on a state’s placement in the system as 
the main driver for scope and ambition of its foreign policy thereby serves as a guarantee to remain part of the realist 
family. In contrast, the inclusion of unit-level factors serving as filters for systemic incentives constitutes as major and 
not undisputed departure from structural realism. Andrew Moravcsik and Jeffrey W. Legro, "Is Anybody Still a 
Realist?," International Security 24, no. 2 (1999): 27f. For their classical realist and structural realist roots, see Hans J. 
Morgenthau, Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace  (New York: Knopf, 1948); Kenneth Waltz, Man, 
the State and War  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); ———, Theory of International Politics. 
34 ———, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (1997): 915. 
35 In this study, rational behavior is understood as the choice of means, consistent with the ends and the available in-
formation, as defined in Snyder, Alliance politics: 4. 
36  Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered threats: political constraints on the balance of power  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2006). 10. 
37 Norrin M. Ripsman, "Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups," in Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign 
policy, ed. Steven E. Lobell, et al. (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 192f. 
38 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro et al., "Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy," ibid. (Cambridge), 2; 
Peter Trubowitz, Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2011). 2-5. 
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1.4 State sponsorship of terrorism 
1.4.1 Definitions 
None of the many definitions of terrorism, which have been debated in politics and academia in 
the past decades, receives undisputed recognition. This has been especially the case, as the every-
day use and political designation is highly subjective and strongly connected to societal, interstate, 
and intrastate enmity.39 This study follows the definition by Bruce Hoffman as well as Schmid 
and Jongman, as their definitions are not only based on a thorough evaluation of terrorism litera-
ture but also touch on the main foci of current debates: goals, targets, and perpetrators.40 
Terrorism 
Hoffman defines terrorism as the “deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or 
the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change [….]. It is meant to instill fear within, and 
thereby intimidate, a wider ‘target audience.’”41  
Schmid and Jongman also stress that the “group or class, whose members' sense of security is 
purposefully undermined, is the target of terror.”42 Paralleling Hoffman’s claim that “terrorism is 
designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little,”43 
Schmid and Jongman assert that political change is the main goal of terrorism. It can be achieved 
by either immobilizing the target “in order to produce disorientation and/or compliance” among 
societal groups or mobilizing “secondary targets of demands” (like governments or political par-
ties) and “targets of attention” (mostly public opinion) to make them favor the perpetrator’s in-
terests.44 Although many authors and government institutions stressed the civilian and non-
combatant character of a terrorist attack’s victims, it is the–a priori unpredictable–separation of 
the targeted group into victims and audiences that plausibly classifies an act of political violence 
as terrorism.45 
Regarding the repercussion of terrorism, it should be noted that the likelihood of falling victim to 
a terrorist attack is very low in most places of the world. Nevertheless, terrorist attacks have a 
significant impact on society and state-society relations, as they challenge the monopoly of force 
                                                       
39 Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories and 
literature, 3. expanded and updated ed. (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2008); Wardlaw, "Terror as an instrument of 
foreign policy," 244f; Hoffman, Inside Terrorism: 32; Richard Jackson, "Knowledge, power and politics in the study of 
political terrorism," in Critical Terrorism Studies: A new research agenda, ed. Richard Jackson, et al. (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2009), 70; Silke, "An Introduction to Terrorism Research," 2-9. 
40 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism; Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism. 
41 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism: 40f. 
42 Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism: 1f. 
43 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism: 41. 
44 Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism: 1f. 
45 Schmid, "The Definition of Terrorism," 46f. 
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and increase domestic polarization.46 Employed in long campaigns and embedded in larger in-
surgencies, terrorism can hurt targeted states economically if they negatively affect tourism and 
direct foreign investment. If attacks provoke disproportional state repression, it can also harm 
their international reputation.47  
The designation of non-state actors challenging the status quo as terrorists or freedom fighters has 
become a constant source of political and academic contestation, far more in fact than the classi-
fication of an act of violence as terrorism. 
First, Hoffman’s claim that only non-state actors employ terrorism has been highly disputed, es-
pecially in the context of statist repression in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.48 Throughout 
history, a large number of governments have used indiscriminate violence against their own citi-
zens, yet primarily in the context of non-military domestic repression, which does not aim at po-
litical change but rather on securing the status quo.49 
Second, departing from an act of terrorism based on the criteria mentioned above, one might end 
up in a ‘duck test’ situation.50 This frequently leads to the designation of groups operating in a 
military manner or aim at controlling territory, but either used terrorist tactics in the past or resort 
to them sporadically as a supplement.51 Hence, both on the list of terrorist organizations of the 
U.S. State Department and the European Union, one might find groups whose classification as 
terrorist is highly contested.52  
International law provides us with a similar picture. Numerous UN Security Council resolutions 
(UNSCR) regulate the member states’ obligation in the fight against terrorism although there is 
                                                       
46 Magdalena Kirchner, Allianz mit dem Terror. Iran, Israel und die libanesische Hisbollah 1979-2009  (München: AVM, 
2009). 43f; Anthony H. Cordesman. "Terrorist and extremist movements in the Middle East: the impact on the 
regional military balance ",  Center for Strategic and International Studies (2005). http://bit.ly/19a8BnA. Accessed 
January 31, 2014. 
47 Alexander Refflinghaus, Deutsche Türkeipolitik in der Regierungszeit Helmut Kohls, 1982 bis 1998. Regierung, Bundestag, 
Presse  (Berlin: Köster, 2002); Bruno S. Frey et al., "Calculating Tragedy: Assessing the Costs of Terrorism," Journal of 
Economic Surveys 21, no. 1 (2007): 7; Volker Nitsch and Dieter Schumacher, "Terrorism and international trade: an 
empirical investigation," European Journal of Political Economy 20(2004). 
48 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism: 40. 
49 Schmid and McAllister, "Theories of Terrorism," 203f; Alex P. Schmid, "Glossary and Abbreviations of Terms and 
Concepts Relating to Terrorism and Counterterrorism," ibid., 690; David Claridge, "State terrorism? Applying a 
definitional model," Terrorism and Political Violence 8, no. 3 (1996): 50-52. 
50 In 2002, Israeli Minister of Defense Ehud Barak responded to the question whether the president of the Palestinian 
National Authority, Yasser Arafat, was a terrorist by stating that Arafat "happens to behave like a terrorist, he looks 
like one, he walks like one, he quacks like one, so maybe he is really a terrorist.” James Reynolds. "Why is Israel 
calling Iran a nuclear duck?",  BBC News Middle East no. 7 March (2012). http://bbc.in/1nEi0vv. Accessed 
January 31, 2014. 
51 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism: 35f. 
52 Council of the European Union, "COUNCIL DECISION 2012/333/CFSP of 25 June 2012 updating the list of 
persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of 
specific measures to combat terrorism and repealing Decision 2011/872/CFSP," Official Journal of the European Union 
55, L 165(2012); U.S. Department of State. 220f. 
Introduction: Internationalizing intrastate conflict 
11 
little consensus on who to designate as a terrorist.53 If they just reflect political will and ideological 
enmity, why are designations relevant after all?  
With regard to the subject of investigation, the formal blacklisting of a group as terrorists by an-
other entity is significant particularly as it causes or increases conflict between this entity and the 
group’s backer.54 If the group of designators is not limited to directly targeted states, the domestic 
and international leeway to retaliate will expand.55 Therefore, the classification of a group as a 
terrorist organization in this study is based on two key criteria: A considerable use of terrorist vio-
lence, independent of other forms of political coercion used, and the formal designation as a ter-
rorist group by other governments. 
State Sponsorship 
It has to be stated that state sponsorship of terrorism is a political term, described by the U.S. De-
partment of State as the repeated provision of “support for acts of international terrorism.”56 
However, reports explaining the designation of particular states as sponsors point out that not the 
support of individual acts of terrorism constitutes the decisive factor, but the support of groups 
labeled as terrorist organizations.57 Elsewhere, it is explicitly claimed that “state sponsors of ter-
rorism provide critical support to non-state terrorist groups.”58 
This understanding is also shared by Daniel Byman, whose definition “a government’s intention-
al assistance to a terrorist group to help it use violence, bolster its political activities, or sustain the 
organization”59 constitutes the basis of the one used in this study. By stressing the intentional 
character of assistance, he excludes cases of sponsorship, where groups exploit “ungoverned, un-
der-governed, or ill-governed physical areas” 60 inside failed states. In addition, he distinguishes 
rigidly between governmental and societal support. Third, concerning the immediate aim of assis-
tance, he specifies the rather vague idea of supporting acts of terrorism to backing a specific group. 
Therefore, it should be maintained that the actual term ‘state sponsorship of terrorism’, which 
dominates the political debate is in itself misleading: While it implies a direct relation between 
                                                       
53 The Security Council Committee. "The List established and maintained by the 1267 Committee with respect to 
individuals, groups, undertakings and other entities associated with Al-Qaida."  Al-Qaida Sanctions List (2013). 
http://bit.ly/1n5Uy7i. Accessed January 31, 2014. 
54 Salehyan, "No shelter here." 
55 Wardlaw, "Terror as an instrument of foreign policy," 244f; Salehyan, "No shelter here." 
56 U.S. Department of State. 171. 
57 Ibid., 171-175. 
58 ———, "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002," (2003). 
59 Byman, Deadly Connections: 10. 
60 U.S. Department of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001". 80. 
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the state and the terrorist attack (as in the case of state terrorism), the phenomenon examined in 
the following should be more precisely understood as state sponsorship of terrorist organizations.61  
Both definitions, however, do not provide the underlying motivations of states to align with ter-
rorist organizations. In a third attempt to define state sponsorship of terrorism, Yonah Alexander 
and Ray Cline highlight this point and describe sponsorship as the “deliberate employment of vi-
olence or the threat of use of violence by sovereign states (or subnational groups encouraged or 
assisted by sovereign states) to attain strategic and political objectives by acts in violation of 
law.”62 
Taking into account all three definitions, this study defines state sponsorship of terrorism as 
A government’s intentional support of terrorist organizations–depicting groups that use (or 
threaten to use) indiscriminate violence on a considerable basis in order to attain certain po-
litical ends and are formally designated as such by at least one country.  
As stated above, terrorism might be one of the most contested political terms around, carrying 
exclusively hostile and illegitimate connotations of political action. Whether an act of political 
violence is described as terrorism in most cases does not result from an assessment of objective 
characteristics, but from a priori judgments whether the aims of the perpetrator are perceived as 
legitimate and justifiable. In the context of state sponsorship of terrorism, this is reflected in in-
ternational sanctions, as well as in the designation of states as pariah or rogues.63 While the ques-
tion of how these labels emerge in international relations and whom they are imposed on is dealt 
with in recent social constructivist and role theory works, the following research targets the back 
end of this nexus by inquiring under what conditions sponsorship relations occur.64 
In order to introduce the empirical puzzle of this study and before turning to the motivations of 
sponsoring states, it seems vital to take a closer look at what is known (and not known) about the 
patterns of state support.  
1.4.2 Pyramid or rag rug? Patterns of sponsorship revisited  
In their 1986 assessment of state-sponsored terrorism as a policy of covert warfare, Alexander 
and Cline distinguished consecutive forms of state support: ideological encouragement (1), which 
was followed by ideological direction (and influence on target selection) (2). Thus, (1) and (2) 
form the basis for a cooperative relationship that includes (3) “intelligence, diplomatic, or even 
                                                       
61 However, due to the prominence of the term in terrorism literature and political debates, both terms will appear in-
terchangeably in the remainder of this study. 
62 Alexander and Cline, Terrorism: 32.  
63 Wardlaw, "Terror as an instrument of foreign policy." 
64 For constructivists and role theory scholarship on the issue, see Martin Senn, Wolves in the Woods: the Rogue State 
Concept from a constructivist perspective  (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009); Marijke Breuning, "Role theory research in 
international relations: state of the art and blind spots," in Role theory in international relations: approaches and analyses, 
ed. Sebastian Harnisch, et al. (London: Routledge, 2011), 33. 
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high-level political contacts.”65 Building on (3), a sponsoring government provides material aid 
like sanctuary, propaganda or logistical support facilities (4). The highest level of support is 
reached when states decide to use their own security forces to arm and train the groups’ fighters 
(5). This implies that sponsorship policies occur in a pyramidal form similar to the one in Figure 
2, starting from mere ideological inspiration and reaching a climax in military assistance.  
 
Source: Alexander and Cline. Terrorism as state sponsored covert warfare: 74f. 
Figure 2: Forms of state sponsorship of terrorism (Alexander & Cline) 
 
Post-Cold War studies have attached lesser importance on ideological guidance. By contrast, the 
provision of sanctuary, which brought Turkey and Syria to the brink of war in 1998 and severely 
deteriorated US-Pakistan relations in the course of the death of Osama Bin Laden in 2011, came 
to the fore of the debate.66 Another issue discussed in the context of the 9/11 attacks was that 
several governments, which had no record of rhetorically or materially supporting al-Qaeda, had 
turned a blind eye on fundraising or recruiting efforts for years (e.g. Saudi-Arabia, Egypt, and 
Pakistan).67 
In 2005, Byman published his inquiries of the specific frequency of occurrence of sponsorship 
components in 38 instances of support between 1990 and 2005. Out of all occurrences, military 
support and financial assistance were the most common (30), followed by the provision of sanc-
                                                       
65 Alexander and Cline, Terrorism: 47f. 
66 Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support: 83-100; Schmid, The Routledge handbook of terrorism research; Salehyan, "No 
shelter here." 
67 Byman, Deadly Connections: 219-258. 
5 - Use of  security forces, 
training of  fighters 
4 - Provision of  Material Aid 
3 - Intelligence, diplomatic, and 
political contacts 
2 - Ideological Direction 
1 - Ideological Encouragement 
  State sponsorship of terrorism 
 14 
tuary in 27 cases. Diplomatic backing, however, has been less common with only 16 instances.68 
His findings suggest that states rather apply ‘rag rug’-patterns in their sponsorship strategy, pick-
ing different options from a range of policy alternatives and re-assembling them in a tailor-made 
manner. In order to illuminate this nexus, the issue at hand will be briefly examined in the cases 
of Iraq, Libya, and Syria. 
Since 1979, the U.S. Department of State repeatedly designated the three countries as state spon-
sors, inter alia due to their support for especially ethno-nationalist and leftist groups.69 Although 
these governments, according to Byman, provided assistance in all four dimensions outlined 
above, Table 1 illustrates significant variances regarding specific patterns of support, which imply 
several interesting aspects for further investigation: 
Table 1: State support for terrorist groups since 1990 (Byman) 
Terrorist Group Training and 
Operations 
Money, Arms, 
Logistics 
Diplomatic 
Backing 
Sanctuary 
IRAQ 
PKK    ✓ 
Palestinian Leftists (PL)a  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
MEK ✓ ✓  ✓ 
LIBYA 
Palestinian Islamists 
(PI)b 
 ✓   
PL ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
New People’s Armyc  ✓   
IRA ✓ ✓   
SYRIA 
PI    ✓ 
PL ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Hizballah ✓ ✓  ✓ 
PKK ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Source: Byman, Deadly Connections: 54-58. 
a Consisting of ANO, PLF, PFLP, PFLP-GC, and other Palestinian leftist groups. 
b Hamas, PIJ. 
c Communist Army of the Philippines. 
 
 
Iraq, for instance, provided all affiliated groups with sanctuary but only Palestinian leftist (PL) 
groups received diplomatic backing and no other than MEK training and operations. In the Liby-
an case, all affiliated groups received money, arms, or logistics. Again, only PL groups found 
                                                       
68 Ibid., 54. 
69 Iraq had been temporarily removed from the list between 1982 and 1990 in order to allow for U.S. arms sales in the 
first Gulf War; removed for good in 2006. See U.S. Department of State. "Rescission of Libya's Designation as a 
State Sponsor of Terrorism."  Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs no. May 15 (2006). 
http://bit.ly/1bhI0EC. Accessed January 31, 2014. 
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sanctuary and diplomatic backing. Syria allowed all four groups it supported to use its territory as 
an area of retreat and shelter. By contrast, only PL groups and the PKK received mentionable 
diplomatic backing. If all four types of support are instrumental in guaranteeing a group’s surviv-
al, why did all three government provide some form of support to all of them and treated others 
differently? How can the exceptional position of some groups be explained? To put it more gen-
erally, and as illustrated by Figure 3, how can we explain different patterns of sponsorship pro-
vided by the same government (Gx) to different terrorist organizations (T1-3)?  
 
Figure 3: Distribution of support among different groups  
 
A second issue stems from a cross-country comparison of support patterns. Although Iraq and 
Syria both supported the PKK after 1990, Syria’s assistance extended to all four forms of backing. 
Likewise, PL groups enjoyed substantial support from both states whereas Iraq gave no signifi-
cant support to Palestinian Islamist (PI) groups. In contrast, Libya assisted PI groups with money, 
arms, and logistics, as Syria did, but provided no sanctuary. How can we explain variances 
among different governments (G1-3) in their respective pattern of assistance to the same organiza-
tion (Tx) (see Figure 4)? 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of support among different governments 
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Although Byman stressed the importance of a government’s extent and degree of support given 
as necessary for “judgments on the scope […] of state support,”70 his examinations disregard po-
tential explanations for the observed variances of sponsorship patterns, especially over time. 
From Table 1, there is no information to be derived on either the actual duration of assistance in 
the observation period or its degree.71 The impression that assistance remained highly stable in all 
dimension, has been challenged by empirical observations. Libyan authorities, for instance, 
closed ANO offices in 1999 after more than a decade of close cooperation and the relations be-
tween Syria and Hamas improved substantially throughout the 1990s.72 How can we explain 
such variances in sponsorship, as Figure 5 indicates them, over time?  
 
Figure 5: Distribution of support over time 
 
Byman argues that two factors determine a state’s support for a terrorist group over time: State 
capacity (high/low) and policy (support/oppose).73 While capacity is of particular interest in cross-
country studies (Figure 4), it is expected that policy plays a much bigger role in shaping both the 
level and spectrum of support in single-country and longitudinal studies (Figure 3,Figure 5).  
Despite the elaborate gathering of a wide range of sponsorship incitements, Byman does not in-
vestigate the specific conditions that facilitate the emergence of respective policies, which are on 
their part expected to determine specific patterns of sponsorship.74 From these gaps, three re-
search questions are derived that will be addressed in the following and examined by resorting to 
theory-guided foreign policy analysis. 
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72 Zaki Chehab, Inside Hamas: the untold story of militants, martyrs and spies  (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007). 145; Ian Black. 
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1.5 Research questions 
Although state sponsorship of terrorism is more than a mere ‘weapon of the weak,’ used by small 
states to compensate for lacking aggregate power, it is a comparatively rarely implemented form 
of security policy. Hence, in order to address the question under what conditions governments decide 
to support terrorist organizations as a supplement or alternative to e.g. armament or interstate alliance for-
mation, state sponsorship of terrorism and apparent cost-benefit calculation of potential or actual 
backers will be examined parallel to other forms of security seeking policy.  
Dealing extensively with questions of state security in international politics, neorealism consti-
tutes the theoretical point of departure of this study, yet will be augmented in the young neoclas-
sical tradition with the unit-level variable state-society relations. As will be examined in greater de-
tail in the following section, neorealism provides us with a set of systemic incentives to states 
seeking security under conditions of anarchy, yet is not determinant about the particular policy 
states choose in order to achieve their ends. Neoclassical realism, however, introduces interven-
ing unit-level variables that are likely to constrain or enlarge a state’s policy choices. Therefore, it 
seem to be helpful in order to explain why different units “behave differently despite their similar 
placement in the system” and at times fail to produce “outcomes that fall within expected ranges” 
that structural realism derives from their international conditions.75 
Once established, the focus of interest in sponsorship relations turns to the question of manage-
ment, particularly in comparison to interstate alliance politics. To what extent does the way states inter-
act with their non-state partners reflect the specific character of this cooperation?  
Again, the examination departs from neorealism, which tells us that the international system’s 
anarchic nature induces a system of self-help that in turn provides incentives for a constant 
reevaluation of security-seeking policies. These incentives lead at times to increased commitment, 
yet can also trigger defection and realignment with former enemies. In order to apply realist ex-
pectations about state behavior to sponsorship, the non-state nature of the alliance partner, and 
the informal and secretive character of agreements, it is vital to accommodate them with assump-
tions about interstate alliances. 
If one links the process of alliance evaluation to actual policy output, the question arises how to 
explain increased commitment, shifts in sponsorship emphases, and realignment by the supporting state.  
Under the precondition that significant patterns of interstate alliance management also occur in 
relations between states and non-state actors (NSA), it is to be expected that factors determining 
alliance behavior towards statist partners also influence sponsorship commitment. In accordance 
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with NCR, international security dilemmas influence alliance management to the extent as to 
what domestic constraints allow for and their interplay produces specific commitments. 
1.6 Research design 
Alongside these questions, this study establishes a new framework to conceptualize state sponsor-
ship of terrorism. Assuming in a positivist and neoclassical realist research tradition that the 
world is ‘out there’ and can be explained, it suggests a causal chain between relative international 
power and policy adjustments on the one hand and the function of domestic politics as a corre-
sponding conditional variable on the other.76  
As mentioned in section 1.2, quantitative studies on third party intervention gained prominence 
and carved out a wide range of relevant unit-level factors. The positive correlation between exter-
nal rebel support and civil war duration or the likelihood of interstate conflict escalation pro-
claimed in these studies underlines the relevance of sponsorship for core questions of internation-
al security.77 Remarkably, Cunningham et al. found significant support for three hypotheses ex-
hibiting strong parallels to assumptions about alliance politics. First, rebel support is more likely 
to occur if the group’s target is in turn backed by another state, thereby increasing the power re-
sources of the adversary vis-à-vis the group as well as a potential sponsor. Second, this likelihood 
increases if the targeted state is involved in interstate rivalry, suggesting that rebel support is one 
of the strategies employed by the adversary.78 Third, rebels are likely to receive external support if 
they have transnational–ethnic or ideological–constituencies.79 
Nevertheless, in order to gather analytical and empirical knowledge on sponsorship policy and 
establish–though contingent–generalizations about the mechanisms at work, the following exam-
inations employ the method of structured focused small-N comparison for mainly two reasons.80  
Despite quantitative efforts to carve out determinants of why state support occurs and to a lesser 
extent influences interstate relations, the question of how states interact with supported groups has 
                                                       
76 For a discussion of the neoclassical realist research agenda, see Taliaferro et al., "Introduction," 20-21; Rose, 
"Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 154; Nicholas Kitchen, "Systemic pressures and domestic 
ideas: a neoclassical realist model of grand strategy formation," Review of International Studies 36, no. 1 (2010): 143; 
Sten Rynning and Jens Ringsmose, "Why Are Revisionist States Revisionist? Reviving Classical Realism as an 
Approach to Understanding International Change," International Politics 45(2008): 34. 
77 Regan, "Third-party Interventions."; Salehyan, "Transnational Rebels."; ———, "No shelter here." 
78 This argument has been further specified by the study of Zeev Maoz and San Akca by emphasizing dyadic conflicts 
between the supporting and the targeted states Maoz and San-Akca, "Rivalry and State Support." 
79 In an extended version of the Expanded Uppsala Armed Conflict (EAC) Data, the authors provide information on 
military capabilities and political opportunities of non-state actors in civil wars. Data includes more than 200 instanc-
es of external rebel support yet go far beyond the recording of non-ambiguous occurrences of state sponsorship of ter-
rorism, in particular by defining non-state actors only in contrast to international organizations without any explicit 
assumptions about different methods of combat applied by them David E. Cunningham et al., "It Takes Two: A 
Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome," Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 4 (2009). See also ———, 
"Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups," International Organization 65, no. 04 (2011): 26. 
80 Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences  (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2005). 
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received little systematic and theory-based attention.81 In order to fill this gap, this study aims to 
uncover elements of interdependence between the sponsoring state and its protégé as well as their 
particular adjustment policies to what Glenn H. Snyder termed an Alliance Security Dilemma 
(ASD). Given the high complexity of such processes and the specific context of outlawed, mostly 
opaque, and informal policies observed in this study, process-tracing is expected to offer a signifi-
cant analytical contribution to their understanding.82 
Moreover, neoclassical realist studies frequently resort to qualitative methods when seeking to 
explain policy variations over time as establishing causality requires an in-depth examination of 
the processes and interactions at hand.83 When studies aim to develop theories and intend to es-
tablish comprehensive and thorough knowledge about complex processes, they frequently resort 
to case studies, allowing for a more specific uncovering of the mechanisms at work as well as the 
effect of the explanatory variables.84  
Given its explorative nature regarding both theory development and empirical evidence, this 
study relies on mainly deductive, yet also inductive elements of process tracing.85 As current re-
search on state sponsorship of terrorism offers few and unspecific explanations of policy variation, 
chapters 1, 1, and 4 develop a new model of explaining sponsorship with neorealist alliance theo-
ry at its core. Understanding sponsorship as ‘deviant’ in the context of alliance policy, evidence 
from empirical cases of sponsorship are used to formulate specific explanations and predictions 
on the processes suggested by the new hypotheses. In order to assess whether the process suggest-
ed by the newly established framework is reflected in the empirical evidence, on the one hand, 
and to maintain the possibility of falsification, on the other, the suggested explanation will be 
comparatively tested against independent evidence in three within-case studies.  
The comparatively long sponsorship history of the Syrian Arab Republic, established in 1961 af-
ter Syria’s disassociation from its union with Egypt, provides us with a rich number of potential 
                                                       
81 This is particularly relevant, as existing historical studies have pointed out significant variances in commitment that 
were not necessarily accompanied by the immediate collapse of the alliance. See, for instance, Byman, Deadly 
Connections; Kirchner, Allianz mit dem Terror; Hanna Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its lesser rural Notables, 
and their Politics  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1999); Patrick Seale, Abu Nidal: A gun for hire  (New York: 
Random House, 1992). 
82 Fabrizio Gilardi, "Interdependence," in Designing Research in the Social Sciences, ed. Martino Maggetti, et al. (London: 
SAGE Publications Ltd, 2012), 155-158. One can hardly dismiss that the choice of a small-N approach is to a certain 
extent owed to an overall comparatively small number of historical cases of this particular policy and an endemic 
lack of both secondary sources as well as access to primary sources. Nevertheless, in the context of theory-guided 
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the causal predictions derived from the theory. Peter A. Hall, "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative 
Politics," in Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. James Mahony and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 391f. 
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M. Ripsman, Peacemaking by democracies: the effect of state autonomy on the post-World War settlements  (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002). 13. 
84 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science  (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1997). 54. 
85 Andrew Bennett, "Process Tracing: A Bayesian Perspective," in The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, ed. Janet 
M. Box-Steffensmeier, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 703f. 
  Research design 
 20 
cases. First, the fact that it supported reportedly over a dozen of different groups directly and 
many more indirectly by tolerating their presence in areas under Syrian military occupation in 
Lebanon between 1976 and 2005, allows for various patterns of comparison under relatively sta-
ble conditions and the control of socio-cultural, geographic, and ideological factors. Second, Syr-
ia’s specific sponsorship policies exhibited remarkable variation between fierce resistance to in-
ternational pressure to cease support and compliance with these pressures. Third, a rich body of 
literature on Syria’s foreign and security policy has accompanied its prominence in the debate on 
security in the Middle East, sponsorship, and rogue states. This constitutes a significant aspect for 
case selection given the opaque nature of sponsorship as well as the limits of primary data collec-
tion.86 
Constituting not only prominent cases but also at a first glance highly dynamic processes, three 
sponsorship alignments are traced in chapters 1, 6, and 7. In the first case, Syria aligned in the 
mid-1960s with the main competitor of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the eth-
no-nationalist and leftist Fatah organization, against Israel. However, even before the alliance 
reached an all-time low in 1976, when Syrian troops directly clashed with Palestinian forces in 
Lebanon, Damascus’ commitment to the group experienced some significant variances both in 
terms of material and immaterial dimensions. In a similar manner, Syria’s alignment with anoth-
er leftist and ethno-nationalist group, the Kurdish PKK, against Syria’s northern neighbor Turkey 
since 1979, exhibited a specific commitment mix of public denial and opaque material support. 
Moreover, the alliance also found a dramatic end in the expulsion of PKK leader Abdullah 
Öcalan in October 1998 in the context of Syria’s realignment with Turkey. In contrast to the first 
two cases, the alliance between Syria and the Islamist and nationalist Hizballah, experienced a 
nearly uniform upwards trend after the end of the Lebanese Civil War in 1989/90. Despite even 
military retaliation by Israel and heavy international pressure particularly after 9/11, Damascus 
displayed an even decreasing willingness to end its backing. 
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1.7 Outline of the study 
The argument and a respective frame of analysis is developed in Chapter 2, 3, and 4 and is put to 
the test in chapters 5, 6, and 7.  
Chapter 2 examines realist thinking on foreign policy analysis, particularly balancing behavior as 
well as alliance formation and management. Based on this focus, two approaches are evaluated: 
In general, neoclassical realism, which addresses a state’s autonomy in foreign policy decision-
making, serves as a framework for the main antecedent condition activating the causal action be-
tween systemic incentives and sponsorship commitment.87 Additionally, Snyder’s theory of alli-
ance politics, linking the incentives from the external security dilemma to specific strategies of al-
liance formation and politics is used to establish the independent variable.88  
Chapter 3 applies the previously established assumptions about interstate alliance politics to state 
sponsorship of terrorism. In a first step, it addresses potential obstacles for realist approaches to 
the issue, such as the non-state nature of terrorist organizations as well as the informal and 
opaque character of such alignments. Subsequently, it examines the costs and benefits of sponsor-
ship against the background of the states external security environment and incentives from do-
mestic politics. Finally, an analytical framework will be established, suggesting a causal chain be-
tween the external security dilemma and specific sponsorship policies in both the presence and 
absence of the antecedent condition. Chapter 4 turns to the research design, the operationaliza-
tion of hypotheses and variables, and the case selection. 
The case studies are presented in chapters 5, 6, and 7. In all three sections, initially the respective 
patterns of conflict between Syria and its adversaries (Israel and Turkey respectively) will be ex-
amined. In a second step, against the background of Syria’s alliance with Fatah, the PKK, and 
Hizballah, an assessment will be established for each case whether or not there is a strong incen-
tive for either fearing alliance abandonment or entrapment. Finally, an examination of state-
society relations will provide patterns of autonomy and regime vulnerability. In the remainder of 
the chapters, Syria’s specific alliance commitments to each group will be studied with regard to 
both material and immaterial assistance. 
Chapter 8 summarizes the findings and conclusions reached in this study and outlines avenues 
for further research. In addition, it discusses the theoretical and policy-relevant implications of 
this research.  
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2 Realist alliance theory and the quest for the optimum balance 
Realist studies on alliance formation and management depart generally from an understanding 
cooperation as an outcome of external balancing and resource aggrandizement vis-à-vis other 
states.1 Furthermore, many of them resort–more or less systematically–to domestic factors in or-
der to explain specific alliance politics. Especially neoclassical realist scholars have focused on 
such unit-level factors and contributed significantly to the development of a realist school of FPA. 
Taking both perspectives into account, it is assumed that sponsorship occurs as other types of for-
eign policy under specific conditions of international and domestic politics.2 
As the application of realist thinking on alliances to the phenomenon of state sponsorship of ter-
rorism has been limited so far, the following section will turn to two theoretical issues.  
1. To what extent is realist alliance theory, established with interstate alliances in mind, able to 
comprehend statist alignments with non-state actors in general and with those labeled as ter-
rorist organizations in particular? Arguably that this is the case if corresponding cost-benefit 
calculations and effects can be observed.  
2. Do the conditions of alliance formation and management, which neoclassical realists empha-
size, also occur in state-NSA-relations? If so, the interplay of international and domestic poli-
tics is expected to bear a specific commitment outcome that is reflected in the abovemen-
tioned dimensions of support. 
In order to address these issues, this chapter consecutively turns to several questions prominent in 
current debates in IR. The first section examines neorealist thinking on foreign policy and the 
role of domestic politics in policy formulation and implementation. In order to move from an as-
sessment of indetermination on to a set of analytical instruments, neoclassical realism will be in-
troduced as a distinct school of foreign policy theory, which gives particular importance to unit-
level factors and aims at establishing causal linkages between systemic incentives, domestic poli-
tics, and actual foreign policy behavior. In a final specification, the study applies realist expecta-
tions about incentives and respective behavior to states facing internal security threats. This is of 
particular importance as one of the core interests of this study is to examine the link between do-
mestic security considerations and foreign policy in general and state sponsorship in particular.  
The second theoretical section turns to interstate alliance formation as a specific form of foreign 
policy and a first proxy for a state’s decision to align with a terrorist organization. Under what 
                                                       
1 ———, Alliance politics; Walt, The Origins of Alliances. 
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conditions do states choose alliances over other forms of security seeking and if so, how is such a 
decision related to domestic security calculations? The examination of this question initially cen-
ters on Snyder’s assumptions of a state’s costs- and benefit ratio regarding alliance formation, 
which will be supplemented by bottom-up approaches tying foreign policy decision-making to re-
gime security. In a similar manner, now focusing on alliance management and commitment, 
Snyder’s concept of a structurally inbuilt security dilemma in alliances will be augmented with 
assumptions over domestic factors inducing a certain type of alliance policy.  
2.1 Neorealism: A theory of foreign policy constraints 
Neorealism’s contribution to FPA is not without controversy. Despite its broad application, a 
major point of criticism has been its systematic neglect of domestic politics and therefore a lack in 
explanatory power regarding specific policy choices.3 In order to also examine the value of realist 
thinking on international politics for the study of state sponsorship of terrorism, the following sec-
tion will address both issues. 
2.1.1 Foreign policy in neorealism: Sealing Pandora’s (black) Box? 
Although realist scholars as well as advocates of other IR-schools have excessively debated the 
question whether neorealism is a theory explaining specific foreign policies, realists share a similar 
understanding of their emergence.4 
In the realm of neorealism, foreign policy is a function of three imperatives stemming from the 
structure of the international system and the conditions of anarchy. First, the main feature of in-
ternational politics is state power, consisting of the following items: “size of population and terri-
tory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and compe-
tence”5 and its distribution in the system. Second, policy outcomes are not determined, yet 
framed by the state’s placement in the system based on its power capabilities. Since Waltz claims 
that “the fate of each state depends on its responses to what other states do,”6 he suggests a pro-
cess of evaluation of the state’s own placement in the system as well as that of others. Third, the 
state is admonished to transfer this judgment into the mentioned response, foreign policy, in a 
                                                       
3 Kenneth Waltz, "International politics is not foreign policy," Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996); Colin Elman, "Horses for 
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process of adjustment and adaptation. Although structural realism does not explain how foreign 
policies emerge, it sheds some light on the main parameters of foreign policy making under the 
conditions that states find imposed on them in international politics. This becomes even more 
apparent when turning to the role of domestic politics in foreign policy. 
2.1.2 In-, not outside the box: Taking domestic politics seriously 
Neorealism assumes that the international system encourages similarly placed states to behave in 
a similar way due to strong incentives for functional similarity and emulation of successful prac-
tices. The transformation of this encouragement into state behavior, however, is a process to be 
found at the national level, thereby exceeding the realm of structural realism.7 Unit-level factors 
come into play only if they impede effective self-help and thus provoke a punishing response by 
the system.8 Such a situation emerges if ideas or internal fragmentation prevent states from clear-
ly perceiving and assessing systemic constraints.9 Domestic politics even cause functional dissimi-
larity, if states cannot mobilize the resources needed to pursue a certain strategy and thus fail to 
respond accurately to systemic constraints.10 Following up on this conjunction, the next section 
deals with both NCR as a form of realist thinking on international politics and domestic asser-
tiveness as a key intervening variable. 
2.2 Neoclassical realism: A theory of mistakes  
In view of the apparent gap between systemic incentives and actual foreign policy and the Waltz-
ian assumption that unit-level factors serve as an intervening variable between structure and state 
behavior, a new group of realist scholars emerged in the first half of the 1990s.11 These neoclassi-
cal realists aimed at systematically increasing the explanatory power of neorealism in FPA by 
shedding light on the process of “how systemic incentives were translated through unit-level fac-
tors into foreign policy,”12 without giving up on the constraining force of the international system 
and the imperatives on state behavior stemming from it. 
As outlined above, structural realism assumes that ‘foolish things’ will result in policy failure.13 
NCR follows this assumption, yet aims to explore the causes and the likelihood of non-responsive 
behavior. 
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Moreover, neoclassical realists contrast the observed foreign policy behavior systemically with 
the path laid out by structural realism, addressing the question “how and under what circum-
stances will domestic factors impede states from pursuing the types and strategies predicted by 
balance-of-power theory and balance-of-threat theory?”14 Therefore, NCR offers a “theory of mis-
takes” as Schweller put it, “provided that one were to consider the policy choice solely in terms of 
the international strategic setting.”15 
2.2.1 Neoclassical realism and the state 
Claiming that the unitary actor is a rather rare phenomenon in international politics, neoclassical 
realists ascribe great importance to domestically generated incoherence and, congruently, the in-
ability of states to both sustain functional similarity and effectively adapt to systemic constrains at 
all times, which, in the short run, generate non-conformist policy choices.16 The question arises, if 
the black box is gone, is there still a coherent conception of the state?  
NCR follows the Hobbesian idea of state formation as the only lasting exit from the hostile condi-
tions of pre-societal anarchy and Gilpin’s assessment that conflict groups are the “building blocks 
and ultimate units of social and political life.”17 Building on both the Leviathan and Max Weber’s 
classical definition of the state, stressing its claim for domestic sovereignty, neoclassical realists 
conceive the state as being autonomous from society to a certain extent.18 This top down concep-
tion of the state constitutes the main difference between NCR and liberal IR-theory, which views 
the state not as an actor but a “representative institution” constituting “a critical ‘transmission 
belt’ by which the preferences and social power of individuals and groups in civil society […] are 
eventually translated into state policy.”19 How does this understanding of state-society relations 
reflect on FPA? 
While NCR asserts on the one hand that the foreign policy executive (FPE)20 epitomizes the state, 
it argues on the other hand that it is–due to its access to privileged information–“frequently more 
aware of the national interest and the dictates of the international system than are other domestic 
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actors.”21 Therefore, in a structural realist best-case scenario–meaning a state acting as a unitary 
actor–the FPE possesses the “ability to commit the resources of the society and, with respect to a 
particular problem, […] the authority to make a decision that cannot be readily reversed”22 even 
in times of opposition stemming from society and other political institutions. 
Where neorealism sees adjustment and emulation at times as “unproductive for all and unavoid-
able for most,”23 NCR sees a high chance that the FPE fails to extract the resources from their so-
cieties needed for the appropriate response. Be it “foreign policy autonomy,”24 “national political 
power,”25 “state mobilization capacity,”26 or “state power,”27 neoclassical realists pay great atten-
tion to the difficulties states have if they want to develop and implement adjusting policies 
(Figure 6, Figure 7).  
 
 
Figure 6: "Broken" causal chain in neorealist FPA 
 
 
Figure 7: Causal chain in neoclassical realist FPA 
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Thus, NCR claims that a state’s relative autonomy in state-society relations determines whether it 
functions as a unitary actor and is able to respond in an effective manner to systemic incentives.28 
Thereby, it offers a theoretical framework useful to trace the process between structural incentives 
and actual foreign policy, especially in non-democratic states. 
2.2.2 Third World only? Neoclassical realism and regime vulnerability  
Among the first scholars challenging the realist idea of strong and unitary states and the narra-
tives of national security and interest reflecting the actual reality of international relations, were 
Joel S. Migdal and Mohammed Ayoob. In the context of their Third World Security approach, 
they linked a state’s adjustment capacity to state-society relations.29 This notion has strongly in-
fluenced early NCR works, which especially adopted the assumption that the endemic lack of a 
domestically generated legitimacy to rule in many developing countries serves as an explanans for 
deviant foreign policies.30  
Steven R. David asserted that Third World states share a distinct security outlook where “internal 
threats […] are far more likely to challenge a Third World leader’s hold on power than threats 
from other states.”31 Moreover, the relevance of military coups, civil wars, and revolutions to po-
litical rule in these countries has not declined to date. On the contrary, the substantial shift from 
inter- to intrastate wars, which David identified as being especially prevalent in the Third World, 
has manifested itself as a global trend in the past two decades, peaking in 2011 when only seven 
out of 186 violent political conflicts were classified as interstate crises.32 Departing from this ob-
servation, regime vulnerability, defined by Joe D. Hagan as the “likelihood that the current lead-
ership will be removed from political office,”33 becomes a key feature of foreign policy decision-
making.  
Competing ethnic, tribal, religious, and other allegiances prevent the formation of a coherent def-
inition of national interest shared by a significant majority. In addition, domestic power fragmen-
tation prevents a “merging of state and society as common expressions of a set of shared val-
ues.”34 Moreover, if political power and mobilization capacity are built on a narrow popular base, 
                                                       
28 Taliaferro et al., "Introduction," 25-28. 
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a situation emerges where political institutions are weak and rulers see the state they command as 
distinct from society.35 As the incentives for political leaders to make significant concessions in 
order to broaden loyalty are significantly lower than for merely shifting allegiance from one to 
another, stronger, social force, the legitimacy of rule is likely to remain scarce and contested.36 
Hence, continuous competition occurs among various social groups for the state as the main 
source of power and economic wealth. One effect of this competitive domestic environment is the 
involvement of social forces in politics laying the groundwork for what Samuel Huntington called 
a praetorian society.37 
Understanding internal politics in Third World states as a reproduction and microcosm of interna-
tional politics, David applies the determinants of the international structure to the domestic are-
na.38 In the same way as international anarchy, the absence of strong political institutions creates 
incentives for a politicization of social forces, sparking to a certain extent processes of emulation 
and self-help, manifested, for instance, in the emergence of militias. Hence, the following section 
will turn to the question whether and to what extent these domestic conditions affect foreign poli-
cy in general and the causal chain as illustrated by Figure 7. 
Regime type and autonomy 
David asserts that Third World leaders enjoy substantially higher levels of flexibility in foreign 
policy, given the small circle of actual decision-makers and the little influence weakness of both 
political institutions and public opinion.39 This seems plausible if one has assertive, charismatic, 
and domestically unchallenged dictators, such as Uganda’s Idi Amin or Iraq’s Saddam Hussein 
and their adventurous foreign policy endeavors in mind. As their respective decision to go to war 
with Tanzania (1978/79) and Iran (1980-88) resulted in international counterbalancing, military 
defeat and exile, or the erosion of authority over the state’s territory, it is questionable whether 
they serve as examples of successful adjustment policies. Is there a link between regime type and 
a state’s ability to assess and respond to systemic incentives? 
Particularly in the works of Norrin Ripsman, state autonomy plays an important role in demo-
cratic foreign policy decision-making.40 According to him, the limited risk of immediate electoral 
reprisal or governmental defeat grants the foreign policy executive in representative democracies 
a comparatively high degree of structural autonomy from domestic opposition.41 In contrast, 
                                                       
35 Harknett and VanDenBerg, "Alignment theory and interrelated threats," 121f; David, Choosing Sides: 13. 
36 Samuel P. Huntington, Political order in changing societies  (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1968). 197; Alagappa, 
National Security: 9; David, Choosing Sides: 13. 
37 Political order in changing societies: 195. 
38 ———, Choosing Sides: 16. 
39 Ibid., 13. 
40 Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies. 
41 Ibid., 44. Nevertheless, most democratic governments face significant mobilization hurdles regarding particular is-
sues such as military intervention. This becomes obvious if we compare for instance support for participation in the 
  “Whoe’er would form eternal bonds…” - Alliance formation 
 30 
states that generally lack mobilization capacity are also less able to commit the resources needed 
for autonomous policy implementation. Hence, states built on a narrow power base and facing 
societal competitors are expected to be less effective in mobilizing those resources from society 
that are necessary for policy implementation.42 Additionally, the intervention of social forces in 
politics impedes a coherent assessment of systemic incentives and limits the choice of policies 
concerning expected domestic costs.43  
Given the centrality of state-society relations and their aim to combine an alternative notion of 
state and security with structural realist thinking about international politics, Third World studies 
provided a clear point of departure for NCR, especially in the context of foreign policy analysis.44 
Throughout the years, however, NCR also turned to–though significantly lower–mobilization 
hurdles and facilitators in democratic states, for instance the public’s aversion against external ac-
tion or disagreement among elites about the existence and nature of external threats and oppor-
tunities.45 To what extent mobilization hurdles are present and play a role in alliance formation 
and management, will be assessed momentarily. 
2.3  “Whoe’er would form eternal bonds…” - Alliance formation  
Among realist IR-scholars, there is wide agreement that alliance formation is a strategy in the 
quest for security and driven by expediency.46 Neither Third World security nor NCR challenge 
this notion. However, there is disagreement particularly on the implicit monopoly of expediency 
directed at external security and, if not, the expected interaction of security seeking, which entails 
alliance formation.47 Hence, the following section examines internal and external incentives for 
alignment before turning to their cost/benefit ratio and interplay. 
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2.3.1 The external security dilemma 
Despite neorealism’s indeterminacy regarding specific policies, the majority of realist scholars 
agrees on what causes alliance formation, whether “what others do,”48 “external threat,”49 or 
“conflict with an outside party.”50 Hence, at the core of both balance-of-power and balance-of-
threat theory and their dependent variables balancing and alliance formation, lays the systemic dis-
tribution of power capabilities and threats to state security.51  
As outlined above, neorealism argues that states tend to form alliances in response to systemic 
power imbalances that could lead to agonizing domination by others or even to falling prey to 
their expansionist policies.52 Under the conditions of anarchy, incomplete information about the 
power capabilities and intentions of others generate a sense of (potential) threat and shared inter-
ests, a motive of alliance formation. If specific conflicts of interests arise between states and mani-
fest themselves in aggressive behavior (or the attribution of bellicose intentions), counteralliances 
are likely to occur and persist.53 
When states respond to systemic incentives, their power accumulating strategies vary mostly be-
tween internal efforts and external endeavors, including at least two more actors.54 In his study 
on alliance politics, Snyder divided these efforts into four substitutable strategies of national secu-
rity: armament (equivalent to Waltz’ internal efforts), alliances and military action (as external ef-
forts), and settlement.55 Which means of power accumulation will be used by a particular state is 
not determined by structural realism, but states evaluate and outweigh their respective costs with-
in the systemic constraints they face.56  
In general, armament is expected to reward states by maintaining their autonomy, whereas they 
need to sacrifice significant values of domestic well-being.57 Military action could prevent the ad-
versary from further expansion and reduce the pressure for increasing one’s own capabilities, yet 
carries the high risk of losing tangible material assets. While alliance formation is expected to be 
less burdensome on states’ resources, allies risk autonomy losses and–given the uncertainty about 
the intentions of others–ending up alone as a result of engaging with an unreliable partner.58  
Drawing on systemic incentives, Snyder recapitulated that alliances are likely to occur if the po-
tential partners “both feel sufficiently threatened by some third state or alliance” and “believe 
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they can do better in an alliance than they could do by themselves.”59 A purely systemic approach, 
however, can provide only insufficient insight into the conditions under which states come to 
such a conclusion.  
2.3.2 The domestic security dilemma 
Assessing a state’s domestic environment is inevitable in order to grasp the security gains, bene-
fits, and tradeoffs in alliance formation.60 
Armament and preparing military action require all states to extract greater resources from socie-
ty, be it through increased taxation or conscription of potential soldiers. As arming spares gov-
ernments costly concessions to potential allies, is much more reliable and can take place compar-
atively fast, it can be a cheaper answer to an external threat, if resources can be mobilized easi-
ly.61 To what extent do domestic politics influence a state’s calculation in this context? 
If leaders feel compelled to give high importance to risks of internal overthrow by societal com-
petitors and lack mobilization capacity, they are also limited in their foreign policy choices. 
Moreover, foreign policy reflects strategies of political rulers to secure or expand their position in 
the domestic system.62 Hence, among armament, military action, and alliance formation, vulner-
able states are expected to tend towards the latter one. On the one hand, this tendency results 
from the risk that large sophisticated armies might split course and overthrow the government by 
force. On the other, vulnerable states also lack available material and immaterial resources e.g. 
the capacity to recruit loyal soldiers outside of their societal power base.63 In some cases, vulner-
able regimes even deliberately reduce their military capability vis-à-vis external forces by creating 
sophisticated parallel militaries in order to prevent coups by the regular military. Where the latter 
therefore lacks combat skills and the best equipment available, the former might not be available 
for interstate military operations.64 
Given the domestic costs of arming and their limited mobilization capacity, vulnerable states are 
expected to choose alignment over arms buildup when responding to an external threat.65 This 
trend is even reinforced in the case of highly fragmented societies. If competing allegiances ex-
ceed demarcated borders, leaders have to fear that in cases of interstate war, some societal groups 
will prefer to bandwagon with the external threat instead of defending a state in whose survival 
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they have no interest.66 Hence, if societal fragmentation impedes a consistent assessment of the 
external threat and a corresponding resource mobilization, leaders are expected to refrain from 
arming and turn most likely to alliance seeking.67 
2.3.3 A simple equation? Costs and benefits of alliance formation 
Snyder suggests that states enter alliances “if the benefits of doing so are greater than the costs” 
and that these are “measured from the security and autonomy enjoyed in the pre-alliance align-
ment pattern.”68 Thus, the following section takes a closer look at the specific patterns of benefits 
and costs that states are expected to face once interstate alignment has emerged. 
2.3.3.1 Tying the knot: Benefits of alliance formation 
According to Snyder, states can benefit from alliances in several ways: First, they can enhance 
their capability for deterrence and defense against external attacks. Second, they can spare na-
tional resources if credible deterrence alleviates pressure for armament or even war. Third, alli-
ances allow for increased influence over befriended states, in particular regarding potential rap-
prochements between them and the adversary.  
In addition, Snyder argues that regimes might be able to strengthen themselves vis-à-vis internal 
opponents by allying.69 For instance, Walt suggested that states lacking domestic legitimacy are 
more likely to seek alliances based on a shared ideology in order to bolster internal support 
through affiliation with a popular movement.70 In addition, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita argued 
that political leaders are likely to forge external alignments that promote and export the state’s re-
ligious or cultural beliefs or enhance national security as part of a domestic cooptation strategy.71 
Hence, domestic politics can be decisive for the question with whom to align. 
In cases of manifest internal conflict, influence over one’s allies gains further importance. On the 
one hand, external alignments can entail direct material assistance, transformable into domestic 
power resources.72 At times, allies also provide a direct source of domestic state power vis-à-vis 
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internal challengers, by delivering weapons, riot-gear, or even committing troops.73 On the other 
hand, states can pressure their allies into denying support to their domestic adversaries. For ex-
ample, although providing in theory a convenient source of backing for the Islamist uprising 
against secular rule in Syria, Iran’s Revolutionary leader Ruhollah Khomeini turned down re-
quests even for moral assistance in order not to jeopardize his anti-Iraq alignment with Hafiz al-
Asad.74 
However, these observations raise a question that deserves further attention in current realist de-
bates. Are realist assumptions of interstate alliance politics useful to grasp alignment dynamics 
against domestic challenges? 
Security of Others: Alliances targeting non-state actors 
According to Walt, an alliance’s defining feature is a military commitment “against some exter-
nal actor(s).”75 Snyder also emphasizes this ‘other-orientation’ as the distinctive feature between 
alliances and other international institutions, yet claims that they are explicitly directed at “states 
outside their own membership.”76 In order to broaden the explanatory scope of alliance theory, it 
is argued that bilateral agreements targeting sub state forces like transnationally active terrorist 
networks or violent uprisings should not be excluded from alliance politics quite so easily. 
 
Societal groups, especially competitors for political power, play a major–at times even decisive–
role in neoclassical realist thinking on interstate alliances.77 Hence, if recalling the supremacy of 
security seeking as a source of alliance formation, the assumption that sub state actors can be tar-
gets of interstate alliances implies an understanding of national security that includes regime se-
curity. A corresponding notion can be found in Snyder’s definition of national security, which 
comprehends not only political security in the sense of independence and sovereignty, and physical 
security, subsuming material costs of war but also the security of “governments against internal 
violent overthrow.”78 This fits in with the assertion of David and others that especially vulnerable 
states see interstate alignment as an external source of domestic power resources. 
 
However, alliance formation should not be understood as a one-way street. The threat of gov-
ernment overthrow might be decisive for one ally whereas the other might not consider it a major 
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threat.79 The events in the course of the uprisings in the Arab World since 2011 exemplify this 
dynamic in a very impressive manner (Table 2). Both Tunisia’s former President Zine El Abidine 
Ben Ali (1987-2011) and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011) had been strong and valuable allies 
of the Western countries for decades before mass protest and realignment by the security forces 
swept them away from power without significant support by their allies. In contrast, Saudi Ara-
bia sent some 1,000 troops to suppress protests in Bahrain, and both Iran and Russia strongly 
supported pressured Syrian President Bashar al-Asad materially and politically in his crackdown 
on domestic dissent.80 In a third case, the French military intervention helping the Malian author-
ities to regain control over the north in January 2013 was not a consequence of the expulsion of 
government forces by Tuareg rebels in early 2012 but the latters’ replacement by the Islamist 
groups Ansar Dine and al-Qaeda in Maghreb.81 
Against the background of these observations, one might argue that not the threat of government 
overthrow was decisive for external support against domestic competitors, but the others’ calcula-
tion whether regime change would come along with an unfavorable international realignment. 
To a certain extent building on U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s theory of “falling domi-
noes,”82 it can be assumed that domestic competitors for political rule serve only as a secondary 
target of interstate alliances, if their success might trigger international realignment and thus a se-
curity threat for the ally. This calculation, however, does not restrain pressured governments to 
divert resources obtained from allies to fight off external rivals against domestic enemies.83 
Table 2: External intervention and the risk of realignment (2011-2013) 
Conflict Risk of international realignment  Pro-government intervention by traditional allies 
EGYPT  - - a 
TUNISIA  - - b 
BAHRAIN  ✓ ✓ c 
SYRIA ✓ ✓ d 
MALI -/✓ -/✓ e 
a West, moderate Arab States 
b West, moderate Arab States 
c Saudi Arabia, GCC 
d Russia, Iran 
e Only after threat of Islamist takeover emerged 
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Having both international and domestic security challenges in mind, alignments might be cheap 
in contrast to internal balancing. As they definitely do not come for free, especially in the case of 
vulnerable states, the following section will turn to the potential costs of interstate alignment.  
2.3.3.2 Fatal attraction: Costs of alliance formation 
Alliances incur certain costs, at times directly neutralizing potential benefits. If they trigger the 
formation of counter alliances, allied states run the risk of sacrificing tangibly higher resources in 
the case of conflict escalation, if they need to help another ally or find themselves being dragged 
into a war with the opponent by an ally all too confident of one’s support. Furthermore, alliances 
put constraints on the state’s freedom of action and the formation of alternative alliances. Implic-
itly, Snyder also identifies a risk of alignments weakening the allying regime’s domestic position, 
which will be further specified as follows.84  
First, external alignments against a rival state can exacerbate domestic conflict, deepen societal 
frictions, and reduce likelihood of internal conciliation. During the Persian Gulf Crisis 1990/91 
for instance, the traditionally strong ties between Amman and the Washington threatened to fur-
ther deteriorate Jordan’s already strained relations with its Palestinian citizens, making up for 
approximately half of the total population and supporting Saddam Hussein. Subsequently, King 
Hussein sided in a limited though unprecedented departure from previous alignment patterns 
with Iraq.85  
Second, alliances generally require their members to resolve conflicting interests and subsequent 
policy concessions can be at times met with refusal by relevant domestic actors.86 As especially 
asymmetrical alignments grant allies leverage, leaders that compromise in intra-alliance bargain-
ing face charges of “deliberate undermining of state sovereignty.”87 This is most likely to be the 
case if an ally’s commitment involves the presence of foreign troops, support bases and facilities, 
as well as over flight rights.88 Exemplified by the cases of Japan, Saudi Arabia, and West Germa-
ny in the 1960s and 70s, the articulation of domestic protest can range from mass demonstrations 
to violent attacks on state officials and the ally’s representatives.89 
Third, weak regimes might find themselves at risk in alliances promoting transnational unity. As 
these endorse allegiances beyond the state, other members of such a unity movement can easily 
interfere in the state’s domestic affairs. Suffering defeat in the struggle over the movement’s lead-
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ership is also likely to further undermine the leader’s autonomy and to reduce the state’s power 
resources.90 
Hence, vulnerable states will be particularly concerned by the autonomy losses and concessions 
of formal interstate alliances, despite the fact that they provide for power resources vis-à-vis inter-
nal competitors in the short run. In 1958, for instance, hte Syrian leadership agreed to join the 
United Arab Republic, initially aiming to decrease the domestic threat of Communist overthrow 
and to cash in on the Pan-Arab popularity of Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser. As they 
miscalculated particularly the domestic repercussions of the concessions they had made to Cairo, 
the government did not survive the Union’s collapse only three years later.91  
2.3.4 Conclusion: Alliance formation in a multifaceted security environment 
The last section centered on several questions. Under what conditions are states generally likely 
to form alliances with others in contrast to arming unilaterally against an external rival? To what 
extent are these conditions applicable to vulnerable states lacking legitimacy and thus autonomy 
in foreign policy decision-making? Given the presence of substantial and structural hurdles to re-
source mobilization in these countries, they tend towards alignment instead of internal arms 
build-up. For them, alliances entail security gains in both the international and domestic arena; 
yet they also carry significant risks at the same time.92 Hence, in order to increase the explanatory 
power of realist approaches to alliance formation by vulnerable states, the external security di-
lemma, which sets important incentives for state behavior needs to be complemented by a second, 
domestic security dilemma (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Neoclassical realism’s causal mechanism in alliance formation 
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As this study addresses not only the emergence of sponsorship relations but also their evolvement 
over time, one should keep in mind that alliance formation does not override the anarchic nature 
of the international system. By contrast, uncertainty about the intentions even of alliance partners 
continues to prevail and influences how states manage their alliance policies.93 Therefore, the fol-
lowing section will initially turn to Snyder’s concept of the security dilemma in alliance politics and 
continue to examine the role of autonomy and regime vulnerability in alliance management.94  
2.4 “… should weigh if heart to heart responds.” - Alliance management 
According to Walt, “there is nothing sacred about an existing alliance, no matter how successful 
or long-lived it has been.”95 Once an alliance is established, all of its members have an interest in 
maintaining cooperation. Yet, under the prevailing conditions of anarchy, states continue to aim 
at maximizing their security benefits and controlling potential or actual alliance costs.96 This im-
plies that the trade-off between security gains and autonomy losses has not been eliminated either 
and likely to spark intra-alliance conflict if the conditions change under which it has been 
formed.97 
2.4.1 The alliance security dilemma 
Alliance formation arises from highly specific conditions. Therefore, outside shocks, such as the 
rise or demise of the external threat, the emergence of alternative policy options, or a change in 
the power capabilities of at least one ally set incentives for states to reestablish the initial “opti-
mum mix.”98 
As outlined in section 2.1.1, states find themselves in a dilemma between security seeking and au-
tonomy retaining, which are to a certain extent incompatible in alliances. Hence, Michael Man-
delbaum observed that if the level of external threat increases, states might fear that their allies 
will “stand aside rather than fulfill a commitment to fight when the war actually begins,”99 in 
short abandonment. This is especially the case if a state sees itself as highly dependent on the ally, 
regarding both the perceived level of threat posed by the adversary and alternative options to deal 
with the security challenge.100 If the ally’s commitment to cooperation remains vague and unspec-
ified and its strategic interests in the state’s security are low, abandonment fears are likely to in-
crease.101 
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When the level of external threat declines, states tend to fear entrapment, meaning, “one ally will 
entangle another in a quarrel in which the second has no substantial take,” thus increasing the 
risk of “fighting an unwanted and unnecessary war.”102 Although a jointly perceived threat is 
crucial for alliance formation, external threats are seldom equally distributed among alliance 
partners. Hence, entrapment is likely to be feared by the ally which perceives itself as being less 
exposed to the threat but might be compelled to fight for the ally in case of conflict escalation, ei-
ther because of respective treaties or strategic interests in the latter’s security. This concern is like-
ly to increase if there is disagreement among the allies of how to meet the external threat.103  
Both the risk of abandonment in times of need and entrapment in someone else’s war play a sig-
nificant role regarding the choice between internal and external balancing and among alternative 
alliance partners. Once alliances are formed, how do states respond to these risks? 
In brief, states fearing abandonment are expected to increase their material and public commit-
ment to the alliance and take a firmer stand against the opponent, whereas those concerned about 
entrapment are likely to relax their commitment and preserve the option to realign with the ad-
versary. As these risks are likely to vary contrariwise, alliance partners find themselves in a di-
lemma: Policies aiming at reducing abandonment tend to also decrease one’s bargaining leverage 
and are likely to increase the risk of entrapment as a strong commitment could encourage the 
partner to become more assertive towards the alliance’s opponent. Moreover, strong alliance 
commitment impedes the chances for a potential realignment with the opponent. In turn, limiting 
the scope and specificity of one’s commitment to the ally seems to be an adequate strategy to 
avoid these negative outcomes (entrapment), as it might relax the external security dilemma and 
increase intra-alliance bargaining power. However, this strategy could raise fears of realignment 
among its partners and correspondingly the risk of abandonment for oneself.104 
Mutual in-/dependency on military assistance, firm, and credible/vague commitments of support, 
and common/conflicting interests in juxtaposition to the adversary, determine whether the alli-
ance security dilemma (ASD) is severe. As these factors are presumably shaped by the allies’ se-
curity environment in general and the nature of the external threat in particular, the following 
section turns to their interplay with the ASD. 
2.4.2 How the security dilemma influences alliance management 
In international politics, when arguing that alliance formation could trigger counteralliances, 
structural realists resort to John Herz’ concept of a security dilemma.105 Accordingly, states are 
inclined to pre-emptively strive for security by acquiring power, among them alliance formation. 
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As this is perceived by others as decreasing their security, counteraction is likely to occur and the 
“vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.”106 Given the lack of information about 
a rising power’s intentions, states can ameliorate the security dilemma by standing firm and thus 
deterring a presumably aggressive power from attacking or by conciliating a benign power. Mis-
perception of intent, however, is costly as virtual status quo powers forced into the defensive 
might respond with a firm policy and aggressive adversaries might interpret appeasement as 
weakness and feel emboldened to further make demands.107 
Balance-of-threat theory revealed that states tend to strengthen their alliance commitment when 
facing an opponent harboring apparently aggressive intentions and that these alliances erode if 
these conditions (or their perception) are no longer given or more attractive alternatives present 
themselves.108 However, it provides us with little systematic insight about the side effects of struc-
tural changes (or those of perceptions) on alliance management between formation and failure. In 
order to discern mutual side effects of the security dilemma and the alliance dilemma, Snyder 
conceptualizes a composite security dilemma, which combines a state’s strategies in opposition to its 
adversary and its ally respectively.109 From this, we can draw two main assumptions: 
First, if a state perceives the alliance’s opponent as aggressive, it tends to strengthen its commit-
ment to the ally in order to deter it from attacking and to reduce the risk of abandonment by bol-
stering its reputation for loyalty among current and potential allies. Yet, a strong commitment is 
accompanied by a loss of intra-alliance autonomy and an increased risk of entrapment. Moreover, 
other costs of alliance formation tend to manifest themselves.110 
Second, if the state perceives accommodation and conciliation as the most appropriate strategy, 
weakening its commitment to the alliance is likely to reduce tensions with the adversary, puts 
substantial constraints on the ally, and reduces the risk of entrapment. Furthermore, a state 
providing only a vague and low commitment to an alliance can also alleviate the general costs of 
alliance formation.111 However, low alliance commitment increases the risk of security losses, ei-
ther in form of abandonment by the ally or a substantial loss in its reputation, thereby reducing 
the availability of future allies.112  
Assuming that the nature of the external security dilemma sets the main policy incentives and 
preferences, this approach clearly follows neorealist thinking of alliance formation and develop-
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ment. The latter’s strong influence on FPA is also reflected in the claim that misperception of the 
adversary’s intentions entails policy failure.113 
A second, implicit, causal chain, which allows for states to direct their policy against the adver-
sary to intra-alliance relations points to alternative reasons for states to employ policies contra-
dicting systemic incentives. Although Snyder explicitly excluded domestic politics from his theo-
ry of alliance formation and politics, he argues, “Systemic structure […] must pass through a do-
mestic political prism.”114 Hence, the implicit assessment that domestic political change may 
cause realignment at times independent of systemic shifts fits in particularly with neoclassical re-
alism.115 Under which conditions domestic politics are likely to influence the ASD and thus offer 
an alternative explanation for alliance management will be examined as follows. 
2.4.3 Domestic politics in the alliance dilemma 
Chapter 2.1.2 examined the constraints domestic politics impose on a state’s response to the secu-
rity dilemma. In a similar vein, the following section turns to the interaction between the ASD 
and domestic politics, particularly in the context of vulnerable states. By linking the risks emerg-
ing from the ASD (abandonment/entrapment) with the security needs of domestically challenged 
governments, specific alignment patterns of vulnerable states will be conceptualized. 
First, they share a strong tendency towards external balancing as their lack in internal mobiliza-
tion capacity and relative military weakness limits policy alternatives (See 2.3.2). Second, their 
need for military assistance against an adversary additionally concerns resources to repress or co-
opt domestic dissent, thereby aggrandizing their demands, expectations, and dependence regard-
ing the alliance. Third, the abovementioned strategy to increase internal support by joining a 
broader ideology-based movement further narrows alliance options. Hence, if vulnerable states 
join alliances, they are very likely to find themselves in a disadvantageous position, pointing to-
wards a desire to reduce abandonment risks. Where one might expect a subsequent bias towards 
formal agreements and willingness for intra-alliance concessions likely to entail autonomy costs, 
the risk of increased domestic dissent stemming from them pressures vulnerable states into a pref-
erence for informal and vague commitments. Hence, high degrees of dependence in order to meet 
various security needs and a bias towards vague patterns of obligations provide the allies of vul-
nerable states with significant leverage in intra-alliance relations. These domestically generated 
fears of entrapment are expected to increase if the state values the threat of domestic overthrow 
higher than an external threat. For instance, Jordan’s King Hussein confirmed in retrospect, that 
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the primary reason he entered the 1967 War was not the external Israeli threat but domestic Pal-
estinian dissent.116  
According to Snyder, states can boost intra-alliance bargaining power by issuing credible threats 
of realignment.117 Yet again, the credibility of these threats is likely to be undermined by the pres-
ence of domestic threats. Generally, realignment entails an–at least temporary–reduction of mili-
tary power due to expected cuts in external arms supplies and considerable amounts of time to 
adapt to new weapons systems and, at times, new military doctrines.118 These security risks fur-
ther increase if social forces affiliated with the former ally oppose the realignment. Be it for ideo-
logical reasons or out of fear to lose a key external source of domestic power, these groups will 
consider the state’s refusal to fulfill the obligations emerging from the alliance as an act of treason.  
The assumption that the ASD is more severe for vulnerable states fits in with NCR emphasizing 
that domestic politics exert substantial influence on how states translate systemic incentives into 
actual policies. If states have to devote a substantial amount of resources not only to the effects 
that changes in their international security environment have on intra-alliance relations (and vice-
versa) but also to how they affect domestic security, coherent responses to the external threat are 
less likely to occur. 
2.4.4 Conclusion: Risk management in alliances 
As much as other forms of external state behavior, alliance politics are a means to adapt to securi-
ty challenges. Hence, changes in alliance policy between realignment and strong commitment are 
expected to result from shifts in a state’s security environment, disarranging the optimum balance 
between the risks of external balancing, once the decisive factor for alliance formation, and the 
state’s efforts to restore it.119 As outlined in the previous section, vulnerable regimes are–in con-
trast to other states–admonished to attribute greater significance to the potential costs of aban-
donment and entrapment also in the domestic realm.  
When assessing the alliance politics of vulnerable states, the complexity of security challenges 
they face plays a key role. This is especially the case, as their subsequent difficulty to restore the 
optimum balance of risks implies a high likelihood that they will choose alliance strategies mis-
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matching the international threat. Hence, also forging alliances with terrorist organizations as a 
functional equivalent to interstate alignments is expected to occur in situations where a severe in-
terstate alliance dilemma is present in concurrence with regime vulnerability. 
In order to examine this idea more specifically, the following chapter will turn to the question 
under which conditions state sponsorship of terrorism alleviates the multiple dilemmas vulnera-
ble states find themselves in when committing to interstate alliances. If such a policy serves as a 
functional equivalent to external balancing, security gains at the expense of external and domestic 
competitors should emerge from it. Hence, as a result of the prevalence of the international sys-
tem’s anarchic structure, a similar dilemma is expected to occur also in sponsorship relations, in-
fluencing the way states balance the respective risks of abandonment by the group and finding 
themselves entrapped in interstate escalation. 
 !
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3 Realism and state sponsorship of terrorism 
In the previous sections, the argument was established that states lacking relative autonomy in 
foreign policy questions, particularly in connection with regime vulnerability, face significantly 
higher costs stemming from the autonomy losses caused by alliance formation. Simultaneously, 
they exhibit a high tendency to commit to alliances if security challenges emerge given their weak 
resource extraction capacity and political risks of internal mobilization. As this strong tendency 
towards external balancing reduces vulnerable states’ bargaining power in intra-alliance relations, 
they are likely to find themselves frequently in a dilemma between the risks of abandonment in 
times of need and entrapment in a war which is not in their interest. In this context, state spon-
sorship of terrorism appears as a form of external balancing, allowing the state to meet various 
security needs and control its dependence on the group, thereby reducing both the risk of aban-
donment and entrapment.  
Hence, the following section will first turn to the question whether sponsorship, which is general-
ly used to describe clandestine and informal agreements with non-state actors can be understood 
as an alliance in the sense of Snyder’s theory. This is of particular interest regarding these agree-
ments’ function as external enemy deterrent and conveyance of reliability to one’s allies. Second, 
it addresses the question of applicability in a more in-depth manner, exploring potential costs and 
benefits of sponsorship, particularly in comparison to interstate alliances. 
Regarding the question, how sponsoring states manage such alignments once they have been es-
tablished, it should be kept in mind that anarchy prevails and both risks continuously influence 
sponsorship policies. Therefore, section 3.3 turns to respective strategies of state sponsorship of 
terrorism and their underlying risk patterns in order to assess whether and to what extent they re-
flect the idea that allies seek to reestablish the initial optimum balance of security and autonomy. 
3.1 Informality and secrecy in alliance politics 
To what extent are informal and secretive alignments with non-state actors likely to entail an aban-
donment/entrapment dilemma similar to those in formal interstate alliances? In order to answer 
this question, it is necessary to address significant differences between alliance and align-
ment/ententes debated among realists, particularly concerning the question of formality, publicity, 
and membership.1 
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3.1.1 Formality: From shaking hands to signing treaties  
Many realist scholars addressing questions of alliance policy have listed both formal and informal 
arrangements under the term “alliance”2 or “alignments.”3 In contrast, Snyder argues that only 
“formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, 
against states outside their own membership,”4 should be considered alliances and subsumed all 
informal arrangements under the term alignment. Whereas the former entails “specificity, legal 
and moral obligation, and reciprocity,”5 in a formalized manner, the latter group consists of mere 
expectations about the future behavior of others, stemming from the “perceived interests, capabil-
ities, and observed behavior of other states.”6  
In order to emphasize this difference, Snyder stresses two points. First, formal alliances “intro-
duce a sense of obligation,” which arises both from “the legal status of the contract as a treaty” 
and a “moral convention that promises should be kept.”7 Second, states find themselves pres-
sured to fulfill such formalized obligations, particularly in order to maintain the credibility of 
their future commitments.8 Yet, to what extent does the saying ‘if it's not written, it didn't hap-
pen!’ apply to the reality of alliance politics? Moreover, does it have to be expanded to ‘if it's not 
written, it won’t happen’?  
Stephen Walt and Robert Kann have addressed this question explicitly and concluded that sub-
stantial obligations are also likely to emerge from informal ententes.9 Remarkably, this notion is 
also adopted by Snyder, stating  
“The political reality of alliances is not different in kind from that of tacit and informal 
alignments; it lies not in the formal contract but in the expectations that are supported or 
created-not only between the partners but also among all interested bystanders, including es-
pecially opponents.”10 
He further softens the rigor of his formal/informal separation by claiming that even the most 
formal alliance commitments are likely to create expectations of support and solidarity that go 
beyond the narrow and precisely specified contingency of the actual contract.11 
Informality reduces, on the one hand, the expected reputation costs of non-fulfillment and the 
risk of entrapment, depriving the ally of both a guarantee that it will receive support in the case of 
conflict escalation and a signed treaty to pressure its partner into contract fulfillment.12 On the 
                                                       
2 ———, The Origins of Alliances: 1. 
3 David, Choosing Sides: 29. 
4 Snyder, Alliance politics: 4. 
5 Ibid., 7. 
6 Ibid., 6. 
7 Ibid., 8. 
8 Ibid., 9. 
9 Walt, The Origins of Alliances: 12; Robert A. Kann, "Alliances versus ententes," World Politics 28, no. 4 (1976). 
10 Snyder, Alliance politics: 9. 
11 Ibid., 8. 
12 Ibid., 188; Kann, "Alliances versus ententes," 621. 
Realism and state sponsorship of terrorism 
47 
other hand, a risk of entrapment emerges from vague commitments as well, as states might feel 
inclined to prove their loyalty by supporting the ally in all contingencies.13 
3.1.2 Publicity: Can a secret deter anyone? 
Particularly realists have emphasized deterrence as a key function of alliances.14 To what extent is 
this compatible with, for instance, Martha Crenshaw’s claim that state sponsorship of terrorism is 
a “means of deception and denial”15? 
Partially or completely secretive alliances have repeatedly occurred in interstate relations, espe-
cially throughout the 18th and 19th century. The formality of secret alliance treaties, bearing signa-
tures of high-ranking state officials, served as a guarantee of alliance loyalty while its secretive 
character offered a possible back door for realignment without losing credibility as a potential ally 
for others.  
Deterrence, a convenient side effect of public alliances replaced deniability as the main objective 
of alliance formation in the 20th century.16 Credible deterrence reduces fears of both abandonment 
and entrapment, sending signals of predictability to others about the alliance’s red lines. If these 
are crossed and deterrence fails, however, allies in public confederations find themselves in a se-
vere alliance dilemma.17 Kann argues that states tend to resort to secrecy or at least vagueness, 
fearing both entrapment and losing international credibility by breaching the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda.18 This is especially the case if the risk of conflict escalation is high.  
In modern times, it remains doubtful whether allies can achieve complete secrecy given the high 
number of people generally involved in such agreements. Additionally, there is the risk that the 
agreement’s content might be leaked if allies disagree about how to meet the common security 
threat. One ally might decide to publicly allude to the cooperation in order to pursue a standing 
firm strategy. Hence, if known to actual and potential confederates as well as enemies, informal 
alliances are likely to function as a means of external balancing.  
Having shown that the intended and unintended effects of alliance management deviate from the 
classical alliance, it is suggested that states employ the four additional strategies of alliance man-
agement displayed in Figure 9 when aiming at restoring the optimum balance between entrap-
ment and abandonment. 
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Figure 9: Patterns of alliance management 
 
In the context of alliance formation, formality, and publicity both generate deterrence and relia-
bility (A). They are also accompanied by costly autonomy losses with a very high risk that if de-
terrence fails, allies will have to follow up on their promises and mobilize corresponding re-
sources or hazard reputation losses.  
While informality and secrecy allow for reduced autonomy losses and entrapment costs (C), se-
curity gains are expected to occur primarily if informality is accompanied by public endorsement 
of the alliance (B), thereby creating deterrence and expectations of loyalty. If an agreement is 
both opaque and formal (D), it increases the relative costs of realignment for the other.19  
It was maintained that both informal and secretive alignments reproduce the effects of formal and 
public alliances on the ASD and thus the international security environment. It is, therefore, 
plausible to treat them as functional equivalents to formal alliances. However, as anarchy prevails, 
no single strategy fully eliminates either entrapment or abandonment risks. 
3.2 When your best friend is said to be invisible: Non-state actors in alliance politics 
Apart from the criterion of formality and a security (military) purpose, Snyder asserts that only 
states can form alliances, thereby explicitly excluding “connections between governments and 
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nongovernmental entities such as revolutionary groups.”20 However, as these also occur almost 
exclusively in the context of security–and the ability to sign treaties binding under international 
law should be a secondary criterion given the debate outlined in the previous sections–further 
reasoning for this exclusion would be desirable. Hence, the following section will elaborate on 
two points frequently mentioned in this context: the role of non-state actors (NSAs) in interna-
tional politics and assumptions about their receptiveness of systemic incentives. 
3.2.1 Non-state actors in international politics 
Since the 1960s, an extensive body of literature focuses on the increasing role and importance of 
NSA’s in international politics in general and global governance in particular, thereby challeng-
ing the primacy of states.21 Others pay attention to the question of states’ delegation of authority 
to international and intergovernmental organizations.22 In most cases, an assessment of the prom-
inence of NSAs in international politics has been accompanied with criticism of state centered re-
alism and the claim that its neglect of non-state entities causes a growing rift between parsimony 
and explanatory power.23  
However, IR-literature has rarely explicitly discussed, whether NSAs can be alliance partners. 
Therefore, a first step will be the examination of their general role in international politics from a 
realist perspective and its reflection in alliance studies. Second, the examination turns to the de-
bate on terrorism, focusing on the challenge that transnationally operating violent NSAs pose to a 
realist understanding of international affairs and adequate state responses. If it is plausible that 
coherent adaptation is easier for states if the terrorist threat becomes attributable by state in-
volvement, sponsorship constitutes a functional equivalent of external balancing. 
To begin with, neorealist scholars have never denied NSA’s existence in international politics. 
According to Waltz, “states are not and never have been the only international actors” and the 
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“importance of non-state actors and the extent of transnational activities is obvious.”24 Neverthe-
less, an international-political system, allowing NSAs to rise stems from the major actors’ delib-
erate decision to “change rules that no longer suit them.”25 Accordingly, the importance of NSAs 
is limited to processes within the international system and challenges the central role of states on-
ly if they “develop to the point of rivaling or surpassing the great powers.”26 This notion is deep-
rooted in realist scholarship.27  
Remarkably, and despite their criticism of structural realists’ straightforward projection of their 
assumptions on how states adapt to structural changes while generally emphasizing the im-
portance of Innenpolitik features in alliance politics, neither David nor other representatives of 
Third World studies contest state-centrality in alliances.28 
 
Regarding the role of terrorist organizations in international politics, scholarship substantially in-
creased after 9/11.29 While the political relevance of this phenomenon is widely undisputed, the 
debate rekindled whether particularly neorealism could serve as a framework for understanding; 
a question of high relevance given the frequent use of terms prominent in realist thinking–most 
prominent the war on terror.30 On the one hand, realism can hardly explain the emergence of ter-
rorism without reducing it to a side effect of at least partial state failure (like transnational crime). 
On the other hand, several realist scholars have claimed that the mere presence of transnational 
terrorist actors neither replaces states as the main actors in the system nor overrides anarchy and 
the incentives it places on targeted states.  
 
Stephen Walt, for instance, claimed that especially to the actions of al-Qaeda, states have re-
sponded predictably.31 This became especially evident in the approach of the U.S. government af-
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ter 2001, employing “ostracism, coercion and elimination typical of all-out war”32 as the appro-
priate means to fight al-Qaeda. Thereby, Washington treated its non-state enemy largely equiva-
lent to an aggressive and openly hostile state, including preemptive military action and endorsing 
interstate alignments against terrorist groups, sponsoring states, and societal sympathizers. More-
over, it pushed for national and international legislation allowing for a maximum in foreign poli-
cy autonomy to implement these policies.33 A similar approach accompanies long established and 
recent counter-terrorist efforts by Israel, Russia, and Turkey.34 Despite all these efforts, the threat 
of transnational terrorism remains far from eradicated. In turn, most criticism of lacking effec-
tiveness draws on the notion that war implies military action in order to restore an imbalance of 
international power and regain national security.35  
 
From a realist point of view, the war on terror reflects a substantial mismatch between the securi-
ty challenges that states targeted by terrorism face and the strategy employed in response–a cru-
cial feature of policy failure. In order to shed more light on this argument, the following section 
turns to the threat terrorism poses to national security and gives a brief realist explanation for the 
ineffectiveness of military strategies. 
3.2.2 How terrorism affects national security 
To access the ability of terrorism to weaken and thus deter others from attacking, it’s necessary to 
take a look at its possible impact on those capabilities that are seen as essential to measure a 
state’s relative power position in the international system.36 
In contrast to other forms of political violence, terrorism is not aiming at defeating the enemy on 
the battlefield. Rather, its goal is to put those members of the targeted groups that are not imme-
diate victims of the attack “in a state of chronic fear (terror).”37 
Despite different opinions about the material effects of terrorism, analysts largely agree on its im-
pact on targeted societies and thus a state’s political capabilities. First, according to a study by 
Frey and others, the state of fear in areas affected by terrorism significantly reduces the people’s 
subjective well-being.38 Second, by challenging the state’s monopoly on the use of force and 
demonstrating its inability to provide universal security and protection of the physical integrity of 
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its citizens, it may harm the fundamental basis of control and legitimacy of the political leader-
ship.39  
Prompted to restore order within their borders or areas relevant to their security, states can find 
themselves manipulated by terrorists to deviate from initially preferred policies. Domestically, the 
government might decide to restrict political liberties or release convicted criminals from prisons 
in exchange for hostages. Internationally, good examples could be the withdrawal of military de-
ployments (e.g. USA from Lebanon in 1985 or Spain from Iraq in 2005), changed interstate 
alignment patterns or costly wars on areas of mere peripheral value to their national security.40 If 
societies limit their government’s choice of political strategies by demanding better protection and 
at times even revenge, terrorism has a significant influence on the state’s political capabilities. 
 
Several studies on the economic costs of terrorism have presented a rather mixed pattern of find-
ings: Apart from insurance claims and costs to rebuild infrastructure destroyed by terrorist attacks, 
there are significant negative effects on tourism in targeted countries. However, the effects vary 
considerably between targeted countries and the strategies pursued by the terrorist group attack-
ing them.41 Additionally, the inflow of foreign direct investment declines in affected countries due 
to higher costs for foreign-owned firms to protect their employees and their ability to move to 
more secure countries more easily than local enterprises.42 Countries affected by terrorism trade 
significantly less than others and terrorist campaigns influence saving and consumption behavior 
of the targeted population.43  
Some studies have shown that there is only a small negative association between terrorism and 
economic growth, especially in OECD countries. However, it makes a difference, as governments 
are more likely to divert their spending from investment to public expenditures securing them 
from terrorism.44 According to governmental sources, Turkey spent more than $300 billion due to 
infrastructural damage caused by terrorist attacks and increased military spending during the first 
25 years of its on-going conflict with the PKK.45 Although recent figures on national counterter-
rorism spending in the EU have not been published yet, an estimate can be made by looking at 
the fact that only the EU’s total estimated spending on non-military counterterrorism measures 
increased between 2002 and 2009 from approximately €5.7 million to about €93.5 million.46 As 
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can be seen, the effects of terrorism are considerable and it is highly unlikely that any government 
would remain deedless facing such a challenge.  
Yet, whether war is the appropriate answer to such a threat is another story, becoming especially 
apparent when comparing the effects of terrorism to those of comparable phenomena, such as 
transnational crime.47 
Therefore, even high-ranking U.S. foreign policy makers such as Richard Holbrooke and John 
Kerry, have repeatedly called for an understanding of the struggle against terrorism not as a war 
in the literal sense but as a metaphor comparable to the war on poverty. Hence, policy success is 
likely to be the result of “winning the ideological struggle so that people stop turning themselves 
into suicide bombers.”48 
3.2.3 Shadow boxing? Realism and the war against terrorism 
“Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until eve-
ry terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”49  
George W. Bush, September 2001 
 
When U.S. President Bush declared a war on terror in 2001, analysts were quickly to remind the 
public that this was not the first time the U.S. government had chosen to do so.50 But whereas 
Ronald Reagan mainly targeted “outlaw states,” such as Iran, Libya, and Cuba in a form of bal-
ancing aggressive state behavior in 1984, it is questionable whether military state action against a 
NSA constitutes an adequate response to systemic incentives. 
Walter Laqueur, for instance, clearly followed a neorealist notion, when stating that “the power 
of the state is infinitely greater than that of terrorists, and it will always prevail, provided there is 
the determination or ruthlessness to do so.”51 Hence, bearing in mind Bruce Hoffman’s claim that 
terrorism tries to “create power where there is none,”52 it appears plausible that the “shocking 
demonstration of power”53 analysts observed in the context of 9/11 did not reflect an actual shift 
in the systemic distribution of power capabilities but rather the mirage of such a process.  
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States that respond militarily to terrorism as an attempt to alter material power structures by the 
means of symbolic violence adhere to what Robert Jervis had described as the deterrence model of 
interstate conflict management and Randall Schweller as overbalancing.54 In this context, states as-
sume that conciliatory moves, such as negotiations with terrorists, will be taken for weakness by 
the adversary and encourage it to push for further concessions.55 Firmness, on the other hand, is 
likely to deter the potential aggressor from attacking (further).56 In the political reality of counter-
terrorism, Israel’s former ambassador to the UN, Benjamin Netanyahu, expressed this latter no-
tion impressively in 1986, stating, “the terrorist objective, of course, is not negotiation, but capitu-
lation.”57 
Others also argue that deterrence is doomed to failure as terrorists “lack a return address against 
which retaliation can be visited”58 and are seen by many as irrational and insensitive to systemic 
incentives encouraging security seeking.59 Under these circumstances, also cooperation with ter-
rorist organizations in the context of sponsorship seems highly unlikely, as the strategies of en-
couragement and restraint employed by states in the context of alliance management would be 
ineffectual.60  
 
By contrast, many scholars have rejected the notion of terrorist organizations as “madmen”61 and 
attributed them sufficient rationality to form “alliances”62 or “coalitions”63 between each other. 
According to Synder’s concept of deterrence by punishment, which had been applied to counter-
terrorism by Trager and Dessislava, targeted states can successfully deter a terrorist organization 
if both sides prefer the status quo to counterterrorist attacks.64 Given the anti-status quo orientation 
of most terrorist groups, deterrence can only be achieved if retaliation puts at risk non-political 
ends being valued more by the group than the political gains achieved from attacking, such as 
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“life, liberty, property, and social standing.”65 For example, Hizballah’s transformation into a po-
litical force in Lebanese domestic politics since the mid-1990s made the group more responsive to 
Israeli threats to carry the war to Lebanon. Hence, the group largely has refrained from firing 
rockets into Israel since the 2006 war.66  
 
The rise of NSAs in international security politics posed a challenge to the explanatory power of 
realist scholarship in the past decades. However, it has not invalidated realism as a framework for 
understanding how states respond to the actions of others, especially under conditions of incom-
plete information about the capacity and intentions of others. Particularly the elusive power a 
state faces in the context of terrorism makes it difficult to counter the threat in an adequate man-
ner, thereby risking engaging in a costly strategy of overbalancing. By singling out specific targets 
and thereby encouraging disagreement over the nature and proximity of the threat among poten-
tial allies, terrorism impedes interstate cooperation.67 In this context, military action might even 
backfire if third parties–not convinced of the latter’s aggressive intentions–understand the state’s 
balancing efforts as a pretext for expansionist moves.68 In the case of the war on terror, the most 
outspoken criticism came from Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad calling the 9/11 attacks 
“a big lie and a pretext for the war on terror and a prelude to invading Afghanistan.”69 Such a 
backfiring effect also entailed the 2003 war on Iraq–an example for unilateral military retaliation 
against alleged state supporters of terrorism.70 
 
Regarding the key question whether NSAs can be included in neorealist alliance theory, one 
might conclude the following: Providing that sponsors see themselves in a position to put re-
straint on the group by issuing credible threats of realignment or encourage it by increasing the 
group’s perception of one’s loyalty, they are expected to manage sponsorship for terrorist organi-
zations in a way corresponding to interstate alliances. Supposedly, this is most likely to be the 
case if their support is decisive for securing a group’s capacity to attack their political targets and 
the mentioned non-political ends. Thus, the remainder of this chapter turns to the question under 
what conditions such a leverage arises, how state sponsorship of terrorism relates to the support-
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ing state’s cost/benefit calculations vis-à-vis international and domestic security challenges, and 
how states respond to entrapment and abandonment risks in such alliances. 
 
3.3 Sponsorship as a functional equivalent to interstate alliances 
The following section turns to four previously reviewed realist assumptions on interstate alliances 
and applies them to state sponsorship of terrorism.  
First, neorealists claim that states form alliances in order to strive for increased security and, par-
ticularly, as a deterrent against external actor(s) posing a threat to all potential allies. Although 
the group’s motivation to enter an alliance with a potential sponsor will be of secondary im-
portance in this study, their potential security gains from the alignment will be assessed in order 
to unveil the leverage state sponsors are expected to have over their protégés. Second and third, 
Snyder and others have carved out the costs and benefits states have to calculate before entering 
an alliance instead of internal balancing. In turn, David and others, stress the need to supplement 
these calculations by domestic security calculations in order to increase the explanatory power of 
realist approaches. Hence, this section discusses the security trade-offs expected in the context of 
state sponsorship in comparison to those present in interstate alliances. The fourth section devel-
ops a classification of supporting strategies. 
3.3.1 What terrorist groups need support for 
 “To be effective, an underground organization needs a stream of money and information, 
new recruits, printing facilities, secret medical help for the wounded, transportation, places 
to hide, and–more than anything else–the readiness of the surrounding population not to 
give its members away. Many, many people must give it at best tacit support.”71  
Uri Avnery, August 1997 
 
Experts argue that the life expectancy of terrorist organizations is relatively low. This is not only 
the case because of counterterrorism efforts and persecution but also because they are prone to in-
ternal conflict and often fail to establish solid structures of support.72 According to Uri Avnery 
cited above and the famous analogy of Mao Zedong about guerilla warfare that "the people are 
like water and the army is like fish,"73 the surrounding population plays a key role in securing the 
group’s survivability and the effectiveness of its attacks. On the assumption that effectiveness in 
this context equates to being able to plan, organize and launch violent attacks on instrumental 
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targets over a longer period of time, four imperatives are placed at the center of attention: Surviv-
ing, Training, Attacking, and Recruiting (STAR, Table 3).74 
Table 3: Non-political values terrorists hold 
SURVIVING: Apart from internal fragmentation and the erosion of its community of support, persecu-
tion and military retaliation pose the biggest and immediate threats to the survival of a 
terrorist organization. To avoid extradition, punishment, and destruction of organiza-
tional infrastructure, they need constituencies providing cover or even deterring targeted 
groups from retaliating against detected culprits. 
TRAINING: The individuals recruited have to be politically, ideologically, and militarily, instructed.  
ATTACKING: As one important part of the definition of terrorism is the instrumentality of the targets 
of violence, access to the targets selected is vital for success and survival of the group. 
RECRUITING: In order to survive, terrorist organizations need to have a certain political appeal and the 
organizational infrastructure, e.g. offices, in order to recruit a sufficient number of po-
tential fighters and generate a pool of sympathizers and supporters from their respective 
community.  
 
Beyond the support of the local population, there are several sources of external backing likely to 
increase the group’s life expectancy and efficiency significantly, touching on all four imperatives.  
External support has a strong effect on the dynamics of insurgency and a targeted state’s capabil-
ity to overcome a terrorist challenge–politically or militarily.75 Especially in the case of salient 
transnational identities–among others tribal, ethnic, religious or ideological–, terrorist organiza-
tions are likely to find a supporting population outside the borders of the targeted state.76 Among 
those societal transnational constituencies, diaspora communities play the biggest role especially 
in funding terrorist organizations with a similar ethnic or religious profile in their respective 
homelands.77 A second group of constituencies are ethnically or religiously similar communities 
in neighboring or even foreign countries willing to provide a safe haven for the group’s fighters, 
support its organizational structure with private donations, or pressure their governments not to 
engage actively in counterterrorism initiatives.78  
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The transition between societal and governmental support is often seamless. In most cases, gov-
ernments enable external societal support due to their inability to control or put a halt to it, taking 
on a role of passive facilitators turning a blind eye to local fundraising, recruits crossings borders 
on their way to training camps or operations, or fighters seeking security from persecution.79 
Moreover, intentional state support for terrorist organizations should take the STAR-imperatives 
into account to a much larger extent when formulating policies of assistance. In this context, ana-
lysts have frequently identified four specific types of external state sponsorship: hosting, military 
support, financial assistance, and endorsement. To what extent they touch on the group’s non-
political values will be examined as follows. 
3.3.1.1 Hosting 
Governments that actively host terrorist groups on their territory or connive to unobstructed shel-
tering of terrorists in areas under their control have revealed a mixed idea of groups recruiting 
members within their borders in the past. In the second half of the 1980s, Iran, for instance, ob-
jected PKK’s propaganda work among local Kurds out of fears of separatism, while Pakistan ac-
tively encouraged the recruitment of Afghan refugees into the anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghani-
stan. In a similar vein, Saudi Arabia became, tolerated by the government, a major recruitment 
base for al-Qaeda in the late 1990s.80 Furthermore, having a safe haven allows the political lead-
ership of the group to develop transnational recruitment strategies and train these recruits in facil-
ities out of reach of most counterterrorism measures. Additionally, hosting plays an important 
role for groups planning and preparing attacks abroad, especially when it includes providing the 
organization with travel documents or access to embassies. Finally, due to the principle of sover-
eignty, a statist host can deter most targeted states from retaliating militarily and restrict persecu-
tion by rejecting to extradite suspects or fugitive fighters.81 
3.3.1.2 Military support 
By providing terrorist organizations with intelligence and weapons, or tolerate arms deliveries to 
groups operating within their borders, governments not only increase the effectiveness of terrorist 
attacks but also indirectly their appeal to potential recruits. In the case of Fatah, enrolment report-
edly increased from 2,000 to nearly 15,000 in three months after the first demonstration of its 
fighting power at the Battle of Karamah in March 1968, where it had enjoyed substantial assis-
tance by Jordanian troops.82 A statist military supporter can either train fighters directly through 
members of its own security forces, like the Iranian Revolutionary Guards that instructed Hizbal-
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lah fighters in Lebanon after 1982, or allow groups operating within its borders to hand their ex-
pertise on to other groups in training camps on territory controlled by it.83 By choosing the latter 
strategy, Syria, for instance, enabled the Japanese Red Army, the German Red Army Faction, 
and others to receive training by Palestinian factions in the Bekaa Valley during its military occu-
pation of Lebanon.84 Additionally, a government can also tolerate groups to build up training fa-
cilities by themselves and run them autonomously, as seen in Afghanistan before the 9/11 at-
tacks.85 Finally, military support can also increase a group’s capacity to survive retaliation by tar-
geted states. In the Lebanon war in summer 2006, Israel was not able to destroy Hizballah’s mili-
tary capability as prior arms deliveries by Iran allowed the group to retaliate with heavy missile 
fire at towns in northern Israel.86  
3.3.1.3 Financial support  
Governments that offer financial patronage to a group help it to build up and sustain the neces-
sary infrastructure to recruit new fighters. In addition, financial assistance enables the organiza-
tion to deepen its roots in its respective community by establishing social programs or launching 
propaganda and media campaigns. In 1991 for instance, Iran reportedly supported the establish-
ment of Hizballah’s al-Manar TV-station with $1 million.87 External funding also allows terrorist 
organizations to acquire weapons from third parties, fake IDs, vehicles, or hideouts rented in the 
targeted area, further increasing the effectiveness of attacks.88 States can also help groups financial-
ly that need to build up and run training facilities or cover the allowances of fighters. Finally, fi-
nancial support increases a group’s longevity, bolstering its organizational structure and enabling 
its members to evade punishment.89 
3.3.1.4 Endorsement 
Public meetings with high-ranking government officials emphasize the mutual commitment and 
support whereas public manifestations of solidarity can also help to lift a group’s political aims to 
the international agenda.90 States that explicitly support terrorist organizations by backing their 
goals diplomatically assist it generally in two ways. First, sponsoring regimes can use their do-
mestic regional or even global influence to endorse a group’s political aims and picture their at-
tacks as legitimate acts of resistance or struggle against an illegitimate enemy and thus limit the 
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targeted country’s leeway to persecute or retaliate against the attack’s perpetrator (surviving).91 Se-
cond, the recognition of the group’s cause by state leaders is likely to increase its appeal among 
the sponsoring state’s residents and their readiness to join the ranks of the organization (recruiting) 
or to financially support them through societal donations, thus funding the group’s build-up of in-
frastructure for training and attacking. Both effects are reflected in Turkey’s increasing endorse-
ment of Hamas since Khaled Mashal’s first official visit to Ankara in early 2006. Refusing to la-
bel Hamas a terrorist organization, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and other officials re-
peatedly called Israeli military retaliation against Hamas “terrorism” and, in November 2012, Is-
rael a “terrorist state.”92 Simultaneously, Turkish societal actors like the IHH Humanitarian Relief 
Foundation stepped up their support for Hamas, including the donation of some $25 million for 
infrastructure projects in Gaza and, most prominently, the Gaza flotilla in May 2010.93  
Conclusively, substantial security gains for terrorist organizations resulting from their alignment 
with states in all four dimensions of state support can be maintained, as illustrated in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10: Security gains of state sponsorship  
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3.3.2 A bird in a gilded cage: The alliance security dilemma from a terrorist perspective  
As the material capabilities, political power, and influence of states exceed those of societal sup-
porters by far, they constitute those external constituencies most helpful and valuable to terrorist 
organizations.94 In contrast to societal supporters, which are in most cases forced to limit their 
support to material–especially financial–assistance and political lobbying, states are able to pro-
vide a much wider range of support. It is therefore expected that active state support gives proté-
gés a comparative advantage over ‘independent’ groups in all four stages of military or political 
activity (STAR) mentioned above.  
3.3.2.1 Costs of sponsorship for the supported group 
In the context of the alliance theory outlined above, the decisive role of statist backing for the 
group’s non-political values (STAR) provides sponsors with substantial leverage in intra-
alignment relations. Before turning to the question how sponsoring states adjust support strate-
gies to their specific security needs, this section addresses the security risks for the group stem-
ming from the alignment. It may be argued that these are not only quite considerable but also re-
semble those that especially vulnerable states face when forming alliances (see 2.3.3.2)  
First, a group’s affiliation with a state is likely to foreclose receiving support from other govern-
ments if they are in conflict with the group’s main backer. Despite many moderate Arab states 
exhibit officially a hostile stand against Israel, their understanding of Hizballah as an instrument 
of Iranian hegemony seeking explained, for instance, Saudi Arabia’s unprecedentedly harsh criti-
cism of the group during the 2006 Lebanon War.95  
Second, state support puts substantial constraints on the group’s freedom of action, both due to a 
general need for coordination in alliances and (most) states’ capacity and willingness to control 
the group’s activity.96 For instance, Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan, increased control over Palestin-
ian refugee camps on their territory after 1965 and prevented cross-border raids into Israel, in or-
der to avoid military retaliation.97  
Third, concessions regarding the timing and targeting of attacks might also undermine the 
group’s reputation among its constituency and weaken it against both targets and rivals. If the 
group belongs to a larger movement, support provides its adversaries with an argument to expose 
the organization as a mere puppet of a foreign power without a genuine legitimacy to act on be-
half of its proclaimed constituency.98 In the case of the exiled Iranian Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organ-
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ization (MEK), the group’s failure to find broad support among the local population resulted to a 
large extent from its known alignment with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88).99  
Hence, it should be highlighted that terrorist groups are also able to extract security gains from 
engaging with a statist backer which exceed the benefits of other options by far. Relying on socie-
tal backers or criminal activity in order to maintain sufficient levels of effectiveness requires a 
much more sophisticated organizational structure and mobility and is–if not occurring as a side 
effect of state failure–highly unlikely to be successful without at least passive state support. How-
ever, sponsorship entails autonomy losses that at times even threaten the group’s very existence 
of the group. As in the case of interstate alliances, this is most likely if the sponsor’s security envi-
ronment changes considerably and realignment looms.  
3.3.2.2 When terrorists fall prey to international politics 
As anarchy prevails, terrorist groups enjoying state support face the constant risk of falling prey to 
interstate conciliation and rapprochement. Transferring again Snyder’s ideas on alliance man-
agement to informal alliance politics, one can distinguish between four forms of statist abandon-
ment:100 
First, states can officially end their support of the group because of realignment with the former 
adversary. In 2009, for instance, Iraq expelled MEK from its territory due to a rapprochement 
with Tehran after the ousting of Saddam Hussein.101 
Second, states can also abrogate cooperation with the group without immediately realigning with 
the adversary if international and domestic costs of support outweigh the benefits stemming from 
it. Such de-alignments occurred, for example, in the course of the 1983 expulsion of the Abu Ni-
dal Organization from Iraq or the ban of Hamas in Jordan in 1999.102 
In contrast to these practices of official termination of cooperation, other forms of abandonment 
do not require a specific act of abrogation:  
Third, sponsors can de facto abandon their protégés by deliberately failing to fulfill specific 
(though mostly vague) commitments. For instance, Iran refrained from entering the wars in Leb-
anon 2006 and Gaza 2008/09, despite strong rhetoric support for Hamas and Hizballah and agi-
tation towards Israel.  
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Fourth, states can disappoint expectations raised from a general ideological, political, or ethnic 
kinship by failing to provide support for the group in conflict with its adversary. On this end of 
the continuum, we find cases of attacks on the group tolerated by the ally, as for example Iraq’s 
indifference towards both Jordan-PLO clashes in 1970 and the 1982 Syrian crackdown on the 
Muslim Brotherhood in 1982.103  
With regard to the research questions addressing the causes of such policy shifts, it is additionally 
necessary to examine the relation between state sponsorship and the sponsor’s security environ-
ment and the respective cost/benefit calculations.  
3.3.3 State sponsorship and the security dilemma 
Although terms like ‘axis of evil’ suggest a sense of irrationality, there is a broad consensus that 
state sponsorship of terrorism is no “uncaused” policy, strongly connected to interstate relations, 
and an instrument of national security policy.104 Hence, the following section examines the bene-
fits and costs of sponsorship, especially in contrast to other internal and external forms of balanc-
ing international and domestic security threats. 
3.3.3.1 Benefits of sponsorship 
State sponsorship of terrorism is considered a cost-effective alliance for several reasons: Providing 
a group with the necessary capability to attack does not require much, as, for instance, the belts 
used in suicide attacks are available for some $5,000.105 Indeed, even high financial support like 
the estimated $50 to $100 million Iran reportedly provided to Hizballah in 2003 made up for only 
3 percent of its overall military expenditure that year.106 By comparison, Iran’s assistance for the 
pressured Syrian president Bashar al-Asad against the internal uprising and respective interna-
tional sanctions amounted to an estimated $1 billion between mid-2011 and early 2012.107 In the 
context of sponsorship, particularly weak military powers can gain significant concessions from 
their adversaries without having to increase defense spending or employ military action.108 
Finally, teaming up with a terrorist organization cannot only deter opponents from retaliating 
against the group but also from attacking the sponsoring state if they fear in return terrorist cam-
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paigns against their own citizens in return. As in the context of other alliances, sponsors can vir-
tually overcome substantial geographic distances and compensate, for instance, a lack of aircraft 
carriers or long-range missiles.109 Accordingly, sponsorship alignments played a role regarding 
both the expected costs of an Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities and a Turkish or inter-
national military intervention into Syria in the course of the ongoing civil war.110 
As in the case of interstate alliances, alignment provides states in most cases with increased influ-
ence over the organization, especially if it is operating on territory under the sponsor’s control. In 
order to maintain Iranian assistance, for instance, the PKK leadership comparatively spared Teh-
ran from rhetorical condemnation as an occupier of Kurdish lands and praised in 1990, despite its 
secular-Marxist outlook, the accomplishments of the Islamic Revolution.111 Furthermore, states 
can use their intra-alignment leverage to preclude a rapprochement between the group and the 
targeted state, inter alia by diverting assistance to radical factions or encouraging internal over-
throw. Correspondingly, Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad and other rejectionist Arab leaders sup-
ported anti-Arafat factions within PLO in order to prevent the leadership from realigning with the 
pro-Western Arab moderates after the 1979 Camp David Accords.112 
In addition, sponsorship provides governments with both material and immaterial ability to 
strengthen themselves against domestic opponents. On the one hand, terrorist campaigns includ-
ing assassinations can literally demobilize domestic opposition and deter still undecided parts of 
the targeted group from joining it. In a crackdown on domestic Kurdish dissent in the early 1990s, 
for instance, both Iraq and Iran reportedly resorted to MEK and Hizballah respectively as a re-
cruitment pool for mercenaries.113 On the other hand, if the group is part of a larger movement 
enjoying substantial support among society and key domestic players, leaders can bolster their 
domestic position by championing the group’s cause and sideline oppositional forces as harming 
the national cause.114 In Jordan, for instance, the political and socioeconomic integration of hun-
dreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees had failed after 1948 and their criticism of the monar-
chy mounted throughout the 1960s.115 Hence, pressured King Hussein aimed at boosting his do-
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mestic popularity by endorsing the Palestinian’s ‘popular liberation’ war, declaring, “We’re all 
Fedayeen.”116 
Despite its informal character as well as the involvement of NSAs, sponsorship touches on all 
benefits of interstate alliance formation to a certain extent. In order to compare them systemati-
cally with formal interstate alignments, this section turns to the question whether such alignments 
also parallel the negative consequences of interstate alliance formation. 
3.3.3.2 Costs of sponsorship 
“Unlimited, I repeat, unlimited solidarity.”117  
Gerhard Schroeder, September 2001 
 
Just as other forms of capability aggregation, sponsorship is expected to trigger counterbalancing 
measures on the side of their adversaries. First, it could cause counter alliances to emerge: Irani-
an and U.S. cooperation against the Taliban regime, for instance, was largely unexpected prior to 
the 9/11 attacks and Iraq’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood intended to pressure Syria into 
realignment in the Iran-Iraq War, but pushed it even closer towards Iran.118 In a broader sense, 
sponsors risk to be excluded from the community of shared values and face regional or interna-
tional isolation as well as economic and political pressure and sanctions.119 
Regarding increased armament by their adversaries as a second unintended consequence of 
alignment, the negative effects of sponsorship might vary: In most countries, counterterrorism 
measures are implemented by members of security services, police officers, and judges. Thus, in-
creased spending on policing and intelligence should rather be the case than conventional or even 
offensive weapons. West Germany, for instance, increased its total spending for domestic security 
between 1969 and 1975 from approx. DEM3 to DEM6 billion in reaction to the Red Army Fac-
tion’s bombings and other attacks on government officials and public institutions.120 Military ex-
penditure, by contrast, remained relatively stable, increasing from DM8.7 billion in 1969 to 
DM11.4 billion six years later.121 
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However, this effect is completely reversed if the targeted state perceives terrorist attacks as a 
threat that can at least be reduced by military force.122 Counterterrorism/-insurgency policies that 
include air or even drone strikes against training camps and the long-term deployment of troops 
in potential areas of retreat lead to growing military spending that not only increases the overall 
military power of the targeted country but also its offensive capabilities. Turkey, for instance, 
shifted its strategy towards the PKK dramatically in 1993, redeploying mass contingents of troops 
and sophisticated weaponry from the Greek-Turkish border area to the southeast, the immediate 
neighborhood of Syria, the PKK’s most crucial external supporter at that time.123 As such an un-
derstanding of fighting a war on terror paves the way for a predominantly military strategy it is 
likely to increase if a link between the terrorist challenge and an international backer has been 
successfully established.  
 
 “There will be no sanctuary for terrorists. We will defend our people, our interests and our 
values.”124 
William H. Clinton, August 1998 
 
In some cases, counterbalancing can also take the form of interstate escalation, boosting the 
sponsor’s commitment costs substantially. 
The risk of interstate escalation is even higher if the group’s confidence, enhanced by the state’s 
backing, causes it to act heedless and aggressively towards the adversary. In September 1970, rad-
ical PLO factions backed by Syria stepped up their campaign against the Jordanian king, includ-
ing an assassination attempt and the coordinated hijacking and destruction of international pas-
senger planes in Jordan. In order to protect PLO forces from the wrath of King Hussein in ensu-
ing clashes, Syria intervened militarily and suffered heavy losses to its ground forces. In addition, 
a regional war including Israel could be averted in the very last minute.125 
 
Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982, the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986, and the U.S. 
missile strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 show that states targeted by terrorist at-
tacks have more than once decided to escalate latent conflicts with states they suspect to actively 
assist the perpetrators.126 Sponsors run the risk of sacrificing vast resources, including the lives of 
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their citizens, even if the targeted population tends to see military strikes against them as dispro-
portionate because the fatalities generally exceed the number of victims of the terrorist attack.127  
Nevertheless, several studies on the rally-‘round-the-flag effect have stressed that foreign policy lati-
tude of the state is generally higher in the context of an immediate security threat in general and 
recent terrorist attacks in particular.128 The events after 9/11 showed, how the disclosure of a de-
liberate backer could help governments to rally domestic as well as international support for a 
military campaign and for turning “anger to resolution.”129 In January 2002, more than 89 per-
cent of the U.S. population supported the attack on Afghanistan and amid a major PKK offen-
sive in the second half of the 1990s, a majority of the Turkish population approved of military co-
ercion to pressure Damascus into ending its support for the group.130 In a similar vein, only after 
PKK operations launched from northern Iraq killed 13 Turkish soldiers within one week in early 
October 2007, the parliament granted the government the right for trans-border operations for the 
first time since 1974.131  
 
As alliances, sponsorship puts certain constraints on the backer’s freedom of action and policy 
options both in the domestic and the international arena. In the context of path dependency, this 
is especially the case if the regime has linked support to its legitimacy and self-image. In Pakistan, 
for instance, governmental assistance for Muslim rebels operating in India’s disputed Kashmir 
province became not only an instrument to bolster domestic legitimacy, but also to mobilize reli-
gious sentiment behind the political leadership. Despite high international pressure in the context 
of the war on terror, then-president Musharraf referred to these domestic constraints as crucial 
during his address to the nation on January 13, 2002, declaring, “No Pakistani can afford to sever 
links with Kashmir. We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support for 
Kashmiris.”132 Furthermore, this domestically generated ‘obligation to commit’ limited the gov-
ernment’s freedom of action regarding any substantial concessions granted to India, least of all a 
rapprochement or realignment. 
 
Approaching Snyder’s final feature of alliance costs, governments might weaken their own do-
mestic position through sponsorship. Such costs occur if the government violates international or 
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Journal of International Studies 8, no. November (2008): 70; Jürgen Gottschlich. "What Turkey Wants From Iraq - and 
the US."  Der Spiegel (2007). Published electronically October 18. http://bit.ly/1nEiUs7. Accessed January 31, 2014. 
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even national law by supporting a group designated as terrorist organizations. Although im-
peachment proceedings against U.S. President Reagan for breaching the 1982 Boland Amend-
ment, outlawing the Contras in Nicaragua as well as their external backing, did not exceed several 
hearings and the appointment of a special persecutor, his popularity dropped significantly in the 
aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair.133 Furthermore, support can also cause domestic costs if assis-
tance to the group is not contrary to national law, but if there is substantial dissent about whether 
the alignment serves the national interest. At times, Iran’s high and vocal commitment to the vio-
lent Palestinian struggle against Israel sparked substantial protests among the youth and public 
figures. Corresponding demands regarding Hizballah reoccurred in the course of the 2005 earth-
quakes, as residents complained that the government “would be quicker in sending support if the 
earthquake had been in Gaza or southern Lebanon,” as well as in the course of the 2006 Israeli-
Hizballah War.134 
 
Putting these observations in perspective, numerous parallels to the costs and benefits of inter-
state alliances examined in chapter 2.3.3 can be maintained. As it requires limited state resources 
and offers strong incentives for both sides to keep commitments generally opaque, sponsorship 
also strongly resembles the policy of external rebel support as a means to balance an external 
threat often preferred by domestically vulnerable states.135 Furthermore, this policy is in a much 
stronger sense related to interstate conflict and increases both the risk of counterbalancing and the 
escalation of latent conflicts.  
 
The calculations regarding the domestic arena present us with a likewise mixed pattern as both in 
the international realm as well as in the context of interstate alliances: On the one hand, sponsor-
ship is a policy understood as “evil” in a nearly universal sense, given the negative connotation of 
the terrorist act (see 1.4.1). Hence, state sponsors not only breach international but also national 
law and risk domestic reputation losses. As there is no consensus on the question of who is a ter-
rorist, on the other, governments can boost their legitimacy by supporting freedom fighters if key 
groups in society share their notion of who is not a terrorist. Nevertheless, a state’s deliberate ex-
posure to counterbalancing is likely to threaten this consensus and to trigger societal rejection of 
the concessions that come along with sponsorship. Table 4 concludes these findings as follows. 
 
 
                                                       
133 Frank Newport et al. "Ronald Reagan From the People’s Perspective: A Gallup Poll Review."  Gallup News Service 
(2004). Published electronically June 7. http://bit.ly/1eqMT2J. Accessed January 31, 2014; "Articles of 
Impeachment introduced, but given no chance of passage," Associated Press, March 5 1987. 
134 Michael Slackman. "Turmoil in the Middle East: Tehran; In the Streets, Aid to Hezbollah Stirs Iranian Fear and 
Resentment."  New York Times (2006): 6. Published electronically July 23. http://nyti.ms/1brHyJD. Accessed 
January 31, 2014; Karim Sadjadpour, "How Relevant is the Iranian Street?," The Washington Quarterly 30, no. 1 
(2007): 79, 154. 
135 Maoz and San-Akca, "Rivalry and State Support."; Cunningham et al., "Explaining External Support."; David, 
"Explaining Third World Alignment," 241. 
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Table 4: State sponsorship of terrorism: Expected costs and benefits  
 Benefits Costs 
EXTERNAL SECURITY    
ENVIRONMENT 
− Enables states to weaken/reap 
concessions from adversaries 
while conserving power resources 
− Creates “proximity by proxy,” 
thereby increasing offensive capa-
bilities of the sponsor  
− (Open) alignment can deter an 
adversary from conventionally at-
tacking by issuing credible threats 
of ensuing terrorist campaigns 
− Triggers external counterbalanc-
ing (sanctions, reputational loss, 
military action, counteralliances) 
− Triggers internal counterbalanc-
ing and increases offensive mili-
tary capabilities of the target  
− (Open) alignment can increase 
the targeted state’s resolve and 
popular support for retaliation 
DOMESTIC SECURITY  
ENVIRONMENT 
− Increases the state’s domestic 
power resources to repress (para-
military force) 
− Increases the state’s domestic 
power resources to co-opt by in-
voking transnational solidarity 
− Increases domestic polarization 
if there is no legal or societal 
consensus about support 
− Path-dependency limits options 
for realignment as betrayal of the 
transnational cause 
EXTERNAL/DOMESTIC  
SECURITY ENVIRON-
MENT 
− Allows for increased influ-
ence/control over a larger insur-
gency movement 
− High risk of entrapment into the 
intrastate conflict 
 
3.4 When do states decide to sponsor? 
As in the case of interstate alignment, there is no structural feature, which definitely conveys 
when states choose sponsorship over other forms of security policy. Furthermore, these strategies 
are not mutually exclusive. Yet again, this study suggests integrating the unit-level factor of au-
tonomy in general and regime vulnerability in particular as a conditional variable in order to ex-
plain why states resort to sponsorship in contrast to directly confronting their adversaries. 
 
As other forms of external balancing, sponsorship allows for relative power gains and a simulta-
neous preservation of national resources, which is especially vital for vulnerable states lacking in-
ternal mobilization capacity. Moreover, the mostly informal and secretive character of this coop-
eration reduces the risk of international reputation loss, which could foreclose alternative alliance 
options and entail counterbalancing. While complete secrecy minimizes the deterrent character of 
sponsorship, exposure carries a high risk of becoming an international pariah or even target of 
military retaliation.  
Therefore, sponsors might find themselves at times in a conflict of interest between successfully 
deterring a rival and avoiding international counterbalancing that is quite similar to interstate al-
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liances. Nevertheless, these forms of cooperation require a mutual commitment for support to 
avoid abandonment and defeat; thus, a–limited–mobilization of resources. In contrast to inter-
state alliances, the concessions that states have to grant their non-state partners are in most cases 
vague, informal, and thus relatively favorable to the sponsor. Therefore, allying with a terrorist 
organization can serve as a substitute for both interstate alliances costly in the domestic arena and 
internal balancing.136 
This changes remarkably if states, aiming to deter external rivals appease domestic rivals or in-
crease their mobilization capacity, decide to openly align with the group. First, international 
counterbalancing is likely to be accompanied by domestic costs–indirect concessions–caused for 
instance by economic sanctions or military retaliation that are expected to undermine the gov-
ernment’s legitimacy and power position among business elites and the army. Second, once the 
government has established its assistance to the group as a source of domestic mobilization ca-
pacity, the costs of realignment might rise to an unprecedented level.137 Therefore, it can be main-
tained that state sponsorship of terrorism bears high resemblance to formal interstate alliances in 
terms of costs and benefits, despite the fact that it includes NSAs and mostly informal, secretive 
patterns of cooperation.  
 
In chapter 1.3 and 1, the study consecutively examined those questions that need to be addressed 
in order to advance realist alliance theory amid rapid changes in the security environment of 
states. By resorting to neoclassical realism and systematically tying system- and unit-level con-
cepts of the security dilemma together in the context of alliance formation and management, for-
eign policy analysts can increase the explanatory power of realist approaches to security coopera-
tion beyond the mere justification of policy mistakes (cf. 2.3.4 and 2.4.4). As state sponsorship of 
terrorism has not been thoroughly examined in the context of alliance theory so far, the previous 
chapter turned in a systematic manner to theoretical and analytical impediments for a straight-
forward integration, most notably the opaque and informal nature of cooperation and the non-
state character of the ally (cf. 3.1 and 3.2). 
Resorting to these determinants of alliance and sponsorship behavior, the following section revis-
its the research questions raised in section 1.5: 
1. Under what conditions do governments choose to support terrorist organizations as a 
supplement or alternative to e.g. armament or interstate alliance formation? 
2. How do states manage their relations with terrorist organizations in comparison to inter-
state alliance politics? 
3. How to explain increased commitment, shifts in sponsorship emphases, and realignment 
by the supporting state? 
                                                       
136 Walt, The Origins of Alliances: 30; San Akca, "Supporting Non-State Armed Groups," 595. 
137 Anat Kurz, Interview by author, Institute for National Security Studies, September 5, 2010. See also Navin A. Bapat, 
"Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups," British Journal of Political Science 42, no. 1 (2012). 
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Regarding question 1, the previously developed theoretical framework suggests three assumptions, 
which are also illustrated in Figure 11. 
 
The Neorealist Hypothesis I (N1) argues that the greater the adversary’s power capabilities, the greater 
the tendency for the state to balance against it. This balancing hypothesis is directly derived 
from Walt’s balance-of-threat theory.138 
The Neoclassical Realist Hypothesis I (NC1) claims that the greater the state’s domestic vulnerability, 
the greater the tendency to balance the adversary externally. This alliance-seeking hypothesis fol-
lows the assumption that regime vulnerability entails a bias towards external balancing. 
The Neoclassical Realist Hypothesis II (NC2) assumes that the greater the state’s domestic vulnera-
bility, the greater the tendency for the state to balance the adversary by sponsoring terrorism. This 
sponsorship hypothesis reflects the contention that domestically vulnerable states are lim-
ited in both their internal and external balancing options and find themselves inclined 
more often than others to form sponsorship alignments. 
 
 
Figure 11: Causal chain suggested by the hypotheses N1, NC1, and NC2 
 
Regarding the questions 2 and 3, it is vital to take again the alliance dilemma into consideration. 
3.5 Sponsorship and the alliance dilemma  
Once established, states (and terrorist organizations) can expect to reap the benefits of their coop-
eration. However, these benefits could be short-lived given the substantial risk outlined above. 
Drawing on Snyder’s concept of an alliance security dilemma (ASD), sponsors are assumedly ad-
justing their sponsorship policy to a sponsorship security dilemma (SSD) if changes in their interna-
tional and/or domestic security environment disrupt the “optimum balance.”139 The following 
section provides an analytical framework including specific roles sponsors assume in the context 
of adjustment.  
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3.5.1 Abandonment risks in sponsorship relations 
Sponsors are most likely to fear abandonment if the conflict with a significantly stronger external 
adversary is severe and other responsive measures (such as interstate alignment or armament) are 
not, or only under substantial domestic risks, available. Such fears mount if the allied group is 
capable of assisting the state in meeting the threat, enjoys sufficient support from other backers, 
which allows it to minimize its material dependency on the state, is not bound to a formal 
agreement, and has little strategic interest in the state’s defense.140 Parallel to interstate alliances, 
a policy of standing firm is likely to emerge from these conditions, comprising increased material 
and rhetoric commitment to the group.141 In this case, with both public endorsement and material 
support being high, the state sponsor assumes the role of a Brother in Arms. 
3.5.2 Entrapment risks in sponsorship relations 
In turn, sponsorship might also trigger counterbalancing and interstate conflict escalation.142 A 
strategy of standing firm could further increase this risk as it encourages (and enables) the group 
to become more assertive towards its targets, prompting retaliatory strikes. This is even more the 
case as these alignments inhibit a variety of conflicting interests with the adversary. For example, 
despite considerable levels of support for ethno-nationalist Palestinian groups and their actions 
against Israel, credible doubts concerning Arab commitment to the creation of an independent 
Palestinian state manifested themselves in the bilateral land for peace agreements of 1979 (Egypt) 
and 1994 (Jordan). If military escalation is not the sponsor’s preferred strategy choice and de-
pendence on the group is decreasing, fears of entrapment are likely to occur and lead to a policy of 
restraint, by either withholding support or issuing threats of realignment. This could result from 
conciliatory overtures by the adversary, a shift in intra-alliance power symmetry in favor of the 
sponsor, or the emergence of alternative alliance options. Hence, a sponsor gradually denying 
both material and rhetoric support to the ally is assuming the role of a Defector.143 
Deducted from Snyder’s neorealist theory of alliance politics and as illustrated in Figure 12, two 
hypotheses regarding the sponsoring state’s policy choices can be established: 
The Neorealist Hypothesis II (N2) argues that the greater a sponsoring state’s fear of alliance aban-
donment, the greater the tendency to strengthen its commitment, stand firm vis-à-vis the adversary, 
and to take on the sponsorship role of a Brother in Arms. This standing firm hypothesis clearly 
follows Snyder’s assumption that states adjust their alliance commitment to incentives 
from the ASD. 
                                                       
140 This could be the case, for instance, if the group does not need the state for strategic retreat or as a rear front against 
the enemy  
141 Kirchner, Allianz mit dem Terror. 
142 Salehyan, "No shelter here." 
143 In contrast to any other state not supporting the group, being designated a defector requires–as in the case of defected 
soldiers–some kind of prior affiliation/alignment with the group.  
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The Neorealist Hypothesis III (N3) claims that the greater a sponsoring state’s fear of alliance entrap-
ment, the greater the tendency to weaken its commitment, conciliate the adversary, and take on the 
sponsorship role of a Defector. Also this restraining hypothesis is derived from Snyder’s as-
sumption that fears of being inadvertently entrapped in the conflict between its ally and 
the adversary will reflect in corresponding policy shifts–even to the point of realignment.  
 
 
Figure 12: Causal chain suggested by the hypotheses N2 and N3 
 
However, as frequently observed in interstate alliance politics as well as in a number of historical 
cases, most instances of sponsorship lie somewhat between the ideal types of Brother in Arms and 
Defector, constituting hybrid types of sponsorship. 
 
In 2001, Paul Pillar straightforwardly tackled this grey area and named the group enablers. In a 
more specified way, Byman distinguished the cases between strong and no support along the 
state’s aggregate capacity and supportive government posture vis-à-vis the group between weak, 
lukewarm, antagonistic, and passive supporters.144 This study suggests an alternative way of concep-
tualizing hybrid forms of sponsorship, against the background of the debate on public/opaque 
and specific/vague alliances in section 3.1. 
A first group consists of states that provide significant material support to terrorist groups, yet re-
sort to the concept of plausible deniability in order to avoid exposure, thereby deliberately reduc-
ing the deterrent feature of the alliance. These are the Secret Backers Martha Crenshaw had in 
mind, when calling sponsorship a “means of deception and denial.”145 In contrast, those sponsors 
representing a second hybrid type, Fellow Traveler,146 publicly praise the group’s cause and issue 
repeated declarations of sympathy. Their material commitment, however, falls dramatically short 
of the expectations raised by their rhetoric. In this case, the sponsor engages in a strategy of cheap 
talk, which might deter adversaries at least in the short run while at the same time undermining 
its reputation for loyalty.147  
                                                       
144 Byman, Deadly Connections: 15; Pillar, Terrorism: 178f. 
145 "Terrorism and Global Security," 73. 
146  In 2007, Paul Collier also used this term to describe constituencies of rebel groups, which emerge from a shared un-
derstanding of grievance, creating an imaginary bond between the group and its supporters. In a similar sense, spon-
sors taking on the fellow traveler-role also engage in the discourse of grievance generated by the group. In contrast to 
Collier’s understanding, however, fellow traveling does not necessarily require material support for the group. See Paul 
Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 22. 
147 Dustin H. Tingley and Barbara F. Walter, "Can Cheap Talk Deter? An Experimental Analysis," Journal of Conflict 
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Figure 13: Types of state sponsors of terrorism 
 
Despite its straightforward character, the typology illustrated by Figure 13 resorts systematically 
to Snyder’s theory of alliance commitment under the conditions of anarchy. In contrast to those 
established by Pillar and Byman, its close linkage to expediency and functionality allows for a 
more precise assessment of the underlying causes of different types of sponsorship. In order to 
address the question how these hybrid types emerge, the following section turns to the sponsor’s 
domestic politics. 
 
3.6 Sponsorship and the domestic alliance dilemma 
As in section 2.3.2 and 2.4.3, which established a link between unit-level factors and alliance pol-
icy, domestic politics are expected to influence sponsorship policy decision-making.  
As in interstate alliances, a strategy of standing firm entails concession granted to the ally and 
foreclosure of alternative alliance options. Hence, strong support might encourage domestic op-
position or alienate key societal backers of the regime, claiming the leader would squander na-
tional resources and deliberately put the security of the people at risk, by isolating the country or 
even risking military confrontation. This is especially vital in the case of vulnerable states that 
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face substantial constraints to autonomy and hurdles to domestic resource mobilization. Addi-
tionally, such an understanding fits in with both the neoclassical realist idea of domestic politics 
as a response delaying factor and the argument that vulnerable states fear domestic repercussions 
of formal and specific alliances.148 
Given the enormous power asymmetry between terrorist groups and both their targets and spon-
sors in nearly all cases, sponsorship a high risk of interstate conflict escalation and international 
isolation limiting the availability of alternative alliance options. Furthermore, the inherent frag-
mentation of intra-alliance interests raises entrapment fears and is likely to increase if domestic 
threats are present. Nevertheless, the sponsor’s autonomy to respond to incentives for realign-
ment is likely to be constrained, as withholding support to a group previously praised as a non-
terrorist liberation movement could be understood as policy failure (thereby exposing the leaders’ 
incompetence) or even treason.149 In addition, if leaders aim at bolstering their domestic power 
resources and opposition to realignment emerges from key societal groups, the group gains fur-
ther strategic importance for the state and threats of realignment will subsequently lose credibility. 
Therefore, deducted from both Snyder’s theory of alliance politics and neoclassical realism, two 
sub-hypotheses of N2 and N3 regarding the sponsoring state’s policy choices can be established 
(see also Figure 14). 
The Neoclassical Realist Hypothesis II (NC2) assumes that if the SSD points to abandonment, 
the greater the state’s domestic vulnerability, the smaller the tendency to strengthen its commitment 
and to stand firm against the adversary.  
The Neoclassical Realist Hypothesis III (NC3) argues that if the SSD points to entrapment, the 
greater the state’s domestic vulnerability, the smaller the tendency to weaken its commitment and 
conciliate the adversary.  
 
Both the limited-restraint (NC2) and the limited-resolve (NC3) hypothesis follow the neoclassical real-
ist argument that regime vulnerability impedes successful adjustment to systemic incentives and 
governments take on the sponsorship role of a Secret Backer or Fellow Traveler. 
                                                       
148 Steven E. Lobell, "Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model," in Neoclassical 
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Figure 14: Causal chain suggested by the hypotheses NC2 and NC3 
 
As proclaimed in section 1.6, the previous two chapters provided the necessary theoretical basis 
to establish both coherent explanations for the phenomenon of state sponsorship of terrorism and 
predictions on causation between a state’s security environment and respective sponsorship poli-
cies. In order to trace such specific processes of adjustment policies resorting to international, 
domestic, and intra-alliance dilemmas, the comparative examination of the empirical evidence 
takes systematic account of the same variables, indicated as follows:  
First, the analysis assesses the external security environment in general and the severity of conflict 
with the adversary of the alliance in particular, thereby constituting the independent variable ‘na-
ture of the sponsorship dilemma.’ Second, it evaluates the domestic security environment of the rul-
ing government, specifically the vulnerability of political leadership in the same period of obser-
vation, in order to examine the correspondent conditional variable. Third, the analysis turns to 
the dependent variable, sponsorship commitment, in order to determine whether and to what extent 
the sponsorship role changed over time.  
Before applying the method of structured focused comparison to the case of Syrian sponsorship 
for Fatah, the PKK, and Hizballah, the following section will turn to the operationalization of the 
variables at play, the methodological design of the analysis, and specific assumptions for the sub-
sequent analysis of Syria’s sponsorship policies.150 
 
                                                       
150 For a detailed examination of structured focused comparison, cf. Hall, "Aligning Ontology and Methodology in 
Comparative Politics."; Tulia G. Falleti, "Theory-Guided Process-Tracing: Something Old, Something New," 
Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association 17, no. 1 (2006); Van 
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4 Research design: Assessing state sponsorship of terrorism 
In order to establish an analytical framework suitable for examining the above-stated research 
questions and testing the assumptions derived from the explanatory model, the first part of this 
section specifies and integrates several hitherto independent strands of analysis.  
Operationalizing systemic incentives as independent variable for the neorealist hypotheses, the 
model resorts to the Waltzian imbalance of power in the case of the balancing hypothesis N1 and 
to the nature of the ASD developed by Mandelbaum and Snyder regarding the standing firm hy-
pothesis N2 and the restraining hypothesis N3. Indicators for assessing variance of domestic poli-
tics as antecedent condition are derived from respective works in comparative politics and neo-
classical realist foreign policy analysis. Finally, measures of sponsorship commitment, identified 
as the dependent variable of all seven hypotheses, are developed along the support dimensions 
hosting, military support, financial assistance, and endorsement as well as existing measurements 
of alliance commitment stemming from the work of Snyder and Walt. Additionally, each section 
presents corresponding methods of data collection and processing. As the empirical analysis in 
chapters 5 to 7 centers on Syrian support patterns for three different organizations in specific in-
trastate and transnational conflicts, section 4.4 turns to the selection of cases and examines key 
specifics of Syria’s external and domestic security environment likely to shape particular sponsor-
ship policies.  
4.1 Independent variable: Systemic incentives for alliance behavior 
Once alliances are formed, five factors determine whether a state will make entrapment or aban-
donment a priority and adjust its policy accordingly.1  
 
Figure 15: Independent variable ‘nature of the alliance dilemma’ 
                                                       
1 Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 472f; ———, Alliance politics: 167; Mandelbaum, The Fate of 
Nations: 101. 
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Figure 15 illustrates the interplay of the factors constituting the alliance security dilemma (ASD), 
which will be operationalized in the context of a sponsorship security dilemma (SSD) as follows: 
The first two are derived from balance-of-power theory, namely an imbalance of power between 
the state A and the adversary B (1) and the capacity of A’s ally C (2). Fears of abandonment are 
increased if conflict between A and B is severe (3) and if A lacks substantial options to realign (4), 
either as a result of (3) or the availability of alternative allies. Finally, fears of abandonment are 
nurtured if A has a strategic interest in maintaining C as an ally, therefore increasing the expected 
costs if C leaves the alliance (5).  
Data regarding the imbalance of power (1), the availability of alternative allies (4), and severity of conflict 
between the sponsoring and the targeted state (3), are primarily collected from Correlates of War 
(COW) databases. First, annual values for the material capabilities of Israel, Syria, and Turkey in 
the overall period of observation (1964-2006) are retrieved from COW’s National Material Capa-
bilities data set (CINC, version 4.0), updated in 2010.2 Second, COW’s Formal Alliance data set 
(version 4.1) provides for data on formal pacts of mutually defense, non-aggression treaties, and 
ententes existing in the observation period.3 As it is explicitly limited to formal alliances, addi-
tional information on informal alignments will be retrieved qualitatively from secondary sources.4 
Third, the probability of war is conceptualized in the sense of Snyder as “amount of conflict and 
tension”5 between adversaries, emphasizing–in contrast to Walt’s ‘level of threat’–the role of per-
ceptions and hence the dependency on primary sources and historical subjective interpretation 
only moderately.6 Given substantial limitations regarding the accessibility of archive material and 
the collection of primary sources, stemming at least twofold from the secretive and politicized 
character of the issue at hand and language barriers, COW’s Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID, 
v. 3.10) data provides for a first quantitative reference point.7 MID supplements COW Inter-State 
War Data (v. 4.0) by listing incidents “in which the threat, display or use of military force short 
of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards […] another state.”8 Furthermore, MID 
                                                       
2  CINC subsumes total and urban population, steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and -
expenditure. See J. David Singer et al., "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," in 
Peace, War, and Numbers, ed. Bruce Russett (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972). 
3 Douglas M. Gibler, International military alliances, 1648-2008  (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2009). 
4 See also Raymond A. Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, The foreign policies of Middle East states  (Boulder, 
Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); Walt, The Origins of Alliances. 
5 Snyder, Alliance politics: 167. 
6 Walt, The Origins of Alliances: 25f. For a discussion on the utility of both approaches, see also William R. Thompson, 
"Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics," International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2001). 
7 Faten Ghosn et al., "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description," Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 21, no. 2 (2004). 
8 Daniel M. Jones et al., "Militarized interstate disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns," 
ibid.15(1996): 163; Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman, Resort to War: 1816 - 2007  (CQ Press, 2010). COW 
defines war as a “military combat is sufficiently sustained that it will result in a minimum of 1,000 total battle 
deaths“ Jones et al., "Militarized interstate disputes," 171; see also J. David Singer and Melvin Small, Resort to Arms: 
International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980  (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982). For instance out of the two interstate dyads exam-
ined in this study (Syria-Turkey and Israel-Syria), only the latter escalated to the level of war in the period of observa-
tion, in 1948, 1967, and 1973. MID data, however, lists nearly 200 incidents of conflict in the respective dyads. 
Research design: Assessing state sponsorship of terrorism 
79 
data allows for assessing the ‘probability of war’ by distinguishing between both those carrying a 
threat, display, or use of force and 22 subtypes of actions ranging from “no militarized action” to 
“begin interstate war.”9 As conflicts are likely to be present–and thus influential on alliance 
choices and politics–before and after they become manifest in a militarized dispute, the study will 
additionally draw on historical sources and expert interviews. This will be the case especially, if 
the database indicates the presence of revisionist states, widely considered as being dissatisfied 
with the prevailing distribution of power capabilities and harboring aggressive intentions towards 
others.10 
The assessment of the fourth variable, capacity of the terrorist organization in relation to the power 
imbalance between the statist adversaries (2), poses a bigger challenge for the acquisition of ade-
quate data. Based on the STAR-imperatives (see Table 3) and the definition of insurgency 
strength by Cunningham et al., as “effectiveness in targeting the vital interests of the government 
and tactics that prevent the defeat,”11 the group’s offensive and defensive capabilities constitute a 
key factor. In this context, power is derived from the group’s ability to attract popular (and exter-
nal) support and to mobilize forces (recruits, arms), to induce material or immaterial costs on the 
targeted state, and to escape or resist retaliation. As Cunningham et al. focus on guerilla tactics 
and direct military confrontation, the offensive capacity of the group through terrorist violence 
will be primarily assessed through the frequency and lethality of terrorist attacks, derived from 
the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).12 Additional data on terrorist attacks during the observa-
tion period, especially before 1970, is to be gathered from secondary sources. The number of 
members, frequently used in recent studies on the evolution of terrorist organizations, indicates 
strength in general and mobilization capacity both with regards to fighters and non-combatant sup-
porters and is expected to increase in relation to the number of attacks and the presence of an 
ethnic base.13 The capacity of the group further increases if it has a clear central command in con-
trast to factional infighting and access to a safe haven.14  
                                                       
9 Jones et al., "Militarized interstate disputes," 170f; Faten Ghosn et al., "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, 
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Interstate Dispute Data, Version 3.0."  Correlates of War 2 Project, Pennsylvania State University no. April 14 (2003). 
http://cow2.la.psu.edu. Accessed January 31, 2014. 
10 Jones et al., "Militarized interstate disputes," 178. 
11 Cunningham et al., "It Takes Two," 573f.  
12 Ibid., 580. GTD is an open-source database comprising detailed information on terrorist events between 1970 and 
2011, based on a definition of terrorism as “threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor 
to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” START. "Global 
Terrorism Database Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables."  (2012). http://bit.ly/1dWnN77. Accessed 
January 31, 2014. 
13 Brock S. Blomberg et al., Terrorist Group Survival: Ideology, Tactics, and Base of Operations  (Los Angeles: CREATE 
Homeland Security Center at the University of Southern California, 2011). 16; Jonathan S. Feinstein and Edward H. 
Kaplan, "Analysis of a Strategic Terror Organization," Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 2 (2010): 282; David E. 
Cunningham et al., "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome," ibid.53, no. 4 (2009): 
579-581. 
14 ———, "It Takes Two," 575,579. 
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Finally, the variable strategic interest in upholding the alliance (5) is defined by Snyder as a future-
oriented interest in “preventing any potential adversary from gaining resources, especially at 
one’s own expense or the expense of one’s ally.”15 This could refer to the control of territory or 
energy sources, if their loss is expected to endanger other aspects of national security in the near 
or foreseeable future.16 Drawing on the understanding of regime security as an integral part of na-
tional security in vulnerable states, states can extract power resources from external alliances, 
which are also of highest strategic interest for the state in the domestic arena.17 Regarding empiri-
cal evidence about whether and to what extent these interests are present, data will be qualitative-
ly extracted from relevant secondary sources and expert interviews. 
As illustrated in Table 5, the separate findings will be integrated in order to assess a general ten-
dency of the SSD. 
Table 5: Nature of the sponsorship security dilemma 
IMBALANCE OF POWER High Low  
CAPACITY OF THE ALLY  Sufficient Insufficient  
INTERSTATE CONFLICT High Low 
ALTERNATIVE ALLIES Not available Available 
STRATEGIC INTEREST Yes No 
CONDITIONS INDUCE A PRIMARY FEAR OF  Abandonment Entrapment 
 
4.2 Conditional variable: Domestic politics 
Neoclassical realists argue that these incentives are likely to prevail until changes in the security 
environment occur, yet ascribe substantial influence regarding the pace and degree of a state’s ad-
justment to unit-level factors. As a proxy for domestic politics, the analysis at hand will mainly 
focus on autonomy, meaning the level of interference of societal groups in foreign policy decision-
making, allowing to a large extent for transferring neorealist thinking about international politics 
to the domestic arena. Hence, foreign policy autonomy as an indicator for absent or insignificant-
ly low levels of regime vulnerability is understood as a condition variable for the causal hypotheses 
N1-N3, in that sense activating or magnifying causation between systemic incentives and specific 
policies.18 
In contrast to proponents of a liberal democratic peace and others focusing on structural autono-
my provided by formal political institutions, recent neoclassical realist studies have stressed the 
                                                       
15 Snyder, Alliance politics: 23. 
16 Ibid., 23f. 
17 Mastanduno et al., "Towards a Realist Theory of State Action," 464f. 
18 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science: 9-11; Schweller, Unanswered Threats: 16f; Snyder, 
Alliance politics: 131. 
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linkage between regime vulnerability and foreign policy decision making.19 They assume that 
state autonomy in foreign policy matters and responsiveness to the systemic incentives decreases 
if regime vulnerability is high and states find themselves compelled to either increase concessions 
to pillars of support or broaden their power base.20  
According to Bruce Gilley, vulnerability occurs if political leaders lack legitimacy, defined as 
“high levels of uncoerced support among the population,”21 and unintentionally reduce govern-
ance effectiveness and popular support by spending resources extracted from society mainly in a 
way that helps them maintain their rule.22 As legitimacy is a latent variable, it can hardly be 
measured directly.23 Thus, the analysis will resort to effect indicators, what state-society relations 
might look like if the government lacks legitimacy, such as the size of internal secret police and 
number of political prisoners as well as anti-system movements, the use of mercenary soldiers, 
demonstrations over legal issues or election results.24 Given the fact that vulnerability also reflects 
the likelihood of a regime overthrow, the state’s coercive power in opposition to domestic rivals 
constitutes a second indicator (see Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16: Conditional variable ‘regime vulnerability’ 
                                                       
19  Concerning the former group, see Navin A. Bapat. "State Sponsorship of Insurgency and Internal Politics."  
University of North Carolina no. unpublished (2010). http://bit.ly/LotJz1. Accessed January 31, 2014; Anna Geis, 
"Diagnose: Doppelbefund — Ursache: ungeklärt? Die Kontroversen um den „Demokratischen Frieden“," Politische 
Vierteljahresschrift 42, no. 2 (2001); David, Choosing Sides: 13. The second group is represented inter alia by Ripsman, 
"Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups."; Schweller, Unanswered Threats; Morgan and Bickers, 
"Domestic discontent and the external use of force."; Bueno de Mesquita et al., The logic of political survival. 
20 Ripsman, "Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups," 188; Bueno de Mesquita et al., The logic of political 
survival: 29. 
21 Robert D. Lamb, "Measuring Legitimacy in Weak States," in Graduate Student Conference on Security (March 18) 
(Georgetown University, Washington, DC2005), 21. 
22 Gilley, "The meaning and measure of state legitimacy," 499. 
23 Especially in the case of weak and authoritarian states, indicators of popular support are difficult to trace as surveys 
and opinion polls like the Arab Barometer are conducted under constricted conditions for both interviewers and in-
terviewees. Results of non-democratic elections are hardly reflecting the actual distribution of opinions and allegianc-
es among societal forces. If not censored and at all accessible, evaluation of local media outlets requires in-depth and 
costly studies and allows primarily for an evaluation of elite perceptions. 
24 Gilley, "The meaning and measure of state legitimacy," 505-509. 
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Systematically integrating domestic politics into structural realist thinking requires a reformula-
tion of the ‘black box’ into a ‘microcosm of international politics,’ where power is fragmented 
and processes of emulation among social forces can be observed.25 Indicators for the emergence of 
a domestic system of self-help are inter alia parallel military forces, challenging the army’s mo-
nopoly on the use of force and increasing the state’s general advance in material power.26 Addi-
tionally, intervention in foreign policy decision-making limits state autonomy and is likely to be 
the case if societal forces are politicized and imitate the state in policy formulation and imple-
menting. While high degrees of army professionalism, for instance, reduce the likelihood of in-
tervention into politics, such as military coups, emulation can also occur in the case of other so-
cial forces like religious institutions or trade unions.27 Although such an understanding of domes-
tic politics requires an in-depth interpretation of historical evidence, it allows for detecting the 
presence of regime vulnerability prior to the outbreak of domestic conflict.  
4.3 Dependent variable: Sponsorship commitment 
In order to assess specific sponsorship policies, the study initially draws on the work of Snyder 
and Walt, as both conceptualize commitment not as mere assistance to another party but also 
with regard to the sacrifices and concessions the ally is willing to take to fulfill its obligations.28 
This is particularly vital as previous works on sponsorship and external rebel support provided a 
spectrum of support, yet based levels of assistance merely on aggregate measures of arms deliv-
ered or troops operating within one’s territory.29  
Commitment plays a key role in intra-alignment adjustment policies.30 Besides increasing the lev-
el of commitment in the way Table 6 suggests, Snyder claims that in order to discourage others 
from realigning, states might also be willing to “renegotiate the alliance contract in the ally’s fa-
vor.”31 With regard to the sponsorship security dilemma, this might apply not only to an increase 
in arms deliveries, but also to agreements regarding the group’s freedom to maneuver for instance 
on the sponsor’s territory or the local population. In contrast, increased control over the group’s 
actions or pressuring it into moderation is expected to limit the risk of entrapment. Threats of rea-
lignment and signaling one’s own unwillingness to accept retaliation against the group as a casus 
                                                       
25 For an examination of the praetorian society concept, see also Huntington, Political order in changing societies: 197. 
26 See also Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing." 
27 Although it is highly unlikely that social forces are zero politicized in any country–given for instance the role of reli-
gious institutions in the provision of welfare in most countries–their intervention into politics will be deemed as sig-
nificant, if they occur as constraining factors for governmental foreign policy, at times even conducting ‘parallel’ for-
eign policies 
28 Walt, The Origins of Alliances: 149, Table 5. 
29 Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support; Cunningham et al., "Explaining External Support."; ———. "Codebook for 
The Non-State Actor Data, a Supplement to the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Data. Typescript."  (2009). 
http://bit.ly/1eqLN76. Accessed January 31, 2014; Alexander and Cline, Terrorism. 
30 Snyder, Alliance politics: 183-186. 
31 Ibid., 183f. 
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foederis (thereby limiting one’s commitment to a low level) are further expected to decrease the 
group’s war-proneness.32 
Table 6: Levels of commitment in interstate alliances 
Level of commitment High Moderate Low 
ALLIANCE INVOLVES… Extensive security co-
operation, active mili-
tary involvement 
Diplomatic coordina-
tion and significant risk 
of military involvement 
Symbolic commitment 
LOSS OF TANGIBLE AS-
SETS* TO FULFILL ALLI-
ANCE COMMITMENT 
Deliberately sacrificed Put at risk, sacrificed 
intangible assets (dip-
lomatic costs) 
Avoided 
Source: Walt, The origins of alliances: 149-152. 
* E.g. territory, money or people 
 
As maintained in section 3.3.3.2, sponsors risk military retaliation by targeted states, economic as 
well as political sanctions by the international community, and being seen as a pariah disregard-
ing international norms both by other states and parts of their own population. Hence, Walt’s 
classification in general seems quite adaptable to a state’s commitment to his non-state ally (c.f. 
Table 6). Integrating the abovementioned types of support into this framework of analysis, they 
will be evaluated with regard to their likelihood to put tangible as well as intangible assets at risk 
and expected forms of sponsorship policy adjustment. 
4.3.1 Hosting 
Among the four support dimensions examined, hosting plays a decisive role for mainly two rea-
sons. First, previous studies have established a strong link between the presence of extraterritorial 
rebel bases and violent escalation of interstate conflict.33 Second, in contrast to other material 
forms of assistance, plausible deniability is difficult to achieve especially if the group uses the 
host’s territory as a rear front. In the context of the sponsorship dilemma, hosting is highly valued 
by the group, be it only by overcoming geographical distances for attacking. In order to assess 
whether hosting indicates a high, moderate or low level of commitment, the following questions 
need to be asked: (1) To what extent does the group enjoy freedom to initiate military operations 
against the adversary? (2) What degree of operational freedom does the group enjoy regarding its 
politically activities? (3) To what degree is the host willing to tolerate the group’s physical pres-
ence within its territory? 
 
 
 
                                                       
32 Ibid., 185f. 
33 Cunningham et al. 6; Salehyan, "No shelter here," 58. 
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Table 7: Commitment I: Hosting 
Level of Commitment High Moderate Low* 
ALLIANCE INVOLVES… Freedom to operate 
militarily (presence of 
fighters and bases, 
cross-border attacks) 
Freedom to operate po-
litically (presence of 
non-military training 
facilities, offices) 
Tolerance of the physi-
cal presence of group 
members devoid of po-
litical activity 
* A fourth category–no commitment–is occurring in the case of a complete expulsion of the group from the state’s territo-
ry and indicates realignment by the sponsor. 
 
Concerning hosting policies induced by the sponsorship dilemma, states are likely to grant their 
protégés higher degrees of leeway, when aiming at discouraging them from defecting. In turn, in-
creased control and a denial of their presence point towards the aim of avoiding entrapment 
(Table 7).  
4.3.2 Military support 
The second dimension, military support, generally occurs in two forms. In a number of cases, as-
sistance consists of supplies of weapons, intelligence, or even personnel sent to areas outside of its 
own territory. In other instances, the state’s territory is used as a corridor for military assistance 
by another state, a strategy allowing for deniability and making it difficult for target states to legit-
imize an extension of retaliation against the group to the sponsor.34  
Military resources for training or the preparation of attacks can also be directly employed to the 
sponsor’s own territory. This strategy fits in with the assumption that sponsors aiming at 
strengthening their commitment are, besides increasing deliveries, expected to make their ‘contri-
bution’ public in order to gain a reputation for loyalty/resolve. Subsequently, they exhibit readi-
ness to sacrifice diplomatic costs and risk limited retaliation in the sense of a medium level of 
commitment. In turn, if states want to avoid entrapment, a decrease in material assistance is like-
ly to occur as well as increased efforts to maintain deniability.  
The risk of interstate escalation and therefore commitment reaches a peak if military support and 
hosting take place simultaneously on the sponsor’s territory. This is the case as such a policy pro-
vides states under terrorist attack with a clear motive and target for retaliatory measures, general-
ly accepted by third parties. In order to avoid entrapment, states might deny the group sophisti-
cated weapons, increase control over training camps or redeploy military facilities and fighters to 
areas outside of their territory.35 Whereas these cases still point to a moderate level of commit-
ment, given the visibility of hosting, public denial and a minimum of assistance indicate a low 
commitment (see Table 8). 
                                                       
34 ———, "Transnational Rebels." 
35 Chris Smith, "Weapons Transfers to Non-State Armed Groups," UNIDIR Disarmament Forum: Engaging Non-
State Actors 1(2008); Schneckener, "Iraq and Terrorism. How are "Rogue States" and Terrorists Connected?". 
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Table 8: Commitment II: Military support 
Level of Commitment High Moderate Low* 
ALLIANCE INVOLVES… Security personnel, 
military assistance 
including sophisti-
cated weaponry on 
one’s own territory 
Military assistance in areas out-
side of one’s territory or tolerat-
ing external assistance, yet limi-
tations on arms supplies, over-
sight over training facilities 
Denial of pres-
ence/deliveries 
* A fourth category–no commitment–is occurring in the case of an end to both active military support and tolerating 
arms deliveries to the group passing through one’s own territory. 
 
4.3.3 Financial assistance  
In contrast to other forms of material support, direct financial assistance plays a rather limited role 
in the sponsorship dilemma. As outlined in section 3.3.1.3, monetary support is crucial in the 
group’s early days, especially if competitors for the constituency’s support need to be sidelined. 
Many of the organizations mentioned in this study have successfully diversified their sources of 
income, either by receiving direct and indirect funds from several states, private donations or tax-
ation among their constituencies. As such a diversification is likely to come along with increased 
independence from existing backers, it is expected increase their concerns over abandonment and 
cause either increased funding or public statements emphasizing one’s own contribution and 
pledging further commitment.  
After 9/11, financial assistance to terrorist organizations became a core issue of non-military 
counterterrorism policies. However, it seems unlikely that such an exposure puts tangible assets 
at risk (Table 9).36 Moreover, if the group enjoys relatively high levels of financial independence, 
governmental budget cuts are expected to have only a limited restraining effect on the group.  
Table 9: Commitment III: Financial assistance  
Level of Commitment High Moderate Low* 
ALLIANCE INVOLVES… - Explicit financial assistance, 
Toleration of fundraising 
among the state’s citizens.** 
Denial of funding 
* A fourth category–no commitment–is occurring in the case of an end to both active funding and tolerating fundrais-
ing/taxation by the group among its citizens. 
** Since 9/11 
 
4.3.4 Endorsement 
As well as financial assistance, endorsement by itself is rarely an indicator for high sponsorship 
commitment as it is unlikely to trigger military interstate conflict escalation and does not require 
military cooperation. Nevertheless, rhetorical or political backing of a group designated as terror-
ists carries diplomatic costs when alienating third parties or increase tensions with the adver-
                                                       
36 Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, Terrorism Financing and State Responses. A Comparative Perspective  
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Sean S. Costigan and David Gold, Terrornomics  (Aldershot, England ; 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007). 
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sary.37 Hence, governments aiming at conciliating the adversary, preventing international isola-
tion, and restraining the ally are likely to refrain from public statements of endorsement. Fur-
thermore, they are expected to publicly question the legitimacy of the group’s actions against the 
targeted state, portrayed as a victim in official rhetoric, and even announce cooperation with the 
adversary against the ‘terrorist’ group.38 In turn, states that want to demonstrate their loyalty to 
the group and discourage it from abandonment are likely to adjust their rhetoric accordingly, em-
phasizing the legitimacy of the ‘resistance’ against rogue and repressive rulers and their own con-
tribution to the group’s ‘struggle’ (Table 10). 
Table 10: Commitment IV: Endorsement 
Level of Commitment High Moderate Low 
ALLIANCE INVOLVES… - Rhetoric in favor of the 
group (resistance), con-
firmation of alliance 
Rhetoric condemning 
the group (terrorists), 
denial of alliance 
 
Conclusion 
Summarizing the findings and considerations from section 4.3.1 to 4.3.4, Table 11 presents the 
analytical categories that were defined in order to assess specific patterns of sponsorship, once 
alignments have been established.  
Consisting of the specific sacrifices sponsors are willing to make in order to assist the group in 
achieving its STAR-goals (c.f. Figure 10), their policies reflect either a high, moderate, or low 
level of sponsorship commitment. In addition, this set of categories also fits in with the four spon-
sorship types established in 3.5.2. 
Whereas the Brother in Arms and the Defector find themselves at the respective ends of the high/low 
(material) commitment continuum, the hybrid types Fellow Traveler and Secret Backer stem from a 
specific mix of material/immaterial policy measures. The former either occurs if the initial spon-
sorship pattern mainly reflects immaterial assistance (endorsement) and only a moderate to low 
level of material assistance or if a Brother in Arms reduces its material commitment without issuing 
public threats of realignment. The latter appears if a Brother in Arms aims at maintaining plausible 
deniability, particularly by reducing the publicity of the alignment in general and its own com-
mitment in particular. This preference for opacity despite at least moderate levels of material sup-
port can also be part of the initial sponsorship policy. 
                                                       
37 Taking Turkey’s endorsement of Hamas as an example, Khaled Mashal’s 2006 visit to Ankara sparked harsh criti-
cism from Israel–including the controversial statement by prime ministry speaker Raanan Gissin: “This situation has 
deeply damaged the relationships. How would you feel if we hosted Abdullah Öcalan?” Bülent Aras, "Turkey and 
the Palestinian Question," SETA Policy Brief 27 no. 1 (2009); Ali Bulac. "Behind the Scenes of Hamas Meeting."  
Today's Zaman no. 21 February 2006 (2006). http://bit.ly/1i8Cp7W. Accessed January 30, 2014. 
38 In contrast to the material forms of support, as informality and opaqueness allow for a policy of “cheap talk,” there is 
no actual need to establish a fourth category of realignment. 
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Table 11: Overview of sponsorship commitment 
Level of  
Commitment 
High Moderate Low 
ALLIANCE INVOLVES… Extensive security coop-
eration, active military 
involvement 
Diplomatic coordination and 
significant risk of military in-
volvement 
Symbolic commitment 
LOSS OF TANGIBLE AS-
SETS TO FULFILL ALLI-
ANCE COMMITMENT 
Deliberately sacrificed Put at risk, sacrificed intangible 
assets (diplomatic costs) 
Avoided 
HOSTING Freedom to operate 
militarily (presence of 
fighters and bases, 
cross-border attacks) 
Freedom to operate politi-
cally (presence of non-
military training facilities, 
offices) 
Tolerance of the phys-
ical presence of group 
members devoid of po-
litical activity 
MILITARY SUPPORT Security forces, Mili-
tary assistance includ-
ing sophisticated wea-
ponry on one’s own 
territory 
Military assistance in areas 
outside of one’s territory OR 
Tolerating external assis-
tance, yet limitations on 
arms supplies, oversight 
over training facilities 
Denial of presence/ 
deliveries 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT - Explicit financial assistance, 
Toleration of fundraising 
among the state’s citizens 
Denial of funding 
ENDORSEMENT - Rhetoric in favor of the 
group (resistance), confirma-
tion of alliance 
Rhetoric condemning 
the group (terrorists), 
denial of alliance 
SPONSORSHIP TYPE BROTHER IN ARMS ____SECRET BACKER/FELLOW TRAVELER _____ DEFECTOR 
 
Hence, this classification constitutes not only an analytical tool for comparison, both within and 
between cases, it also subsequently provides a framework of analysis for studies addressing the 
three empirical puzzles highlighted in section 1.4.2. 
Applying this measurement to empirical cases of state sponsorship of terrorism, a significantly 
high level of commitment was provided by Afghanistan to al-Qaeda after 1996, including a safe 
haven and training facilities, allowing fighters to travel freely within its borders and to enter the 
country without visas.39 Moreover, assistance entailed substantial tangible sacrifices: First, the re-
gime’s hosting of al-Qaeda and refusal to extradite the group’s leader Osama Bin Laden in 2000 
increased international isolation and led to a freezing of its financial resources in December 2000 
by UNSCR 1333. Second, military sanctions occurred in August 1998 when the U.S. air force 
bombed four al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and invaded the country in late 2001 in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.40 Yet, despite strong counterbalancing measures by others and sig-
nificant security losses between 1996 and 2001, sponsorship commitment to al-Qaeda remained 
                                                       
39 Byman, Deadly Connections: 205. 
40 Ibid., 212-216. 
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high, indicating the Taliban regime’s failure to adjust its policy to systemic incentives for security-
seeking.  
As indicated in section 3.3.2.2, other backers have proven to be more responsive to external secu-
rity changes. In November 1983, for instance, Iraq’s foreign minister Tariq Aziz summoned the 
Abu Nidal Organization’s (ANO) leadership to a meeting, informed them “that you have become 
a dangerous burden to us” and called on the group’s leader to “leave Iraq the minute you step out 
of this office!”41 ANO had held a strong presence in Iraq since 1970, yet in the early 1980s fell 
prey to Iraq’s efforts to overcome the country’s strained relations with the Gulf States and the 
West in general and to obtain their support against Iran in particular. Regarding the occurrence 
of specific sponsorship roles between 1970 and 1983, Iraq took on the role of a Brother in Arms af-
ter the October 1973 war in order to undermine regional trends of moderation. According to Pat-
rick Seale, however, the final shift to defection in 1983 resulted from a gradual process of policy 
adjustment reflected in a widening gap between ongoing material support and an official rhetoric 
of alienation since the 1978 Arab League summit, which points to secret backing.42 
In order to systematically trace, examine, and understand the underlining dynamics of such pro-
cesses of resistance and realignment, the study turns to the empirical evidence of sponsorship in 
the case of Syria. 
 
4.4 The case of Syria  
The following analysis will comparatively trace the process of alignment formation and man-
agement between the Syrian government, on the one hand, and three different organizations on 
the other. While two case studies address Syrian state sponsorship of terrorism in the context of 
its conflict with Israel, examining support for Fatah (1964-76) and Hizballah (1989-2006), Da-
mascus’ alignment with the PKK against Turkey (1979-98) constitutes a third case.  
 
Particularly in comparison to its non-Arab neighbors and lacking the vast national resource en-
dowment of other regional states, Syria has been a small power in military, geographic, demo-
graphic, and economic terms.43 Hence, both dyads of interstate conflict (vs. Israel/vs. Turkey) 
exhibited both a clear imbalance of power to the disadvantage of Syria and historical as well as 
territorial revisionism, entailing systemic incentives for balancing policies. Both dyads experi-
enced periods of conflict de-escalation, for instance in the context of the Israel-Syrian Disen-
gagement Agreement of May 1974 or the 1987 Damascus Agreement with Turkey, and limited 
tendencies of leveling of the power imbalance, for example in the immediate aftermath of the 
                                                       
41 Seale, Abu Nidal: 123. 
42 Ibid., 111-113,123f. 
43 Latif Wahid, Military Expenditure and Economic Growth in the Middle East  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009). 116f. 
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1991 Gulf War. Hence, these subtle trends are expectedly influencing Syria’s balancing efforts as 
the neorealist hypotheses N1 (balancing), N2 (standing firm), and N3 (restraining), suggest.  
While the probability of interstate war with Israel was ever-present during the initial period of 
Syria’s alignment with Fatah, both states revealed a strong status quo orientation after Syria had 
established hegemony over Lebanon in the late 1980s. Therefore, international incentives to pres-
sure Israel through Hizballah should be significantly lower throughout the 1990s and 2000s, hint-
ing also to a reduced fear of alliance abandonment reflected in Syria’s sponsorship commitment. 
Although Turkish-Syrian relations were far from cordial throughout the observation period of the 
third case, Syria’s alignment with the PKK, the conflict never escalated to open war and cases of 
violence occurred only in a sporadic manner. While the general adjustment pressure stemming 
from the power imbalance and interstate relations points toward a balancing policy aiming at 
abandonment avoiding, incentives for a high commitment policy are expectedly lower than in the 
first case.  
 
Before turning to the specific characteristics of the three groups, it is necessary to take different al-
ternative alliance options among the cases into consideration. Throughout the entire observation 
period (1964-2006), Syria had a record of mostly informal and unsteady interstate alignment pat-
terns against both Israel and Turkey, severed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, Damascus’ 
most important international ally during the Cold War.44 While this supposedly induced a gen-
eral fear of abandonment in existing non-state alignments directed against Israel, such concerns 
are expected to be particularly high in cases of regional isolation, most prominently in the second 
half of the 1960s (Fatah) and in the run-up to Syria’s enforced withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 
(Hizballah). In the case of the PKK, Ankara’s strong ties to the West and its neutral position in 
the Iraq-Iran War prevented the emergence of stable interstate alliances throughout the 1980s. 
Eventually, Turkey’s open alignment with Israel in the mid-1990s triggered a moderate regional 
counterbalancing in favor of Syria, assumedly reducing fears of abandonment by the Kurdish 
group. 
 
In order to generate expectations about group capacity and Syria’s strategic interest in maintain-
ing the alignment as components of the sponsorship security dilemma, it is necessary to highlight 
the specific features of Fatah, the PKK, and Hizballah. Among the large number of groups re-
portedly supported by Syria in the context of latent or manifest interstate conflict, these three 
have successfully weathered heavy military retaliation campaigns by Israel and Turkey as well as 
factional infighting, commanded at times tens of thousands of core members, and enjoyed com-
                                                       
44 Malik Mufti, Sovereign Creations: pan-Arabism and political order in Syria and Iraq  (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 1996). 
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paratively high levels of societal support.45 Despite their considerable strength, their capacity re-
mained–as in most cases of intrastate conflicts–insufficient to level the imbalance of power in the 
interstate conflict dyads. Below the threshold of sufficiency, however, all three groups underwent 
substantial upward and downside capacity trends, likely to influence the respective nature of the 
sponsorship dilemma. Yet, there is a strong interdependence between group capacity and spon-
sorship in all three cases, as the groups were substantially weaker at the outset of Syrian assis-
tance than in later periods of cooperation. While Hizballah’s steady growth throughout the ob-
servation period assumedly triggered Syrian abandonment fears, Fatah and the PKK experienced 
severe internal and external crises likely to reflect in additional Syrian restraint.  
 
In addition, and intertwined with the capacity feature ‘support base’, the presence of Syrian stra-
tegic interests constitutes a key factor in all three cases. Whereas all three groups benefitted from 
strong societal backing, the importance of their direct and indirect constituencies for regime secu-
rity considerations varied significantly. Both Fatah and the PKK had strong ties to the Palestinian 
and Kurdish minorities inside Syria and claimed, in addition, to represent transnational move-
ments. Therefore, Syrian championship over these groups provided Damascus with a tool of pro-
jecting ‘soft power’ to other states in the region and of preventing them, in turn, from interfering 
in Syrian domestic politics. Although it lacked a specific popular support base inside Syria, Hiz-
ballah constituted an increasingly important proxy and guarantor for Syrian predominance in 
Lebanon. While diverging interests, particularly in terms of political and territorial revisionism 
vis-à-vis Israel and Turkey, at times dampened Syrian commitment, all three alignments provided 
a source of domestic legitimacy and immaterial regional power resources.  
 
Two neoclassical realist hypotheses suggest a bias among vulnerable states both towards alliance-
seeking (NC1) in general and sponsorship (NC2) in particular, given their lacking capacity to mobi-
lize sufficient domestic resources against powerful adversaries on the one hand and potential 
backlashes in the domestic arena over intra-alliance autonomy losses on the other. In the case of 
Syria, this bias is expected to occur frequently, particularly before 1970. 
 
Reviewing the societal composition of Ottoman Syria with regard to the formation of an inde-
pendent political entity in 1915, Thomas E. Lawrence warned, “any wide attempt at autonomy 
would end in a patched and parceled thing, an imposition on a people whose instincts forever 
and ever have been for parochial home-rule.” 46 And indeed, most studies on domestic politics in 
Modern Syria assert that–as in other post-colonial states–the state’s weak mobilization capacity 
                                                       
45 On the relationship between membership, organizational structure, and longevity of a group, see inter alia Seth G. 
Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How terrorist groups end. Lessons for countering al Qa'ida  (Santa Monica: RAND, 
2008). 
46 Thomas E. Lawrence. "Syria, the Raw Material."  Arab Bulletin March 12, (1917). http://bit.ly/1k0kwfi. Accessed 
January 31, 2014. 
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and regime vulnerability stems from societal dissent over what might constitute a national inter-
est, who should be eligible of commanding the state, and of loyalty and exclusive allegiance to 
the political leadership.47 On the one hand, separatist revolts by the country’s compact minorities, 
such as the Druze, Alawis, and Kurds, reflected domestic opposition to the state as perpetuating 
Sunni Muslim predominance.48 Territorial detachments from Ottoman Syria, on the other, in-
creased Sunni revisionism both towards European powers and the minorities as potential or actu-
al usurpers.49 Hence, Syria emerged as a state that found, if at all, little acceptance and where 
nearly all its constituencies reject formally existing boundaries as artificial.  
 
Under such conditions, and emphasized by most assessments on Syrian foreign policy, regime 
vulnerability impeding foreign policy autonomy emerged as a constantly present factor shaping 
foreign policy choices.50 Whereas those forces tending towards accepting the status quo in favor 
of autonomy were swept from power immediately after the 1948 War and old elites were delegit-
imized, social fragmentation between mostly Sunni Muslims, opting for Pan-Arab unionism, and 
the non-Sunni minorities, advocating a Pan-Syrian solution, prevented foreign policy consensus 
and paved the way for military rule established in 1949.51 Representing a model case of oligarchic 
praetorianism, the military gained an autonomous status in the following decades and was, ac-
cording to Amos Perlmutter, “always in a position to overthrow the military oligarchs, who de-
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pend on the military establishment for support.”52 To make matters worse, the army, though suf-
fering from internal fragmentation, had evolved into the “political guardian of the country,” per-
ceiving itself rather as a “savior” than an “arbitrator.”53 Ever since, fragmented domestic power, 
increasing authoritarianism, and militancy against Israel as the only means of sustaining legitimi-
zation created not only praetorian instability, but also heavily affected foreign policy decision-
making.54  
Against the background of more than half a century of one-party-rule, Syria has been a popular 
object of research for studies on the persistence of authoritarian rule.55 Indeed, the 1970 coup by 
Hafiz al-Asad ushered in an era of domestic stability after 21 different governments had taken 
over power in a literal struggle for Syria since 1946.56  
The observation period of the Syria-Fatah case encompasses both the time before and after 
Asad’s ascension to power. As he managed to overcome institutional power fragmentation in fa-
vor of the presidency, the conditional variable domestic politics is expected to be especially influ-
ential before 1970. Nevertheless, the violent revolt of the Muslim Brethren (1976-82), repeated 
hints of intra-elite conflict over succession in the 1980s and 1990s, and the continuation of coup-
proofing measures after Bashar al-Asad’s accession to power in 2000, support Raymond Hinne-
busch’s assumption that praetorianism in Syrian domestic politics after 1970 has been “con-
strained but not eliminated.”57 
Particularly reflected in Pan-Arab unification schemes, but also in other instances, the assump-
tion of intra-alliance autonomy losses in order to extract power resources indicated a lack in for-
eign policy autonomy as suggested in the case of vulnerable states. Moreover, political dependen-
cies, for instance in the context of alignments based on pan-ideology, stood at times in contrast to 
Syria’s economic reliance on other interstate alignments providing economic domestic power re-
sources, through, for instance, foreign aid.58 Moreover, the sponsorship hypothesis NC2 suggests, 
than Syria resorts to state sponsorship as a means of counterbalancing its adversaries, if caught in 
a predicament between international adjustment pressure and substantial domestic risks stem-
ming from internal and external balancing and a lack of reliable state allies. 
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5 From joint defeat to open war: Syria & Fatah  
“Israeli reaction to hostile Syrian action would have to be directed against both the terrorists 
and the Syrian regime, itself.”1 
Yitzhak Rabin, September 11, 1966 
Within a decade, the Palestinian nationalist Fatah rose from a Kuwait-based splinter group, estab-
lished in 1958, to the “most prominent of the terrorist groups.”2 Although the goal to destroy the 
state of Israel and restore pre-1948 Palestine was widely shared among Palestinian insurgent 
groups, Fatah’s ‘Palestine First’ doctrine constituted a departure from mainstream Pan-Arab uni-
ty approaches. After years of challenging the 1964 established Palestinian Liberation Organiza-
tion’s (PLO) claim to represent the Palestinian struggle, on the one hand, and targeting Israel 
with guerilla raids, on the other, the Fatah leadership headed by Yasser Arafat took over PLO in 
1969 and dominated it until his death in 2004. 
Until at least 1993, Israeli and other Western officials frequently denounced Fatah as a terrorist 
organization, based on numerous armed attacks on civilians, bombings, hostage taking, and sab-
otage acts.3 Furthermore, the term ‘terrorist’ as a reference to Fatah occurred also frequently in 
Western politics, academia, and media. This was especially the case in the early 1970s, during 
the group’s “two-year foray into international terrorism.” 4 Although international sanctions for 
sponsorship were weak in the 1960s, Fatah’s terrorist reputation came along with threats of retal-
iation and increased, for instance, Western support for Israeli complaints over border violations.5  
The following section will consecutively examine Syria’s sponsorship security dilemma as well as 
domestic politics between 1964 and 1976. Finally, the analysis turns to Syria’s sponsorship role 
and its potential modification over time. 
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5.1 Nature of the Sponsorship Dilemma 
In order to assess systemic and domestic incentives for sponsorship policies tailored to reduce re-
spective risks of abandonment and entrapment, the following section turns first to the imbalance 
of power between Syria and Israel and the relative capacity of Fatah. Furthermore, the analysis 
examines the severity of interstate conflict, Syria’s alternative alliance options, and strategic in-
terest in maintaining the alignment. A conclusive section evaluated incentives for specific Syrian 
sponsorship policies regarding Fatah. 
5.1.1 Drifting apart: The power imbalance between Syria and Israel 
Regarding the imbalance of power between Israel and Syria, this study takes into account primar-
ily demographic, industrial, and military indicators of power. These are a translated in COW’s 
Composite Index of National Capability (CINC), measuring a country’s relative share of power 
capabilities distributed in the international system.6 
 
Figure 17: Relative share of world power: Syria and Israel (1964-1976) 
According to CINC data, Israel steadily expand its initially small advantage after 1966 and espe-
cially in the interwar years, despite a significant increase in Syria’s national capability after 1970 
and in the aftermath of the October 1973 War (Figure 17). Data also indicates that the imbalance 
of power in favor of Israel peaked in 1973/74. This becomes all the more obvious after taking a 
closer look at the respective military expenditures in the period of observation (Figure 18).7 
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While Syria steadily increased its military expenditure, particularly after 1972, it fell short of 
coming even close to the boost in Israel’s annual spending, which increased sevenfold between 
1967 ($491.6 million) and 1976 ($3.5 billion).8 
 
Figure 18: Military expenditure of Syria and Israel (1964-76) 
Moreover, Patrick Seale described Syria’s army in the mid-1960s not only as “ill-prepared for 
war” but also as a force of some “poorly-trained” and “under-officered” 50,000 soldiers, 
“equipped ‘on the cheap’” by the USSR.9 Only half of its 500 tanks were operational and while 
the Air Force commanded some 100 MiG-17 jets, Syria possessed neither air defense missiles nor 
a relevant naval force. Additionally, the army’s chain of command was fragmented and divided 
on both the officers’ as well as the political level.10 
Israel, in turn, has been considerably weak on the defense, given its unfavorable geographic loca-
tion and its small size. Yet, as a lesson from the 1956 Suez campaign, Israel strengthened its of-
fensive capabilities by expanding, for instance, its air force and acquired helicopters. Additionally, 
Israel’s Defense Forces (IDF) developed its tank corps and mobile armored units, expanded its 
paratroop corps, mechanized the infantry, and created a naval commando.11 In contrast to Syria’s 
army, IDF was shaped by a coherent military doctrine, able to mobilize about 500,000 reserve 
soldiers at speed by 1967, and its leadership consisted of a cohesive, professional, and well-
trained officer corps. Israel also benefitted from its good relations with the West and subsequent 
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high-technology weaponry deliveries–including the development of nuclear technology.12 Even-
tually, Israel manifested this conventional superiority in the 1967 and 1973 wars and strength-
ened its low defense capabilities by creating buffer zones and occupying areas of strategic im-
portance.13 Additionally, Israel’s historical ties to Lebanon’s Christian communities translated in-
to actual security-political advantage, particularly in the context of the Civil War 1975.14  
Already by the time of the third Arab Summit in Casablanca in 1965, Israel, a territorial and de-
mographical dwarf in the region, had achieved military superiority over its rivals. Based on this 
assessment, Egypt’s president Nasser publicly precluded open war against Israel as the Arab ar-
mies lacked “the necessary weapons and training.”15  
Regarding systemic incentives for adjustment strategies, the clear imbalance of power in favor of 
Israel suggests an overall Syrian policy of balancing, especially after 1965 and to an increasing ex-
tent between 1967 and 1971, as suggested by the balancing hypothesis N1. In 1973/74, the imbal-
ance of power and therefore systemic adjustment pressure on Syria peaked, yet moderately de-
clined in 1975/76. With regard to existing anti-Israel alliances and as suggested by the neorealist 
standing firm hypothesis N2, the imbalance induces Syrian efforts to avoid abandonment, especial-
ly in the second half of the 1960s and after the October 1973 War. 
5.1.2 Bridging the gap? Fatah/PLO’s capacity as an ally 
“The Syrians use this weapon of guerilla activity because they cannot face us in open battle, 
because they are militarily very weak, and they know we are bent upon establishing … cer-
tain facts along the border.”16 
General Aharon Yariv, May 1967  
In section 3.2, the assumption that rebel forces meet a state’s power capacity to a degree sufficient 
to fill others’ need for assistance was put into question. Also EAC data attributes a strong relative 
weakness to the case of Israel and Fatah.17 With an estimated average of 4,500 fighters distribut-
ed over several countries, Fatah provided little conventional assistance to Syria in case of an Is-
raeli attack, which is expected to induce entrapment-avoiding policies.  
Throughout the observation period, however, the degree of Fatah’s inferiority varied significantly 
and should reflect in Syria’s commitment. Hence, the capacity of Fatah will be measured by 
evaluating the frequency and lethality of attacks on Israel, its membership strength and support 
base among societal constituencies and third states, cohesion of its command, and its ability to 
escape or resist retaliation. 
                                                       
12 ———, Asad of Syria: 118; Ovendale, The Origins of the Arab-Israeli wars: 199. 
13 In the course of the June 1967 War, IDF captured the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West 
Bank from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. 
14 Mordechai Nisan, "Did Israel betray its Lebanese allies?," Middle East Quarterly 7, no. 4 (2000). 
15 Ovendale, The Origins of the Arab-Israeli wars: 192. 
16 Seale, Asad of Syria: 126. 
17 Cunningham et al., "It Takes Two." 
From joint defeat to open war: Syria & Fatah 
97 
5.1.2.1 Attacks against Israel 
In contrast to other Palestinian groups violently challenging Israel, Fatah’s record of terrorist at-
tacks has been a comparatively moderate one.18 Nevertheless, its campaign against Israel reveals 
interesting variances: Before the 1967 War, attacks against Israel were only few in number, non-
lethal and mostly sabotage acts against the National Water Carrier (NWC) or settlements close to 
its borders to Jordan and Syria.19 After the war, Fatah stepped up its activity and targeted Jerusa-
lem and Haifa as well as settlements in the upper Galilee. Instances of cross-border fire and other 
operations steadily increased after February 1969 yet declined in the second half of 1970. Guerilla 
attacks carried out by Fatah and others averaged at 24 between March and August 1969, reach-
ing a preliminary peak of 43 in the latter. In contrast to some 50-70 operations per month be-
tween January and August 1970 (52 in August alone), the frequency of attacks dramatically de-
clined to eight in October and twelve in December 1970.20 
In addition, Palestinian groups increasingly targeted civilians, causing 337 deaths only in 1970.21 
In the twelve single attacks Fatah could be ascribed to or deliberately claimed responsibility for 
between June 1967 and September 1970, fighters killed 24 people and injured more than 100 in 
attacks on Israeli institutions, also in Western Europe and Latin America. Following a deadly 
bomb blast in Tel Aviv on November 6, Fatah co-founder Salah Khalaf (‘Abu Iyad’) stated that 
this was “the start of more and bigger operations within our occupied homeland.”22 Especially in 
contrast to the early 1970s, PLO resorted to violence in order to assert its presence and prevent its 
exclusion from diplomatic initiatives.23 Between the September 1970 crisis in Jordan (Black Sep-
tember) and the October 1973 War, the number of attacks directly against Israel decreased sub-
stantially, as Fatah’s radical offspring Black September Organization (BSO) targeted mainly con-
servative Arab countries.  
The average number of cross border attacks carried out by Fatah and other Palestinian groups 
sunk, in contrast to 1970, to under 20 throughout 1971. After a brief period of increased activity 
in early 1972 (64 operations between January and mid-March), attacks settled down at an aver-
age of seven between April 1972 and January 1973. In the months leading to the 1973 War, Fa-
tah reportedly launched only one to two attacks per month. While citing the wishes of ‘friendly 
states’ and clearly Syria as a major determinant of Fatah inactivity, Iyad hinted in January 1973 
to external pressure.24 Although Mickolus and other databases list no Fatah attack throughout 
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1976, the group resumed both to trans border assaults on Israel and bombings in West-Jerusalem 
in the context of the Lebanese Civil War, killing some 33 and injuring 127 civilians.25  
5.1.2.2 Support base 
Several of Fatah’s founding members, such as Khalil al-Wazir (‘Abu Jihad’) or Arafat shared 
close ties to the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had gained popularity by 
linking political Islam to Palestinian nationalism and Arab unity.26 In 1954/55, they started 
mounting sabotage raids against Israel from Gaza and calculated that military reprisals might 
create an “‘explosive’ atmosphere” likely to increase the “self-awareness” of Palestinian popula-
tion.27 Fatah quickly established links with other Palestinian guerilla organizations and potential 
recruits through media outlets.28 
Although Fatah raids in 1964/65 inflicted no major military harm on Israel, their presentation in 
Arab media helped portraying the group as a worthy competitor of the PLO, which found itself 
heavily constrained by Cairo. Nevertheless, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan prohibited cross border 
attacks and denied support to Fatah between 1966 and June 1967. After the war, Fatah shifted its 
focus to the West Bank and successfully diversified the number of its statist backers. Additionally, 
the transfer of PLO finances and mass defections from PLO’s Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) 
to Fatah boosted the group’s operational strength in late 1967.29  
Throughout 1968, both statist and societal support for Fatah soared as well its international repu-
tation as a political force. The group’s ability to fight IDF to a standstill in the Battle of Karamah 
caused the Palestinian refugees to hail the ‘rebirth’ of their people and according to Fatah sources, 
thousands of volunteers joined the group within days.30 The Gulf States and Lebanon stepped up 
their financial assistance substantially, allowing the group to guarantee lifetime support for the 
families of fighters killed in action. Reportedly, the number of fighters in Jordan alone accounted 
for some 20,000 by late March 1968 in comparison to approx. 200 about three years earlier.31 In 
addition, Fatah reported in May to have received over 20,000 applications from Egyptians and 
another 1,500 per week from Iraqi volunteers. Although only one third of the recruits actually 
completed training, Fatah commanded by June about 2,000 fighters and 12,000 supporters.32 On 
a political level, improved relations with Cairo resulted in increased media endorsement and mili-
                                                       
25 Transnational terrorism; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 
26 Sayigh, Armed Struggle: 49. 
27 Ibid., 82. 
28 Ibid., 84f. 
29 Ma'oz and Yaniv, "On a short leash," 195; Shemesh, The Palestinian Entity 1959-1974: 91f. 
30 Donald Neff, "Battle of Karameh establishes claim of Palestinian statehood," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 
(March 1998). 
31 Edward Hughes, "A brotherhood of terror," Time 91, no. 13 (1968); Thomas Kiernan, Arafat: The Man and the Myth  
(New York, NY: Norton, 1976). 206. 
32 Sayigh, Armed Struggle: 181. 
From joint defeat to open war: Syria & Fatah 
99 
tary aid as well as Egyptian pressure on Jordan and Lebanon to tolerate the presence of Palestini-
an fighters and their increased control over local refugee camps.33  
Despite Fatah’s popularity among its Palestinian constituency, its increasing radicalization wors-
ened relations with Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, particularly because of Israeli reprisals.34 In 
Jordan, violence erupted in September 1970, leaving hundreds of Fatah fighters and several thou-
sand Palestinian civilians dead, and resulted in the shutdown of all PLO offices and confiscation 
of weapon stores.35 Subsequently, Fatah transferred its fighters to South Lebanon, known as ‘Fa-
tahland’ when their number rose to up to 20,000.36 After the 1973 war, the Arab Summit recog-
nized PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, entailing a boost in Ar-
ab support. Nevertheless, increased tensions with the Lebanese government in the context of 
cross-border attacks and Israeli retaliation laid the path for renewed violence. By the end of 1976, 
Fatah had lost some 900 fighters, including many veteran commanders, in clashes with the Leba-
nese government, loyalist militias, and the Syrian army.37  
5.1.2.3 Cohesion of command 
Initially directed by a collective leadership (executive committee), Fatah’s command became in-
creasingly centralized and from 1967 to 2004, Arafat stood out clearly as the group’s undisputed 
leader (and PLO since 1969).38 While EAC data supports this assessment of a clear central com-
mand, it indicates that Fatah exercised only a moderate degree of control over the Palestinian in-
surgence.39  
Generally, a lack of consensus regarding the character of any future Palestinian entity, external 
alignments, as well as the appropriate strategy against Israel, triggered several coup attempts and 
factionalism within Fatah/PLO. In 1966, for instance, PLA captain Yusef Urabi briefly assumed 
unilaterally leadership over Fatah–reportedly on the orders of the Syrian General Command.40 In 
the wake of Fatah’s formal takeover of PLO in the second half of the 1960s, divisions along ideo-
logical as well as strategic lines occurred. While Fatah al-Islam, mainly comprising of Jordanian 
Muslim Brethren, challenged the secular-leftist cadres’ dominance in 1969/70, other leftist PLO 
factions PFLP (est. in 1967), PFLP-GC (1968), and DFLP (1969) disagreed with Fatah in partic-
ular on their position vis-à-vis the conservative, pro-Western Arab states, as well as the means to 
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achieve their nationalist goals.41 Nevertheless, on February 4, 1969, Arafat became chairman of 
the PLO and able to politically sideline as well as to outnumber his rivals in the Palestinian are-
na.42 In addition, discord within Fatah centered on alignments and particularly the use of vio-
lence. Sabri al-Banna’s militant Fatah-Revolutionary Council (also known as Abu Nidal Organiza-
tion) de facto replaced mainstream-Fatah in Iraq in the early 1970s. In addition, the imposed ‘lack 
of action’ after the Black September caused a crisis in 1972 in Lebanon between a local Fatah 
branch and the Central Committee as well as within the leadership.43  
After 1973, Fatah gained additional Arab resources and increased control over potential breaka-
way or even revolting factions.44 Its formal calls for the establishment of a national authority in 
any liberated part of the Palestinian territory and the dismissal of violence as the only legitimate 
strategy strengthened, on the one hand, pragmatist forces and divided, on the other, leftists inside 
Fatah.45 While this increased Fatah’s internal cohesion, it caused several radical leftist and rejec-
tionist PLO-factions to temporary leave the organization.46  
5.1.2.4 Ability to escape or resist retaliation 
Finally, the capacity of a terrorist organization is measured by its ability to escape or resist retalia-
tion by the targeted state, indicated by access to a safe haven, either inside or outside the targeted 
state’s territory.47 Although safe havens in Israel’s vicinity had become crucial for Fatah since 
1964, the degree of protection that they were able and willing to provide varied significantly over 
time.48  
Before the June 1967 War, Israel limited its retaliatory strikes to Jordan and Fatah staging camps 
in the West Bank.49 In early 1968, IDF raids lasting for weeks foiled Fatah attempts to establish a 
safe haven in the Occupied Territories, killing dozens and detaining hundreds of fighters.50 In 
contrast to this material weakness, the popular perception of Fatah’s ability to resist retaliation 
peaked in the aftermath of the Battle of Karamah on March 21, 1968, which left 28 Israeli sol-
diers dead and 90 wounded.51  
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According to analysts, Fatah/PLO military bases and supply routes located in Jordan and Leba-
non were mostly “plainly observable […] and thus vulnerable to air strikes and shelling.”52 For-
mally, the Cairo Agreement of November 3, 1969, obligated Beirut to accept the “right of the 
guerillas to attack Israel’ in return for their obedience to state authorities.”53 However, retaliatory 
strikes of Israel’s Air Force (IAF) frequently targeting Jordan and Lebanon in 1969 and after 
1970 further aggravated tensions between Fatah and the respective governments. In 1970/71, Fa-
tah lost its Jordanian safe haven and relocated many of its fighters to Lebanon. However, already 
existing dissent over Fatah’s presence in the country and the Palestinians’ repeated violation of 
the agreement increased. This trend was not only reflected in the government’s refusal to permit 
air raid shelters in Palestinian camps in 1974 but also increased communal tensions escalating to 
major Civil War only months later.54  
Finally, Operation “Wrath of God” (1972-88), a series of assassinations and raids, which includ-
ed numerous intelligence operations in Western Europe after BSO’s attack on the 1972 Summer 
Olympics in Munich, illustrated that retaliatory strikes were not limited to Israel’s immediate 
neighborhood.55  
Conclusion 
As indicated above, Fatah generally lacked sufficient capacity to level the high asymmetry of 
power between Palestinian and Israeli forces. However, a more precise examination of the fre-
quency and lethality of Fatah attacks, its power base, and ability to resist retaliatory strikes, indi-
cates variation below Snyder’s threshold. Fatah gained substantial strength after the June 1967 
War, overcoming the Arab States’ preference for PLO and even inheriting its facilities, boosting 
its standing among the Palestinians, and demonstrating at least a partial capacity to resist. In ad-
dition, Fatah attacks against Israel became more numerous, peaking between early 1969 and the 
second half of 1970. Although societal support remained stable, internal factionalism and wors-
ening relations with the frontline states weakened Fatah. Hence, the number of attacks on Israel 
decreased after a preliminary high in 1972, yet became more deadly and targeted Israeli civilians 
in a more frequent manner. Before 1967 and especially after the disengagement agreement in 
1974, Fatah bases in Syria had been rather safe from Israeli retaliatory strikes in contrast to Jor-
dan, Lebanon, and the Occupied Territories. However, regional backing of the Fatah-led PLO, 
which had strengthened its control over other Palestinian factions substantially by 1973, boosted 
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after the war. Hence, it is to be adhered that Fatah gained significant strength after the June 1967 
War and the October 1973 War respectively. Although a general tendency towards fears of en-
trapment has to be adhered, Fatah’s capacity alleviated this tendency to a certain degree in the re-
spective periods. 
5.1.3 Severity of conflict 
Understood as a form of counterbalancing, the extent of sponsorship commitment is also influ-
enced by the severity of conflict between the sponsor and its adversary. Thus, a high probability 
of inter-state war is expected to induce fears of abandonment. 
A longstanding interstate conflict in the region, Syria’s feud with Israel escalated several times in-
to full-scale war (1948, 1967, 1973). Historical and territorial revisionism on both sides, the unset-
tled status of up to 140,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria after the 1948 war, the culmination of 
U.S.-USSR rivalry and its penetration of the region, as well as tensions over the regional distribu-
tion of water further aggravated the conflict.56  
Between 1948 and 1976, MID data (3.10) lists over 40 dispute events, ranging from border viola-
tions to sporadic clashes, attacks, and interstate war, and indicates a high probability of war.57 Af-
ter 15 years of low-intensity skirmishes at the mutual border, Israel gained de facto sovereignty 
over several disputed demilitarized zones (DMZ) of strategic and economic importance near the 
Sea of Galilee in 1964.58 The conflict, however, intensified as these territorial gains entailed the 
initiation of Israel’s NWC project in 1963, diverting some 75 percent of the Jordan waters for ag-
ricultural and industrial development; a move that was seen as extremely hostile by Syria, which 
sent troops to the border.59 In 1965/66, border clashes increased inter alia, as Israel repeatedly at-
tacked Syrian diversion works of the Jordan River with long-range tank fire and even an air 
raid.60 As if relations could not get any worse, Israel’s Chief of Staff, Yitzhak Rabin, threatened 
to hold Syria accountable for increased Palestinian activity since autumn 1966 and was granted 
bigger freedom of movement by the government in early 1967.61 The conflict reached a pre-war 
peak on April 7, 1967, when clashes between Syrian and Israeli air force and a tank battle result-
ed in a fiasco for Syria: Six of its jets were destroyed and “victorious Israeli jets swept over the 
suburbs of Damascus.”62 Additional alarm bells were set off when Rabin stated after the clash, 
“the Syrian government needed to be overthrown before Israeli security could be guaranteed.”63  
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The June 1967 War resulted in a disaster for Syria, manifested by the loss of the Golan Heights 
the displacement of some 100,000 local residents (including 17,000 Palestinians), and the weak 
performance of Syrian troops during the war.64 On the one hand, the defeat led to a demoraliza-
tion and moderation of the Syrian radical factions, no longer rejecting negotiations as a means of 
conflict solution after 1970 and thus to a decline in dispute events.65 On the other hand, Israel’s 
occupation of Mount Hermon exposed Damascus to IDF surveillance and strengthened Syria’s 
revisionism against Israel. In particular, the trauma of defeat convinced Hafiz al-Asad that “ex-
pansionism was in Israel’s very nature.”66 
The constantly high probability of war after 1967 reflected strongly in several episodes:  
In response to an increasing number of attacks, Israeli Air Force (IAF) struck Fatah bases in Syr-
ia and Israeli Mirages shot down a Syrian MiG-17 and a MiG-21 on February 24, 1969.67 Be-
tween April and June 1970, fierce clashes broke out repeatedly on the Golan, involving tanks, ar-
tillery, and air force. Again, IAF shot down in total seven Syrian MiGs and the clashes left hun-
dreds of Syrian soldiers injured and killed.68 In the following years, Syria repeatedly failed to re-
gain the area by military means.69 When Syria intervened on behalf of PLO forces in northern 
Jordan in September 1970, Israel mobilized forces for a potential ground operation into Syria and 
the U.S. ambassador in Tel Aviv warned that Israel might “so smash the Syrians that they won’t 
rise again for a long time.”70 Finally, in the weeks after the Munich Massacre in early September 
1972, IAF repeatedly raided villages just outside the capital, army positions on the Golan Heights, 
and Fatah camps near the Lebanese border and in the Damascus area.71 On November 21, IAF 
shot down seven Syrian planes and on January 8, 1973, it attacked numerous military and eco-
nomic targets in Latakia and Tartus. In the course of the operation, IAF killed some 400 civilians 
and soldiers and destroyed an army camp, a radar post, and anti-aircraft batteries.72  
After the October 1973 War, in which Syria failed to recover the Golan Heights, tensions de-
creased in the context of the May 1974 Disengagement Agreement.73 Remarkably, both Israel 
and Syria found themselves on the pro-status quo side in the context of the Civil War in Lebanon 
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1975/76. Hence, in contrast to Jordan in 1970, Israel even tolerated Syria’s direct intervention in-
to Lebanon in June 1976.74  
It can be maintained that between the early 1960s and 1974, territorial revisionism, two conven-
tional wars in six years, frequent border clashes including heavy weaponry and casualties, and a 
fierce rhetoric provided for a constantly high probability of war. Hence, the Syrian-Israel conflict 
sets a clear incentive for Syria to prevent allies from abandonment. After 1974, however, tensions 
with Israel significantly decreased, inducing fears of entrapment in the conflict between Israel and 
Fatah. 
5.1.4 Availability of alternative allies 
Once sponsorship alignments are established, intra-alignment dependence declines and fears of 
entrapment correspondingly increase if other reliable allies are available. To what extent have al-
ternative alliances influenced Syria’s leverage over Israel and Fatah in the respective security di-
lemma? 
Syria has been a part of large regional alliance bodies ever since gaining independence, most 
prominently the League of Arab States (AL). AL, initially established in 1945 as a mediating in-
stitution, was re-designed as a collective security system in 1950.75 In a corresponding Joint De-
fense and Economic Cooperation Treaty, AL members pledged to  
“Consider any [act of] armed aggression made against any one or more of them or their 
armed forces, to be directed against them all. Therefore, in accordance with the right of self-
defense, individually and collectively, they undertake to go without delay to the aid of the 
State or States against which such an act of aggression is made, and immediately to take, 
individually and collectively, all steps available, including the use of armed force, to repel the 
aggression and restore security and peace.”76 
However, as the treaty quickly posed a contradiction with the AL members’ national interests, it 
was gradually replaced by ad-hoc and specific alliances such as the defense agreement between 
Cairo and Damascus in 1966/67.77 
In January 1964, AL members rejected Syria’s call for joint war against Israel and Nasser made it 
clear that, if Syria would provoke such a war, it would have to face Israel on its own.78 The fol-
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lowing summer, Syria’s disappointment over lacking international support increased when it took 
the matter to the UN Security Council–without any effect.79 By that time, foreign policy makers 
realized that Syria was neither strong enough to face Israel by itself nor able to convince other 
states to intervene on its behalf.80  
Syria’s regional isolation after its breakaway from the Union with Egypt (1958-61) aggravated al-
so the weakness of its formal alliances.81 Even when the Ba’th party returned to power in Iraq in 
1968, the political leadership in Damascus refrained from an alignment and its radical left-wing 
posture strained relations with the conservative-moderate Arab states.82 Finally, USSR support 
increased before the June 1967 War, yet excluded forthcoming military support during the war. 
As Moscow clearly preferred a political settlement with Israel, it could also not be completely 
counted on after the war.83 
 
With the exception of Iraq, Syria’s patterns of interstate alignment changed considerably after the 
Asad coup on November 13, 1970. Though merely of proclamatory nature, Arab unionist pro-
jects re-emerged in 1971, this time with Libya and Egypt.84 Furthermore, Asad searched for a 
rapprochement with Jordan and Saudi Arabia in order to form a unified Arab front against Israel. 
This approach bore fruits in 1973, when both Egypt and Syria coordinated their efforts against Is-
rael.85In addition, financial assistance from the Gulf rose from $7 million in 1968 to $1.5 billion 
in 1980.86 Relations with the USSR cooled in the coup’s aftermath, yet improved by 1973 and 
contributed to the build-up of the Syrian army. The rapprochement peaked in February 1976, 
when General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev publicly ranked Syria as one of the most important re-
gional allies of the USSR.87 
 
The availability of alternative allies is expected to have a moderating effect on Syria’s abandon-
ment fears in its relations with Fatah. Although Damascus had de jure been a member of a multi-
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lateral defense pact since 1950, its interstate allies repeatedly failed to deliver on the promises of 
assistance against Israel, thereby increased fears of abandonment by Fatah. This tendency was al-
leviated temporarily by the Egyptian-Syrian defense agreement on the eve of the 1967 War and 
Asad’s alignment successes after 1970. Amid resumed military cooperation with Egypt in 1973, 
improved ties to Jordan and the Gulf States, and a somewhat eased dependence on USSR sup-
port, incentives for entrapment avoiding increased in the early 1970s. 
5.1.5 Strategic interest in upholding the alignment 
Independent of the actual adversary, a sponsor’s strategic interest in upholding the alignment also 
shapes the sponsorship security dilemma and creates incentives for abandonment avoiding poli-
cies.88 In order to examine this interplay, the following section turns to regional and domestic re-
sources linked to Syria’s alignment with Fatah. 
On April 21, 1988, exiled Fatah founder Khalil al-Wazir was buried in the Palestinian Yarmouk 
refugee camp in Damascus. Up to one million people attended the funeral, which followed a per-
sonal invitation from president Asad. This had been particularly remarkable as Syria was at that 
time effectively at war with Arafat-led PLO and the Syrian-Palestinian community itself account-
ed for only 250,000 people.89 Understood in a domestic, regional, and international context, this 
brief episode illustrates the strategic importance of the Palestinian cause and Fatah as its de facto 
‘sole representative’ for the Syrian government. 
Since the Arab revolt in the late 1930s, the question of Palestine had been the most important fac-
tor of Pan-Arab ideology, carrying expectations of unity and cooperation against Western impe-
rialism.90 Hence, the establishment of the state of Israel on what many Syrian’s understood as 
Syrian land boosted politicization also among army officers, and radical nationalist pressure 
peaked in regime overthrow in 1949.91 While up to 190,000 refugees from territorial detachments 
to Turkey and Israel constituted a constant reminder of Syrian-Arab inferiority, granting residen-
tial rights and obligations resembling those of Syrian nationals to the refugees established the is-
sue as a domestic factor in Syria.92 As radical Arab nationalism became a key instrument of dis-
crediting and delegitimizing both ruling elites and domestic challengers, governments tied their 
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own worthiness to rule to their commitment to the Palestinian cause.93 Subsequently, the Ba’th 
party portrayed Palestine as a “key issue in the party’s struggle in the domestic, Arab, and inter-
national domains” after their 1963 accession to power.94 
The awareness of the strategic importance of a pro-Palestinian alignment became repeatedly evi-
dent in regime rhetoric. In November 1965, for instance, members of the Ba’th regional com-
mand issued a statement warning that in case of any further delay of “a struggle that will be a real 
revolutionary experience,” “we shall definitely lose the confidence of our people and the confi-
dence of the rank and file of the party.”95  
Beyond potential domestic challengers to Ba’thist rule, Syria linked its pro-Palestinian alignment 
also to its regional interests. Particularly after the Arab states had de facto suspended military ac-
tion against Israel in 1965, support for Palestinian efforts of popular liberation became the ‘touch-
stone’ for commitment to Arab unity. Subsequently, a process of ‘outbidding’ emerged over 
championship of the Palestinian resistance.96 As a prominent supporting role was also suitable to 
compensate for legitimacy losses in times of inter-Arab conflict, linking the Palestinian resistance 
exclusively to the revolutionary camp aimed at preventing the moderate camp from benefitting 
from the PLO’s political successes.97 In 1971, also Minister of Defense Mustafa Talas empha-
sized this linkage when stating that the Palestinian struggle “could not be separated from the cur-
rent Arab revolution.”98 
In this context, Syria’s strategic interest in upholding its alignment with Fatah increased after 
1964, as the group gradually replaced PLO, whose formation under the aegis of Cairo had frus-
trated Syria’s claims of representing the Palestinians. In this context, Syria’s rejection of the Cas-
ablanca summit allowed it to portray itself as the only source of significant Arab support to the 
Palestinian struggle.99 While Syrian exclusive patronage was challenged by especially Egyptian 
pro-Fatah realignment in the second half of the 1960s, inter-Arab competition over the Palestini-
an cause somewhat eased in the early 1970s.100 This has been illustrated not only by Egypt’s, 
Lebanon’s, and Jordan’s disengagement from the Palestinian struggle in a nationalist turn, but al-
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so by Anwar Sadat’s claim that Egypt had “spilled more than enough of its blood in the Arab 
cause.”101 
Regarding Syria’s wider international interests, control over PLO allowed Damascus to reap both 
reputational and material benefits from other states. First, the Gulf States subsidized Syria as a 
frontline state in the Arab-Israeli conflict after 1973/74. Second, Syria’s handling of the ‘Palestin-
ian Card’ played a significant role in both the boost in USSR-Syrian cooperation after 1972 and 
the temporary suspension of USSR arms deliveries in the context of Syria’s intervention in Leba-
non in 1976.102 
Summing up, championship of the Palestinian cause had been both a key pillar of regime legiti-
macy and a contested resource in inter-Arab relations. Incentives for abandonment avoiding 
peaked in the second half of the 1960s and declined to a certain extent in the early 1970s, due to 
the disengagement of the moderate camp. However, the Palestinian Card remained strategically 
important ever since, providing the regime with leverage over domestic competitors and the Pal-
estinian refugees inside Syria, on the one hand, and a tool of influencing PLO’s constituencies in 
other Arab states on the other. 
5.1.6 Conclusion 
The previous section explored the nature of the sponsorship security dilemma (SSD) between 
Syria and Fatah during the observation period (1964-76). Comprising and constituting the inde-
pendent variable of the neorealist (N1-3) and neoclassical realist (NC1-3) hypotheses, the SSD con-
stitutes a crucial point of departure for further examination. In order to emphasize systemic in-
centives for balancing (N1) and specific alliance policies between standing firm (N2) and restraining 
the ally (N3), the SSD’s specific nature will be assessed on the basis of the findings in 5.1.1 - 5.1.5. 
The first, neorealist, hypothesis N1 assumes that an imbalance of power induces corresponding 
adjustment policies. Given the clear and steadily increasing imbalance between Syria and Israel 
in favor of the latter, it should be maintained that there is a clear and strong incentive for re-
sponse. This has been especially the case after 1965 and to an increasing extent between 1967 and 
1971, peaking in 1973/74 and to a moderately lower degree after 1975. Whether structural real-
ism remains indecisive regarding the precise policy, two expectations regarding adjustment 
choices can be maintained from the observations made in section 5.1.3 (severity of conflict) and 
5.1.4 (availability of alternative allies). First, as established by balance-of-threat theory, the pres-
ence of severe interstate conflict is likely to trigger balancing behavior.103 Prior to mid-1974, inter-
state conflict had been endemic and escalated frequently between 1963 and 1973. Second, ad-
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justment policy choices are highly depending on their availability. Prior to 1972, Syria’s military 
expenditure suggested limited effects of internal balancing, increasing the pressure on external al-
liance formation. However, Syria’s patterns of interstate alignment were heavily constrained by 
fragility, unreliability, and intra-Arab rivalry with little exceptions throughout the 1960s.  
By 1965/66, Israel’s material superiority, constant fears of escalation resulting in defeat, and a 
lack of reliable allies, were assumedly crucial for Syria’s decision to propagate a popular war of 
liberation as a new military doctrine–with the Palestinian rebels at its center.104 As conventional 
war had been de facto ruled out as an option, Damascus eventually announced in mid-1966 to be 
“‘no less heroic than Hanoi.’”105 Section 5.2 will examine domestic pressures to align with Fatah, 
as emphasized by the neoclassical realist hypotheses NC1 (alliance-seeking) and NC2 (sponsorship). 
Both neorealist hypotheses suggesting either a policy of standing firm (N2) or restraining the ally 
(N3) turn to alliance management and maintain that the SSD’s nature entails a specific sponsor-
ship policy. Table 12 concludes these observations as follows. 
Table 12: Nature of the sponsorship dilemma I: Syria-Fatah 
Indicator Observation Induces a general fear of 
IMBALANCE OF POWER High in favor of Israel 
Peak: 1973/74; moderate: prior to 1965; 
1975/76 
Abandonment 
CAPACITY OF THE ALLY Insufficient to fill Syria’s need for assis-
tance, vulnerable to retaliatory strikes 
Limited increased strength 1967-69 and 
1973-76 respectively 
Entrapment 
SEVERITY OF CONFLICT High 
Significant ease of tensions after 1973 War 
Abandonment/Entrapment 
ALTERNATIVE ALLIES Not available/Available 
De facto isolation until 1973- with the excep-
tion of 1966/67 (Egypt), ad-hoc cooperation 
against Israel. 
Abandonment/Entrapment 
STRATEGIC INCENTIVES High 
Alliance provides for control over Palestinian 
constituencies and domestic power resources 
Abandonment 
 
It becomes immediately apparent that throughout the period of observation no trend prevailed 
clearly. Therefore, Syria’s commitment to Fatah is expected to range between a strong policy of 
resolve and a policy of restraint. This comes not as a big surprise, given the long observation period, 
the instability of Syria’s interstate alignments, the rapid decline of open interstate confrontation 
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after 1974, and finally the fact that Fatah has never posed a substantial military threat to Israel. 
Nevertheless, several critical junctures for Syria’s sponsorship policies could be identified:  
Between 1964 and 1973, incentives for abandonment were dominant, given Syria’s regional isola-
tion, high levels of conflict, and Israel’s power predominance. Accordingly, the rise of Fatah in 
the Palestinian arena in 1967 and inter-Arab competition over championship have assumedly in-
creased this tendency. Jordan’s and Egypt’s disengagement from Palestine, improved inter-Arab 
military cooperation, rifts within the Palestinian camp eased tensions between the adversaries 
and an improved Syrian power position point towards increased restraint roughly after 1971 and 
to a larger extent after 1974. 
Having laid out the incentives stemming from the SSD, the following section turns to Syria’s do-
mestic politics in order to examine the antecedent condition ‘regime vulnerability/autonomy.’ 
5.2 Domestic politics: The Struggle for Syria 
All four neoclassical hypotheses argue that regime vulnerability is a decisive factor regarding the 
questions when states seek alliances instead of internal balancing (NC1) or choose sponsorship (NC2), 
and under what conditions they opt for tailor-made alignments policies deviating from policies of 
standing firm and restraining (NC3/NC4).  
Against the background of Syria’s instable alliance patterns, one might assume a preference for 
internal balancing in its efforts to counter the Israeli threat. The steady rise in Syria’s military ex-
penditure, increasing from some $90 million in 1966 to $150 million (1968), $388 million (1973), 
and exceeding one billion in 1977 also supports this assessment. In addition, military personnel 
tripled between 1966 (80,000) and 1976 (240,000).106  Figure 19 and Figure 20, illustrating Syria’s 
internal balancing efforts in the period of observation, indicate that they stagnated until the 1967 
War–despite increased Israeli power capacities and a high level of conflict. Only after 1971, Syr-
ia’s internal balancing efforts reflected the Israeli development to a larger degree. In a similar vein, 
there was no substantial increase in recruitment between 1964 and 1970.107 It is hence noteworthy, 
that Syria’s increased efforts of internal balancing coincide not with the period of regional isola-
tion and high conflict, which had been observed in the 1960s, but with declined tension and im-
proved inter-Arab relations as well as a rise in economical assistance from the USSR and the Gulf 
States (see also section 5.1.1).  
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Figure 19: Internal balancing efforts by Syria (1964-1976) 
 
 
Figure 20: Internal balancing efforts by Syria and Israel (1964-1976) 
 
   Domestic politics: The Struggle for Syria 
 112 
Under the condition of unfavorable alliance options, the neoclassical realist alliance-seeking (NC1) 
and sponsorship (NC2) hypotheses emphasize regime vulnerability as a potential explanatory factor 
for both the observed time lag in internal balancing and the choice of sponsorship in order to 
compensate a lack in domestic mobilization resources. Whether this has also been the case in 
Syria between the Ba’thist coup in 1963 and the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1976 will 
be assessed as follows. 
5.2.1 Ties that divide: Ba’thist factionalism and the struggle for Syria 1963-1970 
Amid the rise of the Ba’th party in 1963, the popular base of the political leadership was affected 
by military purges and the fact that authoritarian rule also spread to the economy, weakening es-
pecially the agrarian-commercial business elites.108 The same year, the regime enacted the emer-
gency law and Syria’s record of sharply restricted political rights and civil liberties worsened 
dramatically.109 Additionally, after having experienced a radical shift among their power base 
from predominantly Sunni urban middle class to a rural constituency, the Ba’th leaders found 
themselves isolated in the political arena and increasingly relied on military repression.110 Endem-
ic corruption and a lack of party discipline reinforced the structural vulnerability of the regime’s 
nationalist credentials, despite the presence of a mass populist party whose membership increased 
dramatically between 1963 (some 2,500) and 1968 (approx. 35,000) and that officially resented 
sectarianism as incompatible with Pan-Arabism and “never experienced”111 by the Syrian people. 
Subsequently, this trend also limited the regime’s ability to mobilize support outside of its own 
community of trust.112 
Regime vulnerability became manifested in the centralization and radicalization of Sunni Muslim 
opposition to secular Ba’thist rule, on the one hand, and an encroaching dominance of the reli-
gious minorities, on the other. Supported by the traditional notability, Communists, Socialists, 
and Nasserites, the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood challenged the government in nu-
merous protests and violent clashes in 1964 and 1965.113 From February to April 1964, for in-
stance, small tradesmen and anti-Ba’th students initiated a wave of demonstrations and strikes in 
Syria’s urban centers, at times violently repressed by army units. Simultaneously, the regime built 
up a workers’ militia to suppress further strikes and in January 1965, a special military court con-
demned eleven men to death that were connected to strikes. To make matters worse, mass capital 
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flight and a virtual stop of private investments led to a massive deterioration of Syria’s economy 
by late 1964.114  
Given the generally high politicization of the army and its dominant role in the Ba’th party and 
vice versa, intra-Ba’th rivalries became intertwined with those within the security forces after 
1963. Hence, a split emerged between the Pan-Arab National Command (NC) and the Syrian 
Regional Command (RC). While the NC included mostly Sunni civilian leaders such as party’s 
founding members Michel Aflaq and Prime Minister Salah ad-Din al-Bitar as well as military 
leaders, such as General Amin al-Hafiz, the RC was dominated by radical leftists and the party’s 
military command, increasingly comprised of minorities from the periphery.115  
Subsequently, sectarian polarization (as indicated by Figure 21) increasingly entailed praetorian-
ism. Thus, a situation emerged in which, “the highest party leaders were isolated from supervis-
ing and directing the organisation” and “party loyalty was replaced by loyalty to a person or 
bloc.”116 Accordingly, the military leadership systematically removed Sunni officers from key 
posts and replaced them with ‘trusted’ leaders from the minority communities. Chief of Staff Sa-
lah Jadid stationed army-units comprised mainly of minorities around Damascus while transfer-
ring assumedly unreliable Sunni officers to peripheral areas and the Syrian-Israeli front.117 In a 
domestic move of counterbalancing the RC, the government aimed at coopting moderate Nasser-
ites and liberals by seeking Western economic assistance. However, as the party left fiercely re-
jected these efforts, a crisis emerged that resulted in Bitar’s enforced resignation.118Directly facing 
a major competitor for its own military and political power resources, the NC dissolved the RC 
on December 19, 1965. It rejected any other allegiance than the one to the party and vowed to 
eliminate the armed forces’ interference in politics.119 Yet, when Bitar publicly suggested sending 
the army back to the barracks in early 1966, the RC’s military members staged a coup, ousting him 
and his remaining allies from the ruling circles on February 23.120 Subsequently, Alawi and 
Druze officers literally eliminated urban Sunni presence from the higher ranks of the military by 
1970.121 Consequently, the Ba’th party eventually overcame the NC/RC-split.122 Nevertheless, it 
was particularly the increased visibility of Alawi minority rule after 1966, which affected regime 
vulnerability to threats outside of the ruling circles. As Figure 21 and Figure 22 show, Druze and 
Ismaili representation in the power circles decreased throughout the second half of the 1960s. 
This narrowing of the power base (‘Alawization’) was accompanied by security repercussions 
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such as protests and even open revolt of Druze officers between September 1966 and March 
1967.123 
 
Source: van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: 28f.  
Figure 21: Sectarian representation in Syrian politics (9/1963-2/1966) 
 
While reducing immediate threats to regime survival, this policy simultaneously narrowed the 
community of trust down to members of the four Alawi tribes.124 Yet, as the ratio between potential 
security forces with an Alawi background and the general Syrian population (14-18/1,000) fell 
short of the ratio needed for effective policing and repression as established by Quinlivian 
(20/1,000), the integration of other segments of society became essential for regime survival.125 
Therefore, socialization, radical agrarian reform, and the encouragement of a massive rural influx 
to urban centers helped the Ba’thists to win over and consolidate their power base among the ru-
ral sector. Additionally, foreign assistance from the Eastern Bloc States and China compensated 
for lacking domestic investments.126 
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Source: van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: 28f. 
Figure 22: Sectarian representation in Syrian politics (3/1966-11/1970) 
 
Yet, efforts to create allegiance to the state beyond religious and tribal bonds were impeded by 
fierce resistance of the urban Sunni population to Alawi rule, rejecting the idea of being dominat-
ed by a minority perceived as heretic and traditionally inferior.127 Furthermore, the party’s mobi-
lization capacity remained limited among small wage earners and artisans in the urban centers 
and domestic opposition to Leninism (Muslim Brotherhood, Nasserites) persisted.128 Subsequent-
ly, major anti-regime protests took place in early 1967. Increased state control over the economy 
triggered renewed strikes and protests in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus in May 1967.129 
In order to weaken its domestic opponents and to increase its acceptance among militant nation-
alists, trade unions, Communists, as well as Nasserites, the government also radicalized its for-
eign policy, preparing Syrians for a “protracted mass armed struggle.”130 These revolutionary na-
tionalist credentials, however, were damaged severly in the 1967 War. First, suspicions emerged 
that the leadership had held back well-equipped forces from the front and too quickly abandoned 
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the Quneitra border province in order to prevent a potential military coup in the capital.131 Se-
cond, the defeat encouraged the Islamist opposition to step up its anti-regime activities by late 
1969. In June 1970, security forces arrested hundreds of union members and the military leader-
ship purged leftists from the armed forces.132 
Inside the coalition, praetorianism remained endemic between two largely autonomous forces. 
On the one side, there was the radical left-wing civilian government and party apparatus, infor-
mally led by Jadid, as well as his non-Alawi allies: President Nur al-Din al-Atasi, Chief of Staff 
Ahmad al-Suwaydani, Colonel Muhammad Rabah al-Tawil, head of the Popular Resistance 
Forces, and Colonel Abd al-Karim al-Jundi, head of National Security. On the other side, the 
army emerged under the increasing control of Minister of Defense Asad and Mustafa Talas 
(Chief of Staff since 1968) into a major domestic force. This was particularly the case as Jadid 
had loosened his grip on the army after taking over the civilian key post of Assistant Secretary 
General of the RC in August 1965.133 
Disagreement on external alignments after the 1967 defeat further exacerbated elite fragmenta-
tion.134 The Jadid faction gave priority to Syria’s socialist transformation and rejected the idea of 
any cooperation with the pro-Western Arab states. In contrast, they favored aligning with the 
Communist bloc in order to gain resources for the domestic socialist transformation.135 The other 
faction, led by Asad, gave highest priority to the struggle against Israel and an end to Syria’s iso-
lation in the Arab world. Thus, they preferred a military strengthening to internal transformation 
and called for cooperation with Egypt, Iraq, as well as the pro-Western kingdoms of Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia against Israel.136 
“The fact that the army is ideological should strengthen its military standards and not 
weaken them. The struggle for Palestine is near. Therefore it is necessary for us to make all 
military arrangements to enter into it.”137  
 
In one of the first internal publications defending the 1966 coup, the reestablished RC spurned 
the idea of “excluding the army from politics” as a manipulative tool of world imperialism and 
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bourgeois domination, contradicting the anti-imperialist concept of an “ideological army.”138 
Hence, the interference of the army into politics increased after the February coup as neither Su-
waydani, former head of the Military intelligence directorate, nor the Air Force Commander 
Asad, relinquished their military functions.139 In contrast, Asad started in late 1968 to cut the 
armed forces off from the civilian party leadership by prohibiting direct contacts between military 
and civilian party sections. Additionally, increased control through military intelligence and the 
transfer of Jadid’s military supporters away from sensitive positions secured his grip on the ar-
my.140  
Throughout 1968, repeated tensions erupted also over the question, whether the socialist trans-
formation and expansion of the public sector should have priority over military spending and a 
rather liberal economic policy, encouraging foreign direct investment  
In order to counterbalance the military wing of the party and reduce regime vulnerability, Jadid 
increasingly relied on the civilian party apparatus and paramilitary forces, thereby creating a dual-
ity of power.141 In September 1966, for instance, the militias associated with the Socialist Workers’ 
Union lost their independence and were forced under the supervision of the party and incorpo-
rated in the Popular Defense Army (PDA), now consisting of thousands of students, radical trade 
unionists, and farm workers.142 Eventually, the PDA guaranteed not only the Jadid faction’s su-
premacy over radical socialist groups within the ruling coalition but also expanded the party’s au-
tonomy from the army.  
Praetorianism peaked when Asad criticized the increasing influence of the Union’s militia as of-
fensive to the army’s monopoly of legitimate violence and transferred the PDA’s headquarters 
from the ministry of interior–led by Tawil–to the ministry of defense. In October 1967, the PDA 
was formally and completely integrated into the regular armed forces.143  
According to Jabber and others, the establishment and subsequent nurturing of as-Saiqa, a Pales-
tinian guerilla organization under informal Syrian command aimed at counterbalancing both the 
army’s dominance over Fatah and its monopoly of force inside the country.144 In addition, Jadid 
kept control over the intelligence and security services through a steadily expanding system of 
petty informers, arbitrary arrests, and torture.145 Eventually, high levels of competition and intra-
elite fragmentation resulted in a stalemate where no party “ever managed to become the center 
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for national political identity or gain sufficient political and military power to ensure its contin-
ued rule.”146 
Efforts of both factions to break off the stalemate to one’s own advantage escalated in early 1969. 
In what was initially a countermeasure against attempted anti-Asad purges in the northwestern 
province of Latakia, the army removed Jadid supporters from office in Latakia and neighboring 
Tartus, nearly eliminated the de facto power base of the RC, and occupied radio stations as well as 
national newspaper offices in Damascus and Aleppo. The army also laid siege on the headquar-
ters of National Security and the General Intelligence Service in March 1969, resulting in the loss 
of Jadid’s last prominent non-Alawi backer when Jundi committed suicide.147 As the stalemate 
was to a certain extent reinstalled at the Extraordinary Regional Congress in the same month, 
Jadid placed Saiqa under RC command in order to secure the group as a potential counterweight 
to the regular army.148 A decisive blow to Jadid’s power position was the withdrawal of the 
USSR from Syria’s domestic arena after Asad and Talas had openly threatened to realign with 
China. Subsequently, Moscow remained silent amid Asad’s persecution of Syrian Communists, 
strong supporters of Jadid.149 
In a final round of internal competition, both factions’ efforts to adjust to the duality of power led 
to regime overthrow: After the Black September fiasco, Asad neutralized Jadid’s last remaining 
supporters in the army. In return, the latter used his strong basis in the party apparatus to remove 
both Asad and Talas from their posts during an extraordinary National Party Congress. Popular 
front organizations and unions backed Jadid, criticizing the army for forming a distinct power 
center and its interference into politics.150 However, as the popular organizations were no match 
for the armed forces and the party lacked the enormous appeal that would have been necessary to 
launch a popular revolt against the army, Asad’s bloodless coup on November 13 swept Jadid 
and his supports from power with little resistance.151  
5.2.2 One to rule them all: Asad’s consolidation of power 1970-1976 
In order to secure domestic hierarchy and subsequently regime security after his coup, Asad es-
tablished a system of ‘three orbits’ of sectarian kinship, inter-communal cooperation, and Arab 
nationalism.152 To attain popular support, Asad quickly aimed at tuning down opposition among 
the bourgeois and conservative middle class through measures of economic and moderate politi-
cal liberalization. In March 1972, for instance, he established the National Progressive Force 
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(NPF), a party bloc consisting inter alia of Nasserites and Communists, serving as an instrument 
to prevent a strong extra-parliamentary opposition.153 
The ousting of the radical socialists led to growing support among merchants and craftspeople 
and even some mosques in Damascus. In addition, economic reforms strengthened the private 
sector and decreased the rate of unionization in the north-central provinces, while rural labor and 
small landowners in the periphery became a new power base for the regime.154 Furthermore, 
Asad muted radical secularism and improved relations with the conservative Gulf States. Align-
ing with their pragmatic-secular Pan-Arabism increased the external legitimacy of the regime 
among the local population as well as other regional powers.155 Nevertheless, fears of Alawi dom-
ination under the cover of secularism continued to set strong limitations to the regime’s coopta-
tion of conservative elements of society. This became most evident in early 1973, when mass pro-
tests and strikes erupted in the north-central cities in reaction to a new constitutional draft not 
mentioning Islam as the religion of the state. Again, the government decided to put down protest 
by massive military force in Hama and Homs.156 While Asad personally continued to portray 
himself as a member of the Muslim community, including the attendance of prayers in Mosques 
or even a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1974, the Alawi elites turned to Lebanese Shiite leader Imam 
Musa al-Sadr to gain collective recognition as a Muslim group.157 The October 1973 War de-
creased exogenous regime vulnerability, as it helped to restore Asad’s nationalist credentials. Ad-
ditionally, due to incoming Arab aid, increased oil revenues, and a boost in Western direct in-
vestment after 1974 the regime was able to accommodate large segments of society, such as mer-
chants, middle class professionals, and skilled workers.158  
By 1975, however, several factors had contributed to a massive crisis in regime legitimacy. First, 
corruption and economic mismanagement had weakened the regime’s position among the north-
central business elites. Second, Asad’s overtures to the West and conservative Arab states as well 
as moderation towards Israel had alienated large segments of Ba’thists, nationalists, and Com-
munists. Third, Syria’s record of political freedom had further deteriorated, entailed by a massive 
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built up of security services and intelligence.159 Hence, waves of arrests of initially economically 
motivated demonstrators, alleged supporters of Jadid, and members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
substantially weakened regime legitimacy and strengthened especially the latter.160 Whereas secu-
rity forces merely threatened to resort to violence in order to put down protests in Aleppo in July 
1975, they responded to renewed protests with massive military force between February and 
April 1976. The regime employed regular armed forces and police, but to an increasing extent al-
so paramilitary units, such as the Defense Brigades and Special Elite Forces. Especially the 
Brotherhood responded to repression with a series of assassinations and bombings throughout 
1976.161 
The crisis in neighboring Lebanon played a decisive role for regime vulnerability for several rea-
sons. Stability in Lebanon became literally a lifeline amid the 1975/76 economic downturn in 
Syria, securing the flow of capital into the banking system and support for its heavy industry. In 
times of domestic unrest in the north-central towns, which constrained the transport of goods 
from Damascus to the ports of Tartus and Latakia, access to the port of Beirut became even more 
important.162 Large segments of the population, including the Sunni rural constituency, as well as 
nationalists within the army and the party resented the invasion and Asad’s opponents again 
raised suspicions that his Alawi background made the president a ‘natural’ traitor of the Arab 
cause.163  
Inside the ruling coalition, Asad’s main accomplishment in the early 1970s was to end the duality 
of power, which had been the dominant source of praetorianism in the second half of the 1960s. 
Asad re-shaped the political system and made the presidency the key power broker in Syrian poli-
tics. Possessing strong executive and legislative powers since the revision of the constitution in 
1973, elected by popular vote, represented in the main party decision-making processes, and 
deep-rooted in the defense establishment, the domestic balance of power tended clearly in favor 
of the president.164 Additionally, Asad constrained praetorianism through purges and the built-up 
of parallel armed forces and a military intelligence network commanded by his relatives or per-
sonal trustees as well as a strategy of cooptation including generous personal privileges for offic-
ers or access to political positions.165 Asad assigned his Alawi kin, and close relatives such as his 
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brother Rif’at, to key positions in the military-security complex. In this vein, he tolerated a strong 
Sunni presence in the highest military ranks (see Figure 23) on the one hand, while depriving 
them of control over potential coup instruments, on the other.166  
 
Source: van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: 28f. 
Figure 23: Sectarian representation in Syrian politics (11/1970-10/1978) 
 
Regarding the Ba’th party’s potential as a source of threat, Asad formally installed one-party-rule 
in the 1973 constitution while simultaneously neutralizing opponents within party ranks by co-
opting non-Ba’thist forces in the NPF.167 Party discipline and cohesion especially regarding for-
eign policy issues was further increased by nearly personal union of RC and NC members, 
among them Asad himself as Secretary-General of both branches as well as his deputies, Mustafa 
Talas and Abd al-Halim Khaddam, ministers of defense and foreign affairs respectively, and his 
brother Rif’at since 1975.168 Other members have been Chief of Staff Hikmat al-Shihabi and, 
since 1976, prime minister Abd al-Rahman Khleifawi. As none of these had an independent 
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power base or was even able to veto foreign policy decisions, policy decisions had a strong con-
sensual character.169 Hence, Asad was not only able to reduce the rivalry between party and army 
that had brought himself to power, but also transformed the fragile system of power duality into a 
pyramidal system of checks and balances securing his predominance.170 
Despite the high levels of violence experienced during the 1976-1982 revolt, most analysts agree 
on the notion that not external opposition to the regime and the dual structure of domestic com-
petition, but the potential fragmentation of Asad’s ruling coalition and especially cracks within 
the Alawi community constitute the main source of threat to regime survival.171 According to 
Hinnebusch, the prominence of the Alawi barons as the glue that holds the ruling coalition to-
gether paved the way for a major shift from their initial role as guardians of regime survival to 
“an intensely praetorian incubus in the heart of the state, kept under control only by presidential 
authority.”172 Furthermore, praetorianism as a threat to the state shifted to the inner circle of the 
regime, constrained only if presidential authority is strong enough to do so. 
5.2.3 Conclusion 
The previous section examined Syria’s domestic politics in order to assess their expected influ-
ence on Syria’s sponsorship policies. Generally, it maintained that the regime’s narrow societal 
power base, frequent protests, and an increasingly repressive character of state-society relations, 
indicate a structural lack of autonomy throughout the entire observation period. While domestic 
power fragmentation was especially high in the years before the two military coups (1963, 1966), 
it declined in the respective early post-coup periods. In contrast to the 1966 coup, which main-
tained the duality of power, the 1970 coup entailed a boost in autonomy through the establish-
ment of presidential monarchy. 
The neoclassical realist hypotheses NC1 and NC2 trace a state’s preference for external alignment 
to domestic vulnerability. This can be to a certain extent confirmed in the period before the 1966 
coup, where no significant internal balancing efforts could be observed despite an increased im-
balance of power and severe conflict with Israel. After the 1963 coup, the regime faced both 
threats from outside the power circles, manifested, for instance, in strikes, clashes, and mass capi-
tal flight in 1964/65. Inside the ruling coalition, a fierce struggle emerged between a highly politi-
cized army and civilian leaders over the army’s role in politics and external alignments, which re-
sulted in the latter’s violent overthrow in 1966. 
Briefly increasing internal cohesion, threats outside of the coalition re-emerged in late 1966 and 
the first half 1967, stemming from protests and revolt in several areas. Inside the power circles, 
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violent overthrow of the civilian leadership remained a salient threat, especially as the army 
maintained to be a key political force. The outcome of the June 1967 War reinforced both 
tendencies. Pitting paramilitary forces against a de facto autonomous army, the government facili-
tated the emergence of a duality of power in 1968. Nevertheless, the internal balance of power 
tilted towards the army in 1969/1970 and the stagnation of Syria’s military personnel until 1970 
suggests that Syria’s internal balancing efforts remained limited during the years of domestic cri-
sis.  
The consolidation of presidential rule and ideological moderation as well as the subsequent at-
traction of external assistance in the early 1970s translated into an increased internal balancing 
policy, matching the external security dilemma to a much stronger extent. Although regime vul-
nerability decreased after Asad’s coup and power became centralized, the regime increasingly re-
lied on repression and coup-proofing measures, particularly to contain unrest in the north and 
segments of the party and the army, which had been alienated by pro-Western foreign policy 
choices. 
Regarding the question, under what conditions domestic vulnerability reinforces incentives for 
sponsorship (NC2), the observations of section 5.1.4 do not support a strong policy of interstate al-
liance formation by Syria, especially between 1963 and 1971. 
As outlined, power fragmentation nearly constantly entailed conflict over foreign policy issues. 
Until late 1966, for instance, anti-Nasserite factions undermined an alignment with Egypt. In a 
similar vein, the army, preferring inter-Arab cooperation, challenged the government after the 
1967 War over its alignment with the USSR. Only after 1970, regime autonomy reached a level 
allowing for external realignment entailing additional material and immaterial domestic power 
resources. However, domestic criticism of ‘anti-Arab’ policies after 1974 and Syrian concerns 
over separate peace agreements with Israel continued to influence foreign policy decisions.  
In the 1960s, Syria faced a loose-loose situation, given a severe external security dilemma and 
simultaneously high costs expected from both internal and external balancing strategies. With re-
gard to its support for Fatah as a balancing substitute, sponsorship incentives expected to be 
higher in periods of both international isolation and internal vulnerability: Between 1965 and the 
1966 coup, between 1968 and the 1970 coup, and after 1973/74. Instead, a stagnation or decline 
in commitment is expected before the wars in 1967 and 1973, the immediate post-coup periods as 
well as after 1974, when efforts of internal balancing were facilitated by USSR and Arab assis-
tance.  
The final set of neoclassical realist hypotheses turns to alliance management with Fatah and ex-
pects deviance from the strategies suggested by the SSD if regime vulnerability is present. The 
limited resolve hypothesis NC2 claims that a sponsor lacking foreign policy autonomy deviates 
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from abandonment avoiding policies induced by SSD. By contrast, the limited restraint hypothesis 
NC3 assumes a contrary deviation, if the SSD points toward entrapment avoiding. In the case of 
Syria and Fatah, this implies that in the peak times of regime vulnerability (late 64-2/66; 1968-
11/70; and to a lesser extent after 1974), the incentives of the SSD were eased/impeded. Subse-
quently, in contrast to a Brother in Arms (max. resolve) or a Defector (max. restraint), hybrid 
forms such as the Fellow Traveler and the Secret Backer are expected to occur. 
5.3 Syria’s policy towards Fatah (1964-1976) 
Among Fatah’s statist supporters, Syria played an exceptional role, mainly for two reasons. First, 
Syria backed Fatah despite the other Arab states initially sided with the PLO, thereby defying the 
norm of Arab unity until 1966/67. Second and in contrast to, for instance, Lebanon or Jordan, 
Syrian support has not resulted from Arab peer pressure, yet reflected a deliberate choice of 
alignment.173 The following section outlines both character and extent of sponsorship. 
5.3.1 Hosting 
This study measures hosting against the background of the group’s freedom to operate militarily, 
including the presence of fighters and bases and permissions for cross-border attacks, the group’s 
freedom to operate politically, meaning the presence of non-military training facilities and offices, 
and the government’s tolerance of the physical presence of group members devoid of political ac-
tivity (See section 4.3.1). 
“I said go to the Syrians. I thought that the Syrians, with their new regime, would be the 
only ones interested in Fatah. They were just as impatient as Arafat […]. And I was 
right.”174  
Hazim al-Khalidi, September 1964  
Although authors differ strongly on both the specific date when contacts were established and the 
role of hosting in the early stages of the alliance, they agree on two main points. First, mutual in-
terests emerged shortly after the establishment of the PLO on May 28, 1964, challenging both Fa-
tah’s and Syria’s claim to represent and champion the Palestinian struggle. Second, it was the 
army and the military intelligence directorate that initially provided informal support for Fa-
tah.175 
While reports indicate that Arafat set up his main base in Damascus already in 1964, Syria’s ini-
tial hosting policy remained somewhat ambiguous.176 Under the guidance of Sulayman Faqr, a 
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Syrian army colonel who was in charge of “Palestinian guerilla agitation against Israel,”177 and 
endowed with Syrian funds and organizational aid, such as fake passports, Fatah toured refugee 
camps in the neighboring countries, in order to recruit new fighters. However, suspicions regard-
ing Fatah’s historical ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian background of numerous 
group leaders delayed public and formal relations with the political leadership.178  
Official policy changed to a certain extent after the eighth National Ba’th Party Congress in April 
1965, as Fatah gained the support of Salah Jadid. In January 1966, for instance, the government 
permitted a public funeral of a Fatah fighter in Damascus, thereby waiving for the first time plau-
sible deniability regarding the group’s presence in Syria.179 Although providing the group with a 
rear front against Israel became a key feature of Syrian support, Damascus repeatedly demon-
strated its determination to restrict guerilla activity and avoid overt involvement. For instance, 
Fatah received no permission to establish camps and guerilla bases on Syrian soil and authorities 
repeatedly detained Fatah commandoes on their way to enter Israel without prior approval.180  
After the 1966 coup, power fragmentation increasingly influenced the specific mix of restriction 
and encouragement. Though defending them publicly, Syrian officials continued to deny respon-
sibility for Fatah military operations against the background of Israeli retaliatory threats. On May 
12, for instance, Minister of Defense Asad publicly refused to argue over Fatah, “since we know 
nothing about it.”181  
Authorities continued their efforts to control Fatah’s movement within Syria and particularly 
prevent badly timed cross border attacks. In addition, this policy reflected in intra-Palestinian fric-
tions. In 1966, Chief of Staff Suwaydani tolerated a coup attempt against Arafat and jailed the 
group’s leadership temporarily to exert stricter control over its operations.182 While still impris-
oned, Fatah reached a formal agreement with Asad, which not only accelerated their release but 
was also accompanied by its formal transfer from the intelligence to the army command (Opera-
tions Division of the Syrian General Staff).183 In this context, Fatah gained substantial freedom of 
movement, both concerning cross border operations–in rare cases even from Syrian territory–and 
training, initially in army camps and since late 1966 in their own training camp near Hama, set 
up with the permission of the ministry of defense.184 Additionally, the government facilitated the 
recruitment of fighters and started to publicly defend immediate cross border attacks from Syrian 
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soil.185 Nevertheless, governmental pressure and restraining measures on cross border operations 
remained present, especially after the military agreement with Egypt since November 1966.186 
The devastating outcome of the June 1967 War increased Syria’s caution against Fatah. Hence, 
Suwaydani, President Atasi, and others, strongly objected Fatah plans to resume attacks in July, 
fearing resumed escalation while Syria was militarily exposed. Therefore, the group transferred 
weapons and fighters to the Occupied Territories and established new headquarters in Nablus. In 
order to facilitate this process, the army set up a command post at Daraa, next to the Jordanian 
border.187  
In Syria, where up to 600 fighters were reportedly present by late 1967 in camps under the super-
vision of the Operations Division, restrictions on Fatah activity increased especially after a sharp 
rise in guerilla attacks on the Golan in early 1969.188 On May 4, for instance, Asad issued a min-
isterial decree prohibiting PLO-fighters to wear arms, carry weapons, or use military vehicles out-
side of their camps without army permission. Additionally, the decree foresaw limiting both gue-
rilla contacts with the Syrian population and its combat activity. Already in September 1968, the 
use of travel passes issued by the guerilla had been prohibited, and the task of issuing passes and 
security control of the guerillas was transferred to of military intelligence–in particular its De-
partment 235, also known as National Bureau of Guerilla Control or the “Palestine branch.”189 
While the ministry of defense formally permitted Fatah to operate in Syria, it also subordinated 
its fighters and recruitment efforts under strict army control. Cross border operations, for instance, 
required a written permission by Asad himself and intelligence was entitled to examine Fatah 
camps and offices.190 
Alongside with the loss of PLO-bases and a large number of fighters, the Black September crisis 
resulted in the expulsion of some 150,000 Palestinians from Jordan in 1970. Damascus showed 
strong reluctance to accept especially the reentry of fighters into Syria and pressured them to relo-
cate to Lebanon.191 The following year, Syria took in PLO units fleeing amid renewed clashes, 
yet only under strict army control.192 However, PLO-bases in Syria remained active and accessi-
ble until 1975 and officers continued to use the Damascus airport to travel to training destinations 
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in Eastern Bloc states.193 For those remaining in Syria, restrictions on cross border attacks in-
creased after the October 1970 coup, and authorities foiled several planned attacks against Jor-
dan.194 In July 1971, existing limitations were expanded and Fatah’s operational freedom gravely 
restricted. Army control over the PLA increased and cross border raids required the army com-
mand’s approval based on information on targets and the attackers’ identity. By that time, travel-
ing was only allowed with passes issued by Department 235. Additionally, Syrian intelligence 
demanded access to every guerilla facility at any time and the recruitment of Syrian nationals re-
quired prior approval. In a major shift from previous hosting policies, Damascus de facto banned 
also political activity inside Syria. Hence, publications needed official approval and Palestinian 
political demonstrations, particularly outside the camps, required permission.195  
Tensions over Fatah’s presence and activity increased on the eve of the October 1973 War. After 
the Munich Massacre in September 1972 and subsequent Israeli reprisals against Syria, the gov-
ernment pressured the group to withdraw its bases from the border area by January 1973. Cross-
border operations required the personal and explicit approval of the President. 196 Additionally, 
the government expelled 15 Fatah leaders from Syria after they had participated in anti-
government demonstrations in March 1973 and arrested another twelve in the course of a rally 
organized by the Palestinian Student Federation against restrictions of guerilla activity in other 
Arab countries.197 Finally, authorities closed Fatah’s broadcasting station in Daraa on September 
14 in the course of Syria’s rapprochement with Jordan.198 
5.3.2 Military support 
Direct military assistance carries a high risk of military retaliation and thus indicates a high level 
of commitment. According to the measurement in section 4.3.2, support is understood as moder-
ate if provided outside of Syria or consisted only of tolerating third-party weapon deliveries. In 
cases of low military commitment, Syria is expected to aim at plausible deniability while tolerat-
ing Fatah’s own acquisition of weaponry. 
In the early stages of cooperation, Syria provided military support primarily informally by indi-
vidual members of the army and security services, most prominently Suwaydani, Asad, and Kha-
lid al-Jundi, head of the workers’ militia. In 1964/65, they provided Fatah with a modest amount 
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of explosives and other weapons taken from the arsenals of the military intelligence and workers’ 
militia.199 On the eve of Fatah’s first cross border raid, members of the Syrian-Palestinian com-
mando battalions boosted its operational capacity by joining the group’s ranks under the aegis of 
military intelligence.200  
As the government adopted a more benevolent stance vis-à-vis Fatah in April 1965, military sup-
port increased substantially. First, Asad and other officials facilitated external weapon deliveries 
and helped the group, for instance, to transfer Chinese and Algerian arm shipments, either 
through the port of Latakia or airbases and provided them with storage facilities.201 Second, Syria 
became more active in assisting Fatah in recruitment of fighters, training, and the establishment 
of bases in- and outside the country. As asserted by Fatah leader Abu Iyad in late 1965, Su-
waydani and Asad helped Fatah to establish two training camps in Hama, some 300km away 
from the border to Israel, and at Maysaloun close to the anti-Lebanon mountains not far from the 
capital.202 Additionally, the group received a live ammunition training area in the Syrian De-
sert.203 In April and May 1965, military intelligence established two Fatah bases in Qalqilya and 
Jenin in the West Bank, close to the 1949 Armistice Agreement Line with Israel.204 Although 
IDF destroyed the camps on May 25, Syrian intelligence assisted Fatah in opening further re-
cruitment offices in camps in Jordan and shipping some 200 recruits off for training in the Syrian 
camps.205 
While military assistance moderately increased after the 1966 coup, Syrian personnel continued 
to participate in Fatah cross border sabotage acts.206 Various state and party institutions–such as 
the Republican Guard and the ministry of interior–provided Fatah with a steady supply in more 
sophisticated weapons and ammunition, mortars, mines, and explosives as well as training in 
their use and Syrian passports.207 In general, Fatah held training under the supervision of the Op-
erations Division, mostly in the army’s camps.208 Besides the facilitation of recruitment by ex-
panding pro-Fatah broadcasts in Syrian radio programs, the army command supported opera-
tions directly.209 In the aftermath of the June 1967 War, Syria initially continued to grant Fatah 
substantial freedom to enhance its militarily capabilities. For instance, the group scavenged in the 
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abandoned Golan Heights for arms and supplies left by the armed forces and amassed some 
6,000 weapons while passing heavy weapons and munitions on to the army. Additionally, Syria 
became a logistics base and arsenal for Fatah weapons from Algeria and other Arab states, China, 
and the USSR.210  
Intra-elite frictions soon influenced also Syria’s military support. While Asad provided Fatah 
with additional light weapons from army stocks and a modest amount of equipment in order to 
conduct operations in the Occupied Territories, Suwaydani and Jadid chose a more restrictive 
position and authorities repeatedly confiscated Fatah weapon stores.211 Although Jadid permitted 
Arafat to take over facilities and fighters of rival Palestinian factions, he granted military support 
only under the condition that the group would not attack Israel directly from Syria.212 In mid-
1968, the group ran a ‘special qualification course’ at the Hama Camp and the following spring, 
Fatah expanded its presence in the border area.213 Additionally, it established another training 
camp near Tartus and received small numbers of 82mm mortars, RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launch-
ers, and 122mm rocket launchers.214 Some minor restrictions came along with Asad’s May 1969 
decree, prohibiting Fatah members the right to carry weapons outside the camps without permis-
sion from Department 235.215 When Fatah-led PLO came under pressure in Lebanon in late 1969, 
Syria massed troops along the mutual border and sporadically shot artillery and mortars in order 
to cover and bolster the influx of Palestinian fighters. Damascus also provided logistical support 
and deployed army personnel to PLO forces.216 
The major litmus test for the steadfastness of Syria’s military commitment occurred in September 
1970, yet surprisingly not in the context of an Israeli attack. Under pressure from Israeli retaliato-
ry attacks and heavy PLO interference in Jordanian domestic affairs, King Hussein decided to 
expel the guerillas by force. The crisis escalated to a civil war on September 17, when the Jorda-
nian army attacked PLO-positions in Amman and Irbid.217 As Iraq declined Syrian requests to in-
tervene on behalf of the PLO with its troops stationed in Jordan and arms deliveries were not suf-
ficient, Syria deployed at least 16,000 troops, 170 T-55 tanks, and heavy artillery in order to es-
tablish a liberated area in northern Jordan, on September 20. Syrian forces quickly advanced, de-
ployed some 300 tanks in the area and took the PLO stronghold Irbid as well as two key cross-
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roads.218 However, Fatah’s safe haven quickly collapsed when Syrian troops withdrew from Jor-
dan on September 23, having suffered up to 1,500 casualties and lost over 120 tanks, and armed 
personnel carriers.219 
Moreover, at least two aspects are fundamental to grasp the actual extent of commitment. In or-
der to maintain plausible deniability, most of the intervening Syrian tanks were initially equipped 
with Palestinian as-Saiqa fighters or operating under the cover of the PLA’s Hittin Brigade. Sub-
sequently, the government denied that Syrian forces were involved after all and claimed that only 
Palestinian forces entered Jordan.220 In addition, the army thwarted a full Palestinian mobiliza-
tion by closing down all branches of as-Saiqa inside the country.221 Despite these limitations, Syr-
ia deliberately committed to an unprecedented extent not only intangible assets by military at-
tacking a fellow Arab country, but also sacrificed its own military equipment and hundreds of 
troops. Hence, this episode contributed strongly to the widespread perception among Syria’s 
leaders of themselves as the only sincere protectors of the resistance.222 
Syria’s commitment sharply declined as the Jordanian-Palestinian crisis continued. While Da-
mascus responded to afresh fighting with substantial political pressure on Amman, its policy of 
military assistance evolved into the opposite direction.223 Against the background of the presence 
of some 9,000 fighters loyal to the PLO in Syria, Asad prohibited Fatah recruitment of Syrians al-
ready in early 1971.224 Moreover, when Jordanian security forces prepared themselves for a final 
assault on PLO strongholds in the north in the following months, Syrian authorities seized and 
confiscated a major arms shipment from Algeria destined for Fatah, including Chinese tanks, 
armored troop carriers, artillery guns, light arms, ammunition, and personal equipment for some 
7,500 fighters.225 In turn, the focus of Syria’s military assistance shifted to southern Lebanon, 
where Damascus continued to provide various kinds of support including logistical-operational 
assistance for attacks against Israel.226 It is further worth noting that authorities released most of 
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the seized armored troop carriers after July 1971 and in the context of Fatah-Lebanon tensions.227 
When clashes erupted in spring 1973 between PLO fighters in Lebanon and government forces, 
Asad declared himself solidary with the PLO and sent Saiqa and PLA units to their support.228 
Additionally, Syrian arms and equipment deliveries to PLO continued after the October 1973 
war in huge quantities.229 In January 1976, only months before the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil 
War, Christian forces attacked Palestinian refugee camps and Asad ordered two battalions of Syr-
ian-controlled PLA to cross into Lebanon despite protests from Beirut.230 Shortly thereafter and 
in order to maintain the status quo in Lebanon, Asad put heavy pressure on the PLO to end its 
alliance with oppositional forces and reportedly threatened to withdraw Syrian support. In order 
to demonstrate its resolve, the Syrian command banned ships from docking at Tripoli in order to 
cut off PLO from supplies and reinforcements on April 3. As Arafat refused to comply with Da-
mascus’ demands, Syrian troops entered Lebanon in June 1976 and directly fought the Palestini-
an forces.231 
5.3.3 Financial support 
The following section turns to both direct financial assistance provided by Syrian officials and 
their tolerance of alternative financial sources, such as external funding, tax collection from Pal-
estinians residing in Syria, and other revenues. 
Although the literature frequently mentions financial assistance alongside other forms of Syrian 
support, there is comparatively little specific evidence for substantial and direct funding.232 In turn, 
Damascus has no record of disrupting the influx of financial assistance from the Gulf States, do-
nations from the Palestinian diaspora, and funds collected among the residents of Gaza and the 
West Bank. In general, Syria assumed a facilitating role, stemming most likely from its own eco-
nomic weakness, the provision of military and logistic services in contrast to financial transfers, 
Fatah’s diversification of sources, and the Gulf States’ readiness to disburden the frontline states 
financially especially after 1967.233 
Between 1964 and early 1966, Fatah received funds from both wealthy Palestinians living in Ku-
wait or Saudi Arabia and Syrian authorities, enabling it to pay its recruits a monthly stipend of 
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some £18.234 Although, Faqr promised the group “unlimited funds,” direct Syrian financing 
ceased after the Fatah leadership was jailed in 1966. Subsequently, the group was forced to in-
crease fundraising among the Palestinians in Lebanon, reportedly also gaining revenues from il-
licit arms and drug trades.235 After the June 1967 War, Damascus resumed to provide the group 
with direct funds in the context of the generally increased assistance.236 Financial pressure on the 
Syrian budget remained limited, however, as Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait established a fund 
of $378 million for Egypt and Jordan at the 1967 Khartoum summit.237 
Fundraising on Syrian soil, was curtailed by Asad’s May 1969 decree, prohibiting the collection 
of contributions in Syria in any form whatsoever.238 Fatah’s financial dependence on Syria further 
decreased with the stronger presence of the organization in the Occupied Territories, larger 
amounts of funding from the Gulf States after 1967 and in the course of PLO’s political consoli-
dation and administrative concentration since the early 1970s.239 
5.3.4 Endorsement 
The final section turns to Syria’s rhetorical-political assistance. Despite the abovementioned lack 
of formal consensus on Fatah’s classification as a terrorist organization, the threat of political 
sanctions and reputational losses for openly supporting Fatah were present in two instances–yet 
in different directions. On the one hand, the pre-1966 Arab consensus to prevent Palestinian 
cross-border attacks on Israel portraying support to Fatah as hazardous to the Arab cause and 
pro-Egyptian press accused the group of being connected to “the agents of CENTO and Isra-
el.”240 Jordan’s crackdown on the Palestinians in 1970/71, on the other, isolated King Hussein as 
a ‘traitor’ of the Arab cause and revealed that also non-support could be seen as harmful to united 
Arab action.241 
Endorsement as an inherent component of Syrian sponsorship occurred for the first time in 1965. 
By that time, only Syrian and pro-Syrian Lebanese media published Fatah’s military communi-
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qués and helped distributing them, while the other frontline states issued statements indicating 
their strong disapproval of Fatah attacks.242 In April 1965, a report submitted by the Ba’th Party’s 
Palestinian Branch in Lebanon, recommended public endorsement as a means to prepare both 
the Palestinian and Arab public opinion for moral and material participation in the subsequent 
war of liberation.243 On a political-diplomatic level, Syrian officials backed Fatah against Jorda-
nian protests over the establishment of staging centers in the West Bank, threatening that any in-
terference would be considered a “subversive act […] and would bring wholesale Syrian wrath 
down on Husayn’s head.”244 In addition, Syrian official papers designated the West Bank under 
Jordanian annexation even as the “Palestinian sector of Jordan.”245Already in January 1965, Ra-
dio Damascus started to broadcast Fatah communiqués and even established a program called 
‘Palestinian Corner’, encouraging constant guerilla activity against Israel.246 In the remainder of 
the year, Syrian media repeatedly praised the group’s armed wing al-Asifa as the fulfillment of 
Arab aspirations and called on all Arab states to encourage and assist the insurgents in their cam-
paign against Israel.247  
Although endorsement remained generally high in the context of fierce anti-Israel rhetoric after 
the 1966 coup, it reached a peak between mid-1967 and 1970. First, Radio Damascus expanded 
its Palestinian program.248 Second, Jadid received Arafat in the latter’s first meeting with an Arab 
leader in September 1967 and asked even him to deliver a speech at a Ba’th party conference.249 
Third, Damascus publicly praised Fatah’s ‘victory’ in the Battle of Karamah in March 1968, rein-
forcing the image of the Palestinian David and boosting Fatah’s mobilization capacity.250 Finally, 
and with the most far-reaching consequences, Syria and Egypt pressured Lebanon into accepting 
the 1969 Cairo agreement, granting Fatah/PLO substantial autonomy and freedom of movement 
both among the local Palestinians as well as regarding attacks on Israel.251 Inside Syria, however, 
Asad’s May 1969 decree put strict limitations on the distribution of information or the possibility 
to hold parades.252  
When some 200 Palestinians and Jordanians died in violent clashes in Jordan in February 1970, 
Syria announced to take the Palestinians’ side in case of further escalation.253 Subsequently, when 
fighting resumed in September, Jadid and Atasi publicly endorsed the idea of a military interven-
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tion and called upon the Syrian population to defend their Palestinian brethren. In a similar vein, 
the General Federation of Workers’ Union called for the overthrow of the “agent military re-
gime” in Amman by the hands of the “Arab Palestinian Revolution and the Jordanian mass-
es.”254 In order to downplay Syria’s abandonment of the Palestinians in the Black September cri-
sis, officials claimed that the PLO itself had refused an offer of Syrian parachute units and ne-
glected the need to protect the Palestinian refugees in Irbid.255 In a similar vein, Asad refrained 
from publicizing his opposition to the intervention, fearing that his domestic rivals could easily 
portray it as a “clear betrayal of the Ba’th commitment to the Palestinians.”256  
A strong vocal commitment to the Palestinian cause remained a constant pattern of Syria’s Fatah 
policy also after the October 1970 coup. In March 1971, for instance, Asad stated, “Syria is the 
lung from which Palestinian activity draws breath.”257 At the same time, the government severly 
criticized BSO’s campaign against Jordan and attacks on Israeli targets outside the region as “ad-
venturist” and “not a part of the armed struggle.”258 Officials also strongly rejected the revisionist 
slogan “the road to Filastin passes through Amman.”259 Nevertheless, Syria exerted strong politi-
cal pressure on Jordan to end local repression of guerilla activity in July 1971, inter alia by tem-
porary closing the mutual border and breaking off bilateral relations from August 1971 until Sep-
tember 1973, in order to push Amman to allow not only the return of PLO fighters to Jordan but 
also renewed cross border attacks on Israel.260 In a similar vein, Syria supported Fatah’s claim to 
control all Palestinian fighters operating in southern Lebanon in July 1972.261Regarding interna-
tional attacks, the regime pressured Fatah through its media outlets in early 1973, to put “an end 
to such actions but, where they are carried out, to avoid declaring responsibility at all.”262  
It is worth mentioning that Syria’s endorsement of Fatah’s political goals had been far from abso-
lute support, especially on the eve of the 1973 War. For instance, the government downsized the 
Palestinian-Jordanian conflict as a “secondary” struggle likely to distract the group from its cam-
paign against Israel.263 
After the 1973 war, Syrian fears of falling prey to an Egyptian-Israeli separate agreement and re-
newed conventional escalations reflected in Damascus’ endorsement policy.264 On the one hand, 
it supported PLO’s claim to be the sole representative of the Palestinians and stressed the group’s 
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independence in order to strengthen its own position in potential negotiations over the return of 
the Golan Heights.265 On the other hand, government officials repeatedly referred to Palestine as 
‘Southern Syria’ and endorsed political unity, thereby objecting the immediate creation of a Pal-
estinian political entity at a time when Jordan or Israel could easily co-opt it and Syria was not 
ready to give up its own territorial revisionism.266 This conflict of interest peaked in 1976, when 
Asad reportedly told Arafat:  
“There is no Palestinian People, no Palestinian entity, there is only Syria! You are an inte-
gral part of the Syrian people and Palestine is an integral part of Syria. Therefore it is we, 
the Syrian authorities, who are the real representatives of the Palestinian people.”267 
The rapid shift of endorsement policy in the course of the Lebanese Civil war reflects best in 
Asad’s speech in front of the provincial councils on July 20, 1976.268  
After denouncing sectarian strife in Lebanon as a plot against Arab unity and Islam, Asad called 
attacks on the Palestinians as “a red line”, which Syria “would absolutely not allow anyone to go 
beyond,” and confirmed arms and ammunition deliveries “in large quantities.”269 The president 
also extensively reported Fatah’s betrayal of the Palestinian cause, “for the sake of their tactical 
or strategic objectives” and rejected any connection between “the fighting of Palestinians in the 
highest mountains of Lebanon and the liberation of Palestine.” Moreover, Asad stressed several 
times the high tangible sacrifices Syria had made in order to support and protect the Palestinian 
resistance from Israeli retaliation, including risking a deterioration of inter-Arab relations.270 
While denying the PLO’s claim for sole representation by calling them “those who say that they 
represent the Palestinian question,” Asad confirmed Syria’s exceptional position as the only 
country not limiting its commitment to mere talking. In contrast, Syria was “sacrificing its sons, 
economy, land and everything so that […] the struggle for the Palestinian question may contin-
ue.”271Despite a temporary rapprochement in the late 1970s, attempts to strip Arafat off of his 
credentials as the legitimate leader of the Palestinian resistance, while at the same time upholding 
the credibility of its own commitment continued to remain a frequent pattern of Syrian endorse-
ment policy vis-à-vis Fatah.272  
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5.3.5 Conclusion 
“It is perhaps one of the bitterest ironies of Palestinian history that the PLO’s most con-
sistent patron and the staunchest defender of Palestinian nationalism should also turn out to 
be its most determined adversary.”273  
In 1976, the Syrian-PLO alliance was in shambles and Damascus’ commitment to the group had 
reached an all-time low. By tacitly aligning with Israel and its Lebanese partners, Syria de facto 
abandoned its ally for over a decade and denied any form of material or political support–with 
one noteworthy exception: Even at the peak of military conflict, Asad never denounced Arafat or 
Fatah as terrorists or publicly questioned the legitimacy of the violent campaign against Israel.  
As Miller implied by referring to Syria as a patron turning into an adversary and evidence suggests 
strongly, there have been significant changes regarding the nature of Syrian sponsorship. To what 
extent did these patterns match the sponsorship roles Brother in Arms, Secret Backer, Fellow Traveler, 
and Defector, on the one hand, and the hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework, on the 
other? 
At maintained in section 5.1.6, the SSD suggested a general tendency to avoid abandonment by 
Fatah between 1964 and 1973, which is expected by hypothesis N2 to entail a policy of standing 
firm. Stemming from the generally insufficient capacity of Fatah to meet Syria’s need for assis-
tance, the brief Egyptian-Syrian military cooperation, and improved relations to the Arab World 
after 1970, this trend was to a moderate degree reversed especially before the June 1967 War. Ac-
cording to the restraining hypothesis N3, this should reflect in a policy shift towards entrapment 
avoiding. In contrast, regional isolation, regime vulnerability, and Fatah’s increased strength en-
hanced the tendency suggested by the sponsorship hypothesis NC2 for a strong sponsorship 
commitment especially in the pre-coup years 1965/66 and 1968-1970. 
NC2 can be confirmed to the extent that limitations on both external and internal balancing an 
increasing Israeli threat coincided with the initiation of institutionalized material support for Fa-
tah since April 1965. However, fears of entrapment stemming from Fatah’s weakness both mate-
rially and in the Palestinian arena slowed down incentives for a strong commitment and resolve. 
Hence, Syria took the role of a Secret Backer, aiming at keeping a low profile regarding Fatah’s 
presence as well as direct operational cooperation and at maintaining a substantial level of plau-
sible deniability by prohibiting cross border raids.274 In a steady transformation to a Brother in 
Arms, Syria protested the Arab League’s endorsement of PLO as well as its 1965 decision to not 
support asymmetric warfare against Israel. Moreover, it exerted political pressure on neighboring 
Jordan and Lebanon to allow Fatah raids into Israel, thereby sacrificing diplomatic assets. These 
costs decreased substantially in 1966/1967, when Nasser and the moderate Arab States shifted 
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their backing from PLO to Fatah. At the same time, facing increasing reprisals by Israel, Damas-
cus stepped up its military support to a high level. Starting in late 1966, Syria publicly defended 
cross border attacks and bolstered Fatah’s military presence on Syrian territory. Alongside with 
logistical support, Fatah received more freedom to operate and assistance in increasing its profile 
among Palestinians throughout the region. Besides Fatah’s increased capacity, regime vulnerabil-
ity even enhanced the SSD’s incentive for resolve, as the post-1966 government aimed at boosting 
it domestic legitimacy by the means of endorsing the ‘struggle for Palestine.’ 
However, the credible risk of entrapment and external alliances (Egypt, USSR) induced the con-
stant use of measures of restraint. While cross border operations were generally prohibited and 
military training supervised by the Operations Division, the army increasingly restrained Fatah 
infiltrations into Israel particularly after the Egyptian-Syrian military agreement. Another indica-
tor of Syria’s unwillingness to fully expose itself as a Brother in Arms and robust tendency towards 
the middle of the sponsorship spectrum (Secret Backer/Fellow Traveler) has also been the practice 
of indirect hosting in Jordan and Lebanon since 1965, while prohibiting attacks via the Golan 
Heights after 1967. In order to restraint the group after the war, President al-Atasi issued an un-
precedented threat of re-alignment by warning Fatah leaders “if you insist on this course, we will 
regretfully have to eliminate you.”275  
At the peak of regime vulnerability in the late 1960s, Syria temporary returned to the role of 
Brother in Arms, when conflicts in Lebanon and Jordan impeded its preferred strategy of indirect 
hosting. PLA forces under Syrian command directly engaged in military action in order to guar-
antee PLO’s presence in and operational freedom in Lebanon. Additionally, military commit-
ment peaked in the course of Syria’s intervention in northern Syria, particularly as tolerating the 
potential elimination of its Palestinian ally would have been perceived as policy failure threaten-
ing regime survival. Although regime vulnerability impeded a policy of entrapment avoiding, 
suggested by the SSD, the latter strongly influenced Syria’s sponsorship. The army, for instance, 
issued substantial restraint by preventing full-scale escalation, Palestinian mobilization, and the 
relocation of thousands of radicalized PLO fighters to Syria. Hence, in the course of the crisis, 
Syria gradually turned into a Fellow Traveler, unwilling to go to war on behalf of Fatah. Never-
theless, Fatah’s ongoing strategic importance as the principal of the Palestinian cause and the se-
vere external security dilemma with Israel prevented defection.  
The positive shift in regime vulnerability and efforts to return to conventional external balancing 
after 1971 increased the looming trend towards restraint after the 1970 coup. Damascus prevent-
ed Fatah not only from recruiting Syrians, but also publicly condemned its radical offshoot BSO, 
when it threatened to foreclose a Syrian rapprochement with the moderate Arab States and trig-
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ger badly timed conflict escalation with Israel. Internal weakness, competition in the Palestinian 
arena, and the decision of especially Egypt to disengage from the Palestinian cause decreased Fa-
tah’s strategic leverage over Syria and thus incentives for entrapment avoiding. This reflected in 
Syria’s repeated decision to cut PLO off from arms supplies destined for campaigns against Jor-
dan and Lebanon in 1971 and 1976 respectively. After Damascus had suffered another military 
defeat in 1973 and gained alternative sources for internal balancing, tensions in Lebanon posed a 
substantial risk of Israeli intervention and Syrian entrapment. Accordingly, Syria dramatically 
turned towards defection from the alliance in June 1976.  
It remains somewhat puzzling that Syria’s rhetorical re-alignment from calling Fatah the ‘fulfill-
ment of our dreams’ in 1965 and resolutely challenging its right to represent the Palestinians in 
1976 did not come along with an openly appeasing rhetoric against Israel or a denouncement of 
Fatah as terrorists. Quite the contrary, Syrian officials repeatedly accused the group of abandoning 
the cause, in order to achieve selfish goals undermining Arab unity and sovereignty. By challeng-
ing the legitimacy of Fatah’s claim to lead the Palestinian uprising against Israel, Syria aimed at 
reducing the risk of entrapment while at the same time maintaining the ‘Palestinian Card’–
entailing a reputation of resolve against Israel. Due to this strategic impediment to realignment 
and the ongoing lack of regime legitimacy, Syria remained a Fellow Traveler. 
 
Figure 24: Patterns of Syrian sponsorship commitment to Fatah  
The outstayed welcome: Syria & the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
139 
6 The outstayed welcome: Syria & the Kurdistan Workers’ Party  
“Recalling the past, [Syria] should not even think of playing the PKK card.”1 
Ahmet Davutoglu, October 2011 
Before Turkey’s foreign minister implied the collapse of bilateral cooperation against the PKK in 
the context of the Syrian Civil War (2011- ), the expulsion of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan from 
Syria and the subsequent Adana agreement in late 1998 had constituted the crowning achieve-
ment of Ankara’s efforts to pressure Damascus out of supporting the group.2 Hence, the follow-
ing chapter will examine first the international and domestic factors shaping Damascus’ security 
environment between 1979 and 1998 and second the nature of Syria’s alignment with the PKK. 
Founded in late November 1978, in the middle of domestic turmoil and polarization in Turkey, 
the PKK initially called for a national-revolutionary overthrow of the state and an “independent, 
united, democratic Kurdistan.”3 The group violently challenged the Turkish state for the first 
time in a parallel attack on military barracks in southeastern Semdinli and Eruh, killing one sol-
dier and two police officers on August 15, 1984.4  
Although most of the over 1,000 attacks reportedly perpetrated by the PKK between 1984 and 
1997 followed a similar pattern, already this first assault exhibited to a remarkable degree key fea-
tures of terrorism. As former PKK-commander Sari Baran stated, the group aimed not at a high 
number of casualties but at gaining popular support.5 By attacking soldiers indiscriminately, the 
PKK hoped to disrupt the link between the army and the local population and convincing the lo-
cal population of its capacity. 6 Although then-prime minister Turgut Özal initially downplayed 
the group as ‘bandits’, the term ‘terrorist’ soon dominated the Turkish public discourse.7 Interna-
tionally, the EU and the U.S. designated the PKK a terrorist organization since the mid-1990s. 
                                                       
1 Aydin Albayrak. "PKK card may exacerbate already strained ties between Syria and Turkey."  Today's Zaman (2011). 
Published electronically October 30. http://bit.ly/v3QVpt. Accessed January 31, 2014. 
2 For an overview of Turkish-Syrian relations, see Oezden Oktav, "Water Dispute and Kurdish Separatism in Turkish-
Syrian Relations," Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 34(2004); Olson, Turkey's relations with Iran, Syria, Israel, 
and Russia; ———, "Turkey-Syria Relations since the Gulf War: Kurds and Water," Middle East Policy 5, no. 2 (1997); 
Muhammad Muslih, "Syria and Turkey. Uneasy Relations," in Reluctant neighbor: Turkey's role in the Middle East, ed. 
Henri J. Barkey (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996); Bülent Aras and Hasan Köni, 
"Turkish-Syrian Relations Revisited," Arab Studies Quarterly 24, no. 4 (2002).  
3 Marcus, Blood and Belief: 46f. Throughout the 1990s, however, it moderated its stance to a certain extent, calling re-
peatedly for a federalization of Turkey and cultural autonomy. See also Gülistan Gürbey, "The Development of the 
Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey since the 1980s," in The Kurdish nationalist movement in the 1990s: its impact on 
Turkey and the Middle East, ed. Robert W. Olson (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 22f. 
4 Marcus, Blood and Belief: 80f. 
5 Ibid., 79f. 
6 Ibid., 81. 
7 Özdag, Interview by the Author, May 29, 2012. See also ibid., 125f. This also reflects in the prominent role of separa-
tism in Turkish anti-terrorism laws. According to the anti-terror law passed in 1991, terrorism is defined inter alia as 
any act aiming at “damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation.” Kurdish Human Rights 
Project. "Turkey's Anti-Terror Laws: Threatening the Protection of Human Rights."  Briefing Paper (2008). 
Published electronically September 11. http://bit.ly/1lWZ8UV. Accessed January 31, 2014. 
Nature of the sponsorship dilemma 
 140 
Although Washington outlawed the group only in 1997, earlier reports and statements indicate a 
corresponding view.8 Quite remarkably, Syria declared the PKK a terrorist organization already 
in 1993.9 Hence, beyond Turkish threats of retaliation, Syria’s support for the PKK exposed it to 
a set of formal and informal international sanctions. Most prominently, the alignment became 
part of Washington’s rationale for not removing Syria from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, 
thereby exposing it inter alia to restrictions on foreign assistance as well as a ban on defense ex-
ports and sales.10 
6.1 Nature of the sponsorship dilemma 
The following section examines the sponsorship security dilemma (SSD) Syria faced when sup-
porting the PKK. Therefore, it examines consecutively Syria’s external security environment, in 
particular with regard to Turkey, the group’s material capacity, and strategic interests in uphold-
ing the alignment. 
6.1.1 A clear superiority: The power imbalance between Turkey and Syria 
“Turkey has a clear superiority over Syria as regards a comparison of the two countries' 
armed forces.”11 
Sükrü Elekdag, 1996 
Taking merely the assessment of Elekdag, himself a former Turkish undersecretary of Foreign Af-
fairs, into consideration, one might expect a clear Syrian policy of abandonment avoiding. In or-
der to also supplement this statement with data in a longitudinal analysis, this section initially re-
sorts to the CINC Index, measuring Syria’s and Turkey’s respective relative share of world power. 
As Figure 25 clearly shows, Turkey’s demographic, industrial, and military capabilities exceeded 
the Syrian power resources by far throughout the entire observation period. Accordingly, the im-
balance of power in favor of Turkey steadily increased after a short low in the context of internal 
crisis 1978-80 and peaked in 1998 after a significant boost in 1993/94. At first glance, this imbal-
ance is a clear case. Turkey is nearly five times bigger than Syria in population and territory, a 
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strong ally of the U.S., and NATO-member state.12 Singling out military expenditures, however, 
provides a much more dynamic picture: 
 
Figure 25: Relative share of world power: Syria and Turkey (1978-1998) 
 
As Figure 26 indicates, Syria’s military expenditure increased steadily between 1979 and 1987 
and even exceeded Turkey’s in the period between 1983-87. Ever since–with the exception of 
1991–Turkey has spent substantially more on the military than Syria. Nevertheless, the tempo-
rary reduction in governmental spending affected the imbalance of power to a rather marginal ex-
tent given Ankara’s re-engagement of the US after 1979.13  
In contrast, several external shocks hit Syria’s military capacity in the observation period. In the 
course of Israel’s invasion into Lebanon in June 1982, Syria lost not only some 29 SAM batteries, 
but also about the same number of MiGs and 35 other planes.14 According to intelligence reports, 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact arms deliveries and military aid to Syria significantly declined since the 
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early 1980s, paralleled by a steep rise in foreign debt and economic instability.15 Nevertheless, 
Syria remained strongly dependent on these deliveries, accounting for some 95 percent of all arms 
transfers in 1990.16 
 
Figure 26: Military expenditure of Syria and Turkey (1978-98) 
 
Only after receiving up to $5 billion from the Gulf States for supporting the US-led alliance 
against Iraq in 1991, Syria was able to partially restore its air force capability and increased its 
military expenditure. The end of the Cold War, however, came along with the loss of its most 
important international backer and Syria had massive difficulties to renew and modernize its 
weapon systems.17 In addition, one should keep in mind, that up to one fifth of Syria’s land 
troops were stationed in Lebanon or committed against Israel in other forms.18  
Especially after 1993, the escalation of its conflict with PKK affected Turkey both economically 
and militarily. In order to put down the insurgency, Ankara spent an annual $7 billion, account-
ing for some four percent of Turkey’s GNP at that time and deployed almost half of its total 
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armed forces to the southeast.19 Furthermore, reports about mass human rights violations against 
the local population strained Turkey’s relations with its NATO partners and Western Europe, re-
sulting, for instance, in the temporary restriction of U.S. and German arms deliveries.20 In con-
trast, a boost in relations with Egypt (including security protocols) and Iraq in the first half of the 
1990s and the Military Training and Cooperation Agreement (MTCA) with Israel in 1996 improved 
Turkey’s security outlook.21  
Regarding the systemic incentives for adjustment strategies, the clear imbalance of power in favor 
of Turkey suggests as the neorealist hypothesis N1 an overall Syrian policy of balancing. Adjust-
ment pressures on Syrian decision-makers have increased especially in the early 1980s, between 
the demise of the USSR in the late 1980s and the end of the Gulf War, and since 1994. However, 
the general tendency for abandonment avoiding in anti-Turkish alliances expected by the standing 
firm hypothesis N2 was to a certain extend attenuated between 1983 and 87, as well as in the im-
mediate aftermath of the Gulf War. 
6.1.2 Added value: The PKK’s capacity as an ally 
Given the high asymmetry of power in favor of Turkey, the SSD model attributes increased im-
portance to the PKK’s capacity. To what extent was the group capable of challenging Ankara’s 
supremacy of power and of subsequently alleviating the interstate power imbalance? 
Although EAC data indicates that the power imbalance between the PKK and Turkey has been 
smaller than the one between Israel and Fatah, PKK’s power vis-à-vis Turkey is nevertheless cat-
egorized as weak, again suggesting a general Syrian policy of avoiding entrapment.22 And yet, the 
PKK’s strength and its ability to inflict not only severe damages on Turkey but also entrap its se-
curity forces in a costly war on its own territory varied substantially over time. 
6.1.2.1 Attacks against Turkey 
Initially, the PKK attacked primarily civilian state officials to demonstrate its capability and 
“physically separate the Kurdish regions from the rest of the country.”23 Afterwards, the group 
employed mostly conventional guerilla tactics and targeted security personnel stationed in the re-
gion, but also resorted to hostage taking and attacks on pipelines and infrastructure.  
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Between October 1986 and the PKK’s expulsion from Syria in October 1998, GTD database lists 
699 incidents of terrorism carried out by the group.24 From taking a closer look at this data 
(Figure 27), it is possible to deduct that while the PKK has been responsible for an average num-
ber of six attacks per month, three periods indicate a significantly higher frequency of attacks. Be-
tween May 1988 and October 1990, PKK stepped up its campaign against the armed forces 
(TAF), reaching a preliminary peak of 20 attacks/month in August 1989. After a relatively quiet 
period, the PKK resumed to a higher level of attacks between July 1991 and December 1992, 
raising not only their frequency to an average of 16 per month, yet also peaking in March 1992 
with 76 different attacks.25 A third and final period of above average numbers of attacks was be-
tween January 1994 and August 1995, peaking in July 1995 with 51 incidents. After 1995, the 
number of attacks rapidly declined.  
 
Figure 27: Attacks carried out by the PKK 1986-98 (frequency) 
 
In the 1990s, the PKK’s focus shifted gradually from southeast Turkey to the West. First, attacks 
increasingly reached the urban centers. Between 1991 and 1998, GTD lists over 50 terrorist inci-
dents in Istanbul, where only a single attack had taken place throughout the 1980s. In addition, 
the group targeted Ankara as well as southern centers. Second, it carried out some 145 attacks in 
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Western Europe between 1992 and 1995, most of them against Turkish institutions and state offi-
cials in Germany, which further increased international pressure on Turkey to solve the issue.26 
According to the Turkish General Staff (TGS), the number of PKK attacks steadily declined from 
3,328 (1994) to 1,500 (1996), and 589 (1998).27 
 
Figure 28: Attacks carried out by the PKK 1986-98 (lethality) 
 
In the course of the attacks listed by GTD, PKK assaults killed 1,423 civilians and off-duty per-
sonnel between 1986 and 1998. According to government sources, the death toll since 1984 had 
reached nearly 27,000 by late 1998, including 3,900 soldiers, 1,200 village guards, and 250 police 
officers.28 While this reveals that the PKK did not only resort to terrorism but also confronted the 
armed forces in conventional gun battles, GTD data indicates a steeply increasing death toll from 
terrorist attacks, illustrated in Figure 28.29  
The overall damage exceeded the loss in security personnel by far, especially in the period be-
tween 1993 and 1995, when the conflict claimed over 10,000 lives. Militants and security forces 
killed nearly 5,000 civilians between 1984 and 1998; both parties detained or kidnapped tens of 
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thousands. In addition to the economic collapse of the Southeast, security operations inside and 
outside the country swallowed billions.30 In contrast, the death toll between August 1984 and 
June 1990 had amounted for 1,771 people.31 These numbers strongly underline the assumption 
by experts that after the end of the Cold War, the PKK had indeed become a significant threat to 
Turkey.32 
6.1.2.2 Support base 
Starting out in 1979 as “an insignificant grouping of Kurdish nationalists,”33 experts estimated 
the PKK by 1996 to be the “biggest guerilla insurgency in the world.”34 Within the next three 
years, however, the number of PKK fighters located in Turkey declined sharply.35 This develop-
ment strongly contrasts with the PKK’s rise throughout the 1980s, linked to the group’s ethnic 
base, ideological constituencies, and external backers.36 
While its anti-religious Marxist-Leninist ideology was initially impeding recruitment among pi-
ous Kurds and the government undermined PKK mobilization efforts by coopting Kurdish tribes 
in the mid-1980s, Ankara’s violent and indiscriminate repression of the insurgency after 1984 en-
hanced a Kurdish national consciousness.37 By 1985, fighters inside Turkey accounted for only 
200, but forced military conscription among the local population increased their number to more 
than 1,000 after 1986.38 Membership additionally boosted in early 1990, when widespread pro-
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tests erupted in the Kurdish areas and were violently suppressed by security forces.39 By the end 
of 1992, the number of PKK fighters in the Southeast reached 10,000.40 
For several reasons, the PKK’s support base among the Kurds of Turkey somewhat diminished 
in the first half of the 1990s. First, harsh violence against dissidents and alleged collaborators led 
many to question PKK rule as a political alternative. Second, whereas the collapse of the USSR 
opened a window of opportunity for moderation and internal reform, the group lost its appeal as 
a liberation movement, while actively contributing to the preservation of tribal structures and col-
laborating with governments repressing their own Kurdish population. Third, Kurdish mass mi-
gration to the West in the early 1990s deprived the PKK of a local source of recruitment.41 
Especially after 1986, international sources of support, especially from states with a significant 
Kurdish population gained importance. The PKK had lost many of its fighters in clashes with the 
armed forces since 1984 and the establishment of the village guard system in Turkey as well as 
tensions with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders had aggravated PKK access to their Turkish and Iraqi 
constituencies (see also section 6.1.2.4). Despite severe limitations on political activity among 
Iranian Kurds, PKK reportedly exchanged money, weapons, and logistic resources against assis-
tance in trans-border smuggling after it had established a permanent presence in Iran’s northwest-
ern West-Azerbaijan region in 1986/87.42 Syria’s Kurds became another major base of recruit-
ment, food, money, and shelter, especially given the close social and economic ties between the 
Kurds on both sides of the border and the marginalized and fragmented character of local Kurd-
ish groups.43  
A final base of support had been governmental backing, besides Syria allegedly by Iran, Armenia, 
Bulgaria, Russia, the Republic of Cyprus, and especially Greece, whose government refused even 
in March 1999 to condemn the PKK as a terrorist organization.44 Russian support for the PKK, 
for instance, decreased after the Cold War to mere political endorsement such as tolerating con-
ferences and the establishment of a ‘Kurdish House’ and reached an all-time low in February 
1999, when Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin refused to give sanctuary to Öcalan, stating, “no 
                                                       
39 Ibid., 140-144. 
40 Ibid., 171f. 
41 Svante Cornell, "The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics," in Dangerous Neighborhood: Contemporary issues in Turkey's 
foreign relations, ed. Michael Radu (New Brunswick, London: Transaction, 2003), 133; Barkey, "Turkey and the 
PKK," 345; Radu, "The Rise and Fall of the PKK." 
42 Nihat Ali Özcan, Interview by the Author, Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Ankara, 
May 28, 2012. See also Kerim Yildiz, The Kurds in Syria: the forgotten people  (London: Pluto Press, 2005). 15f; 
Menashri, Iran: 89f.  
43 In addition, the vision of an independent Kurdish state attracted also higher educated and socialists Kurds, tradition-
ally affiliated with the Syrian Communist Party (SCP) Marcus, Blood and Belief: 100f; Gary Gambill, "The Kurdish 
Reawakening in Syria," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 6, no. 4 (2004): 1; Radu, "The Rise and Fall of the PKK." 
44 Cornell, "The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics," 134; Davis et al., Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism: 111; 
Barkey, "Turkey and the PKK," 351f; Tozun Bahcheli, "Turkish Policy toward Greece," in The Politics of Modern 
Turkey, ed. William Hale and Ali Carkoglu (New York: Routledge, 2008), 182f. 
Nature of the sponsorship dilemma 
 148 
terrorist will be granted political asylum.”45 In another example for state support, Iran facilitated 
the transfer of fighters from Lebanon to Iraq in 1982 and allowed the group to use its territory as 
a rear front, but also a safe haven with training centers, meeting spots, and hospitals, since 
1986.46 Thereby, Iran enabled the group to reach targets in northeastern Turkey.47 After the cap-
ture of Öcalan, Iran reduced, yet not fully suspended its assistance. In early 2000, foreign minister 
Kemal Harrazi stated, "We reject the PKK terrorist organization and do not approve of its activi-
ties."48 
6.1.2.3 Cohesion of command 
Ever establishing the group in 1978, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan made his name literally a syn-
onym for the party’s leadership and dominated its political as well as military agenda.49 While 
EAC data confirms the group’s clear central command even after more than a decade of Öcalan’s 
imprisonment, it also indicates that the PKK failed to exert full control over all Kurdish constitu-
encies.50 
In order to consolidate his predominance within the party, Öcalan quickly gained a notorious 
reputation of sidelining and even physically eliminating dissidents and potential rivals. Attempts 
to establish rival groups such as, for instance, Ali Ömer Can’s ‘PKK Refoundation’ in 1991, were 
quickly repressed.51 Reports of mass purges among recruits mounted, peaked in the late 1980s 
when university students joined the PKK in large numbers and questioned the autocratic nature 
of the leadership.52 Despite its negative reputational repercussions, internal repression prevented 
factionalism and strengthened the organizational capacity of the group.  
Nevertheless, dissent over the appropriate strategy emerged particularly in the early 1990s. As 
civil unrest erupted in the Kurdish areas during the Gulf War, several commanders such as 
Semdin Sakik advocated a popular uprising. In contrast, Öcalan aimed at forcing the state mili-
tarily into negotiations.53 Hence, amid resumed army operations after the PKK pledged a unilat-
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eral cease-fire in April/May 1993, Sakik ordered rebel units in Diyarbakir to ‘assert’ PKK author-
ity, resulting in the murder of 33 unarmed off-duty soldiers as well as four teachers.54 Another rift 
occurred in the mid-1990s as Öcalan’s directions from Damascus mismatched the strategic and 
military challenges amid full-scale TAF operations in Turkey and northern Iraq.55 Although tac-
tical dissent did not manifest itself in offshoot organizations, the centralization of power was ac-
companied by a substantial decline in PKK’s capacity to adjust to conflict dynamics. 
Externally, the PKK had largely marginalized or coopted other leftist Kurdish political groups in 
Turkey by the early 1980s.56 Indiscriminate army violence and PKK retaliation against alleged 
collaborators undermined early government successes to recruit 13,000 local Kurds into a pro-
government militia (‘village guard’). Only in 1987/88, a policy shift towards political and cultural 
moderation as well as intra-Kurdish strife boosted the number of guards especially in the areas 
bordering Iran and Iraq.57 Nevertheless, the group maintained its popularity and exceptional posi-
tion in the Turkish-Kurdish realm as intra-Kurdish competitors, such as the right-wing Kurdish 
nationalist Hizbollah party in the early 1990s, failed to consolidate themselves and the group 
managed to take control over the legal Kurdish parties since 1991.58  
In contrast to Fatah, the PKK never gained the status of a Kurdish “sole representative” and 
Öcalan’s claim for Pan-Kurdish leadership found a strong competitor in Massoud Barzani, leader 
of Iraq’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), who even denounced the group as “earning the ha-
tred and disgust of all the Kurdish people.”59 Yet, amid the rise of Kurdish nationalism after 1991 
and infighting between Iraqi Kurdish factions, the PKK’s campaign attracted many Kurds from 
neighboring countries and it gained a reputation as the “standard bearer for Kurdish nationalism 
around the Kurdish world,”60 while simultaneously denouncing their rivals as “leeches” and “col-
laborators.”61 However, PKK’s military defeat and the creation of a de facto unified Iraqi Kurdi-
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stan in the second half of the 1990s, turned the tide again in favor of Barzani and Jalal Talabani 
(Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), denouncing Öcalan as “enemy of the Kurds.”62  
6.1.2.4 Ability to escape or resist retaliation 
A final indicator assessing PKK’s capacity is the group’s ability to escape or resist Turkish retalia-
tion. In this context, safe havens located both on territory controlled by the targeted state and in 
neighboring countries played a decisive role.63  
In the early 1980s, the PKK was not able to actively resist Turkish policing measures, but to tac-
tically retreat into Syria or Iraq. In response to increased military state pressure, the PKK trans-
formed its military wing in 1986 from the Vietcong-styled guerilla Kurdish Liberation Union to 
the Kurdistan People’s Liberation Army, whose structure resembled a conventional army.64 This 
tactical shift allowed the PKK to prevent the armed forces from entering or permanently regain-
ing “semi-liberated zones” in many southern and eastern provinces, thereby creating a safe haven 
on Turkish soil.65 In August 1991, for instance, PKK forces defended positions in northern Iraq in 
a conventional battle with the Turkish army lasting for several days, boosting its military reputa-
tion.66 
In response, the government resumed a campaign to eradicate PKK as a force in the Kurdish are-
as in August 1993, primarily through a mass deployment of up to 300,000 security forces to the 
Southeast.67 Additionally, TAF established smaller rapid response teams in order to reach targets 
even in mountainous areas, increased the frequency of attacks, improved the coordination of air-
ground operations, strengthened its fire support elements, and dispatched heavy cannon, artillery 
units, and large numbers of helicopters.68 In a parallel campaign against potential sympathizers, 
authorities hit the PKK’s local logistical support base, by burning down villages and orchards.69  
As the PKK fighters found themselves deprived of food and shelter in Turkey by the mid-1990s, 
external safe havens in Iraq, Syria, and Iran gained significant importance.  
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Until today, northern Iraq has been a key pillar of the group’s “strategic depth,” especially as the 
Iran-Iraq War created a power vacuum in the Kurdish populated area.70 In 1983, the KDP and 
the PKK signed a ‘Principles of Solidarity’-accord und the latter established camps in the Qandil 
and Dohuk mountains.71 Between 1987 and 1994, however, the PKK’s security situation in 
northern Iraq worsened significantly. On the one hand, the KDP-PKK alliance collapsed over 
TAF incursions into northern Iraq as well as PKK attacks against Kurdish civilians and even 
KDP members.72 Turkey, on the other, was able to expand its influence over northern Iraq after 
the 1991 Gulf War, manifested in the deployment of up to 5,000 troops.73 After clashes in 1992 
had left up to 5,000 PKK fighters dead, resumed KDP/PUK infighting, eventually allowed PKK 
to reestablish its presence in PUK-controlled areas after 1994.74 Although tens of thousands of 
Turkish soldiers repeatedly entered northern Iraq in 1992, 1995, and 1997, TAF failed to eradi-
cate PKK’s presence there.75  
Since 1986, Iran served as a safe haven for pressured PKK fighters escaping from Turkey.76 After 
the Gulf War, however, a moderate rapprochement between Ankara and Tehran limited the 
group’s access to Iran. Under considerable diplomatic pressure from Turkey, Iran repeatedly tol-
erated cross-border operations and signed two security protocols in early 1993 and mid-1994, 
agreeing to take measures against the PKK and to facilitate the bombing of camps in border dis-
tricts.77 Subsequently, authorities repeatedly denied logistical and military assistance to the PKK 
and extradited dozens of fugitive fighters between 1992 and 1996. In 1996 alone, Iran conducted 
more than 20 anti-PKK operations.78 As bilateral relations deteriorated in the context of Turkey’s 
security agreement with Israel in 1996, reports over resumed material assistance and new camps 
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mounted. In the course of TAF Operation “Hammer” in northern Iraq in late 1997, hundreds of 
fighters were reportedly sheltered in the Iranian border town of Urmia.79 
Conclusion 
Despite the fact that it was able to resist and absorb conventional attacks in the early 1990s to a 
significant extent, the PKK was no match for TAF throughout the entire observation period and 
therefore incapable of filling Syria’s material need for assistance in balancing Turkey. Neverthe-
less, the PKK was able to politically exploit indiscriminate state repression and consolidate its 
predominant position in the Turkish-Kurdish realm. In contrast to its relative vulnerability in 
northern Iraq, western Iran provided PKK with a real safe haven between 1986 and 1992. Thus, 
Syrian entrapment fears are expected to have been steadily alleviated since 1983/84 after the 
PKK had found a rear front and shelter in northern Iraq and took up their campaign in southeast 
Turkey. Between 1988 and 1992, the group’s capacity reached a climax in membership and inter-
nal cohesion, operational vigor as well as local and regional support. In contrast, the PKK’s clear 
military inferiority after 1993 sent strong incentives for a policy of entrapment avoiding.  
6.1.3 Severity of conflict 
Section 4.1 suggested that a sponsor is likely to initiate and increase its commitment if conflict 
with the targeted state is severe. Hence, the following section will turn to bilateral relations be-
tween Syria and Turkey in the observation period.  
Historically, bilateral tensions originate in Damascus’ key role in the Arab Revolt (1916-18) 
against Ottoman rule. Pan-Arabism has been a crucial part of Syria’s self-conception and endur-
ing fears of Turkish domination, manifested in the loss of the Ottoman Sanjak of Alexandretta, 
which became the Turkish province of Hatay in 1939, were present among elites even in times of 
good bilateral relations.80 In the 1950s and 60s, the East-West conflict additionally exacerbated 
these tensions.81 Bilateral relations worsened substantially in the early 1980s over the distribution 
of the Euphrates and Tigris waters, as Turkish irrigation systems and major dam projects, such as 
the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), became a massive threat for Syrian agriculture.82  
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Although the conflict never escalated to a war, empirical evidence indicates substantial variation 
in conflict dynamics. Between 1987 and 1998, numerous confrontations took place.83 In March 
1987, for instance, Turkish officials threatened to punish Syria “in a severe manner” and Coskun 
Kirca, Turkey’s ambassador to Canada, warned to take all “necessary means” against “that hos-
tile country.”84 Only three months later, Turkish jets looking for PKK camps and bases overflew 
Syrian territory in order to demonstrate Ankara’s resolve.85 The 1987 Damascus protocol, ad-
dressing mutual security and water interests, contributed only temporarily to easing tensions, as 
Turkish guarantees did not meet Syria’s water demands.86 
Tensions increased again in autumn 1989. Turkish officials stepped up their rhetoric vis-à-vis Syr-
ia and President Özal publicly threatened for the first time to turn off the Euphrates’ water flow 
across the border if Syria would not comply with the Damascus Protocol.87 Only weeks later, two 
Syrian MiG-21 fighter jets entered Turkey’s airspace and shot down a surveying plane, killing five 
civilians. In response, Ankara announced to interrupt the southward Euphrates’ flow for an entire 
month in January 1990 and repeatedly reduced it in the following years.88 
As the number of PKK attacks increased, Turkish officials threatened in early 1992 to attack the 
group’s bases in areas under Syrian control in Lebanon. The following year, Dogan Güres, Chief 
of the General Staff, warned that the army was planning ‘deadly strikes’ on PKK leaders, includ-
ing those based in Damascus. In addition, foreign minister Hikmet Cetin openly called for in-
creased cooperation with Israel against Syria. In a brief period of de-escalation during Syria’s 
temporary suspension of assistance to PKK in mid-1992, Syrian foreign minister al-Shar’ praised 
bilateral relations on August 1 as at their best level since both states’ independence.89 As coopera-
tion failed, Defense Minister Mustafa Talas denounced Turkey’s policy as harmful to Arab inter-
ests and responded with navy exercises for a potential attack from the sea as well as large-scale 
ground force maneuvers in October. In order to ease tensions, President Asad personally received 
a high-level delegation from Ankara only a few weeks later, calling for further cooperation.90 In 
January 1994, TAF repeatedly entered Syrian territory pursuing PKK fighters and Ankara sig-
naled that Damascus could count on “receiving an unhindered supply of water only so long as 
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they maintained friendly amicable relations.”91 Again, Syria called for a comprehensive approach 
and increased consultations throughout the following months.92  
Border fortifications and troop concentration by both states reflected increased tensions since 
1995.93 On a diplomatic level, Prime Minister Tansu Ciller threatened to “teach Damascus a les-
son they would never forget.”94 In April and May 1995, officials warned, “those who harbor en-
mity against us should fear our enmity,” explicitly calling Syria “hostile.”95 The following year, 
TAF infiltrated Syrian territory in several hot-pursuit operations and shelled Syrian positions al-
legedly serving as hideouts or bases for PKK-operations. In addition, Turkey held extensive naval 
and ground maneuvers and signed the MTCA with Israel in February.96  
Syrian officials harshly criticized the agreement. In June 1997, for instance, Vice President 
Khaddam labeled it “the greatest threat to the Arabs since 1948.”97 Shortly after, Turkish Foreign 
Minister Mesut Yilmaz openly warned that Turkey would resort to a military strike if Syria 
would not cease assistance for PKK.98 In response, Syrian officials denounced a joint naval ma-
neuver by the U.S., Jordan, Turkey, and Israel as “provocative and dangerous”99 and the latters’ 
alliance as “unacceptable.”100 Throughout October 1998, high-ranking Turkish officials openly 
announced to have lost their patience with Syria and called bilateral relations an “undeclared 
war,” while both countries massed troops along the border, where Syria additionally installed one 
quarter of its 120 Scud-C missiles.101 Although, it was Syria making a bold move towards de-
escalation by expelling Öcalan and signing the Adana agreement on October 20, Turkey quickly 
sent conciliatory signals by postponing further naval exercises with Israel, re-opening the mutual 
border, and calling for the enhancement of bilateral trade.102 
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Summing up, one can maintain a mixed pattern of conflict intensity and its subsequent effect on 
Syria’s sponsorship security dilemma. Despite ideological and revisionist rivalry, interstate con-
flict became manifest only in 1987, aggravating the incentive for a policy of resolve set by the im-
balance of power. Incentives for abandonment avoiding were also present between 1989 and 
1992, as threats and military maneuvers increased the risk of interstate conflict escalation. After 
gradually declining due to conciliatory measures and common interest in containing the Kurdish 
momentum in Iraq, conflict intensity increased again in 1995, pointing towards a policy of re-
solve until 1998. 
6.1.4 Availability of allies 
As outlined above, abandonment fears and incentives for a policy of resolve decline if other allies 
are available. Therefore, the following section turns to Syria’s ability to form alternative interstate 
alliances against Turkey. 
Given the de facto insignificance of the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty since the 
1967 War (c.f. 5.1.4), COW’s Alliance data set (v. 4.1) lists only Syria’s Friendship and Coopera-
tion Treaty with the Soviet Union between October 1980 and 1991.103 Since 1979, the USSR in-
creased the amount of military aid and weaponry to Syria substantially and assistance experi-
enced a boost after 1982, including SAM-5 and SS-21 missiles.104 However, USSR’s growing un-
willingness to support Syria in its goal to reach strategic parity with Israel and economic difficul-
ties after 1985 reflected in a sharp decline of arm shipments from some $2.4 billion in the first half 
of the 1980s to $1.3 billion in the second, as well as in a partial withdrawal of military advisors.105 
Shifting its aid focus from parity to reasonable defensive sufficiency, Moscow refused to provide 
Syria with modern SS-23 missiles in 1989/90 and other arms deliveries subsequently fell down by 
94 percent compared to the 1986-89 period. After 1993, however, relations substantially im-
proved, reflected in military agreements and the Syrian acquisition of MiG 29, T-72 tanks, some 
1,000 anti-tank rockets, and 300 Scud missiles.106  
The historical legacy of Ottoman rule and Turkey’s good relations with Israel limited Ankara’s 
regional power position.107 To what extent was Syria able to exploit Arab suspicion vis-à-vis Tur-
key and form corresponding alignments?  
                                                       
103 Gibler, International military alliances, 1648-2008; Freedman, Moscow and the Middle East: 92. 
104 ———, Moscow and the Middle East: 75,151,171,185f; Stäheli, Die syrische Aussenpolitik: 224f. 
105 Olson, Turkey's relations with Iran, Syria, Israel, and Russia: 1; Michael Sharnoff, "The Syria-Soviet Alliance," inFocus 
Quarterly 3, no. 1 (2009); Freedman, Moscow and the Middle East: 263-267; Stäheli, Die syrische Aussenpolitik: 400; 
Ephraim Karsh, The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years  (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1988). 89f. 
106 Stäheli, Die syrische Aussenpolitik: 403-406. 
107 The importance of these conflict lines became quite visible in the context of the Cyprus Crisis in 1974. Erhan, Inter-
view by author, May 18, 2012; Hasan Köni, Interview by author, Istanbul Culture University, Department of Inter-
national Law, May 30, 2012. On Arab-Turkish relations, see also Çelik, Contemporary Turkish foreign policy: 49f; 
Kemal H. Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays  (Leiden: Brill, 2002). 524; 
Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000: 170,182. 
Nature of the sponsorship dilemma 
 156 
Although the dispute over the distribution of the Euphrates’ waters in the early 1980s also soured 
Turkey’s relations with Bagdad and brought Iraq closer to Syria, an ensuing alignment fell out 
quickly due to intra-Ba’th rivalry. In addition, Ankara’s neutral position in the Iran-Iraq War cur-
tailed joint military cooperation against Turkey.108 After a period of estrangement due to Syria’s 
siding with Iran and its ongoing conflict with the PLO in Lebanon, Syria revitalized its relations 
with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the context of the 1991 Gulf War and re-entered 
the Cairo-Damascus-Riyadh axis.109 Although this process did not entail a broad anti-Turkish al-
liance in the Arab World, Damascus successfully lobbied Egypt and the GCC States to openly 
support Syria in its protest against the construction of new GAP dam and water pollution in late 
1995, and further complicate the finalization of credit agreements for Turkey.110 Yet, the Arab 
States revealed little interest in conflict escalation, given the potential dilemma of an Arab Fellow 
fighting against a U.S. ally.111  
Finally, Syria’s alliance with Iran, initially formed against Israel and Iraq, became a main factor 
in Damascus’ regional policy after 1979. Against Turkey, however, evidence presents a less clear 
picture of alignment cooperation.112 Turkish-Iranian relations soured after the Islamic Revolution 
as well as in the context of repeated Turkish military incursions into northern Iraq since 1986. 113 
Economic interests and Turkey’s neutral position in the Iran-Iraq War, in turn, limited hostility 
throughout the 1980s.114 Although relations worsened in the early 1990s over a more assertive 
Turkish policy towards ethnic Turks in the region (including Iran’s Azeri minority) and the loom-
ing alliance with Israel, on the one hand, and Iran’s alleged efforts to export the revolution and 
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support to the PKK, on the other, Tehran showed no interest in forming an explicit anti-Turkish 
alignment with Syria.115 
Although Syria was able to lobby Arab political support via the historical narrative of anti-
Turkish Arabism and received arms and economic assistance from Russia and Iran, none of its 
statist allies openly committed to Damascus against Turkey throughout the entire observation pe-
riod. Hence, this lack of reliable interstate allies expectedly nurtured existing abandonment fears 
in Syria’s alignment with the PKK, particularly when Iranian-Syrian relations worsened in the 
second half of the 1980s over conflicting interests in Lebanon, and Soviet military assistance de-
clined. Under these conditions, the neorealist hypothesis N2 expects a policy of standing firm. Pro-
spects of interstate alignment as an adequate balancing strategy against Turkey reoccurred only in 
the mid-1990s, when Turkey’s military agreement with Israel brought Syria and the Arab States, 
as well as Iran closer to each other. 
6.1.5 Strategic interest in upholding the alignment 
The assumption that abandonment fears increase if the sponsor has a strategic interest in uphold-
ing the alignments points to benefits exceeding counterbalancing a common adversary (c.f. sec-
tion 2.4.2). Hence, the following section turns to international and domestic power resources Syr-
ia aimed at gaining exclusively from supporting the PKK, against external and internal rivals. 
In contrast to the Palestinian issue, Kurdish demands for a homeland did not coincide with Syri-
an territorial revisionism, as the 1920 Treaty of Sevres incorporated several areas into French Syr-
ia, which were previously claimed by the Kurds as parts of their autonomous region.116 At the 
height of Pan-Arabism in the mid-1950s, Damascus even demanded the return of Kurdish popu-
lated areas in southern Turkey while simultaneously taking measures of excluding Kurds from 
the political and cultural landscape of Syria.117 Understanding Kurdish nationalism as a signifi-
cant threat to Syria’s territorial integrity and contradiction to Arab nationalism, the government 
repressed any potential vehicle for secession, such as the teaching of the Kurdish language and 
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press, and restricted political activity. Besides military purges, authorities subsequently denied ac-
cess to police and military academies to Kurdish applicants.118 
Given the dominance of Arabism as a source of regime legitimacy, supporting Kurdish national-
ism was likely to backfire domestically as undermining Syria’s Arab identity.119 Nevertheless, 
supporting demands for autonomy in Turkey and Iraq shielded Syria to a certain extent from its 
neighbors playing the Kurdish card against Damascus and increased its own influence in north-
ern Iraq. In this regard, the alignment gained strategic importance especially when Turkey made 
progress in appeasing its own Kurdish population or aligning with the Kurdish parties in Iraq. In 
contrast, Ankara’s support for Bagdad against the local Kurds and military incursions into north-
ern Iraq facilitated the Syrian-brokered KDP/PKK cooperation and the steady mobilization of 
Kurdish nationalism against Syria’s statist rivals.120 After the Gulf War, Turkey’s rapprochement 
with the Iraqi Kurds increased PKK’s strategic importance as a tool of containing Turkish influ-
ence in northern Iraq.121 Given constantly high levels of violence in Turkey’s and Iraq’s conflicts 
with the Kurdish groups, PKK’s role as a spoiler for a Turkey/Iraqi-Kurdish realignment was of 
minor necessity. However, the PKK’s importance for Syria in order to maintain influence over 
northern Iraq increased during the presidency of Turgut Özal (1989-93) and in mid-1995, when 
the Drogheda Peace Talks almost led to a military agreement between Turkey and KDP/PUK.122 
Inside Syria, violent Kurdish anti-government protests erupted almost on a regular basis in Da-
mascus, Qamishli, and Afrin after the government had impeded the public celebration of the 
Kurdish Newroz Festival in 1986 and after Öcalan’s arrest in early 1999.123 To what extent has 
the alignment contributed to contain the domestic threat of Syrian Kurdish nationalism? 
Throughout the 1970s, President Asad broadened his power base inter alia by coopting the Kurds. 
Besides including the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Communist Party (SCP) into the NPF and 
announcing the end of resettling Arabs in Kurdish areas, he reintegrated Kurds in the minor 
ranks of the security apparatus. They gained particular importance in elite divisions, such as the 
Special Units and the Defense Companies, which were repeatedly employed to quell Sunni anti-
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regime protests in the urban centers.124  In addition, authorities employed a three-fold strategy to 
contain Kurdish ethno-nationalism: First, the government refused to lift restrictions on the teach-
ing of the Kurdish language, Kurdish publications, the use of Kurdish in the work place and–
since 1992–registering children with Kurdish names. Second, previous Arabization policies be-
tween 1973 and ‘76 had disrupted trans-border Kurdish ties.125 Third, the government openly 
supported the Kurds of Iraq, even by demanding autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan in the early 
1970s.126 Thus, bolstering the PKK’s position in northern Syria, especially after the regime’s fall-
out with the SCP in the early 1980s, fragmented the Syrian Kurds and created a balance of proxy 
power, preventing a monopolistic position of any Kurdish faction inside Syria.127  
Finally, the alignment served as a powerful tool of diverting Kurdish nationalism in Syria to-
wards the struggle for a “true Kurdistan” in Iraq and Turkey.128 Remarkably, the PKK explicitly 
assisted Damascus in this strategic aim in its 1978 party program, emphasizing the liberation of 
‘Turkish Kurdistan’ and explicitly postponing the expansion of its struggle to other areas.129 In 
1995, the PKK even denied the existence of what Syrian Kurdish nationalists termed ‘Syrian 
Kurdistan,’ portraying it as “a small part in the west of southern Kurdistan [northern Iraq; MK]” 
and an “extension of the borders of northwestern Kurdistan [Turkey; MK].”130 The following 
year, Öcalan stated in an interview that the Kurds living in present-day Turkey, Iraq, and Iran 
will be living together in freedom one day, again ignoring Syrian Kurdish demands for self-
determination in any entity less than a Greater Kurdistan. Hence, he adopted the government line 
that “Syria had no Kurds of its own and that those living there were refugees from Turkey.”131  
 
Concluding, the domestic and regional strategic interests of Syria’s alignment with the PKK pro-
vide a significantly less clear pattern than in the case of Fatah. While it became an important tool 
for containing Kurdish nationalism inside Syria, supporting it outside Syria threatened to hurt the 
regime’s Arab nationalist credentials and economic interests. In addition, no international out-
bidding war emerged among the group’s statist backers, limiting Syria’s ability to exploit the 
alignment in order to attain external power resources.132 In contrast, the alliance threatened to 
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damage Syria’s nationalist credentials in times when it was anyway accused of betraying its Arab 
brethren by siding with Iran and later the U.S. against Iraq.  
Domestically, assistance did not serve as a tool of generating outright regime support but rather 
as an instrument of appeasing particularly Kurdish parts of society. As such, its importance in-
creased especially in late 1982, when Jalal Talabani, who had previously tried to establish himself 
as the leader of the Syrian Kurds, negotiated a cease-fire with Saddam Hussein and when the 
united Kurdish front eroded in the second half of the 1980s. In contrast, the PKK gained addi-
tional importance for Damascus when PUK/KDP achieved autonomy in northern Iraq and the 
uprising of the Turkish Kurds threatened to spill over into Syria in 1991/92.133 With regard to the 
SSD, evidence in the context of strategic interests suggests a moderate tendency for abandonment 
avoiding, given the domestic and regional limitations for a public alignment with the Iraqi and 
Turkish Kurds as well as the perceived threat of Kurdish nationalism inside Syria. 
6.1.6 Conclusion 
In order to capture incentives for Syria’s specific sponsorship policies, the SSD indicators exam-
ined in 6.1.1 - 6.1.5, this conclusive section highlights tendencies towards alliance formation and 
alliance management as well as potential trend reversals between 1979 and 1998. 
First, the clear imbalance of power in favor of Turkey set a strong incentive for a Syrian adjust-
ment policy throughout the entire observation period, which considerably increased in the second 
half of the 1980s and after 1994. By the mid-1980s, the issues “Water” and “Kurds” had become 
increasingly conflictual, reflected in mutual military threats. Subsequently, the generally non-
violent conflict escalated sporadically in hot-pursuit operations and cross border shelling after 
1994. Eventually, military cooperation between Israel and Turkey as well as increased saber rat-
tling in the mid-1990s further increased incentives for balancing (N1). 
Considering the choice of balancing policies, Syria’s remarkable efforts of internal military build 
up throughout the 1980s and early 1990s correspond to a large extent to the policy of strategic 
parity with Israel, which engrossed the overwhelming share of the defense budget. The rapid and 
nearly incessant decline of military expenditure after 1988, amid increasing Turkish capabilities 
and interstate conflict, indicates a bias towards external balancing (NC1). However, before the for-
mation of specific interstate counter alignments against Israeli-Turkish alliance formation in the 
mid-1990s, allowing Damascus to divert resources extracted from anti-Israel alignments, Syria 
largely failed to mobilize external statist support against Turkey. 
Hence, Syria’s incentives for initiating a campaign of proxy warfare (NC2) against Turkey were, 
despite material inferiority and a lack of reliable allies, significantly less strong than in the case of 
Israel because of a less severe interstate conflict. Only by the end of the 1980s, increased interstate 
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hostility and material inferiority amid improved Turkish-Arab relations set a clear incentive for 
aligning with the PKK.  
Apart from a general anti-Turkish sentiment among Syrian elites and Damascus’ inability to 
pressure Ankara into a favorable water agreement in 1980 by conventional means, this time lag 
makes it difficult to identify a clear pattern triggering the initiation of the alignment after Öcalan’s 
arrival in Syria in 1979. Nevertheless, it fits in nicely with two observations made by most ana-
lysts: First, that the PKK’s initial settlement in areas under Syrian control has been rather the re-
sult of passive Syrian support to Marxist and Leftist groups in general, especially as the group did 
not launch its anti-Turkish campaign prior to 1984. Second, that Syria’s relations with the PKK 
emerged in the context of Damascus’ anti-Iraq alignment with Iraqi Kurdish groups.134  
Regarding specific alliance policies, the neorealist hypotheses maintain that the nature of the SSD 
comes along with a specific form of alliance management, ranging between a policy of standing 
firm (N2) and restraining the ally (N3).  
Table 13: Nature of the sponsorship dilemma II: Syria-PKK 
Indicator Observation Induces a general fear of 
IMBALANCE OF POWER High in favor of Turkey 
Peaking in 1985-88 and after 1993  
Abandonment  
CAPACITY OF THE ALLY Insufficient 
Increased capacity in 1988-1993 
Entrapment  
SEVERITY OF CONFLICT Moderate 
Intensified after the mid-1980s (brief re-
laxation in 1992-1994) 
Entrapment/Abandonment 
ALTERNATIVE ALLIES Not available/ Available Abandonment/ Entrapment 
STRATEGIC INCENTIVES High 
After 1982, alliance allows for control over 
Kurdish constituencies (especially 1989-
1993 and since 1995) while avoiding rep-
utational losses from “anti-Arab” behav-
ior, limited domestic power resource 
Abandonment 
 
As concluded by Table 13, the SSD underwent not only some remarkable changes due to signifi-
cant variations in Syria’s external security environment. While it was possible to carve out some 
critical junctures, clear-cut tendencies towards either a strategy aiming exclusively at abandon-
ment avoiding, as suggested by the standing firm hypothesis N2, or at entrapment avoiding, as as-
sumed by the restraining hypothesis N3, have not appeared. Hence, Syria’s assistance for the PKK 
is likely to range between the ideal policy types of resolve and restraint. 
Given the dominance of Israel in Syria’s security outlook, low levels of interstate conflict, the 
PKK’s initial weakness both vis-à-vis Turkey and as a force in the Kurdish political arena, a rela-
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tively clear incentive of entrapment avoiding in the early 1980s can be maintained. This changed, 
to a certain extent, amid the increased importance of northern Iraq in the context of the Iran-Iraq 
War in 1982 and the PKK’s ability to both monopolize Turkish Kurdish politics and form a pan-
Kurdish alignment.  
From the mid-1980s onwards and particularly between 1989 and 1993/94, fears of entrapment 
based on the PKK’s weak capacity were somewhat alleviated by its rapid growth in operational 
and organizational strength as well as local support infrastructure, rear fronts, and safe havens. 
As the PKK was still no match for the Turkish army in conventional battle, entrapment risks re-
mained present and constrained Syria’s policy of support. However, mounting interstate conflict, 
the lack of statist allies against an increasingly powerful Turkey, and Damascus’ concerns both of 
spillover effects of rising Kurdish nationalism into Syria and an alignment between Turkey and 
the Iraqi Kurds, increased incentives for Damascus to adhere to alignment. From 1995 until 1998, 
general incentives for standing firm policies resulted from a renewed deterioration of interstate re-
lations and a clear imbalance of power in favor of Turkey. Kurdish infighting and Ankara’s polit-
ical and strategic shift in 1992/93 threatened, on the one hand, to marginalize the PKK as a mili-
tary force and increased, on the other, internal friction and heavily affected both local support in-
frastructures as well as external assistance. Subsequently, the PKK’s demonstrated inferiority af-
ter 1993 sent clear and strong incentives for a policy of restraint, which was reinforced by the new-
ly established statist Arab/Iranian counter-alignment against Israel and Turkey.135  
The neoclassical realist model outlined above assumes that unit-level factors in general and re-
gime vulnerability/autonomy in particular filter the SSD’s incentives. In order to examine 
whether this antecedent condition has affected Syrian support for the PKK, the following section 
turns to domestic politics. 
6.2 Domestic politics: Power consolidation and a looming succession crisis 
The Waltzian assumption that states choose balancing strategies based on availability indicates 
that a lack of reliable allies increases the tendency towards internal balancing. By contrast, the 
neoclassical realist alliance-seeking (NC1) and sponsorship (NC2) hypotheses suggest that the lack of 
regime autonomy entails a bias of vulnerable states in favor of external balancing. 
Hence, pressures for armament stemming from a lack of anti-Turkish alliance choices were con-
siderably higher during the Iran-Iraq War–and particular the second half of the 1980s–and signif-
icantly lower after the 1991 Kuwait crisis. At least partially, COW data supports this assumption, 
indicating a steep rise in Syria’s overall military expenditure, nearly quadrupling between 1978 
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($1.165 billion) and 1987 ($3.95 billion).136 The following three years, however, military expendi-
ture literally crashed to an average $1.58 billion (1988-91). Despite a sharp increase in 1991 and 
1993 as well as a brief period of stagnation in 1995/96, a general downside trend in Syria’s ex-
penditure throughout the 1990s amid Turkey’s massive military build up supports the assumption 
of a decreasing pressure for internal balancing as a result of external alignments. Both trends re-
flected in increasing and declining numbers of military personnel (see Figure 29/Figure 30).137 
 
Figure 29: Internal balancing efforts by Syria (1978-1998) 
 
It is an important caveat of this study that aggregate data is only available for overall military ex-
penditure, making the actual direction of armament difficult to access. This is especially vital as, 
for instance, the geographical deployment of troops suggest that Israel was a much bigger factor 
in Syrian security considerations than Turkey (see also 6.1.1). Especially in the 1980s, the dynam-
ics of the steep rise in Syria’s internal balancing efforts seems somewhat decoupled from Turkey 
given the fact that its underlying resources resulted from Syria’s anti-Israel alignments (see 6.1.4).  
As suggested by balance-of-threat theory, the low adjustment pressure throughout the first half of 
the 1980s given the clear priority of the Israeli threat reflected in the fact that Syria revealed little 
interest to divert resources extracted from anti-Israel alliances against Turkey. Throughout the 
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1990s, the alliance-seeking hypothesis NC1 suggests that lacking foreign policy autonomy influ-
enced Syria’s decision to not adjust to an increased Turkish threat by internal balancing, yet opt 
for external balancing. Regarding the sponsorship hypothesis NC2, Syria’s presumed domestically 
generated inability to either balance Turkey internally or form statist anti-Turkish alliances in the 
mid-1990s is seen as decisive for continued PKK support, thereby also pointing towards a poten-
tial explanation for Syria’s decision to abandon the group in 1998. 
 
Figure 30: Internal balancing efforts of Syria and Turkey (1978-1998) 
 
6.2.1 To Hama and back again (1976-1985) 
Despite its successful consolidation of power (see also section 5.2.2), efforts to expand the popu-
lar acceptance of the Ba’th regime remained ineffective for several reasons. While measures of 
political liberalization, such as local and parliamentary elections as well as party pluralism were 
not associated with actual power sharing, state repression increased after 1970.138 In addition, the 
Ba’th party’s transformation into a corrupt and undisciplined network of patronage rapidly re-
duced its ability to mobilize societal support outside of the coalition’s constituencies.139 Finally, 
Syria’s intervention in Lebanon in June 1976 severely undermined the regime’s domestic position, 
allowing its rivals to denounce Asad’s rule as anti-Arab, anti-Muslim, and sectarian.140  
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The Islamist uprising 
Against this background, the regime came under massive pressure by a popular Islamist uprising, 
which started in 1976 as a campaign of terrorist attacks and evolved into urban warfare in the fol-
lowing years. By 1980, the insurgency had reportedly killed some 300 Ba’thist officials and 
Alawis in assassinations and bombings.141 
The revolt gained momentum, as the Muslim Brotherhood remained the only credible alternative 
to the Ba’th party, whose economic reforms had hit the urban Sunni middle class of the northern 
centers, particularly Hama and Aleppo, and the agrarian bourgeoisie. Decrying the army’s inca-
pability to recover the Golan due to the regime’s subordination to both U.S. and Soviet interests, 
the ‘Islamic Front in Syria,’ formed in 1980, also aimed at reaching out to nationalists. Addition-
ally, the Front gained external societal and at times even state support. 142 The group’s manifesto 
united all these sources of support: It called for a “true Islamic state” with remarkably strong el-
ements of liberal democracy, and suggested a restructuring of the army, foreign policy realign-
ment, liberating Palestine by jihad, and economic liberalization.143  
Until mid-1980, the regime ascribed the insurgency to the interference of “al-Sadat and Zion-
ism.”144 In addition, it tried to bolster its power position against the uprising by increasing salaries 
of bureaucrats and military personnel and announcing economic measures, political liberalization 
in the NPF as well as a fight against corruption.145 Furthermore, Asad publicly stressed the Mus-
lim nature of his regime and mobilized the workers’ militias as well as and thousands of its mem-
bers against “reactionary violence.”146 
These measures failed to have an appeasing effect, especially as the anti-corruption campaign ex-
cluded the inner core of the regime, formally coopted segments of the secular opposition started 
to position themselves as potential alternatives to the regime, and conciliatory moves evolved 
simultaneously with harsh repression. 
In 1980/81, security forces killed over 2,000 insurgents in strikebreaking operations and arrest 
raids, conducted by tens of thousands of troops led by the Defense Companies (DC).147 After sev-
eral major attacks in Damascus in the second half of 1981, the Islamic Front eventually seized the 
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city of Hama on February 2, 1982, triggering the decisive battle of the conflict.148 The govern-
ment laid siege on the town with some 12,000 soldiers, attacked its quarters with artillery bom-
bardment and helicopter gunships, regained full control over the city after three weeks, and elim-
inated the Islamic Front as a political force in Syria.149 
After the crisis, Asad attempted to reestablish himself as a national and regional leader. On the 
one hand, the Ba’th party gained increased importance as an instrument of rallying mass appeal 
in the context of economic crisis, domestic violence, Syria’s regional isolation and military inferi-
ority to Israel.150 On the other hand, the regime employed some 12,000 members as the presi-
dent’s personal bodyguard.151  
Demonstrations, strikes, and even violent anti-regime protest indicate low levels of regime legiti-
macy after 1976, impeding efforts to mobilize foreign policy resources especially from Arab na-
tionalist and Sunni Muslim parts of society. However, sufficient levels of coercive power limited 
the threat of regime overthrow. First, the centralization of political power since 1970 prevented 
the emergence of a rival domestic power center. Second, dissident forces failed to form a broad 
anti-regime alignment, eventually rivaling the state’s power position.152 Third, USSR and Iranian 
fears of Syria’s possible international realignment after regime change boosted external support 
for the pressured regime in Damascus. 
Nevertheless, the repercussions of the Islamist uprising were also felt in the regime’s inner core: 
Singling out particularly Alawi targets, the insurgency exacerbated sectarian conflict and contrib-
uted to a rift in the ruling circles between those opting for reform and conciliation, such as the 
Sunni prime minister Abd al-Ra’uf al-Kasm on the one side, and hardliners on the other, most 
prominently among them the president’s brother Rif’at al-Asad.153 The debate eventually tipped 
in favor of the latter group for two reasons. First, the massacre of dozens of Alawi military cadets 
by a Sunni Ba’thist officer in Aleppo on June 19, 1979, and an assassination attempt on Asad by 
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a member of his own presidential guard, increased the perception of their adversaries’ intransi-
gence among particularly Alawi members of the ruling elite. Second, the positioning of exiled 
Ba’th founding figure Salah al-Bitar as a potential alternative and an abortive coup in January 
1982, led by Sunni Ba’thist officers, boosted additional fears of a breakaway of the regime’s Sunni 
power base in the party and the armed forces.154  
Hence, whereas the crushing of the Islamist revolt contributed to the regime’s external consolida-
tion, it substantially affected the internal balance of power. Amid mass defections of Sunni troops 
during the Hama campaign, paramilitary (predominantly Alawi) units, particularly DC, com-
manded by Rif’at al-Asad and the Special Forces (SF), led by Ali Haydar, evolved into key pillars 
of regime stability and their commanders to self-proclaimed shields of state survival.155 Especially 
the DC, a four brigade strong elite force deployed just outside Damascus, whose 55,000 members 
enjoyed an exceptional position in the army in terms of training, endowment, and equipment, 
were a decisive force in the conflict.156 Subsequently, their command gave Rif’at a powerful posi-
tion in the security apparatus; according to Patrick Seale, one “second only to Asad’s in the 
state.”157  
The DC’s de facto independence of both the ministry of defense and the regular army as well as 
Rif’at’s establishment of a substantial power base among pro-Western (and anti-Communist) 
forces and the Damascene merchants increased his personal autonomy as a domestic power bro-
ker.158 His increased power capacity reflected in several areas of contention regarding foreign pol-
icy. First, opposing the alliance with Moscow, he criticized the strategy of military parity with Is-
rael as harmful to Syria’s autonomy. Second, he was highly critical of the president’s feud with 
Fatah and of Damascus’ alliance with Tehran, a contradiction to the raging battle against politi-
cal Islam inside Syria. His close relations to the political leadership of Saudi Arabia and Morocco 
added to a situation where his policy preferences were highly incompatible with the president’s 
strategies.159 Hence, by the time the regime had worn down the revolt, a duality of power and re-
newed praetorianism had emerged–this time at the regime’s core. 
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The succession crisis 1983/84 
“’You want to overthrow the regime? […] Here I am. I am the regime.”160  
Hafiz al-Asad, April 1984 
Rif’at’s extraordinary power position in particular and the general dominance of the Alawi ‘bar-
ons’ in the security sector became a question of regime security when the president fell seriously 
ill in November 1983.161 Open political mutiny ensued Asad’s decision to transfer authority to a 
formal committee consisting of six senior Sunni government, party, and army officials. Amid 
fears of potential power loss, the Alawi-dominated Regional Command (RC) of the Ba’th party 
substituted itself for the committee.162 Interpreting the RC’s revolt as support to his own claims 
for leadership, Rif’at became more assertive.163 Although the president soon recovered, a rift be-
tween Rif’at supporters and his opponents, which also feared an external realignment undermin-
ing their domestic position, persisted.  
In order to constrain his brother’s ambitions, Asad relied on military as well as air force intelli-
gence, paramilitary forces such as the Republican Guard (RG), the Struggle Companies, and the 
SF, as well as the 3rd Armored Division, ordering them to Damascus on February 26, 1984.164 
Furthermore, he deprived Rif’at of de facto command over the DC and appointed him, in a simul-
taneous series of transfers and arrests of his supporters, vice president by decree on March 11.165  
Tensions threatened to escalate, when Rif’at subsequently ordered the DC to move into Damas-
cus, thereby confronting the materially weaker SF and the RG. Only after Asad’s personal inter-
vention, Rif’at withdrew his forces from the capital. Besides sending his brother off to exile until 
1992, the president had his political and military backers purged from their positions, and dis-
mantled a network of civil society organizations, which Rif’at had built up as an alternative pow-
er base to the Ba’th party. In addition, Asad reduced the DC in both size and material endow-
ment, partly demobilized, or transferred to the SF and RG. In 1986, the president’s oldest son, 
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Basil, took over security at the presidential palace in 1986 and his cousins Haydar, ‘Adnan, and 
Muhammad al-Assad started to command the Special Units controlling the Damascus area.166 
Regarding external alignment preferences, Rif’at’s fall from grace strengthened regime constitu-
encies that were doubtful about a domestic rapprochement with the Sunni business elite and a 
partial realignment with the U.S. in contrast to a firm commitment to the USSR.167  
Although domestic threats stemming from sources outside the ruling circles seemed less acute af-
ter 1982, cooptation strategies paralleled repression throughout the decade. In this context, the 
Ba’th party’s role decreased significantly. Especially the overrepresentation of Alawi members led 
observers to the conclusion that it no longer constituted a domestic force on its own, having 
turned into a mere reflection of the army’s power structure.168 Asad further marginalized the par-
ty’s influence especially in foreign and economic policy issues undermined its constitutional su-
premacy by increasingly resorting to the NPF as a forum for political debates.169 Rather than rely-
ing on the party as a tool of popular mobilization, the presidency itself became a source of legiti-
macy. Just after Rif’at’s attempted coup, Asad’s portrayal in the public gained even a ‘sacred’ 
character, including references to immortality and, for the first time in 1984, statues.170 
In addition, the party’s downgrading entailed the regime’s cooptation of the bourgeoisie through 
both mass state employment and economic liberalization.171 Though limited both in pace and ef-
fect, the opening of Syria’s economy in the mid-1980s was a key strategy to woo the private sec-
tor and attract foreign investment.172 During the foreign exchange crisis of 1986/87, for instance, 
the government strongly encouraged exports and expanded the private sector’s role.173 This policy 
of liberalization clearly illustrated the regime’s growing inability to mobilize those resources nec-
essary for survival. Hence, pressure to cater to the private sector increased especially amid declin-
ing revenues from oil production and external assistance. Hence, economic liberalization allowed 
the regime to generate resources without strengthening potentially rival power centers on the one 
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hand, while new dependencies on the private sector immediately threatened this newly gained 
autonomy, on the other.174  
The private sector’s accession to the ruling coalition at the expense of its traditional constituen-
cies did not take place immediately. By 1990, however, a consensus on ‘controlled’ economic lib-
eralization had been established, as economic crises created high pressures for attracting private 
and foreign investment.175 Pitted against this rising business elite, however, were the traditional 
pillars of the regime’s old power base in the rural areas and especially the coalition of the mili-
tary, the party, and the public sector, which had been established in the early 1970s.176 
6.2.2 Constraining praetorianism: A family affair 
Given the de facto absence of an organized opposition, and the marginalization of the Ba’th Party 
and the army as rival power centers, questions of regime security in the 1990s mainly centered on 
two issues.177 First, as the president’s deteriorating health threatened to ease constraints on intra-
regime praetorianism, hereditary succession aimed at maintaining domestic supremacy. Second, 
the regime continued to coopt the business elite in order to extract economic power resources 
amid continuously low levels of political freedom.  
In the early 1990s, Hafiz al-Asad started to position his first-born son Basil as his successor, who 
had been appointed a brigade commander in the RG, taken over partially oversight over Lebanon, 
and was granted substantially more public exposure in state media and official rhetoric.178 The 
fact that the looming ascension of a young and inexperienced president remained unchallenged 
even in the course of Rif’at al-Asad’s return in 1992 reflects a high level of political autonomy.  
To a certain extent, this had also been a result of increased efforts to bolster Asad’s personal legit-
imacy of president Asad himself through tailor-made policies of political liberalization. For in-
stance, mass amnesties of political prisoners in 1991 and 1995 coincided with a presidential refer-
endum, which Asad won without any competition by 99.99 percent, and the 25th anniversary of 
his ascension to power. Moreover, throughout the 1990s, the regime became more tolerant to-
wards the expression of religious sentiments and released numerous imprisoned members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. As Zisser suggests, this also helped Syria to generate pan-Islamic solidarity 
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against domestic and external rivals.179 
Intra-regime rivalries surfaced after Basil’s sudden death in a car accident on January 21, 1994, 
and the gradual positioning of his younger brother Bashar as heir apparent. While Bashar was 
quickly promoted through the military ranks and his power base bolstered by reshuffles promot-
ing young and mostly unknown officers of Alawi background to the divisional command, Rif’at, 
but also Khaddam and Shihabi brought themselves into position.180 In response, the president 
gradually marginalized Khaddam, in the mid-1990s Bashar’s main competitor for succession, 
most prominently in the context of the Lebanon portfolio.181 
The looming generational change was pitched to the public and regime constituencies at several 
occasions, thereby endorsing a public sentiment of continuity and change, preferring Bashar al-
Asad to a representative of the Old Guard as “a spark of new hope.”182 While the public support 
of Mustafa Talas and deputy Chief of Staff Ali Aslan for Bashar’s candidacy apparently guaran-
teed continuity, the heir apparent repeatedly engaged in debates of modernization and interna-
tional integration.183 
In order to finalize succession, a major reshuffle in the military-security complex took place, en-
tailing a shift in the regime’s inner core in 1998. Already in late 1997, reports mounted of violent 
clashes between Rif’at and Bashar supporters in Latakia, but only in February 1998, Rif’at lost 
his post as vice president and left for French exile.184 Along with other members of the Old Guard 
in the army and intelligence apparatus, the president forced Shihabi into retirement, replacing 
him with Aslan, while close aides of Bashar rose to key positions in the General Intelligence Di-
rectorate (GID).185 Besides several ‘new faces’ in the security apparatus, Bashar used an alterna-
tive tool–the Syrian Computer Society–to mobilize support among the urban economic elites, 
from which he recruited many into government and party functions.186 
It is noteworthy, that it was appearance of a new regime constituency, the private sector, which 
accompanied, if not enabled, this relatively smooth power transition. With regard to regime secu-
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rity, the rise of the private sector allowed the presidency to maintain autonomous from traditional 
power centers in order to generate domestic and external power resources.187 The question of au-
tonomy resources became particularly vital, given the low percentage of taxes on government 
revenues–accounting only for some 25 percent–and the regime’s inability to mobilize sufficient 
alternative resources, for instance from external alignments or deficit budget cuts.188 
In turn, the class of private entrepreneurs, which had emerged in the course of economic liberali-
zation and controlled inter alia more than 90 percent of agriculture, a key sector of Syria’s export-
oriented trade policy, became more assertive regarding political liberalization and participation. 
In May 1990, for instance, representatives of business associations were for the first time elected 
in large numbers to parliament since 1963–at the expense of the Ba’th party. The following year, 
the regime launched a ‘second wave’ of liberalization, including a new investment law, welcom-
ing both foreign and private investment in Syria’s industry. The law contained several other in-
vestment-friendly measures, such as the waiving of import taxes and restrictions of the private 
import of hard currency.189 As an unintended consequence of economic liberalization, the ascen-
sion of Syrian private investors, described by Kienle as a group “prone to interfering in poli-
tics,”190 was accompanied by a loss of state autonomy also in foreign policy matters. 
Subsequently, this shift in the ruling coalition influenced foreign policy decision-making, as new 
constituencies opted for a moderation and pro-Western realignment of Syria’s external relations, 
particularly concerning their sectorial interests.191 Although transfers to the public sector from the 
Gulf States after the Kuwait Crisis thwarted pressure for accommodation towards the West, 
which occurred in the context of economic liberalization and the loss of export markets in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the ability of traditional regime constituencies to contain the 
private sector’s influence declined after 1992.192 
6.2.3 Conclusion 
The neoclassical realist explanatory model, reflected in corresponding hypotheses on the for-
mation of sponsorship alignments (NC2) as well as their management (NC3/NC4), suggests that re-
gime vulnerability and autonomy deficits serve as an antecedent condition for Syria’s commit-
ment policies.  
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Between 1976 and 1982, the state underwent a severe legitimacy crisis, stemming from unpopular 
foreign policy choices, repression of internal dissent, and the Islamist uprising. In 1983, the reli-
ance on the Alawi barons for regime survival enabled–together with the president’s deteriorating 
health–a brief return of praetorianism to the domestic political arena, when Rif’at al-Asad 
reached for power. Nevertheless, the previously attained centralization of coercive force and po-
litical power guaranteed not only regime survival but granted–together with external support 
from Iran and the USSR–also sufficient levels of autonomy. 
The regime’s structural lack in foreign policy autonomy also reflected in the course of economic 
crisis. In response to the economic downturn, the government preferred liberalization and the al-
location of new resources through a strengthening of the private sector over diverting funds from 
the state’s growing defense budget, necessary to both appease the army and maintain a public 
profile of resolve vis-à-vis external enemies.193 While especially Syria’s massive internal security 
apparatus points to low levels of regime legitimacy, economic liberalization gradually broadened 
the ruling coalition and increased the regime’s autonomy from traditional domestic power cen-
ters.194 
Although moderate measures of political liberalization took place in the early 1990s, the regime 
took no actual steps of democratic reform or power sharing and it is rather continued repression 
that explains the absence of publicly displayed dissent.195 Under these conditions, state autonomy 
from society has been continuously depending on the nature of the regime’s power base.  
Given Asad’s deteriorating health and difficulties to reach a well-timed hereditary succession, the 
threat of a renewed outbreak of praetorianism inside the regime’s core was ever present through-
out the decade, indicated by repeated reshuffles in the security apparatus. By 1992, a new power 
center had emerged with the ascension of private sector entrepreneurs. While this process in-
creased autonomy from the traditional regime pillars (a party struggling for ideological survival 
after the end of the Cold War, a security apparatus constituting a massive economic burden, and 
a far from productive public sector), pressures for external moderation, demilitarization, and in-
tegration into the world economy mounted.  
The neoclassical realist hypothesis NC1 claims that vulnerable states share a bias towards alliance 
seeking in their adjustment strategies. In the Syrian case, this reflects, for instance, in the key role 
of external assistance in military spending and development, such as limited internal balancing 
efforts against Turkey in times of severe conflict and a highly pressing imbalance of power.196 In 
addition, two other factors weakened the government’s ability to mobilize domestic resources 
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against Turkey: The clear priority of Israel as the biggest external threat among all regime con-
stituencies and low levels of popular support for Kurdish nationalism schemes (6.1.1, 6.1.5). 
Concerning the sponsorship hypothesis NC2, section 6.1.4 suggested that Syria failed to form stable 
interstate alliances against Turkey, particularly before the looming Israeli-Turkey alliance in the 
mid-1990s. Simultaneously, the diversion of external anti-Israel assistance to anti-Turkish 
measures would have undermined the regime’s domestic position.  
Hence, incentives to align with the PKK were considerably higher by the end of the 1980s amid 
the lack of external allies, massive defense budget cuts, and increased interstate conflict with Tur-
key. While incentives for external balancing increased amid rising tensions, a growing imbalance 
of power, and limited state autonomy throughout the 1990s, only the threat of a military alliance 
between Israel and Turkey allowed Damascus to rally external support against Ankara. Given the 
lack of consensus over policies of cooperation (private sector) or confrontation (public sector, Old 
Guard) with the West, pressures to realign and cease support of the PKK increased after 1992, 
especially in times of Turkish overtures and initiatives of economic cooperation.  
Throughout the 1990s, policies of resolve and steadfastness against Syria’s external enemies as a 
traditional tool of generating public support gained importance as an instrument to contain the 
private sector’s political ambitions. Whereas, as Lawson concluded in his 1994 study, considera-
tions like these were decisive for Syria’s confrontational policy towards Israel in the early 1990s, 
the window of opportunity of pro-accommodation forces has been presumably bigger in the 
Turkish case.197 Despite traditional resentment of Turkey among Syrian elites, the conflict had 
been substantially less severe until the Israel-Turkey agreement in 1996 and played a minor role 
in the external threat perception of the Syrian public. In contrast, the perception of Turkey was 
rather unclear. On the one hand, Turkey became a natural rival over both the quantity and the 
quality of the Euphrates river’s water flow and also a threat to regime stability given its ability to 
block 40 percent of the water flow to Syria since the completion of the GAP project’s first part in 
1990. This was especially the case when agriculture had become a decisive part of the govern-
ment’s opening policy.198 On the other hand, Syrian-Turkish trade doubled between 1988 and 
1993 and in order to assist Syria in the exploitation of its oil and gas reserves, joint projects were 
established after the liberalization of the energy sector.199 
 In late 1994 and early 1995, bilateral trade discussions took place and Syria’s Minister of Econ-
omy, Muhammad al-Imad, emphasized Syria’s interest in improved trade relations, suggesting, 
for instance, increased Turkish imports of Syrian phosphates as a way of reducing Syria’s then 
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$300-million trade deficit.200 Hence, with increased bilateral trade and beneficial regional water 
schemes looming, the international and regional environment indicated, that maintaining the 
alignment with the PKK would no longer serve Syria’s foreign policy interests.201 
These trends expectedly also influenced Syria’s management of its relations with the PKK be-
tween 1979 and 1998. Accordingly, both neoclassical realist hypotheses suggest a policy of limited 
resolve (NC2) or limited restraint (NC3) if Syria lacks the autonomy to implement the standing 
firm/restraining-strategies encouraged by the SSD. In section 6.1.6, the SSD between Syria and 
the PKK provided mostly a mixed pattern of incentives and rarely a clear signal towards resolve 
or restraint. Nevertheless, evidence pointed towards a preferred strategy of entrapment avoiding 
in the first half of the 1980s, shifting slightly towards the other end of the spectrum by the middle 
of the decade. With regard to internal conflict, this shift expectedly accelerated between 1980 and 
1984, towards a policy of secret backing/fellow traveling. Between 1989 and 1992/93, the SSD sug-
gested a policy of resolve, yet constrained by the PKK’s structural inferiority to Turkey’s military. 
In contrast, the succession crisis amid the rise of a new pro-Western regime constituency in the 
mid-1990s, alleviated pressures for resolve stemming from the deterioration of interstate relations 
and a clear imbalance of power in favor of Turkey. 
6.3 Syria’s policy towards the PKK (1978-1998) 
Although Syria has not been the PKK’s only statist supporter, there is substantial variation be-
tween the group’s backers. Iran, for instance, served as a rear front and hideaway for the group 
since 1986, yet exerted high levels of control over the PKK’s activity among local Kurds. In con-
trast, the establishment of PKK camps and bases in northern Iraq since 1982/83 resulted from 
lacking state control over Kurdish areas in the course of the Iran-Iraq War. While the presence of 
PKK fighters and camps in Lebanon was mainly limited to areas controlled by the Syrian army, 
the group also benefitted from the at least temporary inability and unwillingness of Western Eu-
ropean governments to cut the group off from diaspora support and financial assets from drug 
trade.202 How Syria shaped its alignment with the PKK throughout the observation period will be 
examined as follows. 
6.3.1 Hosting 
“Öcalan’s presence in Damascus was the worst-kept secret.”203 
A key factor in Syria’s hosting activity has been the de facto aggrandizement of its territory due to 
the stationing of up to 40,000 troops in neighboring Lebanon since 1976. Subsequently, hosting 
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terrorist groups in the Bekaa Valley located in Lebanon’s occupied northeast, allowed for plausi-
ble deniability to a much larger extent, especially as Hafiz al-Asad repeatedly downplayed Da-
mascus’ influence over Lebanon in public.204 With regard to Syria’s hosting policy, the PKK’s 
military presence in Lebanon thus constitutes a case of moderate commitment. 
Under increasing pressure from Turkish authorities–and reportedly mediated by Jalal Talabani–, 
PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan fled to Syria in July 1979, where he quickly got in touch with Syri-
an intelligence and the president’s brother Jamil Asad.205 Reportedly, he and Rif’at became the 
PKK’s main liaison officials after 1980, providing Öcalan inter alia with a residence in central 
Damascus.206 
Although exact numbers are widely disputed, at least 50 fighters followed Öcalan only a few 
months later and their number increased particularly after the military coup in Turkey in 1980 to 
some 300 in 1982. Reportedly, Syrian border forces turned a blind eye on the influx of fighters as 
well as their settling in Syria and Lebanon.207 Although a small group re-entered Turkey in April 
1980, the PKK generally refrained from fully redeploying to the area of fighting in southeastern 
Turkey. In contrast, hundreds of fighters moved from a training camp in the north of Damascus 
to Palestinian training camps in the Bekaa Valley, among them the Helwe Camp run by the 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).208  
Although Syria’s indirect hosting included a toleration of the PKK’s political activity in Lebanon, 
allowing, for instance, some 80 PKK members to gather at the party’s first conference at the 
Helwe camp in July 1981, authorities repeatedly aimed at keeping up deniability.209 First, they re-
stricted trans border attacks from Syrian soil.210 Second, they provided PKK fighters operating in 
Lebanon with Arab, yet non-Syrian, identity cards in order to deny their presence.211 Opacity be-
came especially crucial after a bilateral extradition agreement signed in June 1981, although Syria 
refused to reply to Turkish extradition demands regarding PKK members.212 The 1982 Lebanon 
War temporarily disrupted the group’s presence in Lebanon and deprived it of its local training 
grounds.213 Subsequently, Damascus allowed the PKK to seek refuge on Syrian territory, provid-
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ed access to training facilities, and permitted a second congress in a Palestinian Camp on the Jor-
danian-Syrian border in late August 1982.214  
The resettlement of PKK fighters to northern Iraq in September 1982 significantly reduced the 
group’s presence in Syria’s sphere of influence, as only the political leadership remained in Da-
mascus. Nevertheless, Syrian intelligence continued to exert substantial control over the group’s 
operations and prohibited, for instance, direct cross border activities.215 Additionally, authorities 
generally restricted the group’s freedom of movement accepting, for instance, only identity cards 
issued by Syrian intelligence and demanded member lists.216 In 1983, the government responded 
to Turkish complaints and pressured the group to generally reduce its presence in Syria and relo-
cate fighters, back to Lebanon. In turn, and especially after Israel’s partial withdrawal in 1985, 
Syrian authorities assisted the PKK in re-establishing and taking full control over the abandoned 
Helwe Camp, formally renamed to Mahsum Korkmaz Academy and becoming the venue of the 
third party congress in October 1986.217 
In 1986, authorities reportedly handed over five PKK fighters over to Turkey.218 Despite the fact 
that Syrian intelligence managed these contacts in a generally opaque manner, they became more 
frequent, including a personal visit of Jamil Asad to the Academy.219 On July 17, 1987, Syria and 
Turkey formally committed themselves inter alia to improved border security and prevention of 
activities “carried out on their territories aimed at threatening or undermining the security and 
stability of the other party.”220 However, whereas Syrian officials pressured the PKK, on the one 
hand, to infiltrate Turkey from Iraq or Iran, they tolerated, on the other hand, the PKK’s training 
and political activity not only in Lebanon but also on Syria territory.221 By 1987, for instance, the 
PKK had offices in all predominantly Kurdish areas as well as in Damascus.222  
The mixed pattern of indirect and opaque hosting policies continued in the early 1990s. In the 
context of a general Syrian-Turkish rapprochement based on a shared opposition to the possible 
creation of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, both countries signed a security proto-
col in May 1992 and another bilateral agreement on security issues in November 1993. In 1991, 
for instance, authorities briefly detained Öcalan after meetings with Iraqi Kurdish representa-
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tives.223 In 1992/93, Syria pressured the group to pull out of the Bekaa Valley, where it had pre-
viously enjoyed a relatively free rein and closed the Korkmaz Academy.224 On November 20, 
1993, both states formally committed themselves explicitly to “deny shelter and temporary quar-
tering to all terroristic actions directed towards each other within their respective territories.” 225 
Accordingly, Syria’s negotiator, General Adnan Badr-al-Hassan, announced a ban on PKK activ-
ities and that Damascus would not give shelter or free passage to “those who are against Turkey’s 
interest.”226 According to Turkish media reports, he also promised, “if caught, Öcalan would be 
returned to Turkey.”227 
Although a number of reports indicate that the PKK maintained a, though less visible, presence 
in the Bekaa Valley, the political leadership transferred the center for political indoctrination and 
other facilities to the Damascus area.228 
Eventually, Syrian authorities further reduced their hosting commitment by pressuring both the 
group into relocating military cells operating in the border region and closing down a meeting-
house in the Bekaa in 1997. Still, the government refused to repatriate him to Turkey.229 In con-
trast, Syria stepped up its support for PKK in early 1996 and established two military camps with 
some 500 fighters about 25 km northwest of Aleppo.230 Although officials repeatedly denied 
Turkish charges about the PKK’s presence in Syria and Lebanon throughout the first half of 
1998, Syrian hosting of the PKK eventually ended in October. After Syrian officials had threat-
ened to arrest and extradite Öcalan to Turkey, he and his fighters left the country. Later this 
month, Damascus announced his departure as well as the shut-down of PKK camps in Syria and 
Lebanon.231 In the aftermath of the Adana agreement, Syria went even further, banned PKK po-
litical activity inside the country and extradited members with Turkish passports.232 
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6.3.2 Military support 
The following section examines the extent of Syria’s military support to PKK. According to the 
criteria outlined in 4.3.2, support is high if there is evidence for direct military assistance, granted 
within Syria, and as moderate if provided outside of Syrian territory, for instance in Lebanon, 
Iraq and Iran. Tolerating arms deliveries by other backers and training under official supervision 
accounts also for a moderate level of support, while the mere permission to acquire weaponry 
from other sources inside its sphere of influence constitutes a low level of assistance. 
Between 1979/80 and 1982, authorities turned a blind eye and reportedly even encouraged the 
transfer of hundreds of PKK recruits into Palestinian camps in Lebanon, where they received 
training in guerilla warfare.233 Reportedly, intelligence agents and army personnel were directly 
involved in the military training, equipping, and ideological indoctrination.234 According to Turk-
ish sources, Syrian intelligence assisted PKK fighters in 1983 and ‘84 to enter Turkey near the 
border towns Cizre and Silopi.235 Syrian embassies in Western Europe constituted another source 
of support especially with regard to the PKK’s ‘out of area’-operations and contact to the Kurdish 
diaspora.236 
Although Syria’s military commitment was generally moderate, given the little resources invested, 
its importance as a facilitator should not be underestimated. Under Syrian tutelage, PKK gained 
tremendous organizational capacity, receiving not only military training but also ideological edu-
cation and expertise on mobilization strategies.237 Furthermore, after the departure of PLO from 
Lebanon and the re-establishment of the Helwe Camp, PKK was allowed to run it largely auton-
omously.238 The at least perceived impact of Syrian military support reflected in statements from 
the PKK leadership in the early 1990s, claiming to have trained up to 15,000 guerillas in the 
camps based in Lebanon and Syria.239 
Although many authors and reports mention Syria as a source of arms used by the PKK, there is 
little specific evidence on direct weapon deliveries.240 As PKK fighters mostly employed a hit and 
run tactic against military posts or rival militias, they mainly required small arms, such as gre-
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nades, rifles, and light machine guns.241 Thus, in order to ensure group survival, authorities re-
portedly supplied PKK directly with small arms in the initial period of cooperation.242 In the fol-
lowing years, tolerating influx of light weapons purchased by the PKK itself on open weapon 
markets in Lebanon, the Kurdish areas of Iran and Iraq, as well as Western Europe became a fo-
cus of Syria’s military assistance.243 However, Syria neither provided nor permitted the purchase 
of advanced weaponry, such as shoulder-fired SAM (surface-to-air missiles) against Turkish air-
planes and helicopters, from other sources. For instance, when the group eventually acquired 
Russian-designed shoulder-fired missiles–reportedly smuggled from Serbia–in the mid-1990s, Syr-
ia’s unwillingness to train fighters in their use prevented their employment.244 A third dimension 
of Syria’s military support was permitting local Kurds to join the ranks of the PKK. After 1982, 
authorities tolerated and facilitated PKK recruitment among Syrian Kurds and actively encour-
aged it after 1985. Hence, the number of active Syrian PKK members trained at the Helwe Camp 
increased from only a few in 1985 to some 45 in 1986 and 130 in 1987 and thousands of Syrians 
joined the PKK throughout the decade.245 After the Gulf War, the government actively encour-
aged local Kurds to join the organization, by exempting up to 10,000 Syrians from military ser-
vice and reportedly pressuring Kurdish tribal leaders to fill a ‘quota’ of recruits. The impact of 
this assistance reflected in a steep rise in their share of PKK fighters, accounting for up to 30 per-
cent by the mid-1990s.246 In the course of Syria’s realignment with Turkey, the government be-
came also increasingly restrictive regarding the PKK’s ties with the local Kurds, forbidding them 
henceforth to engage in the group’s activity.247 
6.3.3 Financial support 
Although many observers mention Syria as a financial resource of PKK in the observation period, 
there is relatively poor evidence for direct governmental funding.248 Reports on PKK financing 
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rather suggest that Syria took on a facilitating role regarding third party funding, mostly by allied 
Palestinian groups or local Kurds, as well as revenues from illicit business.  
In the initial period of the PKK’s presence in Syria’s sphere of influence, DFLP, for instance, be-
came an important source of funding, covering not only basic expenses of recruits but also paying 
up to $300 as a monthly allowance to each fighter.249 Nevertheless, former PKK members and 
others, trained in DFLP camps in Lebanon at that time, claimed that this support would not have 
been possible without the approval of the Syrian authorities.250 In addition, Syria tolerated the 
PKK’s involvement into smuggling, drug trafficking, and other illicit business since the mid-
1980s.251 Kurdish diaspora communities in Western Europe and their donations constituted a 
major source of funds already in the initial stages of the group’s activities. After 1986, also local 
Kurds in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and southeastern Turkey gained importance as the group discovered 
taxation as a potential source of revenues.252 With tacit government approval, PKK also started 
to collect money in Kurdish villages in Syria and introduced taxes on smugglers in the border ar-
ea.253 Hence, despite low levels of direct transfers, the sharp decline in PKK’s annual estimated 
revenue after 1998, from $200-$500 million throughout the 1990s to tens of millions in the early 
2000s, reveals the importance of Syria’s indirect support to the group’s fundraising activities.254 
6.3.4 Endorsement 
“Syria declares the PKK as a terroristic organization.”255 
Joint Memorandum of Minutes on Security Issues, November 1993 
Promoting both the goals and means of the group publicly, portraying them as legitimate, and 
hence risking at least diplomatic frictions with the targeted state, in brief endorsing the group indi-
cated a moderate level of sponsorship commitment (see 4.3.4). In addition, endorsement is also 
present if a backer uses its political weight to convince third parties to support the group at least 
passively. 
In this context, the 1993 Joint Memorandum marks a critical juncture as the first instance of Syr-
ia formally designating the PKK a terrorist organization and a low-point in its endorsement poli-
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cy. Regarding the extent of this decline, it is noteworthy that Syria had no strong record of public-
ly supporting either the PKK or calls for Kurdish rights of self-determination in general.256 In ad-
dition, Syria’s self-obligation as a UN member state, signatory state of anti-terrorism protocols, 
and member of the Organization of Islamic Conference, committed to “respect the right of self-
determination and non-interference in the domestic affairs […], sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of each Member State,”257 limited incentives for publicly endorsing the group. 
A remarkable deviation from this policy occurred in 1981, when Syria refused to extradite PKK 
members, stating that they were “no terrorists, only political refugees.” 258 Yet, instead of endors-
ing the PKK’s political goals, officials repeatedly denied knowledge of its presence and implicitly 
agreed to assist Ankara in July 1987, by preventing operations from groups threatening Turkey’s 
“security and stability.”259 Although Hafiz al-Asad joined the PKK in a ceremony in the Bekaa 
Valley in early 1991, officials repeatedly expressed fears that Kurdish national ambitions might 
lead to a territorial disintegration of Iraq after the Gulf War.260 
In 1992, Damascus deliberately limited its scope for denial by agreeing in another bilateral mem-
orandum to consider any organization banned in Turkey as illegal in Syria. In this context, it de-
clared the PKK an outlawed organization and pledged to prosecute its members.261 However, as 
Syria’s non-compliance became obvious in the following months, officials resorted again to deni-
al. As reports about the activity of the PKK’s radio station from Damascus made it difficult to 
deny concerning the group’s presence in Syria, the government shifted its rhetoric to acknowledg-
ing the PKK’s presence on the one hand, but maintaining, on the other, that it was not allowed to 
use force.262  
In the aftermath of the November 1993 agreement of, Syria’s state minister for security, Nasir 
Kaddur, announced in Turkish television:  
“The PKK is considered illegal in accordance with our laws. In brief, the PKK has been 
banned in Syria…From now on, the PKK or Öcalan may not make use of us or pass 
through Syrian territory.”263 
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In this context, Kaddur became also the first Syrian official publicly denouncing the PKK as “ter-
rorist.”264 Nevertheless, while generally complying with this assessment and repeatedly declaring 
Syria’s commitment to the territorial integrity of Middle Eastern states, Foreign Minister Faruq 
al-Shar’ refused to denounce the PKK as a terrorist organization in August 1994. In addition, he 
partly retracted Kaddur’s statement, when he identified the PKK as a "resistance movement" ra-
ther than a terrorist group.265 In October 1998, the Syrian government signed the Adana agree-
ment and denounced in this context the PKK again as a terrorist organization.266 
Despite low levels of public rhetorical support, Syria endorsed the PKK as a tacit facilitator, by 
both backing it in intra-Kurdish and regional affairs and actively assisting the group in establish-
ing an international network of support. In the early 1990s, Syria tolerated the PKK’s de facto take 
over of parts of the northwestern Kurd Dagh province. Government consent reflected also in the 
fact that six overt PKK-supporters from this area entered the national parliament in May 1990.267 
On a regional level, Asad personally persuaded both Massoud Barzani and the Iranian govern-
ment in 1982 to tolerate and facilitate the settlement of PKK fighters in northern Iraq.268 
Although some analysts claim that Öcalan was strongly constrained and limited regarding his di-
rect personal contacts to politicians outside Syria, Damascus enabled several meetings with for-
eign diplomats and other officials.269 In summer 1987, for instance, authorities facilitated a meet-
ing between Öcalan and Soviet diplomats in Damascus.270 After the Gulf War, contacts increased 
as well as their visibility. In October 1991, for instance, Syria permitted a group of Greek parlia-
mentarians, journalists, and retired generals to visit PKK camps and the following spring, they 
even tolerated a joint press conference with Greek politicians in the Bekaa Valley.271 Reportedly, 
the PKK was free to use Syrian facilities in order to hold party congresses and press confer-
ences.272 Although the government had formally and explicitly committed itself to prevent PKK 
from holding meetings in its territory in November 1993 and cancelled, for instance, a press con-
ference of Öcalan in Lebanon in September 1994 on short notice, Öcalan continued to hold meet-
ings in Damascus with high-ranking German politicians and intelligence officials throughout 
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September 1995. This reveals at least a deliberate support of PKK’s efforts to gain recognition as 
a legitimate and political organization by the international community.273 
6.3.5 Conclusion 
Portrayed as a major Turkish foreign policy success against state sponsorship of terrorism, the 
Adana agreement represented not only “total Syrian surrender”274 but also a complete realign-
ment and abandonment of the PKK. However, the Syrian defection also marked a final point in a 
bilateral cat-and-mouse game of almost two decades. To what extent fits Syria’s sponsorship 
commitment policy before 1998 in with the three remaining sponsorship types Brother in Arms, 
Fellow Traveler, and Secret Backer? 
Overall, two special characteristics of the Syria-PKK alliance should be maintained–especially in 
contrast to the case of Fatah (c.f. 5.3). First, as officials praised and attempted to legitimize nei-
ther the group’s specific political ends and means nor the Kurdish cause, Syria never assumed the 
role of a Fellow Traveler. Public deviations from Damascus’ proclaimed policy of non-support, 
such as official visits to PKK camps in the Bekaa Valley, were in all cases framed in the broader 
context of an increased material commitment. Second, Syria revealed a substantial unwillingness 
to sacrifice tangible assets to fulfill their commitment manifested by indirect hosting, operational 
restrictions, and a lacking record of the active involvement of Syrian security personnel on behalf 
of the PKK. 
In the initial period of cooperation, Syria contributed directly and indirectly to PKK’s capacity 
building, backing it materially, and tolerating political activity. Reportedly, Syrian security per-
sonnel has been involved in training and provided logistical support. As there is no evidence of 
their immediate involvement in PKK operations and given numerous measures aimed at keeping 
the PKK’s presence in Lebanon a secret, there was a strong trend towards the Secret Backer role. 
This strategy included both rhetoric of denial, portraying PKK fighters as unorganized refugees, 
and increased control on the group’s activity when the Lebanon War required an at least tempo-
rary withdrawal of PKK forces fro Lebanon into Syria. 
Within the scope of secret backing, Syria’s material commitment increased substantially after 
1985 and reached the status of a virtual Brother in Arms, placing thousands of Syrian Kurds and 
potential conscripts for the Syrian army at the PKK’s disposal. Additionally, the group’s freedom 
of political maneuver and contacts with regime officials increased. However, this development 
entailed no fierce or threatening rhetoric against Turkey, yet shallow promises of compliance in 
matters of bilateral security cooperation.  
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After the Cold War, Syria allowed the PKK to step up its visibility in the Bekaa and the share of 
Syrian Kurds among the group’s ranks further increased.  
Hence, despite several measures had pointed towards realignment or at least a return to secretive 
backing, including the denouncement of the PKK as a terrorist organization in 1992/93 and the 
closing of the Korkmaz Academy,275 assistance remained substantial and far from opaque in 
1995/96.276 In this period, authorities permitted the establishment of camps in the border area, 
portrayed the PKK as a resistance movement, and tolerated meetings with Western officials. 
Nevertheless, tensions became visible in reported clashes between the PKK and local intelligence 
and the closure of PKK’s political presence by 1997. Issuing such strong threats of realignment 
indicated an increasing unwillingness to be drawn into open conflict with Turkey, and resulted in 
Syria’s realignment and defection from its alliance with the group in late 1998. 
In contrast to the Fatah case, support for the PKK and the Kurdish cause (not to mention a popu-
lar war against Syria’s northern rivals) played if at all, a little role in domestic politics in general 
and intra-regime rivalries in particular. A marginalized and fragmented out-group in Syria’s polit-
ical landscape for decades, rallying Kurdish support seemed generally of little importance for the 
state in constraining domestic praetorianism. This also stemmed from the fact that rivals for 
power revealed little interest in mobilizing pro-Kurdish sentiment against the regime, especially 
after the succession crisis in 1983/84, when the key tool of integrating Syrian Kurds into the se-
curity apparatus, Rif’at as-Asad’s DC, was cut in size and downgraded. Additionally, the report-
edly close contacts of Asad’s younger brothers Rif’at and Jamil, who even visited the Helwe 
camp in 1985, weakened the group’s value as an asset in Syrian domestic politics after their dis-
posal from the inner power circle.277 As the demobilization of many DC members timely coincid-
ed with the active encouragement of PKK mass recruitment among Syrian Kurds, it is likely to 
have constituted an instrument to deprive potential domestic rivals of Kurdish militias as a power 
resource. Regarding the expulsion of PKK in 1998, Alain Gresh reports, in contrast, that ceasing 
state support for the PKK was used by then de facto leader Bashar as an effective tool of weaken-
ing the domestic power position of General Duba, who had been the PKK’s main backer in the 
regime’s inner core.278 
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Figure 31: Patterns of Syrian sponsorship commitment to the PKK  
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7 A shifting balance: Syria & Hizballah 
Hizballah emerged in the early 1980s as a Lebanese and Shia Muslim movement supplementing 
and steadily replacing the PLO as the main non-state actor fighting against the Israeli invasion 
and subsequent occupation of south Lebanon after 1982.1 Since the end of the Lebanese Civil 
War (1976-1990), the group steadily moderated its Khomeini-inspired pan-Islamist opposition to 
the Lebanese sectarian-confessional system and established–after a period of severe confronta-
tion–a comparatively stable co-existence with its main competitor in the Lebanese-Shia arena, the 
secular Amal organization. In 1992, Hizballah formally joined Lebanon’s political institutions 
under the leadership of Hasan Nasrallah. However, the group’s opposition to Israel and bilateral 
peace schemes (‘Lebanon First’) remained manifest even after Israel’s withdrawal from southern 
Lebanon on May 24, 2000, resulting in open war in July 2006. 
From what observers initially described as merely one of many Syrian proxies in the Lebanese 
Civil War, Hizballah rose within two decades to a major political player in Lebanon and the re-
gion, at times even described as “stronger than the state.”2 Subsequently, some even speak of a 
‘shifting balance’ between Hizballah and Syria, likely to influence intra-alignment politics.3 
U.S. economic sanctions targeted Hizballah for the first time in January 1995 on the grounds of 
its opposition to the Peace Process and subsequently, the group was included in the list of For-
eign Terrorist Organizations established in October 1997.4 However, two factors impeded efforts 
to create an international consensus on denying legitimacy to Hizballah violence. First, both in 
academic and political discourses, disagreement persists regarding the classification of Hizballah 
as a terrorist group, based on the fact that it was mostly targeting combatants.5 Second, between 
1978 and 2000, Israel’s refusal to withdraw from Lebanon as mandated by UNSCR 425 made it 
de jure an occupying force and allowed Hizballah to legitimize its attacks in the context of nation-
al resistance.6 
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Throughout the decades, Hizballah was involved in numerous acts of violence classified as terror-
ist actions. Targeting civilians and unarmed UN personnel in kidnapping and skyjacking opera-
tions in the second half of the 1980s, conducting suicide bombings killing hundreds in Beirut, 
Tyre, and Buenos Aires, launching rocket fire against Israeli civilians, and being involved in polit-
ical assassinations, repeatedly undermined Hizballah’s nationalist credentials and contributed to 
a more broad perception of the group as a terrorist organization.7 In the same pace, however, Is-
rael’s leeway for internationally tolerated retaliation as legitimate self-defense against both Hiz-
ballah and its backers increased and gained unexpected, though implicit, support in July 2006, 
when Saudi Arabia publicly questioned Hizballah’s character as a legitimate resistance.8 Hence, 
the following chapter turns to the question, how the expected variations of Syria’s sponsorship di-
lemma reflected in its commitment in intra-alignment politics towards Hizballah. Furthermore, it 
addresses the influence of domestic politics on specific sponsorship patterns. 
7.1 Nature of the sponsorship dilemma 
In order to assess the nature of the Sponsorship Security Dilemma (SSD) in Syria’s alignment 
with Hizballah against Israel as the key factor shaping Syrian sponsorship commitment, the fol-
lowing section turns to Syria’s external security environment in the observation period (1989 – 
2006). Therefore, it assesses both the respective interstate adversary dilemma and Hizballah’s ca-
pacity as an ally. 
7.1.1 Facing a decisive edge: the power imbalance between Syria and Israel  
A key assumption of this study’s explanatory basis is that a state facing a clear imbalance of pow-
er in favor of its rival is likely to give a priority to abandonment risks in alliance politics. In order 
to assess this imbalance between the End of the Lebanese Civil War in 1989 and the July 2006 
War, this section initially turns to Syria’s and Israel’s relative share of power capabilities distrib-
uted in the international system.9 In contrast to the 1960s and 70s (section 5.1.1), CINC data 
draws a rather balanced picture and even a slight tendency in favor of Syria in the respective first 
halves of the 1990s and 2000s (see Figure 32). While particularly demographic factors, such as 
Syria’s rapid population growth and urbanization and its large conventional forces were decisive 
                                                       
7 Ibid., 77f. 
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for the small power gap between both states, it highly contrasts highly with data on the corre-
sponding military expenditure (see Figure 33).10 
 
Figure 32: Relative share of world power: Syria and Israel (1989-2006) 
 
Figure 33: Military expenditure of Syria and Israel (1989 - 2006) 
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With the exception of the immediate post-Gulf War years (1991-93), where aid from the Gulf 
States eased the pressure on Syria’s tight military budget and expenditure rose substantially in 
1991 to an almost equally high level, Israel’s edge in defense spending became manifest again in 
1994 and increased in the following decade.11 In addition, and also not reflected in CINC data, 
the quality of Syria’s military capacity had suffered heavily in the course of the observation peri-
od for several reasons. 
Most decisively, the end of the Cold War deprived Damascus of its main source of both foreign 
aid and cheap arms deliveries.12 Already in November 1989, USSR officials had declared Mos-
cow’s unwillingness to further support Syria’s aspiration of strategic parity with Israel with free 
supply of arms.13 Against the background of decades of military cooperation, purchasing equip-
ment from other than Russian sources, such as 600km-ranging Scud-C surface missiles from 
North Korea in early 1991, carried the risk of interoperability problems.14 In addition, Syria had 
failed to develop appropriate procurement, maintenance, and modernization strategies on its own, 
which stands in stark contrast to Israel.15 By the end of the observation period, Syria’s armed 
forces had become what observers termed a “military museum,”16 while Israel was attested a 
“decisive edge in conventional forces”17 over all of its Arab neighbors, which was also backed by 
a regional monopoly of nuclear weapons. 
A second advantage for Israel concerns the quality and combat strength of military forces. Over 
the years, endemic corruption, poor training, weak management structures, and a highly politi-
cized and fragmented leadership had created “hollow” forces in Syria.18 Besides the reshuffling in 
the military security complex in the mid-1990s, major, though bloodless, purges took place in the 
first half of the 2000s, additionally weakening Syria’s command structure.19  
In addition to peace agreements with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) and buffer zones in Gaza, 
the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, Israel was able to maintain some ten percent of Lebanon 
under military occupation between 1985 and 2000.20 Besides a small leverage over Lebanese do-
mestic politics, the occupation and military operations against insurgent forces provided both 
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IAF and IDF with an opportunity to train and test new equipment in a realistic environment.21 In 
contrast, Syria’s military unchallenged presence in Lebanon, which particularly coincided with 
corruption and involvement in smuggling, affected the armed forces’ overall strength negatively 
in a longitude perspective.22 
The neorealist balancing hypothesis N1 suggested that the manifest and clear military imbalance of 
power in favor of Israel induced a general balancing pressure on Syrian politics, especially before 
1990 and to a steadily increasing extent after 1994. As assumed by the standing firm hypothesis N2, 
Israel’s military edge provided a general incentive for policies aiming at abandonment avoiding. 
7.1.2 Hizballah’s capacity as an ally against Israel 
Although many understood Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon as a military success for 
Hizballah, the group’s estimated strength of 3,000 fighters and its classification as ‘much weaker’ 
relative to IDF forces in the EAC database suggest that its capacity was unlikely to be sufficient 
to even the imbalance of power between Syria and Israel.23 In order to determine whether a sub-
sequent incentive for Syrian policies of restraint has been subject to variations, particularly Hiz-
ballah’s capacity to inflict damages on Israel and resist retaliation will be assessed as follows. 
7.1.2.1 Attacks against Israel 
After the Israeli pullback to the security zone in 1985, Hizballah adapted to the subsequent stra-
tegic changes and chose a strategy of attrition in the 1990s, employing hit-and-run tactics with 
small units against patrols of IDF and the South Lebanon Army (SLA). Additionally, it im-
proved reconnaissance and operational planning capacities, thereby strengthening the efficiency 
of its attacks.24 However, GTD data indicates that both the number of terrorist attacks and their 
deadliness remained on a comparatively steady level throughout the observation period (see Fig-
ure 34 and Figure 35). 
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Figure 34: Attacks carried out by Hizballah 1989-2006 (frequency) 
 
 
Figure 35: Attacks carried out by Hizballah 1989-2006 (lethality) 
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Throughout the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, three trends steadily increased Hizballah’s 
ability to attack Israel both in Lebanon and inside its own territory: 
First, Hizballah improved its intelligence capacity, military equipment, and fighting tactics. Since 
1991, it relied increasingly on Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and roadside bombs. Simul-
taneously, the group also started to use Sagger antitank and SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles, forcing 
IAF to temporarily suspend flights of C-47 aircraft in Lebanese airspace and improve the defense 
of IDF armored vehicles.25 In 2000, Hizballah unveiled its ability to penetrate fortified bunkers 
with AT-4 Spigot and other anti-tank missiles.26 In the second half of the 1990s, Hizballah carried 
out hundreds of attacks on security personnel, patrols, and military posts.27 The overall number 
of IDF casualties rose continuously from 13 in 1992 to 23 in 1995, peaking in 1997 with 39 killed 
soldiers. By employing a strategy of entrenchment, IDF was able to reduce this number by 1998, 
yet only at the expense of increasing SLA frontline fatalities and the assassination of a high-
ranking IDF commander in February 1999.28 After the withdrawal, the group targeted IDF per-
sonnel in the occupied Shab’a Farms, by, for instance, firing anti-tank missiles on IDF positions 
in March 2002 on a near daily basis.29  
Second, Hizballah internationalized the conflict by 1992. In response to the assassination of Gen-
eral Secretary Abbas al-Musawi on February 16, a suicide bombing struck the Israeli embassy in 
Buenos Aires, leaving 29 civilians dead and 242 injured.30 Two years later, another suicide attack 
in the Argentinian capital, this time on the Mutual Israeli Association of Argentina (AMIA), 
killed 85 people and wounded another 300.31 In addition, Hizballah carried the war to Israel’s ter-
ritory. On February 17, the group fired Katyusha rockets into northern Israel for the first time, 
targeting population centers in the Galilee.32 These attacks hit Israel’s public morale severely and 
undermined the government’s efforts to justify the occupation as the only strategy to provide se-
curity for northern Israel.33 
Finally, Hizballah boosted its combat strength by employing psychological warfare strategies.34 
In 1991, for instance, Hizballah launched its TV-station al-Manar, broadcasting not only pictures 
                                                       
25 Ibid., 132, 129. 
26 Ibid., 246, 197f. 
27 According to UNIFIL sources, 644 attacks took place in the security zone in 1994 and their number increased to 908 
the following year. From 855 attacks in 1997, the number of assaults rose to 1,500 in 1998 ibid., 145-149, 200. 
28 Ibid., 211, 224-226. 
29 Ibid., 292-297, 322, 312. 
30 Ibid., 98. 
31 Ibid., 115. 
32 Ibid., 98f. 
33 Furthermore, the constant alert in Israel’s north also caused substantial economic damage. On February 6, 2000, for 
instance, the government wrongfully anticipated Katyusha fire in response to an IAF raid in Lebanon and ordered a 
48-hour state of emergency in the area, accounting for an economic damage of nearly $5 million. Ibid., 132f., 200, 
247f; Luft, "Israel's Security Zone in Lebanon," 14f; Mahdi Ahouie, "The Middle East Peace Process from the 
perspective of Revolutionary Iran. Will Tehran ever take part?," Iran Analysis Quarterly 1, no. 4 (2004). 
34 Blanford, Warriors of God: 123. 
Nature of the sponsorship dilemma 
 194 
of Lebanese civilian casualties but also of injured and killed Israeli soldiers, as well as clips in 
Hebrew after 1996, confronting the Israeli public with the price of the occupation.35 
7.1.2.2 Support base 
“Hizballah is a movement whose members are Lebanese, its leadership is Lebanese, the deci-
sion is Lebanese and it is made by a Lebanese leadership. The movement is fighting on Leb-
anese soil for the cause of liberating Lebanese territory and for the honor and freedom of the 
Lebanese people and the nation in general.”36 
Hasan Nasrallah, March 16, 1997 
In 2002, Richard Armitage, U.S. deputy secretary of state, described Hizballah as “the A-Team 
of terrorists,” based on the group’s operational success but also its mobilization base.37 Between 
the mid-1980s and 1998, Hizballah’s support base rose from some 7,000 partisans to about 6,000 
trained fighters and some 10,000 active supporters.38 In late 2006, analysts estimated the number 
of active members as being around 20,000 with additional tens of thousands passive supporters.39 
The politically and economically disaffected, yet internally cohesive, Shia Muslim community in 
the Bekaa Valley constituted Hizballah’s core constituency and basis of support and recruitment. 
Linking promises of Shia empowerment in Lebanese politics and material assistance to impover-
ished families to fierce resistance against the Israeli occupation served as a catalyst for recruit-
ment among Shia Muslims also in Southern Lebanon.40 Throughout the 1990s, Hizballah also es-
tablished an international network of societal support among Lebanese Shia expatriate communi-
ties, particularly in Western Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South as well as North America.41  
Initially, Lebanon’s deep societal fragmentation and suspicions of Iranian and Syrian interference 
limited Hizballah’s appeal to other communities. After 1989, however, Hizballah gradually por-
trayed itself as ideologically flexible and a genuine national party, making amends with the secu-
lar, liberal, and multi-denominational state, and attracted additional support from inside and out-
side of Lebanon.42 In 1997, Hizballah was even able to form a new unit of fighters from non-Shia 
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communities in Lebanon.43 Three years later, societal support for Hizballah reached a climax 
with the Israeli withdrawal on May 24, which Hasan Nasrallah declared a “day of victory for all 
Lebanese.”44 Internationally, a wave of admiration on the Arab Street and UN General Secretary 
Kofi Annan’s decision to meet Nasrallah in Lebanon frustrated Israeli and U.S. efforts to reach 
international condemnation and isolation of Hizballah.45 
Nevertheless, the intra-sectarian, national, and international consensus on Hizballah’s exception-
al position eroded in the post-withdrawal period. First, Hizballah failed to deliver on its promise 
to improve the position of their Shia kin inside Lebanon and faced new competitors in the Shia 
realm.46 Second, the absence of broad international support for an Israeli withdrawal from the 
Shab’a Farms encouraged those in- and outside Lebanon calling for disarmament of Hizballah, 
as resistance was no longer necessary.47 Third, increasing sectarian tensions after the 2003 Iraq 
War exacerbated Hizballah’s ability to maintain its cross-sectarian profile.48 Eventually, the do-
mestic and regional balance shifted against the group after the assassination of former Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri on February 14, 2005, and the July 2006 War. Although fighting 
Israel to a stalemate was a major military success, several constituencies in Lebanon refused to 
pay the price for the escalation. Only after a major reconstruction and propaganda campaign and 
the revitalization of cross-sectarian alignments, Hizballah was able to partially rebuild its nation-
alist credentials and mobilize non-Shia supporters against international pressure for disarma-
ment.49 
Internationally, Iran had been a key and constant source of support for Hizballah ever since the 
group’s formation, providing it generously with arms, money, training, and endorsing it among 
both the Lebanese Shia and Tehran’s allies in Damascus and Moscow. Throughout the observa-
tion period, Iran’s commitment was only moderately reduced and temporarily subordinated to 
Tehran’s efforts to attract Western support for its economic recovery from the Iran-Iraq war.50 
7.1.2.3 Cohesion of command 
As in the cases of Fatah/PLO and the PKK, EAC data attests Hizbollah a clear central com-
mand yet only moderate control over its constituencies.51 Hence, the following section will con-
                                                       
43 The Saraya Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya (Lebanese Resistance Brigades) launched its first attacks in March 1998, 
commemorating Israel’s invasion into Lebanon in 1978. Blanford, Warriors of God: 101,197,212. 
44 Ibid., 281f. 
45 "Annan meets guerrilla chief."  BBC (2000). Published electronically June 20. http://bbc.in/1fmpfSW. Accessed 
January 31, 2014; Zisser, "Hizballah," 96; Hinnebusch, The international politics of the Middle East: 60,237. 
46 Zisser, "Hizballah," 97f; Norton, Hezbollah. A Short History: 101. 
47 Zisser, "Hizballah," 98; Blanford, Warriors of God: 303f. 
48 Norton, Hezbollah. A Short History: 121ff. 
49 The Lebanese War 2006 had caused an economic damage of some $15 billion. See Blanford, Warriors of God: 
412f.,439f. 
50 On Iranian support for Hizballah, see also Ranstorp, "Hizbollah's Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision-
Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions."; Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: chapter 
6; Kirchner, Allianz mit dem Terror; Blanford, Warriors of God: 93f. 
51 Cunningham et al. 4. 
Nature of the sponsorship dilemma 
 196 
secutively turn to Hizballah’s internal structure and competitors in the realm of Lebanese re-
sistance against Israel. 
Since its establishment, Hizballah’s collective leadership was highly cohesive.52 Furthermore, the 
leadership institutionalized a key decision-making council (Majlis al-Shura) and the position of 
General Secretary by 1989. These formal institutions as well as corresponding sub-committees 
and local councils allowed the political leadership to exert control over the military wing.53 Nev-
ertheless, the changed political situation in Lebanon after the end of the civil war exacerbated in-
ternal frictions between hardliners rejecting any cooperation with the Lebanese state and pragma-
tists opting for political integration. Backed by Iran and Syria, the latter group prevailed over the 
first and Hasan Nasrallah took over the post of General Secretary from Suhbi al-Tufayli in 
1992.54 In the following years, fluctuation in the leadership structure was limited and stemmed 
seldom from internal friction.55 In what observers consider the biggest internal discord so far, al-
Tufayli founded the “Revolution of the Hungry” in 1997, a group criticizing Hizballah for ne-
glecting its Shia kin, and openly challenging it at the ballot box the next year.56 However, alt-
hough Nasrallah’s prominent position in the party steadily increased–manifested by his reelection 
for life in July 2001–open rivalry did not break out.57 
Regarding command over its constituencies, Hizballah largely benefitted from two developments. 
First, the vacuum created by the PLO’s departure from Lebanon in 1982 allowed for the emer-
gence of a substitute, Lebanese resistance against Israel.58 Deprived of a political leadership and 
the option to resettle in the Galilee after the 1993 Oslo Accords, Lebanon’s 300,000 Palestinian 
residents became a factor merely in domestic affairs and no competitor to Hizballah as a champi-
on of Lebanese resistance against Israel emerged from them.59 
Second, Hizballah became the strongest force in the Shia realm by the mid-1990s as the acquies-
cence of Amal, the then leading representative of the Shia community, to the Israeli occupation 
served as a catalyst for defections to radical and resolute resistance.60 While direct infighting in 
the late 1980s ended in a military standoff, Hizballah’s status as legitimate resistance against Isra-
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el shifted the intra-Shia political balance in the early 1990s.61 However, Amal continued to be a 
key force especially in the formal institutions of the state and in the South, thereby constituting an 
ongoing impediment for outright Hizballah dominance in Shia affairs.62 
7.1.2.4 Ability to escape or resist retaliation 
After IDF’s partial withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985, Israeli land and air forces have repeatedly 
retaliated against Hizballah, mainly resorting to three strategies. First, decapitation measures, 
such as the assassination of al-Musawi in 1992, second, targeted air strikes against Hizballah po-
sitions in the Bekaa Valley and southern Beirut, and third, major military operations in 1993, 
1996, and 2006, intending to set the local population against Hizballah and pressure the Lebanese 
government to reign in the group.63 Hence, the following section examines whether and under 
what conditions Hizballah was able to escape or even resist these retaliatory strikes.  
As al-Musawi’s assassination and several abductions of lower ranking commanders reveal, Hiz-
ballah was not able to escape decapitation. However, its attack on the Israeli embassy in Buenos 
Aires in 1992 demonstrated a capacity of global retaliation and created an effective deterrent. In 
the following years, Israel did not cease targeted killings of Hizballah members but refrained from 
attacking senior leaders.64  
On a similar note, IAF exposed Hizballah’s vulnerability to targeted retaliation in June 1994, 
when jets and helicopter gunships shot and killed over 40 recruits sleeping in tents and huts in the 
Ain Dardara Camp located in the eastern Bekaa Valley, assuming that the mere presence of Hiz-
ballah’s and Syrian air defense systems would deter Israel from attacking.65 In addition to another 
act of global retaliation, the AMIA bombing, Hizballah adapted to its structural vulnerability to 
air strikes by moving to the more wooded western flanks of the Bekaa and adjusting its training 
methods to a more flexible structure.66 Hence, when IAF bombed inter alia two Hizballah build-
ings in southern Beirut and a weapons depot in the Bekaa Valley in 1996, the group lost a signifi-
cantly smaller number of fighters than in the course of a similar operation in 1993 and damage to 
decisive organizational infrastructure was limited.67  
Throughout the observation period, Hizballah developed remarkable technological and intelli-
gence capabilities to thwart IDF retaliation efforts. By 1997, the group was, for instance, able to 
infiltrate SLA and thus detect IDF/SLA cooperation, and to intercept Israeli UAV video trans-
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missions, thereby undermining Israeli attempts to emulate Hizballah’s guerilla tactics. Finally, 
Hizballah gained the military capacity to destroy Israeli Merkava tanks with AT-4 Spigot anti-
tank missiles.68 This increasing capacity to resist retaliation reflected in the narrowing of the fatal-
ity ratio between IDF (and SLA) and Hizballah personnel. While in 1990, Hizballah casualties 
were five times higher than those of Israel and its Lebanese ally, the ratio rapidly sank to 2:1 in 
1991, and settled down at a stable level of about 1.5:1 until the Israeli withdrawal in 2000.69 
In contrast to both Fatah and PKK, Hizballah successfully established a ‘balance of terror’, ena-
bling it to even deter Israeli retaliation. In July 1993, for instance, Hizballah responded to IAF 
strikes by firing hundreds of rockets into Israel, raising skepticism inside Israel over the opera-
tion’s effectiveness.70 In response to IAF strikes on Beirut, villages in the South of Sidon, and 
power plants, in April 1996, Hizballah fired more than 24 Katyushas on a single day into Israel, 
pressuring the government into a formal agreement.71 As Hizballah carefully paid attention to re-
frain from disproportional retaliation, it effectively constrained Israel’s leeway of retribution and 
shifted, according to some observers, even the direction of deterrence.72  
After 2000, Hizballah expanded intelligence gathering to northern Israel and established a vast 
bunker-and-tunnel system in southern Lebanon.73 While the tunnel system strengthened Hizbal-
lah’s defensive posture in the event of a ground invasion, its secretive character reduced the risk 
of targeted raids and retained an important element of surprise.74 By 2004, Hizballah had also es-
tablished a heavily secured command and control center in southern Beirut as well as a system of 
safety locations.75 Hizballah’s deterrence capacity temporarily collapsed in July 2006, when Israel 
escalated the conflict, bombing the group’s strongholds in south Beirut. Nevertheless, the safety 
points ensured that propaganda and military operations continued virtually without interruption, 
enabling Hizballah to prevent IDF victories on the ground and pressure Israel into a cease-fire by 
steadily increasing the number and range of rockets fired into Israel.76  
Conclusion 
The neorealist hypotheses N2 (standing firm) and N3 (restraining) suggested that if Hizballah was 
capable of filling Syria’s need for assistance in balancing the common rival, fears of alliance en-
trapment are less pressing. Hizballah’s strength in all four STAR-dimensions (See 3.3.1) in-
creased throughout the observation period, reaching an estimated overall peak in the years lead-
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ing to and the aftermath of Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon. Hence, although the group lacked 
sufficient material capacity to defeat the IDF in a conventional battle or deter it persistently from 
retaliating, it’s ‘balance of terror’ produced remarkable policy gains until Israel’s withdrawal. 
Apart from Syria’s military presence in Lebanon as a potential deterrent, Hizballah’s ability to 
escape retaliation was limited by the lack of areas of retreat outside of Lebanon. However, by ad-
justing to this vulnerability, Hizballah was not only able to evade and resist retaliatory strikes but 
also to at least temporarily deter them. 
Despite the fact that the general tendency towards entrapment risks, which is inherent to sponsor-
ship of terrorism, is expected to be substantially less strong in the second half of the 1990s, the Is-
raeli withdrawal, 9/11, and regional polarization gradually weakened Hizballah’s domestic and 
international reputation as a legitimate, national resistance. As in the early 1990s, when support-
ing Islamist and rejectionist Hizballah stood in contrast to a sincere commitment to the Peace 
Process, supporting the group in times of the waging war on terror entailed an increased risk of en-
trapment. 
7.1.3 Severity of conflict 
One assumption derived from the explanatory model is that states give a priority to preventing 
their allies from abandonment policies if both interstate conflict and the probability of war with 
their adversary are high. Although formally at war since 1948, bilateral relations between Israel 
and Syria were subject to substantial variation between 1989 and 2006, which this section will 
examine as follows. 
Since Israel’s invasion into Lebanon in 1982 and subsequent clashes, no large-scale military con-
frontations have occurred between both states. Nevertheless, relations remained conflictual 
throughout the observation period, mostly as territorial revisionism persisted because of Syria’s 
inability to regain the Golan Heights by conventional military means and Hafiz al-Asad’s ongo-
ing perception of Israel as an aggressive and expansive entity.77 Between 1992 and 1996, however, 
bilateral relations experienced a moderate thaw in the context of the Peace Talks in general and 
negotiations over an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan in particular.78 
The conflict worsened in February 1996, when Israel suspended all land-for-peace talks in re-
sponse to a series of deadly terrorist attacks and the Syrian government reportedly encouraged 
Hizballah violence in south Lebanon in order to remind Israel that its security would require a 
full withdrawal.79 Tensions further increased in May 1996, as the new Israeli prime minister, Ben-
jamin Netanyahu, refused to proceed with negotiations from where they had come to a halt and 
Syrian officials revived their hostile rhetoric. President Asad and Chief of Staff Shihabi de-
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nounced Israel as an aggressor and thief, threatening that it would pay a heavy price for any ag-
gression against Syria.80 Negotiations resumed in 1998, yet collapsed in early 2000 inter alia after 
Netanyahu’s successor Ehud Barak had linked their future to Syria reining in Hizballah’s opera-
tions in south Lebanon.81  
The importance of Lebanon as a factor in the conflict between Syria and Israel reflected in the 
fact that between 1989 and 2001, the MID dataset lists violent conflict incidents between the ad-
versaries only in the context of the Lebanese-Israeli conflict.82  
In 1993, for instance, Israeli air raids killed up to six Syrian soldiers in the Bekaa Valley and Isra-
el’s envoy to the Peace Talks, Itamar Rabinovich, warned Syria that retaliation for Hizballah at-
tacks would not necessarily be limited to the group itself.83 Although Israeli officials denied in ret-
rospective to have directly targeted Syrian forces in the course of Operation “Grapes of Wrath” in 
April 1996, IAF jets hit a Syrian aircraft position in Beirut, killing one soldier and injuring several 
others.84 In addition, Netanyahu repeatedly emphasized Syria’s destructive role in Lebanon and 
aimed at isolating Damascus through a separate agreement with Beirut, while calls for military 
sanctions against Syria mounted in the security military-complex.85 In response to a warning by 
Israeli officials in August 1996, that further cross-border escalation by Hizballah would elicit re-
taliatory measures, Syria redeployed parts of its 14th Special Forces Division from Beirut to the 
Bekaa Valley.86 
 
Government transition in both countries in 2000 and the outbreak of the Second Intifadah in the 
Occupied Territories also affected bilateral relations after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. 
Syria’s new president Bashar al-Asad, for instance, repeatedly and publicly rejected the legitima-
cy of Israel’s existence, denouncing it as an abnormal “colonialist-settlement entity.”87 Israel, in 
return, shifted the target of retaliation for Hizballah attacks to Syria’s military outposts in Leba-
non. On April 15, 2001, for instance, IAF fighter planes destroyed a Syrian radar station in the 
Dahr al-Baydar area of Mount Lebanon, killing four soldiers in the first targeted attack on Syrian 
positions since 1982.88 Israel’s Foreign Minister Shimon Peres justified the attack, arguing that as 
long as Syrian military presence and hegemony in Lebanon persisted, it bore responsibility for at-
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tacks in and beyond the border area.89 Defence Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer called the attack a 
signal for Syria that “the rules of the game have changed.”90 Although Syrian officials announced 
to hold Israel responsible for the attack, Damascus refrained from military action.91  
As Hizballah attacks continued, an Israeli air-to-surface missile destroyed another Syrian radar 
station in the Bekaa Valley on July 1, wounding three soldiers. Again, Syria limited retaliation to 
a warning by foreign minister Faruq al-Shar’ that "Israel will be held responsible for the conse-
quences of any further retaliation on the entire region, world security and peace."92 
Driven somewhat into a corner by Israel’s diplomatic success in linking the U.S. War on Terror af-
ter 2001 to its own non-state competitors, Asad escalated his rhetoric against Israel and declared, 
for instance, in March 2003 that its existence itself was perceived as a threat.93 Simultaneously, 
Israel pressured Syria both militarily and diplomatically to reign in its non-state allies in Lebanon 
and the Occupied Territories. In August, for instance, IAF jets overflew the presidential palace in 
Latakia and carried out an airstrike against a PFLP camp northwest of Damascus, the first on 
Syrian territory since 1973, on October 5.94 Shortly after, Israel’s Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
denounced Damascus for tolerating mass transfers of Iranian rockets to Hizballah and the 
group’s unhindered presence in south Lebanon.95  
In the following years, both sides chose a more moderate approach to the conflict and officials 
advocated a resumption of the Peace Process. Although both parties failed to reach a formal 
agreement, they displayed a clear preference for maintaining the status quo.96  
In a final round of rhetorical escalation, Asad rejected the continuation of peace talks in January 
2006 and accused Israel of attempting to reshape the region. In response, Israel’s Ambassador to 
the UN, Dan Gillerman, called Syria part of a “new axis of evil and terror.”97 When violence es-
calated between Hizballah and Israel in July 2006, Israeli officials vowed to hold Syria responsi-
ble, as the group was "merely the finger on the blood-stained and long-reaching arms of Syria and 
Iran."98 In response, Asad called on the Syrian armed forces to prepare for military confronta-
tion.99 In the course of fighting, however, Israeli officials such as Defense Minister Amir Peretz, 
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repeatedly reiterated another message; they had no intention of drawing Syria into their war with 
Hizballah.100 
Although territorial revisionism and conflict remained significant features of bilateral relations, 
the probability of interstate war was comparatively low in the post-Cold War era. On the one 
hand, this assessment points toward a priority of entrapment risks in Syria’s alignment with Hiz-
ballah, as the neorealist restraining hypothesis N3 suggested. According to the standing firm hy-
pothesis N2, on the other, incentives for a policy of resolve are expected to have occurred during 
conflicting times, such as Netanyahu’s first term as prime minister or during Israel’s political-
military initiative to hold Syria responsible for attacks by Palestinian groups and Hizballah (2000-
03). Despite diplomatic deadlock and rhetorical hostility, the conflict decreased to a non-violent 
level after 2003 and again strengthened incentives for a policy of restraint. 
7.1.4 Availability of allies 
 “No single Arab country can establish a balance of power, however limited, with Israel.”101 
Bashar al-Asad, June 2003 
As maintained in section 5.1.4 and 6.1.4, the lack of reliable interstate allies, a factor increasing 
abandonment fears, had been a structural deficit of Syrian foreign policy.102 Hence, the following 
section examines whether Syria has been able to form interstate alignments and alliances against 
Israel after the Cold War. 
In 1991, Syria’s most important formal alliance, the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with the 
USSR, collapsed and a rapprochement was impeded in the following years by disputes over Syri-
an debts, Moscow’s dependence on Washington, and its efforts to improve bilateral ties with Is-
rael.103 Relations steadily improved between 1996 and 2001, entailing major arms deals and 
agreements on foreign aid.104 In November 2002, however, Moscow’s commitment reached an 
all-time low when it abandoned plans to sell advanced SA-8 surface-to-air missiles to Syria.105 As 
indicated already in section 6.1.4, Moscow’s changing commitment compelled Syria to reach out 
for alternative allies, such as the pro-Western Arab States as well as their Iranian and Iraqi ri-
vals.106 In order to overcome regional isolation, Syria reestablished full diplomatic relations with 
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Egypt in 1989, signed the Damascus Declaration, calling for security cooperation with the Gulf 
Monarchies and Egypt in 1990, and joined the US-led alliance against Iraq the same year.107  
However, Syria was not able to divert resources stemming from these alliance patterns directly to 
its conflict with Israel for several reasons.108 First, Cairo confined its assistance of Syria against 
Israel to diplomatic backing.109 Second, heavy Iranian pressure on Syria undermined multilateral 
strategic and military cooperation with the Gulf States.110 Third, both the respective peace treaties, 
which Egypt (1979), the PLO (1993), and Jordan (1994) had signed with Israel, and bilateral ten-
sions, particularly after 1996, impeded joint military cooperation against Israel, frustrating Syrian 
hopes for a united Arab front in negotiations.111 After siding with the anti-Iraq coalition had de-
prived Syria of a potential ally against Israel, relations with Bagdad improved in the second half 
of the 1990s. However, although reports indicated plans to improve bilateral strategic cooperation, 
including military equipment sales, they focused mostly on economic cooperation.112 Although 
relations improved by the end of the decade, Syria’s inter-Arab alignments displayed little resolve 
vis-à-vis Israel. In contrast, the 2002 Saudi-sponsored Arab Peace Initiative threatened to override 
Syrian security interests.113 The post-Cold War axis of Damascus, Cairo, and Riyadh eventually 
collapsed with the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri and disagreement over the Second Lebanon 
War reinforced inter-Arab tensions in 2006.114  
Despite its domestic fragility, Lebanon became a key Syrian ally in the Arab arena after both 
countries signed a Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination on May 22, 1991. The 
agreement de facto legitimized the deployment of Syrian troops in Lebanon and obliged the latter 
to not becoming “a transit point or base for any force state or organization that seeks to under-
mine its security or that of Syria.”115 Although Lebanon appeared to be rather helpless regarding 
Israeli strikes on Syrian positions and opposition to Syria’s military presence increased after 2000, 
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Beirut provided Damascus with a buffer zone for Israeli operations against Syria on its vulnerable 
southwestern flank.116  
Since 1980, Syria and Iran maintained an informal and defensive alignment, aimed at neutraliz-
ing the increasing offensive capabilities of Iraq and Israel.117 In 1991, Tehran and Damascus fur-
ther deepened and institutionalized their relations by establishing a Joint Higher Syrian-Iranian 
Cooperation Committee as well as joint programs to produce ballistic surface-to-surface- and 
Scud-missiles.118 Relations soured when Syria improved its ties to the Gulf States and entered in-
to peace talks with Israel, which Iran strongly opposed.119 Hence, when a breakthrough between 
Israel and Syria seemed attainable in mid-1995, Iranian foreign minister Velayati warned Syria 
that “the more a country gets close to the usurper regime [Israel], the more it will distance itself 
from us.”120  
Against the background of the collapse of negotiations and the Israeli-Turkish security agreement 
of 1996, relations quickly improved. In this context, Iranian officials even pledged to come to 
Syria’s aid in the case of an attack and after two subsequent visits of Asad to Tehran in 1997, mu-
tual visits of high-ranking officials took place repeatedly in the following four years.121 Although 
diverging opinions on U.S. policy in the region since late 2001 initially weakened the alignment, 
the rapid deterioration of both parties’ relations with Washington paved the way for increased 
cooperation after 2003.122 Subsequently, both countries signed and ratified a Joint Strategic Cooper-
ation Accord in November 2005 and established two joint signal intelligence installations in 
northwestern Syria and in the Golan Heights.123 Reportedly, Iran also provided financial assis-
tance to Syria’s acquisition of Russian air defense systems and delivered military equipment di-
rectly to Syria.124 The alliance reached a peak in formality and publicity on June 15, 2006, when 
Iran’s Defense Minister Mostafa Najjar, and his Syrian counterpart Hasan Turkmani announced 
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to have signed a military cooperation agreement „against Israel's threats."125 Despite vagueness 
over specific military components of the agreement, Najjar signaled a strong commitment, declar-
ing that Iran "considers Syria's security its own security, and we consider our defense capabilities 
to be those of Syria."126 Accordingly, during the July 2006 War, Iran’s president Mahmoud Ah-
madinejad threatened to perceive an attack on Syria as an “equivalent to an attack on the whole 
Islamic world.”127 However, other high-ranking officials quickly denounced reports of an Iranian 
intervention as baseless rumors and reported that Tehran would “never militarily” participate in 
this conflict.128 
Throughout the observation period, Syria failed to establish a Pan-Arab alliance against Israel as 
the moderates’ pro-Western stance and bilateral peace agreements impeded an Arab commitment 
to Syria’s territorial revisionism and threat perception. These limitations on cooperation, and Syr-
ia’s increasing isolation in the Arab World–especially against the background of growing sectari-
anism after 2003–induced fears of abandonment. While the steady formalization and deepening 
of Syria’s alliance with Iran after 1996 alleviated such fears, Iran’s support for Hizballah (See 
7.1.2.2) assumedly limited Syrian leeway for a policy of restraint. 
7.1.5 Strategic interest in upholding the alignment 
A final component of the sponsorship dilemma, which induces abandonment fears, is the spon-
sor’s strategic interest in upholding the alignment. According to Snyder, such an interest is pre-
sent, if the alliance prevents others from accessing resources deemed as important, for instance in 
order to secure domestic power capacities or scarce economic goods.129  
Intertwined with the alignment has been Syria’s strategic aim of maintaining control over Leba-
non, which covers the entire western flank of southern Syria and borders the key regions of cen-
tral Homs and Damascus.130 Besides geographical proximity, it were historical linkages, transna-
tional ties, and territorial revisionism in the context of ‘Greater Syria’ that made Lebanon also an 
influential factor in Syrian domestic politics.131 In addition, dominance over Lebanon served as 
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an economic lifeline and a major source of revenue to Syria.132 On the one hand, it enabled Syri-
an officials to increase their personal wealth, also by means of illicit business.133 Especially after a 
respective agreement in 1991, it enabled, on the other, the flow of hundreds of thousands of Syri-
an workers to Lebanon, sending billions in remittances to their families.134 
Manifested by the 1989 Ta’if Agreement that ended the Lebanese Civil War and formal bilateral 
agreements, Syria institutionalized its de facto overlordship in Lebanon by late 1991, especially re-
garding foreign relations, defense, and national security.135 Especially tacit U.S. approval of a 
‘pax Syriana’ limiting Iran’s influence and constraining Hizballah operations against Israel, bol-
stered international recognition of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon in the first half of the 1990s.136 In 
this context, Syria’s dependence on previous informal alignments with sub state entities in Leba-
non, declined substantially.137 Syrian patronage over Lebanon peaked in April 1996, when Asad 
negotiated an agreement with Israel on behalf of both Lebanon and Hizballah, whose representa-
tives were not invited to high-level meetings, yet only consulted by al-Shar’.138 
Inside Lebanon, Syria built its hegemony first on its own military and intelligence apparatus and 
second on the Lebanese security forces, infiltrated by Damascus loyalists. After 1991, Hizballah 
served also as a social pacifier and a tool for mobilizing Shia acceptance of Syrian dominance 
over Lebanon.139 Subsequently, the alignment’s strategic importance rose to a moderate level be-
tween 1992 and 1998, as Damascus successfully balanced both Rafiq al-Hariri’s government and 
Hizballah against each other.140  
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In 2000, power transition in Syria and Israel’s withdrawal entailed the erosion of societal consen-
sus on Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, serving as an ambivalent catalyst for Syria’s strategic inter-
est in its alignment with Hizballah.141 First, Hizballah’s attacks on IDF positions in the Shab’a 
Farms underlined Syria’s claim that Israel had not completely withdrawn from Lebanon, intend-
ing to justify the ongoing presence of Syrian forces. Second, the group gained importance as a 
part of Syrian efforts to balance an emerging and increasingly assertive Sunni-Christian-Druze 
counter alliance to Bashar al-Asad’s patronage of personal loyalists in the Lebanese security ap-
paratus.142 In contrast, the alignment became a major international point of contention between 
Damascus and Washington after the 9/11 attacks, hurting Syria’s reputation as a regional pacifi-
er, and indirectly paving the way for international backing of the anti-Syria coalition inside Leba-
non.143 
Hizballah’s strategic importance for Syria in the Lebanese realm skyrocketed in late 2004, when 
Damascus failed to silence Sunni-Christian-Druze demands for a complete withdrawal of Syrian 
troops through its own, traditional, channels of influence.144 Subsequently, Syria relied on Hizbal-
lah as a Lebanese nationalist mouthpiece denouncing UNSCR 1559 as an “international diktat 
with no Lebanese or Arab legitimacy,”145 an interfaith interlocutor appeasing particularly Druze 
opposition, and a tool of mobilizing societal support for Syria’s presence in Lebanon.146 Although 
appeasing the opposition failed particularly after the assassination of Hariri, on February 14, 
2005, Hizballah was able to gather some 500,000 people in central Beirut in a solidarity rally on 
March 8, 2005.147  
Given the collapse of the first two pillars of Syrian control over Lebanon in 2005, Hizballah 
gained a decisive role in fulfilling Asad’s prophecy that “Syria's power and its role in Lebanon do 
not depend on its presence in Lebanon.”148 Since joining the government in July 2005, the group 
has become the main protector of Syria’s interests in security and economically sensitive as-
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pects.149 In addition, Hizballah successfully weakened forces hostile to Syria in early 2006 by 
aligning with former prime minister and Maronite leader Michel Aoun.150 Eventually, the out-
break of the July 2006 War reminded the international community not only of Syria’s enduring 
ability to harass Israel but also of its value as a regional pacifier.151 
Particularly in the early 1990s, Hizballah’s reputation as a Pan-Arab source of admiration among 
the Palestinian and Syrian public created additional interests among Syria’s political leaders. On 
the one hand, the group supported their criticism of bilateral peace schemes of Egypt, Jordan, 
and the PLO as a selfish betrayal of Arab unity.152 By refraining, on the other hand, from criticiz-
ing Damascus for its own participation in the peace talks, Hizballah shielded Syria’s reputation of 
steadfastness, a crucial part of regime legitimacy.153 In October 1990, for instance, General Secre-
tary Tufayli publicly praised Asad as a “big brother to all men of resistance.”154 His successor, 
Hasan Nasrallah singled out Syria as one of the few countries strongly supporting the right to 
self-defense and struggle for liberation, in August 1993.155 Emphasizing the Arab credentials of 
the Alawi leaders and bolstering their central role, Syria’s commitment to the group also reflected 
positively in domestic politics.156 This was particularly the case in the context of bilateral negotia-
tions with Israel over the return of the Golan Heights, occupied by Israel since 1967. 
Strong feelings of territorial revisionism among the Syrian population, embodied by the some 
130,000 former inhabitants of the area and their descendants, making up for about 500,000 peo-
ple, severely constrained Asad’s leeway in negotiations.157 Given Syria’s failure to achieve com-
plete Israeli withdrawal through either military force or negotiations, the government’s commit-
ment to Hizballah gained importance as a tool to appease revisionism by signaling that Syria’s 
leaders were “not asleep” regarding the Golan.158 Both threads of strategic interests coincided in 
the context of Syria’s losing grip on Lebanon since 2000. Already in his inauguration speech, Ba-
shar al-Asad aimed to divert frustration over Syria’s inability to regain the Golan Heights by re-
ferring to the Lebanese example and praised steadfastness as “the guarantee that our land will be 
liberated.”159 Furthermore, he highlighted the decisive role of Syrian assistance, depicting those in 
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Lebanon who demanded a separation of ways after the Israeli withdrawal as ungrateful.160 Simul-
taneously, the government seized the opportunity to exploit Nasrallah’s increased popularity and 
plastered Damascus with posters featuring him, the late, and the current president, again empha-
sizing Syria’s contribution to Hizballah’s success.161 
Eventually, the 2006 War resulted in the celebration of Nasrallah as a great Arab hero in mass 
solidarity demonstrations in Cairo, Amman, and Damascus, signaling the group’s potential to 
overcome sectarian divisions.162 Along similar lines as in the early 1990s, Hizballah’s regional 
reputation of steadfastness allowed Asad to expose the moderate Arab leaders as “half men” and 
legitimize Syria’s reluctance towards a negotiated settlement as steadfastness instead of a “half 
solution.”163  
7.1.6 Conclusion 
As this section initially indicated, the nature of the SSD in Syria’s alignment with Hizballah 
against Israel was subject to moderate though significant fluctuations in the external security de-
velopment of both allies. Which general incentives for balancing (N1) and specific alliance man-
agement strategies between standing firm (N2) and restraining the ally (N3) can be deducted from 
the single indicators investigated in 7.1.1 - 7.1.5? 
The first hypothesis (N1) asserts that the greater Israel’s power capabilities, the stronger is the in-
centive for Syria to balance against it. Section 7.1.1 concluded that there had been a manifest and 
clear imbalance of power in favor of Israel, not only based on its conventional military superiori-
ty but also the favorable outcome of peace talks with the moderate Arab states. More precisely, 
pressure to adjust to this imbalance has assumedly been less strong in the context of the Gulf War 
and considerably higher since the late 1990s. Although one cannot deduct a specific adjustment 
strategy from the distribution of international power by itself, an assessment of both the severity 
of interstate conflict (7.1.3) and the availability of alternative allies (7.1.4) provide information on 
expected policy choices.  
Although territorial revisionism over the Golan Heights and–to a lesser extent southern Leba-
non–remained dominant in bilateral relations, direct interstate conflict remained mostly non-
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violent, thereby easing balancing pressure. While tensions were remarkably low between 1992 
and 1996, repeated retaliatory strikes against Syrian positions in Lebanon and even inside Syria 
increased the risk of conflict escalation after 2001. Besides general incentives for balancing, the 
question remains, which strategies have been employed. While the substantial gap between Israel 
and Syria’s achievements in military build-ups indicates a limited internal balancing strategy (and 
even a turning away from the former goal of strategic parity), it implies a preference for alliance 
formation.  
However, Syria was unable to form reliable interstate alliances against Israel in the first half of 
the 1990s, yet improved its ties to Iran after the collapse of the peace process. Hence, Israel’s ma-
terial superiority, Syria’s inability to formalize its alliance with Iran until 2005/06, ongoing Syri-
an territorial revisionism over the Golan Heights and increased Israeli policy revisionism over 
Syria’s support for Hizballah after 1996 expectedly created incentives for continued Syrian spon-
sorship for Hizballah after the end of the Cold War. In addition, section 7.2 will examine domes-
tic pressures to align with the group. 
Both neorealist hypotheses on alliance management turn to the SSD as the independent variable 
inducing specific alliance policies, ranging from standing firm against the adversary (N2) to restrain-
ing the ally (N3). Table 14 concludes the findings of 7.1.1 - 7.1.5 as follows. 
Table 14: Nature of the sponsorship dilemma III: Syria-Hizballah 
Indicator Observation Induces a general fear of 
IMBALANCE OF POWER High in favor of Israel Abandonment 
CAPACITY OF THE ALLY Insufficient to fill Syria’s need for assis-
tance, increasing strength after 1991, peak-
ing in 1998-2001 
Entrapment (moderate) 
SEVERITY OF CONFLICT Low in the first half of the 1990s, increas-
ing after 1996 and 2001 respectively 
Entrapment/Abandonment  
ALTERNATIVE ALLIES Not available/Available in 2006 
 
Abandonment/Entrapment 
STRATEGIC INCENTIVES High 
Alliance ensures influence over Lebanon and 
domestic resources of regime legitimacy (espe-
cially after 2000) 
Abandonment 
 
As outlined, Syria’s security environment changed considerably in the observation period. As re-
flected by N3, the SSD induced a policy of restraint especially during the first half of the 1990s. 
Regarding the contention of the standing firm hypothesis N2, it is noteworthy that incentives for 
policies of resolve and high commitment increased after the Israeli withdrawal. Additionally, 
Hizballah’s increasing strength and its growing prominence in Damascus’ efforts to maintain 
control over Lebanon is likely to have reinforced this trend throughout the 1990s. 
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However, several factors at times alleviated the impact of this trend reversal. First, revisionism 
and the strategic importance of the alignment both in the Lebanese realm and with regard to Syr-
ia’s commitment to steadfastness reduced incentives to restrain Hizballah before 2000. Second, 
international criticism of the alignment as state-sponsored terrorism after 2000/2001 severed Syr-
ia’s standing in Lebanon and the international community, thereby making the emergence of in-
creased entrapment fears among Syrian foreign policy decision makers plausible.  
Having laid out the incentives stemming from the SSD, the following section will now turn to 
Syria’s domestic politics 1989-2006 in order to examine the antecedent condition ‘regime vulner-
ability/autonomy.’ 
7.2 Domestic politics: Power transition and external shocks  
The contention that domestic politics in general and foreign policy autonomy in particular serve 
as an antecedent condition for Syria’s adjustment policies is reflected in the hypotheses suggest-
ing alliance seeking (NC1), sponsorship (NC2), and the emergence of hybrid sponsorship policies 
(limited resolve, NC3/limited restraint, NC4).  
After the Cold War, the end of bipolarity and the peace process made a united Arab military 
front de facto unattainable and limited Syria’s external balancing options until the emergence of a 
formal military alliance with Iran in the mid-2000s (see 7.1.4). Thus, one might expect a tendency 
towards internal balancing and military build-up, particularly before and after the 1992-96 nego-
tiation phase. Instead, COW data and Figure 36 illustrate Syria’s efforts of internal balancing 
through armament in the observation period and indicate a downside trend since 1993 rather 
than a proportionate reflection of the continuously increasing Israeli military expenditure.  
Already in the late 1980s, the USSR had shown a growing unwillingness to maintain its com-
mitment to Asad’s strategy of conventional parity with Israel. This development drastically lim-
ited Syria’s domestic resources available for internal balancing–alleviated only briefly by the in-
flux of $5 billion in aid from the Gulf States in 1991. Additionally, data indicates that Syria re-
duced its military personnel from 408,000 to 320,000 in 1993/94 even before an agreement with 
Israel became attainable, despite a slight increase between 1999 and 2001 (Figure 37). As in-
creased internal balancing efforts in the early 1990s and to a lesser extent at the end of the century 
were intertwined with improved ties to the Arab moderate states and Russia transferring money 
and arms to Syria, one might find it difficult to clearly distinguish between internal balancing 
from the internally felt outcome of external balancing. As suggested by the neoclassical realist al-
liance seeking hypothesis NC1, particularly cuts in military expenditure and personnel point to a 
tendency for resource-conserving external balancing, either due to Syria’s lack in economic ca-
pacity to mobilize sufficient resources on its own or a deliberate policy choice no to do so. 
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Figure 36: Military expenditure of Syria and Israel (1989 - 2006) 
 
Figure 37: Internal balancing efforts of Syria: Military personnel (1989-2006) 
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Regarding the question whether Syria chose external alignment over internal balancing (NC1) 
and state sponsorship of terrorism as a specific form of the latter (NC2), domestic vulnerability 
expectedly plays a role as an explanatory factor. This applies to both the observed reverse trend in 
internal balancing and the choice of sponsorship in order to compensate lacking mobilization re-
sources amid unfavorable alliance options. Hence, the following section addresses both the level 
of regime legitimacy and coercive domestic power between 1989 and 2006. 
7.2.1 The heir apparent 
Although neither high levels of political violence nor open intra-regime rivalry occurred after the 
end of the Cold War, it posed a twofold challenge to regime legitimacy in Syria, depriving the 
leadership of key external backers, trade partners, and its ideological alliance system. 
Regarding the economic power base, a moderate recovery at least temporarily alleviated pressure 
for liberalization in the early 1990s, due to incoming aid from the Gulf States, continuing trade 
with the Eastern Bloc, and Syria’s new supplementary labor market in Lebanon.164 Nevertheless, 
measures of economic liberalization accelerated the rise of the Sunni bourgeoisie to the regime’s 
orbit (see section 6.2.2) since the late 1980s.165 As their influence increased through respective 
governmental committees and a merchant and industrialists bloc in the parliament, calls for Syr-
ia’s integration into the global economy and a moderate stance towards the West emerged.166 On 
the one hand, governmental efforts to have, U.S. sanctions in the context of Syria’s designation 
as a state sponsor of terrorism removed, reflected increased representation of the business elite’s 
foreign policy preferences.167 Their integration increased, on the other, regime autonomy from 
traditional power centers, as it broadened the regime’s power base by neutralizing former anti-
status quo forces and constraining the re-entry of political Islam into politics.168  
Given the pressure for political liberalization and the legitimacy crisis of socialism in the early 
1990s, political Islam became a force to reckon with. Beyond appeasing policies such as amnes-
ties and a more liberal approach towards religious schools and mosques, Syria’s Alawi leaders 
aimed at entrenching their sect into Syria’s mainstream Islam to such an extent that their rule 
would find acceptance even in a less autocratic domestic environment.169 In addition, and despite 
the fact that hundreds of political prisoners remained jailed and both the presence and power of 
security services unbowed throughout the decade, the government initiated a campaign of limited 
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rapprochement with leftist political dissidents and the Muslim Brotherhood after 1997.170 
Presidential autonomy, particularly from the Ba’th party, increased because of the collapse of the 
socialist ideological self-image and reached a peak in 1991, when Asad decided to join both the 
Gulf Coalition and the Madrid peace conference without even consulting the party’s Regional 
Command (RC).171 The president’s leeway in foreign affairs remained high as the 1993/94 bilat-
eral peace agreements eased popular pressure to gain Pan-Arab achievements from negotiations 
with Israel.172 Nevertheless, the party remained an important asset to rally rural Sunnis and civil 
servants in favor of the regime, in order to balance both the urban bourgeoisie and the Alawi-
dominated security apparatus.173 In order to alleviate concerns over both liberalization in the pub-
lic sector and the security apparatus, the leadership constrained demands for rapid economic de-
centralization and initially showed itself reluctant towards military budget cuts.174 Furthermore, it 
assured the Alawi barons and other high-ranking officials a fair share of the expected peace divi-
dend from economic liberalization through increased business connections between them and the 
Sunni merchants.175 
Nevertheless, Asad failed to eradicate praetorianism inside the inner circle and risks of regime 
overthrow re-occurred in the renewed outbreak of the succession crisis after 1994.176 His decision 
to gradually establish hereditary succession was disputable, given Syria’s republican identity and 
the fact that Asad’s sons did not maintain a position in the ranks of the military, the party, or 
among the public that would sanctify their succession.177 Thus, after Basil al-Asad’s death in early 
1994, the president established a power base for his second son, Bashar, through rapid and re-
spective military appointments and reshuffles and a media campaign portraying his son as a sym-
bol of hope and the ongoing Arab struggle (see also 6.2.2).178 
Eventually, Hafiz al-Asad de facto secured Bashar’s rule through a massive purge in the security 
apparatus in 1998/1999 and the permanent ousting of his brother Rif’at from the inner circle, as-
sumedly after reported clashes between his and Bashar’s supporters in late 1997 had raised fears 
of further escalation.179 Although the purge sidelined prominent Alawi officials such as General 
Ali Duba, head of military intelligence, and Muhammad al-Khuly, commander of the Air Force, 
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it significantly narrowed the regime’s sectarian power base.180 First, the gradual transfer of the 
Lebanon portfolio from Khaddam to Bashar al-Asad and Damascus’ prevention of Rafiq al-
Hariri’s re-election as Lebanese prime minister in 1998 weakened transnational Sunni linkages. 
Second, the fact that Ali Aslan, an Alawi, replaced Sunni Chief of Staff Shihabi, shortly after, re-
inforced this tendency.181 Third, Major General Ali Houri, an Ismaili, replaced the Sunni head of 
the General Security Directorate (GSD), Lieutenant General Bashir al-Najjar, in July 1998. Nev-
ertheless, the simultaneous appointment of Mohammad Nassif Kheyrbek, who was also in 
charge of the Lebanese Shi’ites, as Houri’s deputy, Bahjat Suleiman as head of internal security, 
and Major General Hasan Khalil as head of military intelligence, secured a strong Alawi pres-
ence in the intelligence apparatus.182 
After nearly four decades in power, Hafiz al-Asad died on June 9, 2000 and both formal and in-
formal mechanisms of succession allowed for a comparatively smooth power transfer to his son, 
Bashar. Within days, a transitional committee led by Khaddam and the RC appointed him com-
mander of the armed forces and nominated him for president. In addition, the People’s Assembly 
voted in favor of constitutional amendments lowering the age requirement for presidents (Art. 82) 
and removing a potential loophole for an attempt by Khaddam to stay in power as acting presi-
dent (Art. 88).183 On June 17, the Ba’th Party general congress elected Bashar as secretary-general 
and nominated him for president.184 In order to also give power transition a democratic pretext, 
authorities held both a parliamentary vote on June 27 and a national referendum on July 10 until 
Bashar al-Asad was eventually inaugurated as president on July 17.185 
7.2.2 Seasons in Damascus 
Regime legitimacy moderately increased after 2000, as Bashar al-Asad continued his father’s pol-
icy of economic and political liberalization, displaying also a remarkable tolerance for calls for 
political reforms from the civil society.186 Similarly to his father, Asad aimed at enlarging his au-
tonomy from the security apparatus and other potential rivals in the domestic realm, by generat-
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ing popular support in his own right.187 Hence, he formally strengthened the role of political insti-
tutions such as the People’s Assembly and the Judiciary Higher Council and undermined simul-
taneously the Ba’th party’s predominance in the public sphere and the National Progressive 
Front.188  
Nevertheless, conditions for Syria’s blossoming civil society steadily worsened after February 
2001, when a secular-liberal opposition movement formed in the context of a new political open-
ness, termed the Damascus Spring, exceeded the limits of criticism acceptable to the regime.189 In 
the following months, security services closed down civil society forums and arrested even par-
liamentarians criticizing political stagnation.190 Nevertheless, the formation of a coherent opposi-
tion appealing to the wider Syrian public failed.191 
In order to mobilize support among its traditional power base, the leadership resorted again to 
the Ba’th party and the public sector.192 Between mid-2000 and May 2004, for instance, Asad de-
creed three times a substantial rise in civil servant salaries and the necessity of absorbing high 
numbers of unemployed Syrians amid a substantial economic downturn of the early 2000s allevi-
ated pressures for economic liberalization.193 Nevertheless, the party’s marginalization as an au-
tonomous political force continued and peaked in July 2003, when the RC announced to cease 
interfering in daily government affairs and appointments.194 Moreover, the government exploited 
anti-Israeli sentiments after the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada in late 2000 both to discredit 
the reformist movement, which explicitly endorsed Western values, and to present Asad as a 
leader of the rejectionist front.195 Finally, Bashar continued his father’s limited appeasement poli-
cy vis-à-vis political Islam.196 Although he refrained from using religious motives in his rhetoric, 
Bashar attended prayers in Sunni strongholds Aleppo and Hama in late 2002, to show his Mus-
lim credentials and send a message of conciliation.197 Again, authorities released hundreds of Is-
lamists prisoners and announced in late 2001 to close the infamous Tadmur prison, scene of a re-
gime massacre of some 1,000 Muslim Brethren in 1980.198 Although membership of the Brother-
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hood remained punishable by death and Islamist political activity heavily restricted, limited ap-
peasement enabled the regime to successfully impede a bipartisan alignment between Islamist 
and secular opposition forces.199  
Eventually, Asad used anti-corruption campaigns and reshuffles to divert popular frustration over 
non-implemented economic reforms towards the security chiefs.200 As the 1998/99 purge had 
caused criticism of Alawization, the 2001/02 reshuffle broadened the inner circle’s sectarian com-
position. Only three months after Alawi General Ali Hammoud had succeeded Houri as head of 
GSD in October 2001, Hisham Ikhtiar, former head of GID’s Palestine division and a Sunni 
Muslim, replaced him. In a similar vein and reviving the traditional allocation of the post of 
Chief of Staff to Sunni Muslims, Hasan Turkmani replaced Aslan in January 2002. However, the 
simultaneous appointment of Ali Habib, Head of the Special Forces, as Turkmani’s deputy and 
Hammoud’s promotion to interior minister reflected the ongoing dominance of Alawis in the re-
gime’s security calculations. Also in 2002, the long-serving heads of Air Force Security and the 
Political Security Directorate, General Ibrahim Hueiji and Major General Adnan Badr Hasan 
were removed from their posts, maintaining only their positions in the Ba’th Central Commit-
tee.201  
Against the background of increasing opposition to Syria’s presence in Lebanon (see also 7.1.5), 
the relocation of Ghazi Kanaan, long-serving head of intelligence in Lebanon, to Badr Hasan’s 
post deserves particular attention. Kanaan had enjoyed good relations with Rafiq Hariri and his 
successor Rustom Ghazali was an affiliate of President Emile Lahoud. Hence, the reshuffle both 
weakened Hariri and his Sunni Syrian allies and increased the presidency’s autonomy in its Leb-
anon policy at the expense of the intelligence services.202 
In a final step of power consolidation in the inner circle, Asad reconciled high-ranking state offi-
cials and their fears over potential losses in political and social status with his policy preference of 
economic liberalization by facilitating their involvement in the private sector in the early 2000s.203 
The subsequent rise of, amongst others, Asad’s cousin Rami Makhlouf but also the sons of minis-
ters Talas and Khaddam, strengthened the internal cohesion of the military-security complex.204 
However, the emergence of such a new oligarchy, persistent corruption, and subsequent conflicts 
over the distribution of benefits stemming from the economic liberalization, threatened the re-
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gime’s alliance with the Sunni bourgeoisie and weakened its distributive power especially in 
times of economic crisis.205 
7.2.3 The emergence of the triumvirate 
Encouraged by the 2003 Iraq War, protests demanding political reforms and cultural as well as 
political rights for the Kurds, occurred in both Damascus and northeastern Syria in March 2004. 
Although protests failed to attract wider support–partially as the war had revived Arab nationalist 
sentiment–authorities suppressed them violently by May.206 At the same time, the presidency 
gained additional foreign policy autonomy in October 2004, when the NPF amended its charter, 
dismissed the former principle of ‘neither peace nor negotiations’ with Israel and called for a ne-
gotiated solution, including the creation of a Palestinian state.207 By thus incorporating key de-
mands of Palestinian Hamas for a truce, the leadership underlined its ongoing commitment and 
entitlement to Arab leadership.208 The simultaneous permission of new parties to the NPF sig-
naled, on the one hand, the government’s ongoing commitment to the path of limited pluralism 
and prevented, on the other, the Ba’th party from gaining an advantage over the state in foreign 
policy decision-making amid a newly discovered Pan-Arab sentiment.209 Another reshuffle in the 
armed forces ensued the retirement of Defense Minister Talas in May 2004. His replacement with 
Asad’s confidant Turkmani and Ali Habib’s promotion to Chief of Staff strengthened the presi-
dent’s personal grip on the military.210 
In contrast, observers termed Syria’s enforced withdrawal from Lebanon in April 2005 the re-
gime’s “darkest hours,” entailing major challenges to its survival.211 
In the ranks of the party and the security apparatus, Asad resorted to reshuffles, in order to pre-
vent a coup from the inner circle and thereby again narrowed his regime’s power base. In early 
2005, Asad’s brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat succeeded Khalil as head of military intelligence.212 
Together with the president and Shawkat, Bashar’s brother Maher, commander of the RG, even-
tually formed what Ellen Lust-Okar termed the “triumvirate” as the center of political decision-
making.213 Additionally, Asad replaced Sulayman as director of interior security with the son of 
former intelligence chief Mohammad Nassif Kheyrbek. During a Ba’th Party Conference in June, 
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Asad had several members of the Old Guard but also some of his former allies removed from the 
party’s high ranks, most prominently–Abd Al Halim Khaddam.214 
Outside of the power circles, the withdrawal encouraged opposition groups, pinning their hopes 
on Western support, to renew their unification efforts. In March 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood 
issued for the first time statements of solidarity with the Kurds and the next month, secular-leftist 
groups called for dialogue with all segments of society. Both initiatives strongly hinted at a 
broadening of the anti-regime coalition, reaching a peak in the issuing of the Damascus Declaration 
calling for democratic change, on October 18, 2005.215 Domestic dissent reached a critical level in 
the context of Khaddam’s spectacular defection in December 2005 and subsequent formation of a 
new opposition coalition, the National Salvation Front (NSF).216 
By aligning with the Brotherhood, the NSF alleviated fears of Islamic rule and retaliation against 
regime loyalists in a potential case of regime change. In turn, the alignment bolstered Khaddam’s 
religious credentials, and his Sunni background made him a credible advocate of a nationalist al-
ternative to Alawi family rule. When the NSF reached out to anti-Syrian figures in Lebanon and 
the Beirut-Damascus Declaration made their alignment public in May 2006, regime fears increased 
that its former backyard could turn into a “beachhead for opposition forces.”217 
In its initial response, the regime accused civil society activists of anti-nationalist treachery, at-
tempting to undermine the state.218 Afterwards, authorities intensified repression, for instance by 
banning oppositional gatherings and pro-democracy forums, arbitrary arrests and travel bans.219 
Simultaneously, the government launched a massive media campaign, depicting the signatories 
of the May 2006 declaration as treacherous agents of the West.220  
The 2006 Lebanon War further undermined domestic opposition to the president. First, Wash-
ington’s clear siding with Israel discredited its Arab, Lebanese, and Syrian allies in their respec-
tive domestic realm.221 Second, as the opposition constituted a natural opponent of Asad’s key 
Lebanese ally Hizballah, the group’s boost in popularity after the war gave credibility to Asad’s 
claims that the opposition were traitors of the Arab cause in the eyes of the public.222 
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7.2.4 Conclusion 
The theoretical framework established above argues that regime vulnerability impeding foreign 
policy autonomy is a key antecedent condition for adjustment policies. Hence, to what extent and 
in what direction are the observed trends in Syrian domestic politics, especially those concerning 
the legitimacy and coercive power of the regime, expected to have influenced both general for-
eign policy choices and specific forms of state sponsorship of terrorism? 
The end of the Cold War and measures of liberalization initially increased the president’s struc-
turally high autonomy from traditional rivals for power within the ruling coalition. Additionally, 
opposition from outside the power circles remained insignificant with little reflection in popular 
protest. Nevertheless, this preliminary peak in presidential autonomy in foreign policy affairs was 
to a certain extent limited by two factors. First, the increasing importance and assertiveness of the 
business elite also regarding foreign policy and alignment choices created a strong incentive for a 
policy of moderation vis-à-vis the West and Israel. Second, and to a certain extent damping the 
former incentive, the regime refrained from limiting the power of the praetorian guards and secu-
rity services. Thereby, it remained dependent on the Alawi barons and the public sector–both 
strongly reluctant to a rapid political and economic rapprochement–as important constituencies 
of its power base. 
In the second half of the 1990s, the collapse of the peace talks and the regime’s rapprochement 
with political Islam and Iran strengthened forces favoring a policy of resolve, yet improved rela-
tions with Turkey after 1998 and the EU as well as the need of economic reform favored the pro-
Western stance of the business elite. Nevertheless and given the absence of organized opposition, 
the focus of vulnerability shifted clearly to the inner core of the regime, in the context of a gradual 
transfer of power. Major purges in the security sector and an increased presence and visibility of 
Alawi’s in the formal power institutions of the state, pointed to a narrowing of the regime’s pow-
er base and an increased reliance on the informal power structures, constraining foreign policy 
autonomy. 
In the course of a crackdown on pro-democracy forces in Syria and Lebanon in 2002, regime le-
gitimacy suffered a setback. Until then, Bashar al-Asad’s policy of moderate and tailor-made 
economic and political liberalization and broadening of the sectarian base of the regime had pre-
vented the emergence of a powerful competitor and an opposition able to mobilize sufficient so-
cietal support. However, strengthening the formal political institutions at the expense of the party, 
economically appeasing the Old Guard at the expense of the Sunni business elite, and again nar-
rowing the inner circle of the regime to a mere triumvirate of power eroded to a certain extent the 
ruling coalition established by his father. This was particularly significant as external develop-
ments such as the Second Intifada and the Iraq War renewed Arab nationalist sentiment increas-
ing incentives for a resolute anti-Western stand. Coinciding with Hariri’s assassination, these de-
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velopments nurtured Sunni revisionist sentiments over Alawi rule in Syria, manifesting them-
selves in the emergence of a broad opposition movement in 2005/06, reaching the inner core of 
the regime with Khaddam’s defection in late 2005. Hence, regime vulnerability as interplay of 
threats from inside and outside the power base reached a relative peak in the period between 2004 
and mid-2006.  
With regard to the alliance-seeking hypothesis NC1 linking domestic vulnerability to a preference 
for external alignment, Syria’s economic troubles alone seem to have set a clear incentive limiting 
internal balancing efforts. However, and altough relations with Israel were the least conflicted in 
the first half of the 1990s, the regime’s structural domestic vulnerability led to ambivalent and 
particularly vague interstate alignments. While, on the one hand, key constituencies of the regime 
such as the party, the army, and the public sector continued to constitute an impediment to a pro-
Western realignment, the boosted role of the business elite and the private sector on the other 
hand prevented a full alignment with the Iran-led rejectionist camp.  
After the transfer of power, the limited increase of internal balancing efforts reflected Syria’s gen-
erally worsened external security outlook since 2002. Nevertheless, the deepening and formaliza-
tion of the Damascus-Tehran alliance hints not only to Syria’s limited domestic mobilization ca-
pacity in times of economic stagnation, military structures weakened through purges, and es-
trangement of large segments of the society. Its clear placement in a revived rejectionist front 
consisting of Iran, Hamas, and Hizballah also provided the regime with additional material and 
immaterial resources it could cash in on such as societal anti-Western sentiment at the expense of 
domestic challengers and maintain simultaneously sufficient levels of autonomy particularly from 
the Ba’th Party.  
As suggested by the standing-firm hypothesis N2, the gradual formalization of the Syrian-Iranian 
alliance throughout the period of observation and the lack of reliable alternative allies–
particularly those willing to risk tangible assets in an open confrontation with Israel–, increased 
incentives for Syria to strengthen its alignment with Hizballah. Although hierarchical power 
structure inside Syria prevented the outbreak of domestic conflict over external alignments as ob-
served in the 1960s, domestic constraints limited Syria’s external international and regional inter-
state alignment options before the clear anti-Western shift after 2002. Hence, supporting Hizbal-
lah became a key asset in attracting power resources from Iran throughout the 1990s without hav-
ing to give in to systemic incentives for a domestically costly full realignment with the West, as-
sumedly entailing strong and incalculable pressure for liberalization. In the second half of the 
decade, when the alignment became a burdening factor in Syria’s relations with the West, it 
eased the pressure on Syria to enter a ‘dishonorable’ peace for economic reasons, undermining 
the president’s personal legitimacy and the regime’s nationalist credentials as the citadel of Arab 
steadfastness. While the formal alliance with Iran partially weakened these credentials and Syr-
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ia’s claim for Arab leadership particularly in times of high Arab sentiment, Hizballah provided 
the regime with a cover of Arab steadfastness against Israel and thus a source of regime legitima-
cy despite Damascus’ de facto anti-Arab alignment with Iran.  
Turning now to the specific nature of Syria’s commitment to Hizballah, the neoclassical realist 
hypotheses NC2 and NC3 suggest that regime vulnerability is likely to cause deviations from ex-
pected policies of resolve or restraint induced by the SSD.223 Accordingly, the occurrence of do-
mestically generated deviations from Syria’s role as Brother in Arms (max. resolve), Defector (max. 
restraint), or hybrid sponsor (Fellow Traveler/Secret Backer) is most likely in times of the mentioned 
conflicting alignment preferences in the first half of the 1990s, Bashar al-Asad’s internal power 
consolidation after 2000, and in the context of Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. 
7.3 Syria’s policy towards Hizbollah (1989-2006) 
„The party depends on Syria as a geopolitical lung.“224 
Although the military and political success of Hizballah has been mostly ascribed to its ability to 
entrench itself to the Lebanese society and reconcile with the state in the 1990s, state support was 
critical in all four STAR-dimensions.225 In contrast to the case of Fatah, Syrian sponsorship 
emerged not in the context of interstate rivalry among various backers but as a division of labor 
with the Islamic Republic of Iran, strongly reflected in specific patterns of Syrian assistance.226 
Although suspicions over Iran’s intentions in Lebanon prompted Damascus particularly in the 
late 1980s to contain Hizballah’s activity, Syria also waived the chance to disband the group in 
the context of the 1989 Ta’if Accord.227 Hence, the following section examines, to what extent the 
observed changing nature of the SSD shaped both the character and extent of Syria’s commit-
ment to Hizballah. 
7.3.1 Hosting 
As permitting a terrorist organization to operate militarily on one’s own territory and to conduct 
cross-border attacks carries a high risk of interstate conflict escalation, it requires a high level of 
commitment. While the limitation of tolerated activities to non-military operations constitutes a 
moderate level of support, it reaches a low level if the group retains merely a physical presence 
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(See also 4.3.1). Although there have been sporadic reports over a significant Hizballah presence 
in Syria, joint efforts to establish a safe haven and a rear front generally focused on Lebanon, 
constituting again a general case of indirect and thus moderate hosting.228 Hence, the following 
assessment of Syria’s hosting commitment focuses first on Hizballah’s armed presence in Leba-
non and second on Damascus’ tolerance of the group’s attacks on Israel from Lebanon.229  
During the observation period, Syria used its presence and influence in Lebanon to shield Hizbal-
lah from both Israeli retaliatory strikes and Lebanese efforts to disarm the group in a somewhat 
ambiguous manner. In the northeastern Bekaa Valley, it permitted the group to establish military 
bases and training camps while Israel’s tacit agreement to not escalate tensions in the area limited 
the risk of retaliatory strikes.230 Simultaneously, Syria closely monitored the group’s activities 
through its intelligence headquarters also located nearby and pressured it, for instance, to submit 
to the formal monopoly of force of the Lebanese army by returning the main army barracks in the 
Bekaa.231 As Israel’s retaliatory strikes against Hizballah and even Syrian positions in the Bekaa 
Valley between 1992 and 1994 as well as 2001 remained limited, Damascus tolerated the group’s 
presence there until the 2005 withdrawal.  
Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon and its role as supervisor of the disbandment of the Civil War 
militias by mid-1991, allowed Damascus to project its hosting capacity to the Lebanese-Israeli 
border area.232 In the context of geographically restricted support, Damascus blocked, for instance 
in 1993, initiatives of the Lebanese government to reestablish the army’s monopoly of force and 
disarm the group in southern Lebanon.233 However, and particularly during the negotiation peri-
od after 1992, Syrian officials at times limited their hosting commitment. Defense minister Talas, 
for instance, reportedly promised in 1995 to disarm and even repress the group after an Israeli 
withdrawal from Lebanon.234 After the transfer of the Lebanese portfolio from Khaddam to Ba-
shar al-Asad in the late 1990s and the Israeli withdrawal, Syria boosted its commitment, granting 
Hizballah an increased military presence in Lebanon and backing the group’s de facto military, po-
litical, and administrative takeover of the border area–and even parts of south Beirut.235 In order 
to shield the group from disarmament, Syria strongly supported Hizballah’s claim that Israel’s 
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withdrawal was incomplete and reportedly pressured Lebanon to refrain from a redeployment of 
the Lebanese army to the south.236 In May 2003, for instance, Damascus rebuffed demands by 
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, to disarm the group.237 Syria’s tolerance for Hizballah using 
southern Lebanon as a front against Israel evolved in a similar way. Although Syrian officials 
permitted attacks on IDF personnel in the late 1980s, they exerted substantial control over both 
their “timing and targeting […] in ways that would convey the message Syria wished to send to 
Israel and the USA.”238 Throughout the 1990s, Syria tolerated, on the one hand, attacks on Israel 
inside Lebanon, mandated by the Ta’if Agreement and legitimized by the 1993 and 1996 treaties. 
On the other hand, Syria found itself obliged as a de facto contracting party to the agreements to 
restrain cross-border attacks into northern Israel.239 Hence, Syria repeatedly demonstrated its abil-
ity to reign in Hizballah, particularly in 1993/94, pressuring the group to refrain from cross-
border attacks, and even obligated the group to put its attacks against IDF positions to a halt in 
order to ease tensions with the West just before Bill Clinton’s 1996 re-election.240  
After the IDF withdrawal, Syria granted Hizballah significantly greater freedom of movement, 
publicly backed Hizballah’s decision to resume attacks on IDF posts, and pressured the Lebanese 
government to facilitate the group’s military mission.241 In late 2000, Asad turned down a request 
from Israel to put a halt on Hizballah’s attacks in the Shab’a Farms, and although Israel made 
sure to publicly link air raids on Syrian positions in Lebanon in April and June 2001 to previous 
Hizballah attacks, there were no signs of Syrian pressure on Hizballah to limit anti-Israel opera-
tions.242 After the 9/11 attacks of September 2001, Syrian officials periodically restrained Hizbal-
lah activity against Israel and in a meeting with U.S. officials in Beirut in late November, foreign 
minister al-Shar’ even hinted at a temporary limitation of Hizballah operations.243 Reportedly en-
couraged by the president himself, Hizballah resume attacks on Israel in early 2002.244  
Finally, Syria’s efforts to maintain plausible deniability as a key benefit of indirect hosting were 
subject to significant variation over time. In the 1980s and throughout the observation period, 
Syrian officials avoided being associated with anti-Western terrorism in Lebanon. For instance, 
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after the 9/11 attacks, President Asad and others quickly denied having any information when 
U.S. officials confronted them with reports that Hizballah members designated by Washington as 
terrorists were operating freely in Syria’s sphere of influence.245  
Before Syria gradually waived deniability through presenting itself as the only force that could 
free Israel from Hezbollah’s attacks, hosting cease-fire talks and negotiating, in 1996, even on be-
half of the group, cooperation retained an opaque character and Damascus managed the align-
ment through its intelligence apparatus in Lebanon.246 In contrast, Bashar al-Asad’s rise to power 
entailed a boost in publicity of Syria’s presence in Lebanon in general and the alignment in par-
ticular.247 While Israel’s policy shift to holding Syria accountable for Hizballah attacks after 2001 
already pointed to increasing Syrian commitment costs, the transfer of the Hizballah portfolio 
from the military intelligence to the presidency, indicated a low priority of entrapment risks.248 In 
an unprecedented move in March 2002, Asad held a meeting and direct consultations with 
Nasrallah before the group resumed its attacks on IDF positions in the Shab’a Farms.249 Under 
increased pressure from Washington in 2002/03, high-ranking intelligence officers, such as 
Bahjat Suleiman, head of the GID internal branch, and Hasan Khalil, head of military intelli-
gence, hinted repeatedly to a possible bargain including a stricter Syrian control on Hizballah.250 
Also, President Asad argued in 2003, that the solution to Hizballah violence against Israel was 
not to put pressure on Syria but on Israel to halt inter alia its violations of Lebanese airspace.251 
In late 2005, however, he sent a strong message of resolve and hosting commitment: Elaborating 
on failed attempts to blackmail Syria into disarming Hizballah in return for international approv-
al of its ongoing presence in Lebanon, Asad threatened that any further attempts to weaken the 
alignment would inevitably lead to chaos.252 
7.3.2 Military support 
Syria’s military support, such as the direct provision of intelligence, weapons, and personnel to 
Hizballah, will be assessed as outlined in section 4.3.2. Hence, assistance constitutes a high level 
of commitment if Syria employed military personnel on behalf of the group or provided it with 
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sophisticated weaponry, as both policies entail economic costs and a high risk of conflict escala-
tion.253 In contrast, military assistance occurs if Syria operated as a military sponsor in a third 
state, particularly Lebanon, or as a corridor for third party arms supplies. Finally, limiting both 
direct and third party military support indicates a low level of military support. 
Throughout the observation period and in contrast to hosting, military support for Hizballah took 
place mainly in coordination with Iran, generating Syria’s role as a facilitator and corridor for 
Iranian support. Besides the aim of bolstering the group’s military capacity, this policy aimed at 
avoiding material costs, maintaining a sufficient level of plausible deniability, and exercising con-
trol over Hizballah-Iranian cooperation in Lebanon to avoid entrapment in an unwanted conflict 
escalation with Israel.254 Especially after establishing a de facto hegemony over Lebanon in the 
early 1990s, Syria substantially interfered in Hizballah’s relations with Iran. For instance, it obli-
gated Tehran to coordinate its Lebanese policies through the Iranian embassy in Damascus in-
stead of Beirut and all flights to Lebanon, carrying both personnel and material deliveries, were 
connected via the Syrian capital.255 
The quantitative and qualitative boost in Iranian arms deliveries to Hizballah after 1990 suggests 
a respective decrease of Syrian restrictiveness on this matter. Reportedly, Iranian Boeing 747s ar-
rived up to four times a month at Damascus airport and Syrian military airfields in the early 
1990s, carrying not only ammunition on a large scale but also a total of more than a thousand 
122mm Katyusha rockets, AT-4 and AT-3 Sagger anti-tank missiles, rocket-propelled grenades, 
and even anti-aircraft batteries. As Syrian officials exercised remarkably little care in disguising 
the shipments’ purpose from Western observers, Damascus’ commitment to Hizballah’s military 
build-up experienced an increase during this period.256 Additionally, its own facilitating role in 
the context of training slightly moved to the upper end of the support continuum. Syria increas-
ingly served as a hub for Hizballah recruits flying to Iran in order to undergo training on larger 
scale weapon systems, as for instance air defense systems and artillery rockets, which could not 
be provided in the Bekaa Valley, an area of easy access for IAF. At times, such specialized train-
ings also took place in Syria itself.257  
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Although Syria refrained from making an explicit commitment regarding Hizballah’s future in 
Lebanon once an agreement was signed during the peace talks, measures of restraining the 
group’s operations at times also affected Damascus military support policy. In late 1993, for in-
stance, Syria vetoed the deployment of Hizballah tanks and missiles from the Bekaa Valley to the 
south and temporarily blocked the transit of heavy weapons from Iran to Hizballah.258 However, 
as this constituted only a small deviation from Syria’s general policy of tolerating Iranian resup-
plies for Hizballah through its territory, its commitment remained at a moderate level.259 
Reports over Iranian arms deliveries via Syria mounted particularly after Israel’s “Grapes of 
Wrath” operation in April 1996. In order to resupply Hizballah, Syria facilitated a massive influx 
of arms, trucked across the border.260 The next year, Syria facilitated a qualitative boost of Iranian 
arms deliveries, providing the group reportedly with Katyusha missiles having nearly twice the 
range compared to previously used.261 Moreover, and particularly in the first half of 1997, the fre-
quency of jumbo flights from Iran loaded with rockets and anti-tank missiles landing in Damas-
cus reached an unprecedented level.262 Nevertheless, Damascus refrained both in the context of 
Operation “Accountability” (1993) and in 1996 from militarily intervening on behalf of Hizballah 
and refused–as in the case of Syrian support for the PKK–to permit the delivery of game-
changing, sophisticated weaponry to the group.263 Hence, military support did not reach a high 
level. 
As in the case of hosting, Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon and Bashar al-Asad’s ascension to 
the presidency constituted game changers also for Syria’s military commitment. In the first pledge 
of military support during his inauguration speech on July 17, 2000, the new president vowed 
that Syria would “always stand by Lebanon and support it in […] its brave stand in the face of 
repeated Israeli threats.”264 According to local sources, between May 2000 and December 2001, 
Hizballah received truckloads of arms and Syria changed from a constraining facilitator to a ma-
jor supplier of arms, providing the group with large quantities of Syrian-manufactured 220 mm 
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Uragan and B-302 rockets with a range of up to 42 miles.265 In addition, Damascus also trans-
ferred highly advanced Russian anti-tank missiles to Hizballah.266  
Although Syria continued to facilitate Iranian shipments to Hizballah through its airports after 
2000, it deviated from its previous policy in two aspects. First, the weaponry delivered from Iran 
to Hizballah via Syria became more advanced over the years, carrying a higher risk of conflict es-
calation.267Second, through the massive boost in direct arms deliveries, Syria increased its com-
mitment to such an extent that the number of Hizballah rockets fired at Israel during the July 
2006 War stemming from Syrian arsenal reportedly exceeded those of Iranian origin.268 After the 
war, Syria was again strongly involved in resupplying Hizballah with weapons. However, its re-
luctance to commit its own military forces on behalf of the group during the war has to a certain 
extent limited the shift from moderate to high military support in the course of Bashar al-Asad’s 
presidency.269 
7.3.3 Financial support 
Since the debate on terrorism financing had gained momentum after the 9/11 attacks, three as-
pects shape its discussion in international politics. First, the direct transfer of funds, second, gov-
ernmental tolerance of donations, and, third, a state’s deliberate toleration of illicit business in its 
own sphere of influence.270 According to the measurement established in section 4.3.3, Syria took 
on the role of a substantial financial backer, if it provided explicit financial assistance and tolerat-
ed fundraising or economic activities. In contrast, policy reflected a low commitment if it includ-
ed substantial cuts in financial support, restrictions on societal support, and efforts to achieve 
plausible deniability. 
Reportedly, Hizballah’s annual budget ranges between $100 million and $400 million.271 Alt-
hough there are claims that Syria provides direct financial support to Hizballah, only a few of 
them find support in the empirical evidence.272 Moreover, direct financial assistance played–as in 
the cases of Fatah and PKK–rather a little role in Syria’s overall sponsorship portfolio, particular-
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ly against the background of Syrian-Iranian division of labor.273 Although Damascus’ role as a fa-
cilitator for third party financial support received increased attention in the context of the 9/11 at-
tacks and resulted inter alia in the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration 
Act (SALSRA) of 2003, direct funding of Hizballah was not mentioned in the legislation. There 
are no indications that direct governmental Syrian support exceeded a low commitment. Never-
theless, Damascus showed no willingness to limit the massive transfer of Iranian money to Hiz-
ballah, which peaked in 1995/96.274 The fact, that this period coincides with Syrian-Israeli nego-
tiations, also displays that Iranian assistance allowed Hizballah to diversify their sources of sup-
port and maintain a certain level of independence from both conventional fundraising and busi-
ness and Syria as a source of revenue.275  
Syrian support assumedly played a considerable role regarding the sending of revenues from illic-
it business outside of the region to Hizballah.276 According to U.S. government and media reports, 
the money partially returned to Lebanon in cash, yet a large amount of it was also laundered and 
transferred via banks and other informal channels in the early 2000s.277 In this context, it was Syr-
ia’s dominance over virtually all sectors of Lebanese economy that allowed particularly Hizballah 
to launder and further distribute donations from sources unwilling to display their identity in pub-
lic.278 
Given increased international pressure on states accused of tolerating terrorism financing after 
9/11, Asad and Hariri coordinated their reaction to Hizballah’s designation as a terrorist organi-
zation and subsequent demands from Washington to freeze its assets. As these consultations were 
widely perceived as influential for the Lebanese government’s decision to decline the U.S. request 
in November 2001, they indicated an ongoing Syrian commitment to Hizballah’s economic sur-
vival.279 
7.3.4 Endorsement 
As outlined in 4.3.4, governmental endorsement of a terrorist organization includes both actively 
bolstering the group’s standing as a legitimate resistance organization in official rhetoric and en-
couraging others to join the alignment at least passively. In contrast, approval of the group’s des-
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ignation as a terrorist organization and its subsequent prosecution point to a low level of com-
mitment. Syria’s endorsement for Hizballah since the initial period of interaction in the 1980s 
was subject to remarkable variation. When relations reached a low point in 1986/87, regime offi-
cials called Syria’s violent crackdown on Hizballah in West Beirut “legitimate self-defense” 
against “enemies.”280 Some twenty years later, Bashar al-Asad publicly declared “if standing by 
the resistance is a mortifying sin, then it is an honor and a source of pride for the Syrian peo-
ple.”281 
In order to legitimize Hizballah’s exceptional position among Lebanon’s Civil War militias after 
the Ta’if Agreement, Syrian officials repeatedly praised Hizballah’s attacks as acts of resistance, 
constituting a Pan-Arab “national duty.”282 Moreover, they aimed at downplaying the extent of 
Syria’s support, in order not to undermine the group’s nationalist credentials or stir up Lebanese 
fears over Syrian revisionism.283 
Throughout the 1990s, endorsement strongly reflected Syrian efforts to reconcile its commitment 
to Hizballah’s campaign against Israel with efforts to maintain its hegemony over Lebanon (c.f. 
7.1.5). Syrian officials repeatedly emphasized the group’s identity as a legitimate resistance 
movement and refused reports over a potential realignment after a breakthrough in negotiations 
with Israel. On the eve of the Peace Process, Vice President Khaddam pledged, “the resistance to 
Israel in Lebanon will continue until the liberation of the south”284 and vowed again in April 
1993 that Syria would never take “any measure which might restrict the national, Syrian, Leba-
nese or Palestine struggle against Israeli aggression.’”285 Again in 1996, president Asad portrayed 
resistance to the Israeli occupation as a legitimate right.286  
In contrast, strategic considerations in the Lebanese and Syrian realm also limited endorsement. 
First, Syrian authorities in Lebanon repeatedly prevented Hizballah from dominating the Shia 
camp by pressuring it into an electoral alliance with its secular Shia rival Amal in the 1992 par-
liamentary elections and even reduced the number of seats attainable to Hizballah in the 1996 
elections.287 Second, Syria also backed the government in constraining Hizballah activity outside 
of South Lebanon. In September 1993, for instance, when Hizballah decried the government for a 
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violent crackdown on socio-economic protest in southern Beirut, Ghazi Kanaan intervened on 
behalf of the latter.288 Third, aware of Syria’s troubled history with political Islam, officials initial-
ly refrained from emphasizing Hizballah’s Islamist character. In an interview in April 1993, for 
instance, Asad stressed the common goal of liberating occupied land as a base for cooperation, 
highlighting the fact that Hizballah was “fighting against occupation and colonization.”289 De-
spite the fact that the president continued to refrain from public meetings with Hizballah leaders, 
authorities eventually invited Nasrallah and Hussein Fadlallah to Damascus to hold meetings 
with representatives of Palestinian and Jordanian Islamist groups in 1997 in the context of the re-
gime’s moderate rapprochement with political Islam.290 
In the course of his increased role in Lebanon in the late 1990s, Bashar al-Asad cultivated a per-
sonally close relationship with Hasan Nasrallah.291 After the death of Hafiz al-Asad, the cordiali-
ty of the alignment was inter alia displayed by numerous posters appearing in Syria and Lebanon, 
featuring the late and the current president as well as Nasrallah.292 In addition, Bashar al-Asad al-
lowed Nasrallah to make a public appearance in the context of his father’s funeral in May 2000 in 
Damascus, invited him to the presidential palace, and reportedly allowed Hizballah fighters to 
march in Latakia on special occasions.293 
In the context of a generally more hostile rhetoric vis-à-vis Israel, endorsing Hizballah became a 
bigger part of Syria’s official positioning.294 Already in his inauguration speech, Bashar al-Asad 
had praised Hizballah as “heroic Lebanese national resistance,”295 and during his first major ap-
pearance on a regional level, the Cairo Summit on October 21, 2000, he praised Hizballah’s vic-
tory over Israel as an “Arab experience” and a source of pride, thereby encouraging other Arab 
leaders to assist the group. 296 Although limiting the visibility of support to non-military means in 
the context of Israeli strikes against Syrian positions in Lebanon in mid-2001, Asad emphasized 
in July that Syria stands by Hizballah “politically and morally.”297 
In addition to international consensus on Israel’s complete withdrawal from Lebanon, the shift of 
U.S. policy after 9/11 further limited Syria’s leeway of endorsing Hizballah as a legitimate re-
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sistance force. Nevertheless, Syrian officials made substantial efforts to prevent a consensus on 
Hizballah’s designation as a terrorist organization.298 Subsequently, Syrian officials portrayed 
Hizballah attacks as legitimate resistance operations against what they termed state terrorism by 
Israel and measures of Lebanese national defense.299 In late 2001, both Asad and foreign minister 
al-Shar’ explicitly rejected the term “terrorist movement” for Hizballah and denounced the 
group’s designation as “shameful.”300 Aiming at undermining Arab support for the group's out-
lawing, the president argued that there was no difference between IDF soldiers and Israeli civil-
ians in his Arab Summit speech on March 27, 2002.301 In this context, Damascus also defended 
Hizballah attacks on IDF posts in the Shab’a Farms in late March 2002 as rightful.302 
Endorsement remained high also in 2004. On May 31, for instance, Asad publicly called Hizbal-
lah the “most successful experience against Israel”303 and when the UN Security Council called 
for Hizballah’s disbandment, the government again stressed the group’s character as a liberation 
movement.304 Subsequently, official rhetoric fiercely targeted the Sunni-Druze-Christian align-
ment challenging Hizballah’s position in Lebanon as non-patriotic forces doomed to failure and 
when pressure on the group mounted after Hariri’s assassination in early 2005, Asad publicly 
vowed to “always stand” with the “patriotic parties,” meaning Hizballah and its allies in Leba-
non.305 In November, Asad again publicly supported Hizballah’s claim on the Shab’a Farms.306  
In the context of the July 2006 War, officials stepped up their rhetorical support for Hizballah. In-
formation minister Mushin Bilal, for instance, declared that “Syria supports the Lebanese nation-
al resistance in its struggles against Israeli aggression” and that “the resistance will be victori-
ous.”307 In early August, foreign minister Walid al-Muallem issued not only fierce threats of retal-
iation in the case of an Israeli attack on Syria but also vowed to be “’ready to be a soldier under 
the leadership of Hasan Nasr Allah’.”308 Subsequently, Syria also criticized UNSCR 1701, calling 
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for the restoration of the Lebanese army’s monopoly on the use of force, as downsizing the “his-
torical achievements realized by the Lebanese national resistance.”309 
After the war, the regional wave of enthusiasm for Hizballah and admiration for Nasrallah as an 
Arab national hero also reached Syria. Hence, authorities tolerated and probably encouraged the 
distribution of posters featuring the Hizballah leader alongside Hafiz and particularly Bashar al-
Asad.310 Subsequently, also rhetorical endorsement reached a preliminary peak. Only two days 
after fighting had ended in Lebanon, Asad praised Hizballah’s achievements as a factor shaping a 
“new Middle East.”311 In addition, he endorsed support for the group as a deterrent against Israe-
li aggression, a powerful instrument of achieving peace and restoring legitimate rights, and a third 
option between a hopeless conventional military confrontation and efforts to reach peace through 
negotiations. While, on the one hand, harshly criticizing the moderate Arab States for their reluc-
tance to support Hizballah, whose resistance is “essential in as much as it is natural and legiti-
mate,”312 he claimed, on the other, that the group finds support among “all the Arab people […] 
completely and unequivocally.”313 In an unprecedented openness, Asad pledged that Syria is 
“standing by and supporting the resistance,” expressed his personal “appreciation and admiration 
to the men of resistance,” and praised Hizballah as “a badge of honour on the chest of each Arab 
citizen.”314 
7.3.5 Conclusion 
„Today, for strategic and ideological motives, Syria is more pro-Hizballah than Hizballah is 
pro-Syria.“315 
 
Throughout the 1990s, Syria exerted a tremendous influence over the group’s ideological direc-
tion, its political and military activity, and its relations with Lebanese and external actors, while 
at the same time maintaining high levels of deniability in exchange for protecting Hizballah from 
disbandment and subsequent extermination as a political force in Lebanon. As Emile El-
Hokayem’s assessment suggests, particularly a substantial shift in the intra-alignment balance of 
power between Syria and Hizballah induced the emergence of considerably changed patterns of 
Syrian support by the mid-2000s. The fact that high-ranking officials pledged allegiance to Hasan 
Nasrallah as a worthy model of emulation, transferred sophisticated weapons to a non-state actor 
that derives an important part of its support base from confronting the region’s leading military 
power, and bore humiliating Israeli retaliation and international isolation indicates a significant 
shift regarding specific sponsorship policies. To what extent do the observed patterns match the 
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sponsorship roles Brother in Arms, Secret Backer, Fellow Traveler, and Defector and the respective as-
sumptions based on the SSD? 
Section 7.1.6 and the neorealist restraining hypothesis N3 maintained that the SSD suggested a 
general tendency towards a policy entrapment avoiding in the first half of the 1990s, given Hiz-
ballah’s insufficient capacity to balance the vast power disparity between Syria and Israel and a 
historically low level of interstate conflict and risk of confrontation. However, the SSD incentives 
towards restraining the ally were alleviated by parallel enticements for policies of standing firm, 
addressed by hypothesis N2. Both Syria’s strategic interest in ensuring Shi’a acceptance of its he-
gemony in Lebanon and the lack of interstate allies for pressuring Israel into concessions over the 
return of the Golan Heights and for balancing its overall military superiority. 
With regard to domestic politics, the necessity of balancing rejectionist and pro-Western forces 
(and ultimately sources of threats to regime survival) inside Syria contributed to an external poli-
cy of maneuvering between the Western camp and Iran. Against the background of the assump-
tion established in section 2.4.3 that realignment is likely to carry along substantial domestic costs 
and the neoclassical realist sponsorship hypothesis NC2, assisting Hizballah allowed for appeas-
ing those strongly opposing realignment and attracting Iranian support without the expected do-
mestic autonomy losses. Eventually, by formally endorsing the Pan-Arab nationalist goal of anti-
Israel resistance and presenting itself as a moderating force, securing Western interests in Leba-
non, Damascus was able to maintain autonomy from pro-Western forces demanding not only ex-
ternal realignment but also domestic liberalization. As this rivalry persisted throughout the entire 
observation period, there was no complete realignment (defection) detected in the post-Cold war 
era. Nevertheless, these conflictual alignment preferences have most likely contributed to the 
emergence of ambivalent pattern of sponsorship suggested by the neoclassical realist hypotheses 
NC2 (limited resolve) and NC3 (limited restraint). 
Beginning in the second half of the 1990s, several factors gradually strengthened existing incen-
tives for a policy of resolve and high commitment, following the argument of the standing firm hy-
pothesis N2. First, while Hizballah’s military and political capacity increased, the power gap be-
tween Israel and Syria further widened and alternative allies showed little readiness to support 
Syria in its gradually worsening relations with Israel. Second, Syria’s increasingly assertive inter-
ference in Lebanese domestic politics and the gradual erosion of the societal consensus on its 
presence increased Damascus’ strategic interest in the alignment with Hizballah. In contrast, fol-
lowing the restraining hypothesis N3, the formalization of Syria’s alliance with Iran in 2005/06 
and the fact that the alignment itself became a burden for local and international tolerance of on-
going Syrian hegemony in Lebanon and served as a legitimation basis for Israeli military strikes 
against Syria, set incentives for limiting its commitment to Hizballah. As reflected by the limited 
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resolve hypothesis NC2, the comparatively high level of regime vulnerability in the mid-2000 years 
induced deviation from the general tendency towards abandonment avoiding. 
As assumed by NC2, domestic conflict over external alignments prevented a Syrian realignment 
in its toleration of Hizballah operations and the patterns of support established after the end of 
open confrontation in the late 1980s persisted. Particularly before 2000, Syria’s policy of indirect 
assistance through a guarded facilitation of Iranian arms deliveries and trainings in Lebanon also 
shaped its material commitment. Within the scope of indirect hosting, serving as an indicator for 
a preference for opacity and a tendency towards the sponsorship type secret backer, Syria was able 
to reduce the risk of being entrapped in direct confrontations with Israel, providing opacity, deni-
ability, and a credible threat of realignment towards Hizballah. Despite sporadic hints towards a 
potential realignment in 1993, Syria also tolerated Iranian assistance and even supported it logis-
tically in areas under its control. However, the nevertheless present international, strategic, and 
particularly domestic incentives for a policy of resolve reflected especially in the support dimen-
sion endorsement. After Hizballah had given up its radical opposition to the Lebanese state, the 
publicity of Syria’s commitment to the group experienced a gradual rise and Damascus refused to 
consent to attempts of portraying the group as a terrorist organization.  
While still hesitant to publicly announce the extent of material cooperation, Hafiz al-Asad and 
his aides provided the group with a political nationalist cover as a ‘legitimate resistance,’ consti-
tuting a form of moderate endorsement and increased visibility. Decreasing restrictiveness on 
Iranian arms deliveries and vague public pledges of commitment additionally contributed to the 
gradual shift towards a brother in arms. While demonstrations of Syria’s leverage over Hizballah 
allowed Damascus to reap substantial diplomatic and political benefits, it also found itself in-
creasingly exposed to entrapment costs such as international criticism and Israeli measures of re-
taliation. 
International consensus on the legitimacy of Hizballah’s operations was built on Israel’s military 
presence in Lebanon and the emergence of a counter alignment was impeded by Syria’s ability to 
present the alliance as a constructive factor both moderating Hizballah (and Iran) and ensuring 
domestic stability in Lebanon. In contrast, Israel’s (and after 2001 also U.S.) policy of holding 
Syria responsible for Hizballah operations on the grounds of its dominant role in Lebanon in-
creased the material costs of Syria’s hosting commitment.  
In the context of these tremendous shifts of Syria’s external security environment, measures of 
appeasing Israel and particularly the U.S. by public signals of restraint in 2001 indicated fears of 
entrapment. Although material support continued and even increased in the aftermath of the Is-
raeli withdrawal, Syria briefly took on the role of a secret backer. As suggested by the neoclassical 
realist limited restraint hypothesis NC3, both regional (Second Palestinian Intifada) and domestic 
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(transfer of power, Damascus Spring) challenges prevented a substantial and coherent shift in en-
dorsement. 
Eventually, in the context of a full alignment with the Iran-led rejectionist camp after 2002, Syr-
ia’s commitment to Hizballah–and particularly the material and immaterial entrapment costs it 
was willing to tolerate–substantially increased and reached a peak in both material military assis-
tance and publicity. First, the gradual reputation loss of Hizballah as a resistance force after the 
Israeli withdrawal and its manifestation in UNSCR 1559 demanded increased efforts of Syria to 
shield the group from persecution. Second, by holding public meetings and repeatedly (and 
proudly) referring to Syria’s contribution to Hizballah’s campaign against Israel, Damascus 
demonstrated an increased willingness to sacrifice at least intangible assets and diplomatic costs 
for assisting Hizballah, both in the international and regional arena. By the end of the observation 
period, Syria’s commitment included the loss of military personnel and reputation through Israeli 
retaliatory strikes, which even reached Syrian territory, and punching above its international 
weight in preventing Hizballah’s disarmament after 2000. Hence, Syria deliberately waived the 
initially high level of deniability indirect hosting had allowed for in exchange for a policy of de-
terrence and resolve, portraying itself literally as Hizballah’s brother in arms. The material base of 
this role, however, remained de facto limited as Syria refrained from actively deploying its own 
personnel against Israel in military confrontations throughout the entire observation period. Fur-
thermore, Damascus revealed no intentions of encouraging Hizballah units to seek refuge in Syr-
ia or making its own territory available as a rear front for attacks on Israel.  
As assumed by the neoclassical realist hypotheses NC2 (limited resolve) and NC3 (limited restraint), 
various challenges to regime security modified the impact of respective SSD incentives. Despite 
the fact that they did not materialize in a significant policy shift (mainly because of Hizballah’s 
increasing importance for Syria in Lebanon and the rapid U.S. shift towards confrontation), offi-
cials issued sporadic threats of realignment in order to appease Syria’s Western negotiation part-
ners. This deviation from the general tendency of high commitment, addressed by the limited re-
solve hypothesis NC2, coincided with a brief period of successful pressure from the business elite 
and civil society forces for particularly economic liberalization, the Damascus Spring. After 2004, 
however, regime vulnerability and the necessity of appeasing pro-Western forces did not have a 
restraining but in fact a reinforcing effect on Syria’s commitment to Hizballah for several reasons. 
First, a key element of Syrian-Iranian relations since 1982, Damascus’ commitment to Hizballah 
was instrumental in securing domestic power resources from the alignment with Tehran. Second, 
not only Syria’s strategic interest in the alignment reached a peak in the context of its forced 
withdrawal from Lebanon. The alignment also successfully prevented the emergence and persis-
tence of a broad Western-sponsored and transnational alliance of oppositional forces in both Syr-
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ia and Lebanon as it allowed the regime to rally domestic support along the lines of anti-
imperialism and Arab steadfastness. 
 
Figure 38: Patterns of Syrian sponsorship commitment to Hizballah  
  
!
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8 Findings and implications 
In early 2014, the government of Serbia announced to build a monument of Gavrilo Princip, who 
struck down the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, on the centenary of the beginning of World War I, 
praising him as a fighter for freedom against the Austrian occupation and rejected his portrayal as 
a terrorist.1 While this episode is unlikely to trigger renewed conflict between Austria and the al-
leged sponsor of the Archduke’s assassins, it highlights that Belgrade can still hope to exploit its 
involvement in order to bolster its nationalist credentials.  
This study was set out to explore the phenomenon of states sponsoring terrorist organizations as 
a form of third party conflict intervention. Although there is a broad consensus both in the aca-
demic and the political realm on the relevance of sponsorship as a factor impeding the settlement 
of intrastate conflicts, particularly the high politicization of the issue prevented a corresponding 
boost in theory-based research. Hence, the study sought to answer three questions that occur re-
peatedly in debates on third party intervention in general and sponsorship in particular: 
1. Under what conditions do governments choose to support terrorist organizations? 
2. How do sponsoring states manage their relations with terrorist organizations, once an alignment has 
been established? 
3. How can variations in sponsorship policy be explained? 
 
In order to address the question under what conditions cooperation between states and terrorist 
organization emerges and which decision-making environments entail the occurrence of specific 
support policy types, the study identified four types of sponsorship (see Figure 39). This typology 
is based on material and immaterial forms of assistance and covers a range of levels of commit-
ment from going to war with the targeted state on behalf of a liberation movement to persecuting 
the latter as a terrorist organization.  
The central argument examined has been that states sponsoring terrorist organizations form and 
shape these alignments according to their specific international and domestic security environ-
ments. Political leaders facing both external and domestic security threats are more inclined to 
choose resource-conserving policies of adjustment, for instance, alliance formation, as domestic 
power fragmentation makes it difficult for them to mobilize societal power resources. Hence, 
supporting non-state actors in conflict with a joint adversary allows these states to reap security 
gains from weakening the other state and to prevent at the same time autonomy losses from for-
mal and public interstate alliances. Finally, the study argued that vulnerable governments calcu-
                                                       
1"A Monument Honoring Gavrilo Princip To Be Built In Belgrade."  InSerbia (2014). Published electronically January 
23. http://bit.ly/1kyDtDP. Accessed January 31, 2014.  
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late the domestic repercussions of alliance formation. Therefore, sponsorship can serve as a vehi-
cle for broadening the societal power base of the regime by emphasizing transnational kinship, 
and reduce reputational losses for appeasing or even realigning with the adversary. 
 
 
Figure 39: Types of sponsors 
In this regard, the argument disagrees with the notion that state sponsorship constitutes an irra-
tional form of foreign policy based on a “rogue” or “evil” ideology, widespread in non-academic 
discourses. Moreover, it challenges state-centered neorealist conceptions of alliance formation 
and politics by systematically integrating both non-state actors and domestically generated incen-
tives for specific alliance policies. Particularly, this study developed a neoclassical realist model of 
sponsorship politics and consecutively tested it as a supplement to neorealist approaches to alli-
ance formation and management. The hypotheses drawn from both models will be reconsidered 
in light of the case studies. 
8.1 Formation of sponsorship 
Regarding the first question on the formation of sponsorship, systemic incentives for balancing 
the targeted state constituted the starting point for both the neorealist balancing hypothesis N1 and 
the neoclassical realist hypotheses, NC1 (alliance-seeking) and NC2 (sponsorship). As the observation 
period covered the initiation of cooperation in two of the three cases, they will be assessed in fur-
ther detail as follows. 
Fatah 
In the first sequence of the conflict dyad between Israel and Syria, from 1964-76, a gradually in-
creasing imbalance of power in favor of Israel and high levels of conflict intensity until at least 
1974 were accompanied by a clear Syrian balancing strategy. Supporting N1, a wide range of bal-
ancing measures were observed, ranging from a military build-up, calls for a joint Arab war 
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against Israel in 1964, a formal defense agreement with Egypt in 1966/67, the initiation of a war 
in 1973, and–eventually supporting Fatah since 1964. 
As suggested by NC1, the substantial time lag in Syria’s internal balancing efforts until the early 
1970s pointed to several domestic impediments to resource mobilization. Despite the fact that 
Syria’s elites agreed on the perception of threat by Israel and territorial revisionism, frequent 
purges in the security sector, mass capital flight and economic crisis after the socialist transfor-
mation as well as repression of internal dissent eroded societal allegiance to the state. In addition, 
power fragmentation became manifest in the mid- and late 1960s, when the civilian leadership 
started to build up paramilitary forces and a highly politicized army eluded civilian control. Only 
after former Minister of Defence Hafiz al-Asad had managed to establish his presidency as the de 
facto unchallenged power center after 1971, Syria’s internal balancing efforts reflected the expecta-
tions of the neorealist hypothesis N1 to a larger degree. 
The neoclassical realist hypothesis NC2 claimed that domestic vulnerability, impeding the for-
mation of interstate alliances, is also an antecedent condition for sponsorship. And indeed, Syria’s 
expected bias towards alliance seeking suggested by hypothesis NC1 did not reflect in the formation 
of stable alliances for two reasons. First, Syria’s calls for a joint war and Arab military coopera-
tion against Israel were undermined by inter-Arab rivalry and the moderate Arab states’ fears of 
being entrapped in a war between Syria and Israel that would necessary end in defeat. Second, 
external alignments became quickly an issue of intra-regime and societal contestation and en-
tailed substantial domestic security risks. In 1964/65, for instance, the Ba’th party leadership ap-
peased Egypt by coopting moderate Nasserites, eventually triggering a military coup in February 
1966. After the June 1967 War, a Syrian realignment with the Arab moderate states, as favored 
by the Asad faction, was prevented by the supporters of his main rival Salah Jadid, who priori-
tized socialist transformation and strong ties to the USSR. However, even after the consolidation 
of domestic power in the early 1970s, Syria’s domestic vulnerability impeded both a solid and 
cooperative relationship with Ba’thist Iraq or renewed Pan-Arab unity schemes, feared to entail 
domestic autonomy losses.  
Hence, aligning with Fatah as a supplement form of externally balancing Israel, as suggested by 
NC2, allowed the domestically pressured government to reduce both the costs of direct military 
confrontation and autonomy losses from interstate alliance formation. As Fatah commanded a 
major and transnational constituency particularly after 1967, it served as a Syrian tool to prevent 
the moderate Arab states from realigning with the West. In addition, Damascus successfully ex-
ploited the alignment domestically to increase the regime’s Pan-Arab nationalist credentials and 
attract foreign support.  
PKK 
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Also between Turkey and Syria, both an imbalance of power in favor unfavorable to the latter 
and patterns of interstate conflict could be observed. However, systemic incentives for balancing 
Turkey (N1) were moderated by the clear priority of the Israeli threat and the costs of occupying 
Lebanon, which absorbed the lion’s share of Syria’s military resources and probably also the po-
litical leadership’s attention, as well as the comparatively low intensity of the conflict. Instead, 
sporadic outbreak of hostilities was in most cases quickly met with conciliatory moves through-
out the 1980s and first half of the 1990s. In the context of the looming Israeli-Turkish alignment 
in the mid-1990s, Syria increased–as predicted by hypothesis N1–its balancing efforts, both by 
limited military measures and extracting power resources from its originally anti-Israel align-
ments with Iran and the Gulf States. In 1998, the preliminary settlement of conflict triggered a 
Syrian realignment with Turkey. While this constituted a factor alleviating the balance of threat 
and subsequently alliance commitment (as suggested by N1), alternative explanations are required 
regarding the starting point of the alignment with PKK as it coincided with internal turmoil in-
side Turkey and preceded the worsening of bilateral relations over the Euphrates’ water.  
In comparison to the 1960s, Syria’s domestic vulnerability was low in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Hence, the most important domestically generated impediment to internal balancing against Tur-
key, as proclaimed by NC1, has been the economic crisis in the late 1980s and the low priority of 
Turkey as a threat compared to Israel. In the late 1980s, a linkage between regime security and 
systemic pressures emerged in the context of the private entrepreneurs’ rise simultaneously in Syr-
ia’s agricultural sector, heavily affected by Turkey’s water policy, and the political arena. The 
private sector’s influence on foreign policy, however, remained limited until the early 1990s, as 
the outcome of the Islamist uprising and the succession crisis had strengthened those regime con-
stituencies opting for a firm commitment to Syria’s alliance with the USSR. In the course of the 
second succession crisis, however, the business elite, opting for economic liberalization and co-
operation with the West and Turkey, gained considerable influence on foreign policy decision-
making. As this indecisiveness impeded a coherent strategy of internal balancing, NC1 suggested 
that Syria would opt for alliance seeking. Yet again, cooperation with its natural ally, Ba’thist Iraq, 
collapsed quickly due to intra-party rivalry and Bagdad’s alleged support for the Muslim Brother-
hood.  
Seeking an alignment with the PKK, offered, as suggested by hypothesis NC2 a possibility to 
pressure Turkey into concessions over water without having to divert Syria’s already scarce re-
sources, on the one hand, and abandon its anti-Iraq alignment with Iran for the sake of a broader 
Arab alignment likely to additionally entail domestic autonomy losses by strengthening pro-
Western forces, on the other.  
In both cases, sponsorship occurred in the context of an unfavorable imbalance of power, en-
hanced by interstate conflict, and both internationally and domestically generated limitations on 
Findings and implications 
243 
adjustment policies. Generally speaking, this confirms the widely held assumption, that terror-
ism–and its sponsorship–constitutes a weapon of the weak. However, this weakness should not 
be understood merely in the sense of relative power capabilities, but rather as the state’s inability 
to form international alliances and–as particularly emphasized by neoclassical realism–to gener-
ate societal consensus for internal balancing against the source of threat perceived by its political 
leadership. 
8.2 Patterns of sponsorship 
As sponsorship alignments emerge under specific constellations of the international-domestic se-
curity environment, these should reflect in specific cooperation arrangements. Assuming in a 
straightforward manner that the vast asymmetry of power between sponsor and the organization 
allows the former to shape commitments tailored to their security aims, the study identified four 
different types of backers. Two of them, the Brother in Arms and the Defector resemble strongly 
forms of interstate alliances and were derived from Glenn Snyder’s neorealist alliance security di-
lemma, which was expanded to include non-state allies (sponsorship security dilemma, SSD). The 
remaining two forms, the Secret Backer and the Fellow Traveler, have been derived from the neo-
classical assumption that domestic politics at times prevent sponsors from adjusting their assis-
tance policies to the incentives laid out by the SSD and cause the emergence of hybrid policy 
types. As illustrated by Figure 40, Syria took on all four roles in cooperating (or non-cooperating) 
with Fatah, the PKK, and Hizballah.  
In all three conflict dyads, a high imbalance of power enhanced by a general Syrian inability to 
form stable interstate alliances against Israel and Turkey, severe interstate conflict, and a high 
strategic interest in maintaining the alignments created incentives for providing the groups with 
substantial material support as suggested by the standing firm hypothesis N2. Nevertheless, the 
groups’ relative weakness in comparison with the targeted states constituted a major caveat for N2 
and set general incentives for reducing support in order to prevent a Syrian entrapment into costly 
wars, as pointed out by the restraining hypothesis N3. This tendency was strengthened in times of 
interstate conflict de-escalation, when Syria successfully formed at least informal interstate coun-
ter alignments, and when the groups’ perception as terrorists by potential allies limited Syrian op-
tions of realigning with former adversaries or attracting external support. To what extent have 
Syria’s sponsorship policies illustrated in Figure 40 corresponded with the specific SSD incen-
tives?  
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Figure 40: Syrian sponsorship patterns 1964-2006 
 
Fatah 
In the case of Syria’s alignment with Fatah, initial incentives for a policy of resolve derived from 
conventional inferiority, regional isolation, and the high probability of war, corresponded with a 
tendency towards the upper end of the material support spectrum. Before 1965, however, particu-
larly a public endorsement of the group was impeded by Fatah’s initial operational and political 
weakness in comparison to Israel and the PLO. Particularly in the second half of the 1960s, Fa-
tah’s rise as the unchallenged representative of the Palestinian struggle, a boost in fighting capaci-
ty, inter-Arab rivalry, and Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights and Mount Hermon corre-
sponded with the increasing level of commitment, which peaked in 1969/70, when Syria took on 
the role of a brother in arms and sent its own troops to Lebanon and Jordan.  
Eventually, the gradual decline in Syria’s material support amid increased criticism when Fatah 
and its affiliates broadened the scope of their operations to the Arab moderate states and Western 
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countries in the early 1970s corresponded with Syrian attempts to realign with the Arab states 
and establish military cooperation against Israel. This tendency of restraint was even reinforced 
by a significant ease of tensions with Israel after the 1973 war and a limited alleviation of the im-
balance of power in favor of Syria. In turn, territorial revisionism, the PLO’s recognition as the 
sole representative of the Palestinian people and the high strategic importance of the alignment as 
foreign policy asset attracting external support, induced opposite policies. 
The neoclassical realist assumption that domestic vulnerability impedes the translation of the 
SSD incentives into sponsorship policies finds support in three instances. First, Syria refused to 
side with the other Arab states and particularly Egypt in supporting PLO, on the one hand, and 
authorities were initially reluctant to formalize ties with Fatah, on the other, which constituted a 
policy of secret backing. This corresponds with the limited resolve hypothesis NC3, as the powerful 
Regional Command of the Ba’th Party fiercely rejected a pro-Egyptian realignment that would 
weaken its own domestic power position in favor of Nasserites. Furthermore, Fatah’s historical 
ties to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood created suspicion at the initial stage of cooperation as it 
coincided with a wave of strikes and popular unrest in 1964/65 encouraged by the Syrian branch 
of the Brotherhood. Second, the repercussion of the 1966 coup and increased praetorianism also 
influenced sponsorship policies. Although the SSD set also incentives towards entrapment avoid-
ing in 1966/67, the new leadership boosted its material and rhetorical support to the ‘struggle for 
Palestine’ in order to rally popular sentiment against opposition from the sidelined Druze officers 
as well as the Muslim Brotherhood. In this case, the antecedent condition domestic vulnerability 
served not as a limitation to resolve. By contrast, the domestically induced lack of autonomy ra-
ther reduced the influence of systemic incentives for restraint. Finally, the limited restraint hypoth-
esis NC4 provided an explanation for Syria’s hesitance to publicly defect from its alliance with 
PLO although cooperation had turned into open warfare in 1976. An unprecedented low in the 
conventional power gap as well as conflict intensity between Israel and Syria, moderation of in-
ter-Arab rivalry and competition over the ‘Palestinian Card’ set strong incentives for a policy of 
restraint as reflected in the dramatic decline of material assistance. Although Asad’s coup and 
subsequent power consolidation were accompanied by a boost in foreign policy autonomy, pre-
serving the regime’s Arab nationalist credentials through a formal commitment to the Palestinian 
issue aimed at rallying popular support and contain nationalist, leftist, and Islamist opposition to 
the regime. 
PKK 
By contrast, Syrian support for the PKK displayed a generally low level of endorsement, peaking 
in the group’s designation as terrorist in the first half of the 1990s and constituted the only case of 
defection observed in this study.  
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Syria’s initially limited and indirect material support and efforts to keep the group’s presence in 
the Bekaa a secret corresponded with little pressure for a policy of resolve induced by the SSD. 
Moreover, fears of entrapment in a war with Turkey, as suggested by the neorealist restraining hy-
pothesis N3, dominated the initial period of assistance as Turkey was weakened by internal tur-
moil, interstate conflict was moderate and the group lacked a significant capacity. The gradual 
rise of material support and endorsement in the Kurdish realm corresponded with a shift in the 
SSD in the first half of the 1980s, thereby supporting the standing firm hypothesis N2. This in-
creased tendency towards a policy of abandonment avoiding coincided with several factors; a 
growing imbalance of power in favor of Turkey, mounting conflict over water distribution, Syr-
ia’s failure to form interstate alliances against its adversary, and the PKK’s rising capacity. 
However, as both states repeatedly signaled conciliation and shared an interest in cooperation to 
contain, for instance, Kurdish nationalism, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Syria carefully 
managed to keep its realignment options open through plausible deniability.  
In the context of the looming Israel-Turkey military agreement in the mid-1990s, relations wors-
ened and conflict reached a level of military maneuvers and even Turkish cross border operations. 
Additionally, the imbalance of power in favor of Turkey reached a peak also as it had improved 
its ties to the Kurds in northern Iraq. Although Syria eventually managed to rally informal and 
political Arab and Iranian support in the water issue and the PKK had suffered tremendously in 
the course of Turkey’s military campaign in southern Turkey and Iraq, the trend towards resolve 
suggested by N2 corresponded with a temporary boost in material commitment in 1996.  
Although the SSD-model was able to explain the general dynamic of Syrian sponsorship, neo-
classical realism served as a refining tool for specific sponsorship throughout the observation pe-
riod. First, the limited restraint hypothesis NC4 finds support as the observation of authorities al-
lowing the PKK to establish a political presence in the Kurdish areas and actively encouraging it 
to recruit Syrian Kurds alleviated two domestic fears; diverting the focus of Kurdish political ac-
tivism towards north prevented both the formation of a broad Sunni alignment against the Alawi-
dominated regime and reduced the assertiveness of local Kurdish nationalist schemes. Second, 
the limited resolve hypothesis NC3, clarified, why Syria largely refrained from publicly endorsing 
both PKK’s nationalist aims and using the alignment as a public deterrent against Turkey even in 
times of high interstate conflict, and remained most of the time a Secret backer. Kurdish national-
ism was seen as contradictory to Arab nationalism by both regime constituencies and its rivals. 
Anticipating the potential damage to its Arab nationalist credentials, already weakened by the in-
tervention in Lebanon and Syria’s alliance with Iran, Syria refrained from publicly praising the 
PKK’s nationalist cause. Moreover, regime fears that endorsing Kurdish nationalism would be 
accompanied by renewed political activism of Syria’s own Kurdish population prevented a public 
alignment. Finally, domestic politics played a decisive role in Syria’s decision to realign with 
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Turkey and defect from its alignment with the PKK in 1998. As Hafiz al-Asad had heavily relied 
on the Sunni business elite, pushing for accommodation and improved trade relations with Tur-
key, to secure both economic state survival and guarantee hereditary succession, their realign-
ment preference strengthened the incentives for restraint induced by the SSD. 
Hizballah 
After the Cold War, Syria’s power position was enhanced, ties to the other Arab states improved, 
and a peace process with Israel loomed large. Hizballah, in turn, found itself literally at Syria’s 
mercy in Lebanon and was perceived as a potential spoiler for both Syria’s hegemony in Lebanon 
and improved relations with the West. As these SSD-incentives for a policy of restraint (N3) corre-
sponded with Syria’s moderate commitment in the aftermath of the Ta’if Accord, the neorealist 
model finds support here. Although Hizballah was able to steadily expand its capacity with Syri-
an assistance after 1992, low interstate conflict and Syria’s limited dependence on the group to 
maintain its dominance over Lebanon prevented a major shift in the SSD towards a policy of re-
solve. Hence, N3 also corresponded with Syrian restrictions on cross border attacks during the 
Peace Process. By contrast, the standing firm hypothesis found support in the general trend to-
wards increased commitment, both in material and immaterial terms, when the peace talks col-
lapsed in 1996 and Hizballah had gained substantial strength to counter Israeli reprisals. Syria’s 
unprecedentedly high level of commitment after the Israeli withdrawal corresponded–thereby 
confirming the standing firm hypothesis N2–with a clear SSD incentive towards abandonment 
avoiding. These enticements were generated by the worsening of interstate conflict particularly 
since 2001, which entailed even targeted Israeli military reprisals against Syrian forces, Damas-
cus’ increasing regional isolation after 2003, and its strong reliance on a highly capable Hizballah 
to contain anti-Syrian forces in Lebanon.  
Domestic politics influenced Syrian support in three instances. As predicted by the neoclassical 
hypothesis NC4, the restraining incentives indicated by the SSD during the negotiation period 
were limited by the regime’s reliance on Arab steadfastness in order to contain, on the one hand, 
the steadily growing influence of those societal forces preferring realignment with the West, and 
to maintain, on the other, support from revisionist regime constituencies. Regime vulnerability 
also reflected in sponsorship policies in the second half of the 1990s, when a narrowing of the 
power base in the context of Bashar al-Asad’s succession was accompanied by a weakening of 
those regime constituencies preferring a balance of power in Lebanon through restraining Hizbal-
lah, such as Vice President Khaddam or Chief of Staff Shihabi, further increasing SSD-incentives 
for a policy of resolve. In a similar vein, Syria’s support for Hizballah peaked after the 2002/03 
Iraq Crisis in the context of international isolation and renewed hostility with Israel, which corre-
sponded with the boost in material commitment in the way the standing-firm hypothesis  (N2) had 
predicted. Moreover, in order to counterbalance the domestic threat of a broad alliance along sec-
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tarian lines against the regime, the alignment with Hizballah remained a key source of both rally-
ing popular sentiment of Arab nationalism in favor of regime and containing forces hostile to 
Damascus in Lebanon. 
In all three cases there was a strong, although not perfect, correspondence between the policy in-
centives of the sponsorship security dilemma and the general direction of Syrian assistance. In 
addition, the neoclassical assumption that domestic vulnerability would reflect in moderate devi-
ations from the expected sponsorship patterns fit in with the observation that regime fears of the 
domestic repercussions of SSD-induced realignments produced hybrid forms of sponsorship.  
8.3 Theoretical implications 
A key finding of this study has been that Syria’s sponsorship policies have corresponded strongly 
with incentives from both international and domestic security environments. Taking into account 
the known limitations of single country studies in terms of external validity and generalizability, 
the analysis proved particularly useful for the in-depth exploration of state sponsorship of terror-
ism as a phenomenon in international relations. Moreover, it proved helpful to both trace the 
complex causal pathways expected by the neoclassical realist theoretical framework in an explor-
ative manner and refine the hypotheses deducted from it. 
Consecutively, the study turned to three general debates in foreign policy analysis. First, whether 
realist alliance theory is useful to explain states’ alignments with terrorist organizations. Second, 
whether and to what extent domestic politics influence foreign policy choices and the way alli-
ances are managed. Third, whether the interplay of external and domestic security challenges 
produces specific patterns of sponsorship. 
Regarding the question, whether supporting a non-state actor could be considered as a form of 
adjustment policy to an unfavorable security environment, it should be noted that the findings of 
the study have been largely consistent with previous neorealist research on interstate alliances. As 
expected by alliance theory, Syria constantly weighed the adjustment policy of sponsorship 
against other forms of balancing its adversaries, choosing it at times as a supplement for them. 
However, Syria’s sponsorship policy corresponded largely with incentives for balancing the re-
spective adversary. Under the scope condition that terrorist organizations hold a status quo orien-
tation with regards to non-political ends (STAR), which they value higher than the political gains 
achieved from attacking, Syrian sponsorship reflected both fears of entrapment induced by the 
groups’ weak military capacity compared to the targeted states and the belief that policies of re-
straint/resolve would not fall on deaf ears. With regard to Glenn Snyder’s alliance security di-
lemma, the claim of applicability finds further support in security gains and losses that strongly 
resemble those accompanied by interstate alliances, ranging from deterrence to inciting military 
counterattacks. Therefore, this theoretical enhancement constitutes an important contribution to 
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further theory-based research on the interactions between terrorist organizations and states as 
their potential allies or adversaries. Moreover, understanding the nexus between international 
power and terrorism is a necessary condition both for explaining the failure of wars on terror and 
for formulating successful counterterrorism strategies.  
Although the question of autonomy in foreign policy decision-making affects both democracies 
and non-democracies, the study primarily turned to structural autonomy lacks generated by low 
levels of regime legitimacy, on the one hand, and coercive power fragmentation, on the other. At 
times highly violent domestic dissent, rivalries inside the ruling coalition, and the subsequent im-
portance of external alignments as a source of international and domestic power resources re-
peatedly reflected in Syria’s adjustment policy choices. Carefully weighing competing alignment 
interests and in order to reduce domestic autonomy losses, Syria refrained from rapid and formal 
realignments. In addition, Damascus frequently opted for informal alignments with non-state ac-
tors whose structural power asymmetry enabled it to shape them according to its specific external 
and internal security demands. In general, this observation supports the neoclassical realist claim 
that the domestic decision-making environment influences how states respond to systemic policy 
incentives, here the alliance security dilemma. Furthermore, it strongly suggests the usefulness of 
neoclassical realism for foreign policy analysis focusing on non-democratic states. Nevertheless, 
the model remained indeterminate regarding the expected direction of causality between regime 
vulnerability and specific alliance choices. While domestic power fragmentation and even praeto-
rianism could explain time lags and incoherent responses to systemic policy incentives, alterna-
tive approaches, focusing on the alignment preferences and assertiveness of domestic actors, are 
expected to provide further insight in this matter. 
The sponsorship security dilemma model and its neoclassical realist specification were estab-
lished in order to explain the formation of specific sponsorship patterns. In contrast to previous 
research on the issue, strongly focusing on material commitment and the impact of support on 
the group’s fighting capacity, the four sponsorship roles also reflect the sponsor’s permanent 
evaluation of abandonment and entrapment risks against the background of its security environ-
ment. Tying in the material and financial costs of assistance with the risk of reputational damages 
or even interstate conflict escalation, this typology enables a straightforward integration of spon-
sorship of terrorism into realist alliance theory. In addition, domestic politics were expected to be 
influential for the emergence of hybrid sponsorship types implying governmental indecisiveness 
on whether to restrain or to stand firmly by the group.  
Although the model was able to explain general trends of sponsorship and the emergence of the 
four support roles, its explanatory power varied substantially among the dimensions of sponsor-
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ship.2 Public endorsement and military support corresponded largely with the respective SSD in-
centives for realignment/resolve. This observation fits in naturally with the assessment of section 
3.1.2, that public and specific sponsorship alignments reflect the deterrence/reliability calcula-
tions of interstate alliances. Although hosting and financial assistance policies also corresponded 
with the general sponsorship role induced by the SSD, they were to a much larger extent influ-
enced by the groups’ specific needs for assistance, their wish to reduce autonomy losses from the 
sponsor, and the availability of other societal and statist backers. This indeterminacy of the model 
was further strengthened by both an endemic lack of reliable data and a strong bias in the litera-
ture towards measures of resolve.  
As other realist approaches to alliances, the SSD model focuses strongly on dyadic conflict and 
particularly its neoclassical realist expansion requires further reflection on the interaction of its 
components. Hence, the SSD model fell, for instance, short of explaining why the improvement 
of Syria’s relations with the Arab states had a restraining effect on sponsorship for Fatah, on the 
one hand, while the formalization of relations with Iran corresponded with a tendency towards 
resolve in the alignment with Hizballah, on the other. Whether sponsorship allows the backer to 
extract external resources from third states or will be accompanied by isolation and a further re-
duction of alliance options is assumed to influence the cost/benefit-calculations of the sponsoring 
state yet exceeds the scope of Snyder’s strategic interest indicator. In this context, the presence of 
international consensus on the group’s terrorist character, strong anti-terrorism norms, and par-
ticularly credible threats of their implementation constituted an alternative explanatory factor for 
restraint in both the PKK and the Hizballah case. In order to avoid collinearity between the ante-
cedent condition regime vulnerability and domestically generated strategic interests as a compo-
nent of the SSD, particularly the rather vague question of what constitutes a strategic interest 
needs to be further specified in future research.  
8.4 Avenues for further research 
Given the explorative nature of this study, further research is necessary for several reasons. On 
the one hand, testing the applicability of the extended SSD-model to other cases of state sponsor-
ship of terrorism than just Syria is required to increase the external validity of the argument estab-
lished in the study. On the other hand, by integrating sponsorship policies into the theoretical 
framework of neoclassical realist foreign policy analysis, it opened new avenues for theory-based 
research on the issue worth examining in the future.  
                                                       
2 For the roles Brother in Arms, Secret Backer, Fellow Traveler, Defector, see 3.5 and 3.6. The four dimensions of 
sponsorship examined were Hosting, Military Support, Financial Assistance, Endorsement (see 3.3.1). 
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Beyond the gathering of additional data on the phenomenon of state sponsorship of terrorism, 
further research should assess other cases of sponsorship and test particularly two key assump-
tions of the SSD model regarding the nature of both sponsored groups and their backers.  
First, the analysis, but also the bulk of previous academic research, considered only groups 
deemed as rational actors in the sense that they value the STAR-imperatives higher than their po-
litical aims. In addition, Fatah, the PKK, and Hizballah exhibited clear and mostly unchallenged 
hierarchical commando structures. In order to test this study’s assumptions that sponsorship 
alignments occur only if the backer perceives the group as responsive to policies of resolve and re-
straint, future case studies should include ‘leaderless networks’ and those organizations having a 
reputation of seeking martyrdom.  
Second, not all state sponsors of terrorism are conventionally inferior to their adversaries and led 
by authoritarian regimes. Moreover, the PKK case demonstrated clearly that turning against 
former non-state allies is not necessarily a sign of democratization. The debate on Turkey’s al-
leged support for Jabhat al-Nusra, a jihadist al-Qaeda offshoot fighting in the current Syrian Civil 
War provides an interesting point of departure for researching the scope conditions for sponsor-
ship by conventionally strong and stable democracies.3 Hence further research should turn to the 
question if also democratic governments that fail to mobilize, on the one hand, societal resources 
for systemically induced, yet domestically unpopular, wars, and, on the other, to form interstate 
alliances against the adversary, resort to state sponsorship of terrorism and which particular pat-
terns of assistance should be expected in this case. 
Finally, further research should turn to the repercussion of sponsorship on the conflicts backers 
seek to exploit.  
While the study mainly concentrated on the relation between sponsorship and interstate conflict, 
it also demonstrated that state sponsorship of terrorism tremendously affects intrastate and trans-
national conflicts. The direction of this impact, however, might vary significantly and turn out 
even detrimental to the sponsor’s own intentions. As the asymmetric and mostly opaque nature 
of the alignments grant supporters a high leverage over the group, states can pressure their non-
state allies into a conflict behavior consistent with their own policies towards the adversary. In 
turn, both the initial adversary and non-state competitors can exploit the alignment in order to 
undermine the group’s revolutionary credentials. The detection of external sponsorship limits the 
group’s ability to gain international and societal recognition in accord with the principle of self-
determination. It also provides the group’s rivals with an increased leeway to escalate against it as 
an agent of external interference in internal affairs, outlawed by the UN Charter. Therefore, the 
                                                       
3 Murad Batal al-Shishani, "Turkey and Syria's Jihadis: More than free passage?," Turkey Analyst 6, no. 10 (2013). 
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alliance dilemma from the non-state perspective and the group’s rationale to seek external sup-
port despite expected autonomy and at times security losses needs to be taken into consideration 
by both potential backers and in the context of future research. In this context, the specific impact 
of sponsorship on the conflict between the targeted state and the terrorist organization also de-
serves further attention.4 
8.5 Policy implications 
 “The success of any political solution is linked to putting an end to support funneled to ter-
rorist groups.”5 
Bashar al-Asad, October 2013 
Understanding both the repercussions of state sponsorship of terrorism on international conflict 
dynamics and the conditions under which it emerges provides policy makers with a strong incen-
tive and a starting point for policy initiatives.  
Although many studies have successfully established a link between third party intervention and 
conflict duration, this study demonstrated that Syrian sponsorship was no one-way-street towards 
conflict escalation. Particularly in the case of Hizballah, and to a limited extent in the other two 
alignments, Syria repeatedly constrained the groups’ actions in order to avoid a potential backfir-
ing from conflict escalation on its own security situation. Moreover, although it used both Fatah 
and Hizballah to gain influence over Lebanon and Jordan, Syria repeatedly reigned in both 
groups when their actions threatened to destabilize its neighbors and to create a pretext for an Is-
raeli intervention. In case of the PKK, Syria’s realignment with Turkey nearly resulted in the 
group’s collapse as it facilitated Öcalan’s arrest and his death sentence was only commuted to life 
imprisonment in the course of Ankara’s bid to be admitted to EU membership. 
As also demonstrated in this study, sponsorship constitutes a tool of exploiting existing conflicts 
rather than initiating them. Vice versa, the end of sponsorship in the case of the PKK weakened 
the group only temporarily. As long as conflict prevails, most terrorist groups maintain at least a 
limited capacity to establish a societal support base, which also makes them attractive partners for 
alternative statist backers seeking ways of balancing the targeted state and of domestically exploit-
ing the group’s popular appeal. Hence, policy initiatives to halt sponsorship need to expand the 
range of actors they want to address to alternative or additional statist backers, particularly if a 
division of labor can be assessed, and the group’s societal support base.  
                                                       
4 Some authors have already turned to the impact of external intervention on civil wars, yet focused mainly on the cor-
relation between external intervention and conflict duration. See Regan, "Third-party Interventions."; Cunningham, 
"Blocking Resolution." 
5  "Assad tells envoy Syrians will decide on peace talks."  AFP (2013). Published electronically October 30. 
http://bit.ly/1n61661. Accessed January 31, 2014. 
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Hence, the findings of this study imply that policy makers should focus on creating incentives for 
a policy of restraint and especially control instead of disrupting the alignment. The SSD model 
provides a good starting point for two reasons. 
First, dynamics of conflict moderation between Syria and the respective target state had a strong 
effect on sponsorship policies and should therefore receive top priority in policy initiatives. Alt-
hough domestic impediments to realignment have at times prevented a complete defection, de-
escalation entailed in all cases measures of restraint. Second, by turning to the sponsor’s strategic 
interest in maintaining the alignment, one should also take fears of domestic repercussions of re-
duced commitment into account when pressuring the sponsor into realignment. By pointing out, 
for instance, that the PKK’s campaign is a domestic problem of Turkey or Hizballah a Lebanese 
nationalist movement, Syrian officials have repeatedly aimed at defining the conflict towards nar-
row identities. While this allows for plausible denial of material support, it could generally consti-
tute a back door for domestically weak regimes to reduce assistance without severing internal secu-
rity dilemmas.  
Ultimately, this study promoted a new understanding of state sponsorship of terrorism as a policy 
of adjustment to international and domestic security environments and a supplement to arma-
ment and alliance seeking. With regard to the central questions raised, it examined specific secu-
rity conditions that induce states to firstly start sponsoring terrorist organizations and to secondly 
manage these alignments once they have been formed. Thirdly, providing a framework that ex-
plains how sponsorship policy variations emerge and under which conditions sponsorship pat-
terns persists is vital for developing suitable political strategies of containment and engagement. 
Whether this approach will reflect in more successful policy initiatives despite the elusive power 
of terrorism, remains to be seen. 
 !
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